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THE MODERN WORLD

A SURVEY OF HISTORICAL FORCES

Edited by
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FRANCE

By SISLEY HUDDLESTON

Author of "France and the French"

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FOREWORD

In conformity with the general scheme as laid down by Mr. H. A. L. Fisher of this series of volumes on the principal countries which compose the Modern World I have endeavoured to show the historical forces which have been at work in the formation of France; and in tracing the course of events, political, diplomatic, social, intellectual, and economic, from the Roman occupation to the difficulties of our day, I have, I trust, given a faithful and illuminating portrait of the French people whom I have known long and intimately and have learned to love for their virtues and with their faults. Their faults, which are chiefly political, I have certainly not omitted, but they do not in the least lessen my sympathy. I desire, in thus defining the scope of the present work, to obviate any confusion in the minds of my readers between it and another recent work of mine entitled *France and the French*, which was conceived and executed with another purpose and on another plan, since it was an attempt to construct a sort of French encyclopædia in which should be found all the relevant facts and figures of the various aspects of present-day French life. There can, of course, be no question of repetition, for the subject, immense and vital, is approached from entirely different angles. My indebtedness to other writers on whom I have sometimes freely drawn is, I trust, adequately expressed.

S. H.

Paris, *September*, 1926

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BOOK I

THE MAKING OF NATIONAL UNITY

FRANCE

CHAPTER I

WHAT FRANCE IS

Geographical Configuration—Character of People—Political Development—President and Parliament—Press and Justice—Army and Navy

FRANCE is with the exception of Russia the largest country in Europe. The chief nations which surround it are more densely populated, and from the beginning of historical time France, standing at the crossways between North and South, East and West, accessible by land and by sea, has repeatedly been invaded but has known how to assimilate the races which overflowed into the most favoured, most compact, most self-contained European territory. The French are a mixture of many peoples—Ligurians and Gauls and Celts and Phœnicians and Greeks and Iberians and Franks and Romans and many other races. Into this melting-pot they poured, but in spite of the diversity of types which still exist the French have become one people, with definite characteristics.

Of all the influences which helped to shape the French spirit the most powerful was the Roman. The Romans placed their indelible stamp upon the nation, and at the outset of any study of France the greatest emphasis should be laid upon the fact that, for five hundred years, the country, occupied by men of different origins, shared the life of Rome. The duration and the completeness of the Roman colonization is too often forgotten or insufficiently recalled. Yet this is by far the most important part of the story of France. Norman and English and Spanish and Germanic and even Arabian invasions left their traces, but the unifying element was Roman.

To-day you will find a strange blend of Northern and Eastern bloods, and the men of different origins are outwardly dissimilar. There are the placid Flemish, the sturdy and imaginative Bretons, the dark Provençals with their liveliness of idea and their eloquence, the jolly Gascons and Basques with their love of adventure, the blue-eyed blond Normans preserving the Viking tradition, the robust brave Alsatians, and so forth, conserving not only their special characters but their special customs and even costumes. Yet one will never understand the institutions and the homogeneity of France if one does not recollect that despite Goths and Vandals the essential France was created by the long Roman civilization which transformed and directed the mind and the material environment of the Gauls. For centuries France was as Roman as the most Latin regions of the Empire, not by constraint but by adoption and by conviction.

Nothing can be more elusive than the search for origins, and when one endeavours to discover the roots of modern forces one is led backwards farther and farther. France as it presents itself to-day is not the construction of this or that *régime*. There is no particular point at which one can say there was a break with the past. One would like to start with the elephant but it is impossible to ignore the tortoise. Considered superficially, French history can be made to fit into well-defined periods. It would be possible to commence with the relatively recent crash of the Second Empire in the most unquestionable and dramatic defeat of a civilized people, and to continue with the painful upbuilding of the Third Republic and the uneasy interval between two wars, which was nevertheless an interval rich in industrial and spiritual activities.

The years between 1870 and the peacemaking of 1919 make a rounded whole. They have the completeness of a well-finished play. We would begin with the rout of Napoléon III of France and the salutation of William I, King of Prussia, as the German Emperor in the Château of Versailles. We would end with the revenge of France and the downfall of the Hohenzollerns in the same palace. The German Empire was there demolished where it was made, and Alsace-Lorraine, which Bismarck violently wrested from France, was recovered. Victory was turned to defeat and defeat to victory.

But one cannot thus treat this half century in isolation. 1914 was perhaps the inevitable result of 1870, but 1870 was the inevitable result of 1848. Or we could fix 1789, with the great Revolution, as the point of departure of modern France, when a rush of new political and social ideas overwhelmed the world in a creative commotion which is not yet stilled. Or, again, modern France could be dated from 1624, when Richelieu appeared and prepared the triumph of absolute monarchy and moulded the nation into a powerful entity. But how would it be possible to omit the immense contribution of the long line of Capetian kings, from the end of the tenth century onwards, with the rise of royal power broken by reverses but sweeping surely in a series of curves upwards ? One must go still further back for some centuries and refer to the part that was played by the Frankish rulers for five hundred years. But when all has been told, it was that Roman settlement in the early years of the Christian era which founded the France we know. Roman modes of thought, Roman legislation, Roman language, Roman roads, Roman administration, Roman traditions, are the indestructible foundations on which Kings and Dictators and Republicans have in their various ways patiently built. Obviously France was destined to be, by its unique geographical situation, a European centre, but with all its advantages it has become what it is by the action and reaction of Rome.

It is a great gateway to many lands. It lies almost exactly half-way between the North Pole and the Equator, and its diversified climate makes it abundantly fruitful. The logic of its configuration is almost impeccable. Five of the faces of the hexagon are determined by Nature. The Pyrenees shut off France from Spain more effectively than the sea shuts off Spain from Northern Africa. The Alps afford an absolute protection. The Jura stand between France and Switzerland. The Mediterranean and the Atlantic wash the shores of France, and while setting limits have invited France to far-off expeditions, so that to-day France is the second Colonial power in the world, and had not England enjoyed still greater maritime advantages might easily have been supreme in Canada and in India. In the Near East, in Indo-China, in Africa, in Oceania, and even in the American zone, the French have huge possessions. Half the frontier of France is on the sea and there are fine advanced sites which have given to the country ports which are inferior to none.

Yet despite her mercantile marine, which occupies the third or fourth place, and her expansion overseas, France has become not so much a naval power as a land power. France has turned her attention to territorial problems, for although she is in large part enclosed behind a solid wall, there are gaps in this wall which are of vital consequence to her. Indeed, those land frontiers have frequently changed in the course of history. Under Louis XIV the Rhine was held to be the ordained boundary, and Richelieu, considering Alsace as a perpetual menace, seized the province. But it is to be observed that the Vosges tend to exclude Alsace from natural community with France. Under the First Empire, Belgium and the Low Countries were included in the French domain. Belgium separates France from her most dangerous neighbour. The most difficult frontier for a nation which would like to suppose itself impregnable is the two hundred miles between Belgium and Switzerland. There the obstacles to invasion are insufficient, and the French have by experience learned to dread a German concentration in this region. Yet what has made for the unification of France is the general precision of French boundaries. They are, it is to be noted, most pronounced when they separate France from kindred peoples. Where the frontiers are more open there are differences of blood, of language, of sentiment and of culture which serve to prevent any intermingling.

Although at one time Lyons was the capital of Gaul, Paris is unquestionably the natural centre of the country. It stands in a basin in which traffic is relatively easy. From Paris radiate in all directions roads and waterways, and, with the advent of steam, railways which connect the capital directly with all the principal towns of France and all the capitals of Europe. From the same centre aeroplane services are being developed which cover the Continent and penetrate far into Africa. The importance of Paris has grown with the growth of the principle of centralization which has more and more dominated French policy. For the purpose of unification the existence of a single authority is doubtless excellent, though in practice centralized administration has proved to have many disadvantages. At any rate, Paris means much more to France than London to England, than Berlin to Germany, than Washington to the United States. It truly sums up the rest of the country. Certain regions like Brittany and the

Vendée, Savoy and the Basque district, have endeavoured to maintain some independence; but they have been brought irremediably under the domination of Paris, and attempts at decentralization seem now to be doomed to failure. It is customary from time to time to question the supremacy of Paris. Paris is not France, it is said; but while one may admit the infinite diversity of France, everything ultimately flows to and from the city on the Seine.

The interior of France, which is more than twice the size of Great Britain, is, though pleasantly broken, mostly fairly flat, with the exception of Auvergne. There are no high mountains, but there is a great central plateau. France is rich in navigable rivers, to which has been added a network of canals. This water-power may well help enormously in the future development of industry and is in some measure already being turned to manufacturing purposes. The mineral wealth, especially in the North and East, should ultimately place France in the forefront of industrial nations, though with remarkably large deposits of iron, especially since the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, France suffers from a shortage of coal. The potash beds of Alsace, with the German potash, would give the two countries a virtual monopoly of this commodity. Among the more important French trades, apart from those connected with metallurgy, are those of silk and cotton and woollens. A good deal of individuality is still shown in the making of furniture, of dresses, and of fancy articles, while luxury trades, such as the working and mounting of jewellery, the distilling of perfumes, and so forth, have been carried to the highest standard.

With a population whose density is about half that of England, France should be practically self-contained. She has the most fertile soil in her plains and valleys, and that soil has been worked for thousands of years. Up-to-date methods are adopted in agriculture slowly, but the natural riches, joined with the laboriousness of the peasant, explain the quick recoveries of France after devastating upheavals. Industry has made, and is making, giant strides and the lure of the town is felt by the country folk. Yet France remains basically an agricultural country, smiling with corn and vine and fruit. The peasant is voluntarily attached to his land, though he gained relative freedom after the Middle Ages. The Revolution completely emancipated him, and the soil was parcelled out in small lots. The system has its disadvantages in that it is not easy to work small farms profitably. There are about 5,000,000 landowners in France, and 4,000,000 of them possess less than 25 acres of ground each. Only 30,000 have more than 250 acres, and fewer than 5,000 have more than 750 acres. Not only is this chopping up of land economically unsound, but the French farmers can, in these conditions, be expected to pay very little in taxes.

It is always dangerous to endeavour to generalize about a people, and it is particularly dangerous to try to sum up the French character in a few pages. There is a genuine French spirit which is manifested by the men of the North and by the men of the South, but nevertheless the men of the North differ from the men of the South as those of the East differ from those of the West. Moreover, among themselves they are full of the strangest contradictions. D'Artagnan is French, but so is Tartarin. Cyrano is French, but so is Joseph Prudhomme. At bottom the Gaul is usually brave, intelligent, generous, eloquent ; but as one writes this one thinks of the prudent bourgeois, the parsimonious peasant, and the dour artisan. It is accurate to describe the

French as credulous and athirst for novelty, but it is also accurate to describe them as conservative.

One suspects all attempts to draw a portrait of a race to be futile. Yet each Frenchman does display in varying degrees opposite tendencies. He is at once romantic—and in my opinion this is the essential part of his mentality—and realist. He is fond of blowing great glittering bubbles, but he also delights in pricking them. He cultivates, consciously or unconsciously, a sort of pragmatism which enables him while indulging in idealism to preserve a certain scepticism. He doubts his own dreams. There is always a smiling philosophy in his outlook on life which saves him from taking too seriously the fantastic flights of his imagination and which saves him from falling into the depths of pessimistic despair. His swift sallies of mockery destroy his most cherished beliefs. He is capable of bombastic eloquence which may conceal cynicism, but he is equally capable of a corroding irony which may hide his seriousness. Profundity in the French does not mean, as it often means with their neighbours, an absence of form. On the contrary, it resolves itself into conciseness of expression—perhaps into excessive precision. The intellectual Frenchman is almost invariably subtle, and in his simplest sentences there may be a witty reserve. He has a special aptitude for seeing the double aspect of everything. If he aims at clarity, clarity does not exclude colour. If he is ardent, one feels the sudden touch of restraint. He loves to imprison his thought in formulæ, yet he will himself shatter them, and when he is most synthetical may become disruptively analytical. The magic of big abstract words hypnotizes him, and he can often be led by pure verbalism. Yet he is always ready to recognize their falsity. Sporting the largest sized *panache*, his practical nature will assert itself. Holding firmly to the doctrine of human equality, he displays the utmost respect for hierarchy. Nobody clamours for personal freedom more than the Frenchman, but he is willing to accept authority; he is patient under iron discipline. He is susceptible to histrionic effects, yet he reasons admirably. Gaiety and vivacity are not, as he has proved, incompatible with industry. Thrift is not incompatible with childlike display. On occasion he can be brilliant and capricious, but he also shows qualities of sobriety and perseverance. The French are dazzled by ideas, but in fact are reluctant to accept fundamental changes.

George Meredith hit off the paradox of the French people when he wrote: "They are the most mixed of any European nation; so they are packed with contrasts: they are full of sentiment, they are sharply logical; freethinkers, devotees; affectionate, ferocious; frivolous, tenacious; the passion of the season operating like sun or moon on these qualities; and they can reach to ideality out of sensualism."

So one could continue a long series of antitheses which are by no means artificial but correspond to the chameleon-like reality. The Frenchman is his own severe judge, and when he acts promptly and vigorously the moderating process immediately begins. He will undertake vast enterprises and will then wonder whether he has blundered, and his vast enterprises may never be carried to their conclusion. In industry he is the most ingenious inventor, but seldom does he turn his inventive faculties to commercial account. In colonization the French have been hardy explorers and remarkable schemers, yet hardly ever have they exploited their explorations or fulfilled their schemes. The same people who under Napoléon bore the French flag across the Continent are obsessed with the desire for security. The same people who are aflame for adventure are always anxious to insure themselves against risks. Perhaps the demand for security clauses in the Treaty of Versailles is a new phenomenon in modern diplomacy, since victory has hitherto been regarded as automatically producing a profitable situation. But the desire for protection in one form or another has always been characteristically French, and in private as well as public life one can trace its consequences. It is this that explains the enormous growth of bureaucracy. The condition of a functionary is mediocre, but it is sure. In the professions there has been a notable absence of initiative, and the businesses of France until recently have been carried on from generation to generation according to a safe family tradition, without the smallest ambition for expansion.

It is no exaggeration to say that the bourgeois sentiment has invaded politics, commerce, administration, and although there is emerging from the ranks of the bourgeoisie a more daring class with wider vision, it may yet be some time before French industry will avail itself to the full of the unquestionable advantages it possesses. The bourgeois, who has dominated French life, strives for a solid, comfortable, and average situation. The aristocracy has let pass its hour because it tried to be a close corporation and did not know how to adapt itself to changing circumstances. It is not extinct—indeed, there are three societies: that of the Ancien Régime; that of Napoléonic days; and a still later nobility of the nineteenth century—but it must take its place in the ranks; in social life distinctions do not count. Titles receive no legal recognition, and there is comparatively little snobbery in a country which admits that there may be different *milieux* of society but no social castes. What are called the upper middle classes are for the most part exceedingly cultured, moderately rich, and artistic. The workers are easily and frequently agitated. They develop slowly as a class because they are individualists. It is with the greatest difficulty that they can be made to unite for common purposes. The peasants, who are the backbone of the country and of whom the Government stands in awe, profess in many parts of the country an advanced Radicalism, but it is rather a Radicalism inspired by suspicion and hostility, and is rooted in a determination to defend their acquired rights. The power of the priest has been considerably shaken, though there are French provinces, such as Brittany, where Catholicism retains its hold on the community. Even where, for political reasons, anti-clericalism is rampant, the Church is, in fact, deeply respected and ecclesiastical rites are observed.

The women of France, though not politically emancipated in the sense of being granted the vote, and still subjected to marriage laws which are often unfair to them, especially in respect of property, enjoy a real freedom, which they have won by their efficiency. They have the substance, which they show no disposition to change for the political and legal shadow. Alleged French immorality is largely a fiction. Certainly Puritanism is laughed to scorn in France ; frankness about sex is accepted ; and the old Gaelic freedom is to be found in conversation as well as in literature. But to judge the French by these ebullitions would be erroneous. The unmarried girl, on the other hand, has far less liberty than in Anglo-Saxon countries, though with the general revision of values and the upset of social ideals which followed the War, the bonds have been somewhat relaxed.

The bellicosity of the French has been a favourite theme, but there has been much misunderstanding about this side of the French character. Anti-militarism has a more formidable place in French writings than in the writings of any other country, and a good deal of what has been mistaken for militarism is a romantic expression of courage and curiosity and of an idealistic missionary spirit. True, the Gaulois was a fine warrior: Charlemagne conquered and reigned over an immense territory; the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries sent the French with splendid enthusiasm on the Crusades; in the sixteenth century the French were in Italy, and in the seventeenth on the Rhine and in far-off Colonies; and the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries saw France's amazing military march through Europe. Most of these enterprises, it should nevertheless be noted, were undertaken with something more than bellicose intentions. The French wars should be ranged in different categories. There were the Wars of Liberation—of their own territory and of the territory of other peoples whose cause they chivalrously espoused. There were the Colonial Wars, which were the outcome of the French conception of their mission. There were Wars of Equilibrium, such as that of 1854, which were imposed by diplomatic considerations. There were "Wars of Magnificence," which were always in the end ruinous and were the work of rulers who were ready to exploit the bravery of the Frenchman and his readiness to respond to the call of glory. There were finally the Defensive Wars, and it is in these Defensive Wars that the French appear at their best. Whenever they are on the defensive they are indomitable, patriotic, completely disinterested. They have learned, one may hope, that Empires are ephemeral, and dreams of hegemony foolish. Too ready to follow false leaders, they have by way of reaction been driven in upon themselves; and after the long flux and reflux of ambition and patient defence they have altogether lost their aggressiveness. The only national foreign policy which exists is that stabilizing the existing frontiers, with an occasional glance at what are regarded as the natural frontiers. The people, as distinct from some of their chiefs, are entirely cured of Militarism and Imperialism. Like Antæus, who was invincible as long as he remained in contact with his Mother Earth, the French are conscious that it is only when their foot touches their own soil that they are unbeatable, and whenever they outpass their proper boundaries they must sooner or later be defeated.

To-day France is almost geometrically divided into *départements*. This was the work begun in 1790. There were created eighty-six divisions of French territory, including Corsica, and now with the restored *départements* there are eighty-nine, excluding Algeria. The *chef-lieu*, or capital of the *département*, is not necessarily the most important town but is the most central. At Rheims, for example, there is only a sub-prefecture. The boundaries of these *départements* are drawn with a ruler and have no natural justification. They are generally named after the rivers. They correspond only to the utilitarian designs of the National Assembly, and afterwards of Napoléon, who agreed with Richelieu on the need for a Central Government and did his best to stamp out the spirit of the provinces. That spirit persists. The French have never taken kindly to the artificial districts, and in spite of the Paris authorities, Normandy and Brittany and Provence and Burgundy and Champagne and the Île de France really exist in the consciousness of the people. It is easy to understand the official prejudice against the provinces, for under the feudal system they were States within the State, with *seigneurs* independent of the King. These duchies and even kingdoms stood in the way of national unity. When the Kings regained control of France they placed their representatives at the head of the provinces, but even in the seventeenth century the intendants had a real power not altogether derived from their royal master.

In some of the provinces veritable local parliaments sometimes met, and the Nobility, the Clergy, and the Third Estate (influential commoners) kept a certain control over the distribution of taxes. Turgot and Necker, under Louis XVI, tried in vain to reorganize provincial administration. Calonne instituted regional Assemblies. Not until the Constituent Assembly of 1789 laid down the principle that all authority emanates from the nation, that there should be a supreme law and a uniform law instead of the contradictory customs that prevailed, was the organization of France in separate provinces menaced. The men of the Revolution were against the provincial idea because they were afraid of the dismemberment of the country. The provinces had grown up as entities, each with its traditions, and to split them up meant that the National Assembly would have a better grip upon them.

Mirabeau suggested more elastic and homogeneous divisions, but his suggestions were discarded in favour of a more rigid system. It is true, measures of decentralization were adopted, and the elected authorities in the *départements* were left considerable discretion. It was when Europe coalesced against France that centralization became more effective and a commissary was sent to supervise each *département*. When the Consulate was set up, absolute centralization was enforced. The Prefect who was appointed to each territorial division was responsible only to Paris. Geometry triumphed over geography. There was not even elective representation on the General Councils nominated by the First Consul.

The methods of to-day are not essentially different. The Prefect, with his imposing uniform, is all-powerful in the region and is subjected only to the policy of the Central Government. It is to be observed that in normal times most of the political disputes in Parliament are made to turn in one way or another on the appointment of Prefects. Governments are overthrown for many ostensible reasons, but if one could trace the true causes it would generally be found that the governmental handling of the Prefects has aroused discontent. Therefore there is a sense in which the Minister of the Interior, though nominally occupying a secondary rank in the Cabinet, is the most important of all the Ministers. There is, of course, abundant historical justification for the obliteration of the provinces and the supremacy of the capital, for France has time after time been torn asunder by the quarrels of the provinces; and Kings and Royalists, Republicans and Dictators, have aimed at the suppression of administrative diversity.

France has always been ready to fall asunder in internecine strife, but in the moment of peril has always been ready to unite—behind Joan of Arc, behind Charles VII, behind Henri IV, behind Napoléon, behind the Republic. The most striking example of this dual tendency is to be seen in the miracle of Joan of Arc. Think of the condition of France at the beginning of the fifteenth century. There was a mad King without extensive power. The Treasury was pillaged. The provinces were at war. The Jacques, that is to say, the men of the country-side, ranged themselves against the Nobles. Assassinations and social troubles were commonplace. The nation was suffering from a hundred years of war. The English were strongly installed in France. Yet in ten years the magnificent patriotic impulse had saved France, and the English, whose

King had been proclaimed King of France, had lost the land they had largely conquered. Here was a resounding assertion of the unity of the French nation after a long period of disunity.

The Renaissance discovered France drawn together in apparently indissoluble bonds. Splendid châteaux replaced the feudal fortresses on the Loire and a brilliant and gallant Court reigned. Yet again France was rent asunder by civil wars. Catholics were leagued against Protestants ; Huguenots against Papists. The Bourbons were against the Guises and the Guises against the Valois. France was ravaged and the horrors of Saint Bartholomew's Day encouraged the foreign invaders, Germanic, British, Spanish. Was France to become a dependency of Spain as she had almost become a dependency of England ? Again Frenchmen in danger grouped themselves about Henri de Béarn, and the Edict of Nantes, recognizing freedom of conscience precisely as it was later to be recognized in the Declaration of Rights, reaffirmed French unity. It is true that Louis XIV endeavoured to impose a greater unity—*Une foi, une loi, un Roi.* The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes was an error which cost dear, but two centuries of monarchic power increased the grandeur of France, until the monarchic symbol, falling into decay, provoked the political and social quarrels of the Revolution.

Girondins fought Montagnards ; and the Hébertists, the Dantonists, the Robespierreists, once more set Frenchmen against Frenchmen. There were risings everywhere ; Emigrés against Republicans. Massacres followed the infamous " law of suspects " ; and Vendée, Brittany, Lyons, Marseilles, Normandy, refused obedience. The work of royalty was compromised in the interior, and externally France was menaced as though she were another Poland destined to dismemberment. But as has always happened in the long history of France, disunion determined a reaction towards closer union. These episodes are characteristic. It is no exaggeration to say that a series of civil wars have established French unity, and that successive *régimes* have not fundamentally changed France. There has been an evolution which has been helped rather than hindered by accidental upheavals, and there has been no real rupture of continuity.

The National Assembly of 1871 evidently intended to ordain some measure of decentralization, but it would now appear to be impossible. The Prefect, who is purely a political person, an official of the Government taking on the political complexion of the Government, makes the most important appointments. He can annul the orders of the Mayors and declare void the resolutions of the Municipal Councils. He is entitled to requisition troops in case of need; he may issue by-laws. With his army of assistants he directs the whole life of the *département*. The General Council meets only twice a year and concerns itself only with local questions. In theory at least it may not express political views, but in fact the Prefect permits the passing of resolutions friendly to the Government. It is a passive body. Its members are elected by the cantons for periods of six years. In 1830, after the July Revolution, it was decided that the General Councillors should thus be elected, but only by the wealthier citizens, and it was not until 1848 that a broader basis of election was adopted.

In each *arrondissement* there is a sub-prefect, and an elective council, which has, however, no budget and little reason of existence. Paris, where a *coup d'état* is always to be feared, is in an exceptional position in that it contains twenty *arrondissements* and is directed by a Municipal Council which appoints no Mayor (though each of the *arrondissements* has a

Maire) and two Prefects, namely, the Prefect of Police and the Prefect of the Seine. The communes are extremely ancient. Their Ligurian ancestry, eight hundred years before Christ, has been demonstrated. They arose in pre-Roman Gaul when the husbandmen fixed their common centres of habitation, with chiefs who were also agriculturists. These human agglomerations sometimes extended over large areas and became States rather than cities. The political organization of the Romans was largely based on the municipality, but gradually, towards the fourth century, the communes were governed by one centre, and under the Franks the autonomy of the cities had for the most part disappeared and they were ruled by delegates from the central authority. Charlemagne and the Carlovingians treated the country as an administrative unit. Under the feudal system the Kings lost their prerogatives and the State became impotent to maintain order. The people rallied as vassals around the wealthy landowners, who were, however, frequently royal officials, and were in their turn servants of the King. They became more and more detached. Fiefs were set up, local taxes levied, money coined, troops kept in the strongholds, and the so-called free peasantry were, in fact, serfs under their *seigneur*, paying their contributions in money, in kind, and in labour.

In the towns, which were often the possessions of the lords, the merchants and workers associated in guilds. The ecclesiastical authorities obtained much power and demanded contributions. The parishioners of the country-side collected around the Church, which often became the leader of an emancipatory movement. But in the towns the Clergy, who were privileged, were on the whole opposed to municipal liberty, while the Capetian monarchs from the eleventh century onwards favoured the communes.

Charters were drawn up and the towns acquired a civil personality with a municipal magistrature, headed by the mayor, elected by the guilds and the burghers. There was hard fighting before the bourgeoisie was permitted to associate, but when we reach the fourteenth century we find that seventy towns sent their deputies to the States-General—a Parliament convoked to vote the subsidies demanded by the King.

In the long wars that followed, national unification made progress, but municipal liberties tended to disappear. It may well be asked whether urban prerogatives in the matter of taxation should have been preserved. To-day, in spite of the intense centralization, there are vestiges of these municipal prerogatives in the shape of the somewhat annoying *octroi*—interdictions and charges on merchandise of all kinds which is brought from one town into another. Under Henri IV and Louis XIII the independence of the towns further diminished, and Louis XIV, in the latter part of the seventeenth century, deprived the communes of the right to choose Mayors, and himself appointed Sheriffs and hereditary officials. Elections were prohibited and offices were sold to bring funds into the royal treasury. Although elections were subsequently partly restored the Mayors continued to be appointed by the King. Absolute Monarchy reached its apex with the virtual extinction of local autonomy in the towns and the subjection of the villages to ecclesiastical domination.

But the Revolution took the opposite view. The communes were held to be the stones of the national edifice. It was decreed that there should be 44,000 communes—that is to say, more than there are to-day. Identical laws were to be applied to all Frenchmen. There were no longer to be "good towns"; and towns, boroughs (market towns), and villages: each community was to have a municipal body with an elected Mayor. Bonaparte considered that the powers which were given to the communes were too wide, and the Consulate imposed a humiliating tutelage on them. The key-note of the Consular law of 1800 was strict discipline. There was a thorough reorganization in the interests of order, and little liberty was left to the existing communes. The Mayors and the Councillors were appointed by the Prefects. The Restoration made few changes, but after the July Revolution, Louis-Philippe promised the elective system for the municipalities, though he restricted electoral rights to citizens who paid certain sums in taxation and retained the right of appointing the Mayors.

The Republic of 1848, instituting universal suffrage, again permitted the election of Mayors. But the Second Empire a few years later restored the principle of appointing Mayors from outside the Municipal Councils, which could be dissolved. Although the Empire in its declining days tried to become more liberal, it was not until April, 1884, under the Third Republic, that municipalities were placed on solid foundations. The Municipal bodies hold public sessions in public *mairies*. Every Frenchman on reaching the age of twenty-one has the right to vote if he has lived six months in the commune, unless for special reasons he has been dispossessed of his rights. Candidates must be twenty-five years of age and must be ratepayers. Salaried officials of the commune, criminals, domestic servants, teachers, are ineligible. There are various rules with regard to incompatibility—thus, members of the same family in the larger communities cannot simultaneously sit on the Council and so obtain a preponderating influence. Nominally the Prefect cannot oppose the execution of the communal decisions unless they are illegal, but, nevertheless, they must seek the approval of the Prefect, the Government, or the Chambers. The Mayors, when they appear publicly in their official rôle, wear a tricolour scarf as a symbol of their authority. The Councillors make by-laws and in an emergency may command the armed forces. Before the Revolution the registers of births and deaths were kept by the Catholic priests, but they are now secularized and the ceremony of civil marriage is performed before the Mayor or his deputy.

The State as it is conceived to-day is based on the sovereignty of the people and is proclaimed to be one and indivisible. Federation as practised elsewhere is unknown in France. It is essentially a Lay State, jealous of all religious interference. There is a President of the Republic, a Government composed of Ministers who need not necessarily be chosen from among the members of Parliament, a Parliament with a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate. The Government is in the hands of three powers, which act, as far as possible, separately. The Deputies and Senators make up the Legislative Assembly; the President, the Cabinet, and the local administrators are regarded as the Executive Authority; and the Judiciary Authority comprises the various courts and the police.

We have already seen that since the Roman occupation the State has undergone many vicissitudes. Feudalism succeeded to the Frankish monarchy and the royal domain was confined to the Île de France. There began a long battle between the King and the Lords. Feudalism sustained a decisive defeat under Louis XI at the end of the fifteenth century, and Louis XIV was able to declare with substantial truth, "*L'état, c'est Moi.*" The Revolution looked upon the people as the source of all authority, and the rulers of the country were subjected to laws, as were the ordinary citizens. Napoléon put into practice the doctrine of Plebiscitary Dictatorship. The hereditary principle was overthrown and the principle of popular government was robbed of its virtue by occasional national consultations, which gave into the hands of one man authority which, it is true, originally came from the people, but was finally alienated from the popular will. The argument was that as the Dictator, who had appealed to the entire people, was elected by the nation, and not by a relatively small circumscription, he was placed far above Parliaments and other bodies which were composed of men who represented only small electorates. To-day it is urged that neither divine right nor plebiscitary right has any validity. The modern State cannot be a person, an abstraction, or a symbol ; it must be as far as is humanly possible a veritable collection of millions of people.

So the President in France, elected by the Senate and the Chamber in a National Assembly at Versailles for a period of seven years, and placed beyond direct control of the people, has limited powers. He has many rights, but it is understood that he shall not exercise them. He must be a passive instrument of the Constitution. The moment he attempts to use any real personal authority he is broken. The President possesses the prerogative of mercy. In him is vested the appointment of civil and military officers. The armed forces are at his disposal. He is given legislative initiative. He convokes the Chambers, which must be in session for at least five months of the year, and are, besides, according to an invariable practice, convoked in the autumn for an Extraordinary Session. (The Chambers can, if necessary, be adjourned twice during the ordinary session for periods of one month.) The Chamber of Deputies can be dissolved by presidential decree approved by the Senate. The President is nominally in charge of international relations and the negotiation of treaties. It is stipulated that military conventions and alliances may be kept secret by him, as was, for example, the Franco-Russian Treaty. Yet with all these powers the President can do nothing without the countersignature of a Minister ; and therefore in reality power is in the hands, not of the President, but of the Ministers. The President is not directly responsible to Parliament, but this very irresponsibility, which forbids his impeachment unless he specifically breaks the constitutional laws, renders him impotent. The Ministers who are responsible can be thrown down at any moment by Parliament, and the French Parliament is quick to express its displeasure and to dismiss its Ministers. The consequence is that with an irresponsible but impotent President, and powerful but fugitive Ministers, there is a lack of governmental stability which, in the opinion of many good observers, is the fatal defect of the Third Republic.

The Ministers of to-day are hardly to be compared with the great officials of the Ancien Régime. Richelieu and Mazarin were powerful Secretaries of State, and there were around them a number of departmental officers, but they owed allegiance only to the King. It was the Revolution that made them amenable to the decisions of Deliberative Assemblies. There was afterwards a reversion to a system not unlike that of the Monarchy, with imperial officials dependent on the Emperor. Not until the Third Republic can the rule of Ministers, as we understand it, be said to have been installed in France. But French Parliaments are no more like English Parliament than French Presidents are like American Presidents. It has been pointed out that while England had, between the years 1875 and 1919, only thirteen Cabinets, France in the same period had fifty-seven, and the tendency is for Governments to have still shorter lives. The inevitable result is that big schemes are seldom undertaken and are with difficulty carried out. Reforms which are urgent are left to a successor, who in turn is chiefly concerned with the sufficient task of keeping his equilibrium on the Parliamentary tight-rope. There is no particular number of Ministers indicated in the Constitution. It is usual for the Prime Minister—the *Président du Conseil*—to take over the portfolio of a department which he considers to be the most important at the moment. He may choose to direct the War Office or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Finance, according to circumstances. Nominally the Minister of Justice is the Vice-President of the Council. There are Ministers of the Marine, of Public Instruction and Beaux Arts, of Public Works, of Commerce, of Agriculture, of the Colonies, and of Labour. Aviation is usually in the charge of an Under-Secretary. The Councils of Ministers are held at the Élysée with the Chief Magistrate presiding, but there are preparatory meetings known as Cabinet Councils. No minutes are kept and there is no real publicity given to the debates. A curt *communiqué* is presented to the Press.

The doctrine of Ministerial solidarity is respected more in the breach than in the observance. Ministers may be chosen from outside Parliament, though this is unusual. They can sit and speak in either House. Apart from the debates on Bills, what are known as interpellations may be introduced and the policy of the Government thus be criticized. The Prime Minister has the option of posing the "question of confidence" on a specific issue or of refraining from doing so; but it is obvious that if the matter were of real importance he could scarcely stay in office against the expressed wish of Parliament. Sometimes the right of the Senate to reverse a Ministry is challenged, but the right undoubtedly exists though it is rarely exercised. Governmental measures which are modified by the Upper House are taken back to the Lower House, where the modifications are accepted or rejected ; and a measure may thus be shuttlecocked between the Senate and the Chamber. The Ministers have at their disposition secret funds, which they may dispose of at their absolute discretion. Partisan newspapers sometimes profit by these funds.

The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies varies. In the 1919 Parliament there were 626 seats and in the 1924 Parliament only 584. Roughly, it is reckoned that there should be one Deputy for every 75,000 inhabitants. Frenchmen are eligible for election at the age of twenty-five, provided they do not fall under the ban of a judicial sentence and do not hold office under the State. The method of election is constantly undergoing revision. Sometimes the *scrutin d'arrondissement*, that is to say, the system of single-member constituencies, is in favour ; and then again there is a reversion to the multiple-member constituency, which is known as the *scrutin de liste*. For the purpose of the *scrutin de liste* the *département* forms the electoral area. Candidates who obtain half the suffrages are declared elected ; but those who have only a relative majority are subjected to a complicated arithmetical process which purports to give some sort of proportional representation. The quotient is ascertained by dividing the number of voters by the number of deputies to be elected, and then the average of votes obtained by the various lists is compared with the quotient. If the average of one list, for example, is twice as large as the quotient that list obtains two seats ; if the average of another list is—ignoring odd figures—equivalent to the quotient, it obtains one seat. If there are any seats left over they are attributed to the list which has the strongest average.

The method in practice appears to be unfair. It has all the defects of election by majority and provokes anomalies which are peculiar to itself. It also results in the formation of electoral *blocs*, and the groups which thus unite their forces at the polls cannot in the Chamber agree upon a common positive programme. The *blocs* in no way resemble homogeneous parties. There are in the Chamber precisely the same number of groups which may sway to one side or the other and produce in the flux and reflux of opinion and intrigue that instability which is notorious in France. The most successful Minister is not necessarily the most able Minister. He is the Minister who is the most skilful in forming combinations. Such combinations have no solid basis. The legal duration of the Chamber is four years. It is not dissolved because of the fall of a Ministry. The Senate is recruited in three sections every three years and the Senators sit for nine years. They are chosen by an electoral college composed of the Deputies of the *départements*, the General Council, the Councillors of *arrondissements* and delegates of the Municipal Councils. A Frenchman is not eligible to sit in the Senate until he reaches the age of forty years.

There are perpetual conflicts between the two bodies. The Chamber possesses the initiative in financial laws, but the Senate is entitled to make whatever changes it thinks desirable. The President of the Senate and the President of the Chamber are regarded as the second and third persons of the Republic. Full reports of the debates are issued in the *Journal Officiel*. If necessary, however, Parliament can sit in secret committee. The members enjoy immunity from arrest and from all legal proceedings during the Parliamentary sessions, but if Parliament chooses it can raise this immunity in respect of particular members at the request of the Government. The members receive payment, which has risen from 9,000 francs a year to 15,000 and afterwards to 27,000.* Commissions play a most important part in the work of Parliament. Draft laws are submitted to them by the Government and are altered or even rejected. When the Bill comes up for public debate the Reporter and the President of the Commission defend the Bill, refuse or accept amendments, and generally behave like Ministers in piloting the Bill through the Chamber or Senate. The usual method of voting is that of placing tokens in the urns which are passed round. White tokens signify " Yes " and blue tokens signify " No." A peculiar feature of the method of voting in France is that absentees may hand over their tokens to a member of their group, who can use them as he pleases. A public ballot in which the members vote personally is comparatively rare.

The Press in our time has become a powerful social and political weapon, but it is only recently that it has enjoyed liberty in France. It has always been feared by the Governments, and freedom was accorded to it only during the first four years of the Revolutionary period, a few years at the beginning of the Restoration period, under the July Monarchy, during the short-lived Republic of 1848, and under the present Republic. The Monarchy and the Empire, generally speaking, have fought against the independence of the Press, and even those *régimes* which were fairly tolerant regarded the liberty of the Press not as a right but as an act of grace. There were three ways in which the Press was assailed. Fiscal burdens were placed upon the newspapers which rendered the production of broadsheets costly. Preventive measures were taken by the institution of a censorship. Repression was practised by proscription or imprisonment for a long list of offences. Even the Constituent Assembly, though proclaiming the liberty of the Press, did not of course leave the Royalist journals unmolested. Newspapers proliferated during the Revolution. The Directoire went so far in its control of the Press as to lay down the penalty of death for those who sought to change the Constitution. Juries naturally declined to convict and such extreme measures defeated themselves. But after the 18th Fructidor scores of journalists were deported. Bonaparte, when he was Consul, and afterwards as Emperor, nominated such journals as might appear. Eventually he reduced the number of Paris organs to four. He considered the journalist to be fulfilling a public function, and this meant that he demanded docility. The censorship operated and expression of opinion was impossible. France was kept in ignorance of the tremendous European events unless they favoured Napoléon.

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* Raised in August, 1926, to 45,000 francs.

The Restoration began by according a relative liberty, but quickly re-established the censorship. It would be wearisome to show how the authorities zigzagged between rigour and indulgence, but after numerous oscillations a new crime was established. Articles were judged not by what they stated but by their tendency. The intentions of the writer were taken into account, though the terms of the article might be impeccable. It is curious to note that the liberty given under the July Monarchy rapidly degenerated into licence and the Press was filled with incitements to assassination. Even to-day it would seem that the French Press, unless it is controlled in some way, is ready to fly to extremes, and in spite of existing laws there are many journals which live on scandal.

It was Emile de Girardin who transformed the French Press in 1836, when he founded *La Presse*. *La Presse* was to publish each day military, naval, legal, administrative, industrial, commercial, literary, and artistic articles. It also inserted paid advertisements. It and its imitators printed in serial form the romances of Dumas, of Balzac, of Eugène Sue. There has been an enormous development of the Press, but the French newspapers are still modelled on *La Presse* of Girardin. After the repressive measures of Napoléon III, the Third Republic in 1881 displayed considerable liberality, though there are still " laws of exception." It is possible indeed to insult and defame public personages, from the President of the Republic to the most humble police agent, without fear of the consequences. Libel laws exist but they are seldom applied. Instead, it is usual to have recourse to the right of response which is given to persons attacked in a journal. The larger newspapers make a rule of following the policy of the Government, whatever that policy may be and however it changes ; but there is a multitude of journals which often indulge in the most outrageous comments with impunity. It may be said, too, of the French Press that it is sometimes susceptible to influences which are unavowable.

The judiciary power in France is exercised by permanently appointed magistrates who, unfortunately are poorly paid. There is a Justice of the Peace in every canton. There is a civil police court in every *arrondissement*. There is a High Court in each *département*. There are Courts of Appeal in about twenty-six different towns. There is a supreme Cour de Cassation which may quash judgments when they are illegal. There is also a Council of

State, with life members, which is a legal adviser to the Government and the supreme authority in the interpretation of laws. A Court of Accounts is composed of permanent officials who supervise the expenditure of funds.

The judicial system may be said to date from Napoléon. It underwent very little change during the nineteenth century. Until the Revolution the administration of justice was extremely unsatisfactory. The Roman law survived in regional customs, which were often unwritten, and there was an immense diversity. As early as the twelfth century there were in Southern France written laws, but side by side with the royal laws there are canonical laws and feudal laws. The beginnings of the jury system are to be found under feudalism, with the *seigneur* acting as judge. The nobles until comparatively recent times settled their disputes by duel, and indeed duelling was common in France until 1914. Under the Kings there were few safeguards. The posts of seneschals or bailiffs were sold. There were the most arbitrary abuses. The Revolutionaries established the principle that judges should be elected by the people and that there should be a total separation of legislative and judiciary powers. They further established the principle of permanency of office, which was designed to make judges impartial and independent. They insisted on publicity. Justice, they said, should be free to all. The giving of presents was abolished. The highest placed personages should act in accordance with the supreme law. These principles, with the exception of the election of judges, are those which are accepted to-day.

The French law aims at conciliation, and the principal function of the Justice of the Peace is to effect an amicable settlement if possible in cases of litigation. Divorce is not, for example, admitted until an attempt at reconciliation by the judicial authorities has failed. The Justice of the Peace presides over family councils, for since the family is in France regarded as the unit, family decisions should have a legal sanction. In the civil and police courts the President is assisted by two assessors. He wears black robes and a bonnet embroidered with silver. He pronounces on misdemeanors and in divorce and property suits. Besides what is called the sitting magistracy there is what is called the standing magistracy—that is to say, officials of the Republic who address the court on behalf of the State. Poor persons may demand judicial assistance, and among other excellent reforms is that which is given the name of its author, Bérenger, and was passed in 1891, by which judges may for first offences suspend sentence (*sursis*). In the Courts of Appeal there is a President assisted by five Councillors in red robes. At the Assizes there are three magistrates and twelve jurymen. The jurymen are chosen from the voters who are at least thirty years of age, but such voters as can show that they live by their daily labour are exempted. There are four sessions a year except in Paris, where they are continuous. France is one of the last countries to abolish transportation to penitential colonies, and in spite of vigorous campaigns long-term prisoners are still shipped overseas to murderous islands.

Women are now eligible to sit on the Councils of Prudhommes, which were established in 1806. Employers and workers may in these Councils thrash out their differences. There are Commercial Tribunals and Councils of the Prefecture. There are Military Courts ; and political offences may be tried by the Senate sitting as a High Court of Justice. On a number of occasions the Senate has tried Ministers and private persons accused of actions assumed to be directed against the security of the State. The procedure is dangerous for the Senate is purely a political body and is bound to be swayed by the political sentiments of the hour. It is intended as a bulwark against revolutionary or reactionary plotting. The fear of a forcible overthrow of the Republic is deep-rooted and the High Court has been summoned to pass judgment upon Boulanger, Déroulède, Caillaux, and others who were supposed to be putting the Constitution in jeopardy. Clearly, to be condemned by a political court is not necessarily to the discredit of the accused person.

Under the Revolution, marriage ceased to be regarded as a sacrament, or rather, became chiefly a civil contract. Marriages were no longer indissoluble. The Catholics, however, admitted only the separation de corps, and indeed there was good cause for the reaction against the abusive facilities which the Legislative Assembly gave for the dissolution of marriages. Divorce became a simple formality if there were common accord. In these circumstances matrimonial agencies flourished and marriages were made and unmade with the utmost freedom. It is not surprising that divorce was suppressed in 1816, when religious ideas re-entered with the Restoration. It was re-established in 1884 with guarantees and formalities similar to those which had surrounded it in the Napoléonic Code. To-day divorce is not obtained as easily as is sometimes supposed. If there is opposition the proceedings may drag on for years. But while under the English law collusion is a bar to divorce, under the French law, on the contrary, it is logically contended that if both parties desire to cease their partnership, it is not for the State to intervene to force them to remain together. It is wisely laid down by French law that the private relations of men and women do not concern the public, and therefore divorce proceedings may not be reported in the newspapers.

As marriages are often contracted under the *régime dotal*, delicate financial settlements must be effected, and where there is a common holding of property, complicated questions may arise. The French are careful to draw up sound marriage contracts, in which all contingencies are foreseen. The children must be properly provided for. The disposal of property in France is hedged round with restrictions, and each member of the family must, will or no will, receive his due part.

The British have been in possession of a jury system for centuries, but in France it was the Constituent Assembly which decided that there should be, first, a jury of accusation, on which should sit eight citizens—what we now call a grand jury—and a jury of judgment composed of twelve citizens. Napoléon maintained only the jury of judgment, and suspended even this jury in cases of high treason. He abolished the election of judges, which had obvious inconveniences, since incompetent persons might be elected for their political opinions. Unanimity of the jury is not necessary. The precise majority which shall be effective has been changed several times. In 1835 nine votes were required for condemnation. In 1848 the number was reduced to eight, and in 1853 to seven—that is to say, a bare majority.

One of the weaknesses of France is the slowness with which justice is administered and the possibility of importing non-juridical considerations into the administration of justice. When a Frenchman is arrested he is not necessarily brought up for public trial within a few weeks or even within a few months. The case is inquired into secretly by the examining magistrate, and he may pursue his investigations for an interminable period. In ordinary criminal charges the preliminary proceedings are usually long, and if politics are involved they are longer still. France badly stands in need of a Habeus Corpus Act, which would compel the judges to try accused persons publicly without delay. At present it is possible to be detained for a year before acquittal or condemnation, and I have known detention to last for over two years. Civil suits are also long drawn out, and by availing himself of many dilatory devices a plaintiff or a defendant may effectively prevent the dispensing of justice, since the essence of justice is speedy decision.

There are few Frenchmen who would not admit the necessity of the most rigorous overhauling of the judiciary machine. Lawyers have repeatedly asked for thorough reform. Yet it is difficult to get anything done. Sometimes a prominent advocate like Henri-Robert, revolted by the scandalous partiality of the presiding judge, who often assumes the rôle of an additional prosecuting counsel, will protest vehemently ; but the protest dies away and nothing more is heard of the obvious defects of a system which permits judges openly to take sides. It is not to be wondered at that juries, reacting against the magistrates, should be ready to acquit far too freely. They are moved rather by sentimental pleas than by careful weighing of the facts, and the eloquence of the Bar in France is expended in the colouring of circumstances, relevant or irrelevant, which may arouse sympathy.

Each young Frenchman is compelled to serve in the army on reaching his majority. In the old days the army was not national. A vassal might be compelled to fight for his *seigneur*, who in turn would owe military service to the King. The army was largely composed of mercenaries, even in the most brilliant days of French military glory. The modern conception of a national army arose after the Revolution, when France was menaced on all sides and patriotism was awakened in its most ardent form. Men volunteered for action in a glow of enthusiasm. The French people became truly conscious of themselves as a people. Afterwards there was universal conscription, and the nation, men and women, young and old, was in arms. The Napoléonic system permitted the drawing of lots and accepted substitutes. Then conscription was suppressed but was restored again in 1830. The period of service was seven years and substitutions were general. The rich were practically exempt. In 1872 substitutions were disallowed, but although in principle everybody was considered to be a soldier between the ages of twenty and forty years, there were numerous dispensations. The basic period of active service was five years. In 1889 this period was cut down to three years, and exemptions were readily enough obtained. Then a more equitable method was adopted in 1905. Changes were frequent, but eventually the period of active service was reduced to two years, though Frenchmen remained in the reserve until the age of forty-five.

Just before the war the period was lengthened to three years. After the war it was successively reduced to two years, and to eighteen months, and will doubtless soon be reduced to twelve months. Each annual class should provide a contingent of nearly a quarter of a million men, and the French are more and more taking the view that the country is not better defended because large armies are kept in barracks in various parts of the country. They accept the theory that a short, intensive period of training is preferable, provided efficient arrangements for speedy mobilization are worked out. The economic loss to the nation caused by long periods of military service must be immense, and the individual Frenchman finds his career interrupted in the vital early years. If more active soldiers, as covering troops and as colonial troops, are required, they can be supplied by the recruiting of professional soldiers, and France also looks to her overseas possessions as a reservoir of coloured soldiers.

The navy has been sadly neglected, and the tendency now is to abandon the building of the bigger vessels and to concentrate on smaller swifter ships, and particularly on submarines, to ensure the defence of the coast and intercourse with the African possessions. It is unlikely that France will ever again become a first-class naval power. Her navy has, in spite of her exceptional coast-line, been developed fitfully—by Richelieu, by Colbert, by the Ministers of Louis XVI—but France has been too obsessed with her north-east frontier to strive seriously for the command of the seas, and to-day the navy seems to have fallen irremediably into decay.

SOME WORKS TO BE CONSULTED

Jean Brunhes: *Géographie Humaine de la France*; Vidal de la Blache: *Tableau Géographique de la France*; Camille Jullian: *De la Gaule à la France*; Raymond Poincaré: *How France is Governed*; J. E. C. Bodley: *France*; Sisley Huddleston: *France and the French*; P. G. Hamerton: *French and English*; Barrett Wendell: *France of To-day.*

CHAPTER II

FRANCE OVERSEAS

Three Empires—Anti-Colonial Sentiment—Northern Africa—Western Africa — Equatorial Africa — Indo-China — The American Zone—Oceania—The Levant

It is still insufficiently appreciated that France has the second largest Colonial Empire. Frequently is it stated with considerable truth that the French lack the colonizing spirit ; but if the average Frenchman is attached to his fields and his family there are many Frenchmen who have shown the greatest enterprise overseas. Since the fourteenth century no fewer than three successive Colonial Empires have been built up, and the Third Republic has seriously endeavoured to enlarge French Colonial territory and to exploit it efficiently. To-day France looks to her Colonies for economic assistance, and in counting her population includes the residents of Africa, of Asia, of Oceania, and of America who come under French rule. A hundred million inhabitants are regarded as French ; and France, careful not to "draw the colour line," endeavours to assimilate the various races and thus give them the right of representation in the metropolitan Parliament. There are, it is true, advocates of a policy of autonomy as distinct from assimilation, but as far as possible the French decline to imitate British methods. It is not, however, possible to apply a single rule, especially since the mandatory system has been introduced. There are Colonies which are being absorbed ; and there are Protectorates which keep their nominal sovereignty. There are territories which are held in trust and whose essential independence cannot be alienated ; and there are territories which would be shocked at any suggestion that they should be thrust outside the French community. There are the most diverse administrations, with the result that at least three separate Ministers are technically responsible for Overseas France: Algeria, for example, regarded as three French *départements*, is governed by the Minister of the Interior; Morocco and Tunisia are placed under the Minister of Foreign Affairs; and other lands are directed by the Minister of Colonies. This lack of unity is an undoubted handicap; and another handicap is the under-population of France. The theory that Colonial possessions are suitable outlets for an excessive population has been adopted by Germany and Italy and other well-peopled countries; and on that theory it is paradoxical that France, who cannot encourage emigration, should rank only second to the British Empire in her control of lands outside Europe.

In Algeria are nearly six million persons; in Tunisia two millions; in Morocco four and a half millions; and in the Sahara half a million; in French West Africa are twelve millions; in Togoland three-quarters of a million; in Equatorial Africa one and a half million; in the Cameroons three millions; in Madagascar three millions; and elsewhere in Africa smaller populations which bring the total of this almost continuous and remarkably compact African Empire to about thirty-six millions. In Indo-China there are no fewer than twenty million persons more or less under French rule and in the Levant two millions. Then there are the scattered possessions of Guadeloupe, Martinique, New Caledonia.

Since the war there has been a lively propaganda in favour of the Colonies, the Protectorates, and the Mandated Lands; and ambitious schemes for their development have been framed. As usual, the execution of the plans for the building of railways and of roads and of ports has been slow, owing to the inability of the State and of private companies to furnish the requisite funds. It is realized that the Colonies are not so much markets for French goods as producers of materials—cotton, wool, timber, cereals, oil, coffee, sugar, rice, leather, furs, and so forth. It would be comparatively easy to obtain most of the supplies which France needs from France Overseas, and a strong movement for trade within the Empire has made itself felt. Moreover, the Colonies, and particularly Western Africa, are looked upon as a reservoir of troops, which may be used not only abroad but in Europe. Perhaps the new tendency to lay stress on Colonial potentialities is exaggerated, but it remains true that in square miles the area of the French Empire is at least twenty-two times the area of France, and that properly managed this great area should be an asset and not a liability.

French colonization has been chiefly due to individual initiative, and only forty or fifty years ago did colonization become a truly national concern. The British, on the contrary, have made colonization a serious business from the days of Queen Elizabeth. The French opened up great tracts of territory which were afterwards secured by England; and it has been epigrammatically said that the British Empire is largely "a present from the French." French Governments light-heartedly lost overseas possessions and the work of explorers and pioneers was sacrificed. In the sixteenth century the French monarchs looked abroad only for gold. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the spices of the West Indies were preferred to the wheat of Canada, and Voltaire described North America as "a few acres of snow." Statesmen like d'Argenson remarked that all the Colonies were not worth a pin's head. Even the Suez Canal, a French enterprise, left the French indifferent. Yet it is a mistake to suppose that the French have not produced the greatest colonizers from the earliest days of world navigation. In 1365 adventurers from Dieppe created numerous establishments on the coast of Senegal and of Guinea ; and in 1404 a Norman, Jean de Béthencourt, occupied the Canaries. The French planted themselves in Brazil at the beginning of the sixteenth century ; and the voyages of Jacques Cartier to Canada followed a little later. Champlain was a worthy successor of Cartier. Guinea and the Antilles and Madagascar were all seized by the French by the seventeenth century. The French installed themselves in India. Continental wars and the growing rivalry of England stripped France of her possessions during the eighteenth century. In 1763 France ceded Canada to England and Louisiana to Spain. In India the English obtained a solid footing, leaving the French only Pondichéry and Chandernagor. The first French Colonial Empire was sadly diminished ; but within a few years Senegal was recovered and New Guinea, the New Hebrides, Tahiti, were added ; Egypt was conquered ; and a second large Colonial Empire was set up. It collapsed with the collapse of Napoléon.

British supremacy was complete in 1815. In that year France retained only Martinique, Guadeloupe and Cayenne, St. Pierre et Miquelon, part of Senegal, the Reunion, and a few trading rights in India—all that remained of the immense domain of the Compagnie des Indes which in the time of Dupleix possessed over eight hundred vessels. A third attempt was seriously made in the nineteenth century. René Caillé entered Timbuctoo. Other explorers pushed into the heart of Africa. Tamative was occupied in 1829 and Louis Philippe in 1830 conquered Algiers, and Oran a year later. The Tahiti Group returned to France. Under the Second Empire, French West Africa expanded considerably. Cochin China was occupied and conventions were concluded with Cambodia and with Siam. New Caledonia was taken.

The Third Republic made a protectorate of Tunisia and progressively occupied Senegal, the Sudan, the Niger, the Congo, the Somali coast, Madagascar, and Morocco. Indo-China was effectively conquered. When the war of 1914 broke out French colonial troops entered the Cameroons and Togoland, in co-operation with British contingents.

This extremely swift sketch of the rise and fall of two Colonial Empires and the remarkable construction of a third necessarily omits many points of interest, but it is intended chiefly to show that the French quest for Colonies has a substantial historical background and is not a new phenomenon. What is new is the better realization of the use that can be made of overseas possessions. Yet if France has always had individuals who have exhibited colonizing zeal, if rulers such as Henri IV and Richelieu have encouraged their enterprises, there has always been a strong anti-colonial sentiment. Colbert, for example, took a narrow view of the functions of the Colonies. Louis XV, with his scepticism and his frivolity, permitted the ruin of the Compagnie des Indes by dishonest speculators, and Montcalm in Canada made vain appeals for help. Bernardin de Saint-Pierre took the same view as Voltaire of Canada. Robespierre, a disciple of Rousseau, cried: "Let the Colonies perish if they are to cost us our happiness, our glory, our liberty." The Convention generally made itself the champion of the complete assimilation of the Colonies, and in the Constitution of the Year III there is an Article which states: "The Colonies are an integral part of the Republic and are submitted to the same Constitutional laws." The Directoire was definitely hostile to overseas expansion. Delacroix, who acted as Foreign Minister, proclaimed: "I would prefer four more villages on the frontiers of France to the richest isle of the Antilles, and I would be vexed to see Pondichéry or Chandernagor belong to the Republic." As for Bonaparte, M. Paul Caffarel writes of him: "The ephemeral conquest of Egypt and of Syria, the seizure of the Ionian Isles, the occupation of Louisiana, the expedition of Santo Domingo indicated that one of his vast ambitions was to elevate the maritime and colonial policy and fortune of France; but from the later years of the Consulate and, above all, when he became Emperor, Napoléon became disgusted with the marine, and the Colonies for him were a negligible quantity." The doctrine of assimilation was reversed by the Article in the Constitution of the Year VII which established that "the *régime* of the Colonies shall be determined by special laws." The very victories of France on the Continent caused the country to become disinterested in the Colonies. With the Restoration there was further opposition to colonial expansion. The Budget of the Navy and of the Colonies was reduced by a third. In 1829 a Deputy asserted: "The Colonies are costly and we should gain much by losing them. The Colonial system which may have been advantageous is no longer practicable. It has incontestably ceased to be necessary."

Under Louis Philippe, under Napoléon III and under the Third Republic, though the Colonial Empire grew larger and larger, there was always a strong current of opposition. When Gambetta cried; "Do we not seem to stifle in this old continent?" he awoke heroic sentiments in the hearts of some of his compatriots, but he also stirred up the anti-colonial spirit which sees in the extension of France only the exploitation of backward peoples. The Socialists definitely protested against the "Colonial derivative," and other parties combined to bring down Jules Ferry after the check at Tonkin. The anti-colonial doctrine persists. Men like General Mangin and Marshal Lyautey who have worked miracles in Africa are regarded with suspicion by the Radicals. Whenever opportunities occur they are disgraced. The colonial expansion of France is the more remarkable because it has always had to overcome the greatest obstacles placed in its path by Frenchmen themselves. Apart from the positive hindrances there was a general apathy. The average Frenchman is inclined to be home-staying. He is reluctant to emigrate and his imagination is not easily stirred by distant rivers and plains which he may cultivate, deserts which he may make blossom, exotic domains in which adventure may move under wide horizons. The vast potentialities of uninhabited earth make little appeal to him.

The Colonial School, which was founded to foster the Colonial spirit and to teach agriculture, woodcraft, and other arts, year after year bewailed the lack of response. So that one may say French Colonial enterprise has been singularly successful in spite of the French people and against the French politicians. Now and again a politician backs up the men of action with conviction, but such politicians are comparatively rare. A clean-cut policy, a comprehensive scheme to make the best use of overseas possessions was hardly drawn up until Albert Sarraut, Colonial Minister in the Poincaré Cabinet after the war, endeavoured to trace the main lines of a positive programme. The Governments have successively shown hesitation, an absence of enthusiasm, in strange contrast with the work of a small company of ardent workers. One of the German objectives in the war of 1914 was the acquisition of French Colonies, for Germany, unlike France herself, was conscious of the political prestige and the economic force which results from a prosperous Empire. Certainly when purely diplomatic interests were involved, France on occasion faced Germany boldly enough and was ready to reply to the provocations of Tangiers, of Casablanca, and of Agadir. But these diplomatic quarrels were on the French side nourished not so much by a sense of the value of the Colonies as by a consciousness of Germany's bid for hegemony. Had France been more wholeheartedly attached to her Empire, Germany might have been less aggressive. It was partly because France was thought not to care overmuch about the fate of countries which had latent and incalculable resources, that Germany was emboldened in her attempt to wrest these countries from France. Always was there an opinion, acknowledged or unacknowledged, in France that Colonies were useless. M. Marcel Dubois expresses himself with vehemence on this point. "This opinion," he writes, "which has until lately paralysed our activity beyond the seas, was the outcome of the discussions begun in the eighteenth century, according to the general tendencies of the epoch, on the question of whether, regarded in the abstract, one should colonize or not." Certainly, after the German menace at Agadir, the Treaty of November 4, 1911, by which France surrendered a strip of the Congo, brought forth indignant protests. The French were deeply moved, but almost immediately the pan-Germanic pretensions were forgotten and Germany could pursue her *Weltpolitik* insolently.

There were plenty of warnings, for in newspapers and in books the superiority of the German people and their predestined domination were announced. The controversies in France which were engaged between the partisans and the adversaries of colonial expansion were, from a larger point of view, an almost irretrievable fault. The two schools argued somewhat as follows: The first declared that the young Republic could not, after the defeat of 1871, regain for France her old position on the Continent by direct continental action without dangerously reviving the suspicions under which the Second Empire had succumbed; but that it could properly recover from its humiliation by a judicious extension of its activities in fields outside Europe; the second urged that the reconstituted forces of France should exclusively serve for the protection of her frontiers, and that to go outside the Continent was to scatter energies which should be concentrated at home. Historically, and leaving aside all question of morality, the first school has been justified. It was by a *détour* that France reached her centre. The second school placed stumbling-blocks which were nearly fatal in the path, but those colonial expeditions which, on the whole, were victorious, reawakened the confidence of the nation and eventually gave the nation its rightful place, not so much in the Colonies as in Europe. A France which was capable of re-establishing her influence in Africa and in the East was no longer a vanquished nation. Precisely in the measure that France grew stronger abroad she grew stronger on the Continent. Those who assert that by her Colonial policy France re-forged her military instrument and refurnished her diplomatic power can support their thesis by irrefutable facts. Yet this was done in the face of implacable *doctrinaires*, who saw in colonization the negation of humanitarianism which they professed, and who postulated the equality of all men and of all races no matter what might be their degree of native intelligence, their degree of education, and their degree of civilization. It was precisely those who called for human progress who refused to participate in the work of elevating backward peoples and who denounced colonization as more barbarous than the barbarities which it suppressed. Riches were running to waste and peoples who were capable of better things were being decimated by their own ignorance, ravaged by their own customs; but the Socialist theory was that they should be allowed to go to perdition in their own manner and to sit tight on wealth which might be employed for the amelioration of the conditions of mankind.

The Ministers were for the most part unable to refute the representatives of these perverted ideas of self-determination. They looked anxiously on their provisional majorities and too often failed in their duty. The Brisson Cabinet, for example, in 1885, after the fall of Ferry, affirmed that the Colonial enterprises had become too onerous. It is easy to do nothing, though the consequences of indolence are usually hard to support. It is easy to attack the actual French administration of the Colonies just as it is easy to attack the British administration; but the greatest accumulation of Colonial blunders and crimes cannot in themselves invalidate the case for colonization any more than, in the words of Waldeck-Rousseau, the most exact treatise of pathology can give a notion of the grandeurs and the splendours of human accomplishment. At any rate, there was a long period of irresolution during which France found herself saddled practically against her will with a developing Empire, and it was not until after the World War that a genuine modification of the popular and political attitude of France towards her Colonies was registered. Since the war there has been a widespread acquiescence in the policy of a progressive *mise en valeur* of the Colonies, and although the clamours have not ceased it is realized that the Colonies need not be a burden but an invaluable asset; that France is not charged with a disagreeable mission but has acquired a guarantee for her future.

There are difficult days ahead, but the existence of France as a first-class nation and her economic restoration are linked with the development of her overseas possessions. From them she may obtain the greater part of the raw materials and the foodstuffs which she imported from foreign countries before 1914. Many milliards of francs will still have to be sunk in the Colonies before they return proper profits. M. Sarraut showed that efforts should first be directed to the improvement of the transport system; and, second, to the augmentation of exports; and, third, to the increase of production. Transport has indeed been improved and exports have been augmented. Perhaps more attention should now be given to production. There need be no opposition between the material benefits which France may rightly expect and the generous purpose of spreading a beneficent civilization.

A more doubtful French activity in the Colonies is the recruiting of native contingents for permanent service in Europe. It was General Mangin who flung the blacks into the battle of the white nations and who gave a stimulus to the swelling of the army by regiments from the African reservoir of man power.

In Northern Africa, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, though coming under different administrations, form a geographical unity between the Mediterranean and the Sahara. It was in consequence of an incident and not by deliberate design that France nearly a hundred years ago set foot on the shores of Algeria, but the relations of France with this country are ancient. From the fourteenth century the inhabitants of Marseilles fished in Algerian waters. Louis XIV endeavoured to make the French flag respected by the pirates who infested the Mediterranean. There were bombardments of the coast and a

Treaty was established with the Dey in 1667. The Algerians committed many infractions of the Treaty, and, after the Revolution and the Empire, England, who was charged with the duties of policing the Mediterranean, energetically intervened. To piratical exploits were added other acts of hostility, and Charles X felt obliged to permit an expedition against the Mussulman, which terminated in a month by the capitulation of Algiers (July, 1830). It was then that Louis Philippe came to the throne and circumstances compelled him to push the French conquests further. The campaign was slow and costly. The French effectives were insufficient and there was no well-studied plan. Three years were occupied in assuring the control of the littoral. The Emir Abd-el-Kader proclaimed a Holy War. Treaties were negotiated in 1834 and 1837, but they did not restore peace, and organized warfare continued from 1841 to 1847. General Bugeaud was assisted by Cavaignac, and later the Duc d'Aumale, one of the sons of the King, was conspicuous as a cavalry leader and then as an administrator. Abd-el-Kader fled to Morocco. There were many risings, but eventually the French firmly installed themselves.

Under the Second Empire continual revolts immobilized a fifth part of the French Army. The submission of Kabylie followed long and painful efforts, but there was no serious peril after the principal routes of the Algerian Sahara were seized. The colony has been covered with a network of railways, and, especially in mining and agriculture, has responded to French capital and direction. Opportunities were given to the Algerians to attend school, and French speech, laws, manners, and customs, have established themselves. Algeria is not dissimilar in its physical character and its climate and its inhabitants from Southern Europe. It is situated between mountain ranges, and although it is rather lacking in water, irrigation has made it exceedingly fertile. According to the latest census there is a population of 5,492,569. This includes 562,931 French settlers and 189,112 other Europeans. The Berbers are the principal race ; the Arabs are fewer. There are Moors and Jews and Spaniards and Italians and Maltese. The administrative organization has undergone several changes. In 1896 Algeria was placed under the authority of a Governor-General at Algiers, controlled by the Minister of the Interior. In 1900 financial autonomy was accorded. The Governor is assisted by a Council of seventeen members and a Superior Council whose principal duty is to examine the Budget. There are also financial delegations elected by the colonials, the natives, and the functionaries. Algeria is divided into three *départements*—Algiers, Oran, and Constantine—at the head of which are Prefects and elected Councils. French justice has been gradually substituted for the local jurisdiction. The main roads which have been constructed are 15,463 kilometres in length, and there are besides 14,000 kilometres of ordinary roadway. Railways run to the principal towns. The aeroplane is freely used for intercommunication between Algeria and the other African possessions. Motor-car services are increasing. Postal and telegraphic facilities are excellent. Algeria yields large quantities of iron and of phosphates. Cereals such as wheat, barley, oats, and maize, are cultivated, and the vine flourishes. The olive, the fig, the orange, the lemon, and the date are grown, and peas, tomatoes, artichokes, and potatoes are exported. Tobacco is the most important of the industrial cultures, but it is hoped to develop the yield of cotton, flax, and silk. The breeding of cattle is relatively difficult, but sheep constitute one of the chief resources of Algeria. The manufacture of carpets and of textiles is prosperous. Algeria occupies the fifth rank among the commercial clients of France, importing foodstuffs, machines, and coal, and exporting chiefly grains, wines, and sheep. Prevost-Paradol rightly called Algeria "*La chance suprême*."

Tunisia, whose frontiers touch Algeria and the Saharan Desert, is washed by the Mediterranean and faces Sicily, Malta, and Sardinia. It is a piece of the East at the doors of Europe. The privileged situation of France in Tunisia dates from 1665, when Louis XIV obtained the formal recognition of the precedence of the French Consul over other Consuls, and serious guarantees for the security of French settlers, and considerable commercial advantages. Earlier treaties were confirmed in 1710, and after the troubles of 1740 to 1756 good relations were resumed. The Compagnie d'Afrique obtained in 1768 full freedom of trade. During the Revolution, French influence weakened, but it was reestablished by Bonaparte. In 1830 a Treaty was signed which made Tunisia in fact though not in name a sort of Protectorate. But Italy was tempted to occupy Tunisia, and the Franco-Prussian war stimulated the intrigues against France. The Bey turned towards Italy for support against France. The French were afraid lest Italian control over the Central Mediterranean countries would have repercussions in Algeria. In April, 1881, Parliament (Jules Ferry was then Prime Minister) voted credits for an expedition designed to consolidate security in Tunisia. The campaign was almost bloodless and in a few weeks the Treaty of Bardo was signed. A French Resident was to direct, with the Ministers of the Bey, the foreign affairs of Tunisia, and a French General was to command the Tunisian troops. England protested, but finding herself faced with a *fait accompli* acquiesced; but Italian resistance was more difficult to overcome. Two years later the Convention of Marsa completed the Constitution of Tunisia. The Bey remained at the head of the Regency but the French Resident-General became in effect the Foreign Minister. Finances, public works, education, agriculture, posts and telegraphs were to have French directors. Twice a year French delegates meet at Tunis, and since 1908 the natives also nominate their representatives. The general organization, however, is left much more largely in the hands of the Tunisians themselves than is the case in Algeria. In 1910 a Superior Council composed of Ministers and departmental chiefs and French and native delegates was created to promulgate the Budget. Tunisia, though only a quarter of the size of Algeria and with a population of 1,850,000 is not unlike the older colony. On the whole, the climate is more favourable to agriculture. The French number only 46,044 while the foreign population as a whole numbers 135,000. Italians predominate and there is the possibility of friction. The development of Tunisia has been rapid and methodical. From the forests cork is collected. The phosphates of Gafsa are particularly rich. There are three regions of iron ore. The area on which cereals are cultivated has multiplied thirty-fold since 1880. The principal industry is the extracting of olive oil.

Morocco lies on the western side of Algeria. It is regarded as a Protectorate. A more recent acquisition, the French hold on the country, in spite of the admirable work of Lyautey, is not yet consolidated. The task is much more difficult; first, because the border line of effective occupation is ill-defined; and, second, because Spain shares with France the control of the country and has never succeeded in tranquillizing her zone. The mountainous regions of the Riff and the Atlas make revolts difficult to suppress. From the twelfth century France had friendly relations with Morocco. François I enjoyed a special position in the Mussulman world by his alliance with the Turks, and he endeavoured to live on good terms with the Sultan of Morocco. Henri IV sent an Ambassador to Fez. One of the agents of Richelieu concluded a Treaty in 1631 assuring France liberty of commerce and authorizing her to maintain Consuls in Morocco. When Louis XIV tried to chase the Corsairs from the Mediterranean he continued cordial relations with the Sultan. The establishment of France in Algeria gave rise to friction. On the common frontier there were many incidents, and it was in Morocco that Abd-el-Kader took refuge. The Moroccans manifested an increasing xenophobia. In the year 1856 the British obtained commercial facilities and the French drew up an accord in 1863. Both France and Spain desired to "protect" Morocco. There was a long drawn out struggle between England and France. It was closed by the Franco-British Convention of April 8, 1904, by which England abandoned her interests in the Cherifian Empire and turned towards Egypt. Zones of influence were laid out by France and Spain. But the intervention of Germany complicated matters. Von Kuhlmann, the Chargé d'Affaires of Germany at Tangiers, at the beginning of 1905 made energetic declarations which the Kaiser endorsed when he visited Tangiers in March. A few months later the Act of Algeçiras consecrated the internationalization of Morocco. The principle of economic equality was affirmed. Nevertheless, anarchy prevailed and France was obliged energetically to assert herself. France and Germany appeared to have settled their differences in the accord of 1909, but while France was chiefly concerned with her political preponderance, Germany was interested especially in economic questions. In 1911, as the result of French action, Germany became menacing. The dispatch of a German gunboat to Agadir could only be taken as a threat of aggression. The incident was closed by the cession to Germany of a portion of the Congo. Germany, on her side, while maintaining commercial rights, admitted the French protectorship of Morocco. This understanding was completed a year later by a Convention with Spain. It was also in 1912 that France signed a Treaty with Morocco by which she might introduce such reforms as she considered necessary. Lyautey was appointed Resident-General—an office which he held with exceptional ability until 1925. Military operations were pursued, but at the same time, as French influence extended, as there was effective pacification, the agriculture, the industries, and the commerce of Morocco steadily grew. The country was economically equipped, schools were established, and native crafts encouraged. Morocco has been described as the Pearl of Northern Africa. It has made a greater appeal to the French imagination than any other region of the New France. Despite the handicaps due to the existence of the Spanish zone and the special zone of Tangiers, an internationalized port, the progress of Morocco is unquestionable. The population of that part of Morocco which is subdued is about four and a half millions but there are still centres of resistance. The French settlers are above all in the towns and number 36,000. Morocco should prove to be a particularly favourable field for the breeding of cattle. From Fez come textiles and pottery, from Marakesh leather work, from Rabat tapestries, from Mogador copper work, and so forth. There seem to be many mineral deposits in Morocco as yet barely exploited.

French Western Africa stretches from Rio de Oro to British Nigeria. The Colonies are separated from each other along the coast by the Colonies of other countries, but they may be said to be all united by the common hinterland of the curve formed by the Niger. From the early part of the fourteenth century the Western shores of Africa were known and colonized by the French. French companies under various names administered Senegal until 1758, when it was taken by the British. Forty years later it was recovered and governed by French officers. A second time the Colony came under British domination, but it was restored to France in 1817. Yet France was content merely to occupy various points along the coast, and it was not until after the disaster of 1870 that the French people really interested themselves in the exploits of Colonel Faidherbe. The oases of the Sahara, the possibilities of the Sudan, then began to fascinate the French. The valley of the Niger, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, and Dahomey revealed their riches. The explorations of Binger (1887-1889) persuaded the French that these countries were the doors of the Sudan on the sea. The next few years were fecund and the plans for Colonial expansion in Western Africa were pursued with success. There were a number of missions and Treaties were signed with native chiefs. Here territory was occupied pacifically and there was won by force of arms. French diplomacy endeavoured to obtain recognition by the European Powers of the French influence in these spheres. There are Franco-British Conventions of 1889, 1890, 1895, 1898, and 1904. There are agreements respecting frontiers with Spain (1900), Germany (1885 and 1897), Portugal (1886), Liberia (1892 and 1907). From Morocco and Algeria to Lake Chad French West Africa was organized. In Mauretania there was considerable agitation, but the troubles were localized. Geographically, Western Africa offers a varied aspect. It is bordered by an expanse of sand but there are mountainous regions, fertile plains, and well-watered parts. The possibility of a rational system of irrigation and the extensive culture of cotton have been carefully studied. The natives range from the white Berbers to the darkest negroes. In 1895 was created the General Government of French West Africa, and in 1904 the General Government was constituted the organ of direction and of permanent control of the entire territories, which were given a single Budget. There are over twelve million inhabitants of the seven Colonies—Senegal, French Sudan, Upper Volta, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Nigeria, and the civil territory of Mauretania. The Governor-General is the depositary of the powers of the French Republic. He has his residence at Dakar. He is assisted by a Council. The Colonies possess a certain administrative and financial autonomy and are each placed under a Lieutenant-Governor. Mauretania is administered by a Commissary of the General Government.

Togoland, which lies between Dahomey and the Gold Coast, belonged to Germany but was confided to France by the Peace Conference of 1919. It comes under the mandatory system. The population is 672,887. The functionary charged with its administration bears the title of Commissary of the Republic.

The amelioration of the moral and material conditions of life has been a constant preoccupation of the authorities. Public hygiene and education, technical instruction, the suppression of barbarous practices, the improvement of means of production both agricultural and industrial, have been studied with the greatest care. Oil and nuts and bananas, rice and millet and coffee and cotton and rubber and gums of various kinds are among the articles of exportation that certainly, with the efforts now being made, can be obtained in much larger volume. West African trade with France in 1895 was put at 79,000,000 francs. In 1920 it was put at well over a milliard francs, of which 589,000 francs represent exports and 654,000 imports. Ports like Dakar and Conakry are being equipped with modern machinery. Railways run from Dakar to St. Louis, to Kayes, to the Niger, and to other regions, and altogether 1,500 miles of railway have been laid down. There are 300 miles of good roads in Senegal; 1,300 miles in the Sudan; 400 in Guinea; 700 on the Ivory Coast; and 600 in Dahomey; and automobile services have been regularly installed. With the greater use of aviation in Africa the last difficulties of transportation should disappear.

In Equatorial Africa, France has no negligible domain. Before the French Congo, which came in 1908 under the general designation of French Equatorial Africa, was truly penetrated, in the administrative sense, it had been delimited diplomatically after brilliant exploration work. The conquest was progressive and pacific. There was virtually no bloodshed in the occupation of these Colonies. From 1840 to 1872 many missions surveyed the land behind Gabun, and finally Savorgnan de Brazza patiently and skilfully between 1875 and 1885 transformed the little possession of Gabun into a great Colony along the basin of the Congo. An international Conference at Berlin in 1885 resulted in a general Act and a series of Conventions which assured Germany of the Cameroons and marked out the holdings of Spain and of Portugal. Gradually the project of extending the French Empire from the Algerian oasis by Lake Chad still further Southwards, and from the Gabun ports through the regions of the Upper Nile to the Red Sea, was formed. The French installed themselves in the territory of the Chad in 1900, and the surrounding districts immediately came under their influence. The Marchand Mission which crossed the French Congo completing important liaisons came into collision with the British forces in the Egyptian Sudan. The Fashoda incident, with its sequel in the declaration of March 21, 1899, might have had grave consequences, but happily, after the crisis in Franco-British relations, there was a desire on both sides for accommodation, and a few years later agreements were entered into which were the basis of the *Entente Cordiale.* Around Chad there was organized hostility and a campaign had to be undertaken. In 1911 Equatorial Africa furnished a counter in the shape of a portion of the Congo, which compensated Germany for her renunciation of her political interest in Morocco. Territory that was then yielded to Germany was recovered during the War, and indeed the German Colony of the Cameroons was added to the French possessions. The Peace Conference changed the status of the Cameroons, placing the country under the mandatory system; but although a separate Commissary is appointed for this region of three million inhabitants it may properly be said to be under French jurisdiction. Rubber, timber, cocoa beans, palm oil, and so forth, were exported in 1921 to the value of about 60,000,000 francs. The country is in parts habitable all the year round for Europeans. When there is a better railway system cattle should be exported in large numbers. Equatorial Africa, as a whole, stretching from the Atlantic to Egypt and from Tunisia to the Congo, covers a surface of one and a quarter million square miles—that is to say, four times the area of France. The climate is extremely varied, ranging from the dry and healthy neighbourhood of the Sahara, to the thick forests with their torrid heat and torrential rains of the centre. The population of six millions is diversified ; there are the nomads of the north and the savage denizens of the woods. Some of them are already touched by civilization and others are at the lowest stage of human evolution. The Colonies are served by magnificent navigable rivers. High hopes are built on the economic possibilities. There are mineral, animal, and vegetable riches to be exploited. Ivory, rubber, and precious woods, copper, zinc, and lead, oils and essences and gums, should in time assure the prosperity of these French possessions.

Madagascar and its dependencies, among them the Archipelago of the Comores Islands, are situated in the Indian Ocean about 250 miles from the African coast. Its area is bigger than that of France, Belgium, and Holland. It was discovered in 1500 by a Portuguese voyager, but Rigault, of Dieppe, founded for the first time a European establishment in the island in 1542. A century later Louis XIII by letters patent ceded the exploitation to the Compagnie de l'Orient. It bore various names until 1686, when it was placed under the Royal Crown. The British combated the influence of France for many years. The wars of the Revolution and of the Empire turned attention from Madagascar, but French rights were maintained by the Treaties of 1815. Two expeditions, one in 1829 and the other in 1845, totally failed ; yet in 1868 Napoléon III concluded an important Treaty which gave many privileges to the French in the island. Difficulties arose and the French were obliged to leave. The island was blockaded in 1883, and eventually in 1885 the Queen agreed that Madagascar should become a Protectorate of France. Still there was considerable opposition and war was declared at the end of 1894. The French entered Tananarive in the autumn of the following year. They obtained the direction of the foreign policy and the control of the internal administration. Intrigues continued and the Queen was deposed in 1897. The island was declared by General Gallieni, appointed Governor-General, to be a French Colony. Madagascar is mountainous but the great plateaux are fertile. The native population is estimated at three and a half millions. The economical growth of the Grande Île has been exceptionally rapid. The general commerce in 1896 was only 17,000,000 francs: in 1920 it was 515,000,000 francs—fairly equally divided in exports and imports. France is responsible for about 78 per cent of the imports—textiles, metals, wines, sugar, wheat. The exports are rice, which is cultivated almost throughout the Colony, manioc, maize, dried vegetables, tropical fruits, vanilla, coffee, tobacco, bamboo and other growths suitable to the fabrication of paper. There are enormous forests. Preserved and frozen meats are furnished to the metropolis. Coal and oil should be obtained in large volume. About forty tons of gold have been brought into France from Madagascar since the annexation, and precious stones abound. Soldiers are recruited in Madagascar as in West Africa and Algeria.

The Reunion Island, lying off the coast, saw the beginnings of colonization in the early part of the sixteenth century, but its development dates from 1689, when a Governor was appointed by the French King. It was seized by the British in 1810, but four years later was retroceded to France. It is essentially agricultural. The sugar-cane is its principal product, but coffee and vanilla are also exported.

French Somaliland is situated on the Eastern coast of Africa surrounded by British and Italian possessions and by Abyssinia. In 1858 the French

Colonial Agent endeavoured to purchase a port on the Red Sea in anticipation of the opening of the Suez Canal. Unfortunately, he was assassinated and it was not until several years later that the bargain was concluded. At first the Colony was a mere police post. Presently there was expansion, but it was then recognized that Djibouti offered better facilities for navigation. The climate is dry and unhealthy. Efforts have been made to develop industries, but Djibouti must rather be regarded as a port of traffic. Lately an accord was reached between Italy and England with regard to economic rights in Abyssinia. It is understood that there is to be the construction of a railway, but in any delimitation of the spheres of influence it has to be remembered that a Treaty was signed in 1906 by France, England, and Italy, agreeing to respect the political statute and the territorial integrity of Abyssinia, which has since been admitted as an independent member of the League of Nations and therefore may appeal to the League against any measures which it considers to be directed against its independence.

Indo-China provides France with acute problems. The people are independent and retain the traditions of an old civilization. French history in the Far East has been curious. In the eighteenth century France lost India and in the nineteenth century was partly compensated by the conquest of Indo-China. When one says that France lost India it is necessary to qualify this statement by recalling that five towns remain out of the wreck of the vast Empire, but their value is that of souvenirs. In the days of Henri IV a privileged company obtained the monopoly of commerce in India but was not particularly successful in its enterprises. A new Indian company was set on foot in 1664 and it opened trading centres in a number of towns, including Pondichéry and Chandernagor. Dupleix and Dumas for a time assured French preponderance, but the apathy of the Government of Louis XV ended in the abandonment of acquired advantages to the profit of England. The Treaty of Paris in 1763, after the Seven Years' War, left to France only five Indian towns on condition that they should never be fortified. Vainly did Louis XVI endeavour during the American War of Independence to recover a better footing in the East. The remnants of French power are scattered and lost in the British Empire.

France has still control of lands which, situated at the gateway of China, comprise a population of over 19,000,000 people, and are held to justify the great expectations which are placed on their future. It was a missionary, Pigneau de Behaine, who persuaded the Emperor of Annam to appeal to Louis XIV for protection against the Chinese. Subsequently a Treaty was signed by Louis XVI in 1789 which gave the French small territorial advantages. French officers helped to defend the country during the Revolutionary and the Empire days. In spite of these services, there was on the part of the Emperor a violent reaction against the French. Tu-Duc was extraordinarily afflicted with xenophobia, seeing in the French implacable enemies who " barked like dogs and butted like goats." Finally France and Spain, who was also interested, decided to send a small squadron to Annam in 1847, and a similar intervention took place in 1852 as a consequence of the murder of several missionaries. A still more serious Franco-Spanish expedition set out in 1858 and took possession of Tourane and of Saigon. France had her hands full at the time, and although Admiral Charner proceeded to the conquest of a portion of Cochin China, little notice was taken of his exploits. For the next ten years or so the French made gradual progress in the conquest of Cochin China and Cambodia became a French Protectorate. Then Lieutenant Francis Garnier, to punish the Mandarins for an exhibition of bad faith, attacked the citadel of Hanoi in Tonkin with feeble forces (1873). Not long afterwards he was killed and the French signed a Treaty by which they lost Tonkin and preserved only certain commercial and diplomatic advantages in Annam. Incidents were multiplied, and at last when Commandant Rivière was assassinated the French Chamber decided that the prestige of France in the Far East had suffered and unanimously voted war credits. The war was made by " little packets " and was long and costly. In 1883 Annam and Tonkin were recognized as French Protectorates. But Chinese troops entered into the fray. When the French were beaten at Langson the adversaries of Jules Ferry, who was the inspirer of the Colonial policy, found an opportunity of overthrowing him and he left office at the end of March, 1885. The negotiations which had already begun led, however, to the conclusion of a Treaty in the month of June by which China recognized Tonkin as a French Protectorate and gave French commerce facilities in the rich Southern Chinese provinces. In 1888 an expedition against Annam was crowned with success. Further operations, long and painful, had to be undertaken before the French were able solidly to instal themselves in Indo-China. The Japanese victory in 1905 had repercussions on the whole Asiatic world. Until the eve of the Great War there were constant local troubles.

Indo-China has an area of 500,000 square miles. It is watered by two great rivers and is traversed from North to South by a chain of mountains. There is an abundance of rain ; the climate is warm though there are sensible variations in the different regions. The population, which is dense, is extremely mixed. The decrees of October, 1887, and of July, 1898, created the Indo-Chinese union and centralized in the hands of a Governor-General the administration of the Colony of Cochin China and the Protectorates of Cambodia, Annam, and Tonkin. Laos is considered as French territory, though native princes continue to exercise, with the consent of France, their sovereignty. In Siam, France has a sphere of influence. The various countries which compose Indo-China possess conditional administrative autonomy. In each of them is a Lieutenant-Governor. There is a general Budget and there are, besides, local Budgets. There are native consultative assemblies. No French possession has a richer soil or is more plentifully supplied with man power. There are immense resources which may be exploited and the volume of trade has developed swiftly. The breeding of cattle has become a great industry especially in Cambodia. Tonkin silks enjoy an exceptional reputation. With the long coastline and the rivers and lakes there is abundant fishing in Indo-China. Rice is cultivated in Cochin China, Tonkin, and Cambodia, and the production is estimated at 4,500,000 tons. Maize is also cultivated, besides coffee and tea and the sugar-cane. Cotton flourishes and may be exported in increasing quantities. There are many other products of the soil which are in process of development. Notably efforts are being made to procure rubber, and the plantations are being extended. The geological exploration of Indo-China has scarcely begun, but undoubtedly there is considerable subterranean wealth. Industries are being set on foot. In 1921 the exportations were valued at 1,467,000,000 francs and the importations at 1,085,000,000 francs. If all goes well an era of prosperity is opening for

Indo-China, but reports seem to show that the petty tyranny of the functionary is an obstacle to the best relations between the native population and the French. There are unnecessary complications by the imposition of a multiplicity of taxes which the Orientals resent, and France would be well advised to abandon some of the peculiarly irritating red-tape methods to which she is addicted.

In the American zone France is established in Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, in the Antilles, which include Guadeloupe and Martinique, and in French Guiana. The little colony of Saint-Pierre et Miquelon is particularly interesting for France in that it is all that remains of the old French dominion in Canada. Besides, it is the only French establishment situated completely outside the tropical zone. These islands though of small dimensions, nourish a population of about 6,000, chiefly by fishing—though it is alleged that an extensive bootlegging trade has had its head-quarters in the islands since prohibition came into force in the United States. Fishing attracted the Bretons to the islands as early as in the reign of Henri IV. When the French were driven from Newfoundland in 1713 they fixed themselves in Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. They were dislodged by the British in 1778 but returned after the Revolution. A Franco-British arrangement in 1904 settled the vexed question of fishing rights.

In lower Canada the French language persists and certain French traditions are maintained. But although there is a sentimental association, the French Canadian does not look upon the Third Republic as his native land. He thinks of France, when he thinks of it at all, as the old Monarchial and Clerical France and not as the Republican and anti-Clerical France. Even the tongue he speaks is not the French of to-day but rather of the seventeenth century. Lately there have been attempts to develop commercial relations with Canada. In the United States, too—in Louisiana, which formerly belonged to France—there are traces of the old French culture.

The French Antilles comprise the two principal islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique, with their dependencies. Guadaloupe was discovered by Christopher Columbus in his second transatlantic voyage in 1493. It remained Spanish until 1635, when it was taken possession of by a French company. In 1674 it was joined to the royal domain. There was a short British occupation from 1759 to 1763 and again during the Revolution. During the wars of the Empire the British once more took possession of Guadeloupe, from 1810 to 1816, when it was definitely restored to France. It forms part of a long chain of volcanic islands. It is separated in two parts by a narrow arm of the sea. There are strong atmospheric perturbations during the winter. The sugar-cane is grown. Rum is exported. Coffee, cocoa, vanilla, pineapples, amplify the commerce of Guadeloupe. Martinique was also discovered by Columbus, but the natives remained master of the island until 1625, when a Frenchman, Pierre Belain, obtained from Richelieu permission to constitute a Compagnie des Îles d'Amérique, and ten years later undertook the colonization of the island. In 1650 the company sold the islands to Duparquet, and in 1664 the Crown bought back the islands and ceded its rights to the Compagnie des Indes Occidentales. British and Dutch attacks led to the dissolution of the company and the return of the islands to the Crown. In 1762 Martinique fell into the hands of the British. It was restored to France but again in 1793 was delivered to the British. Since 1815 it has not ceased to be French, and since the abolition of slavery in 1848 it has participated in larger measure in the public life of France and is regarded as a *département*. It has suffered from volcanic eruptions and seismic convulsions. Here, as in Guadeloupe, the sugar-cane is the principal culture and rum, coffee, vanilla, bananas, pineapples, oranges, and so forth, are to be found among its exportations. Unfortunately, political passions are easily aroused, and owing to the remoteness of the Antilles, official rapacity, administrative scandals, and the most culpable electoral intrigues are frequently alleged. From time to time it is proposed to cede the Antilles to the United States in part payment of France's debt; but sentimental objections are raised.

French Guiana off the coast of South America is a third the size of France. Since 1854 it has been, with New Caledonia, officially designated as a penitentiary colony. Promises are made that these penal settlements will be abolished, but in spite of the most hideous revelations France retains her unenviable reputation of being one of the last countries to keep the inhuman system. The temperature is totally unfitted for white men living in the abominable conditions which are imposed. It may be properly asked whether the lot of the released convict in Guiana is not worse than that of the prisoner. After the discovery of Guiana by Columbus there were numerous European expeditions, and the Dutch, the British, and the French figured in its history in the seventeenth century. Attempts at colonizing failed from lack of organization and some of them were disastrous. When the Second Republic abolished slavery the black inhabitants refused to work and grave labour problems arose. In 1854 gold mines were discovered and the plantations were abandoned. The exportation of gold varies annually from 2,660,000 to 3,762,000 kilos. There is comparatively little agriculture and the forests are scarcely exploited. One of the reasons of the failure of the French in Guiana —if one admits the morality of the system of deportation—is that the penitentiary administration is autonomous. As a French writer says: "If *le bagne* is to be utilized economically, this service, now independent, should be placed under the direct authority of the Government. Here is a reform which is necessary if Guiana is at last to emerge from the muddle in which it has been plunged for so many years."

At the antipodes is New Caledonia. Its geographical situation has become more important with the opening of the Panama Canal. Placed between Australia and the Polynesian Islands, it is on the sea route from Sydney to San Francisco and Panama by the Fiji, the Samoan, the Tahiti Islands, and also on the route from New Zealand to Indo-China by Java and Sumatra—in a word, it may easily become the central station of the Pacific. New Caledonia was announced to exist by Bougainville after his voyage round the world from 1766 to 1769, but it was Captain Cook who discovered it in 1774 on his return from the New Hebrides. Not until 1843, however, did the first Europeans establish themselves on the island. They were French missionaries, some of whom were massacred together with French sailors. It was to avenge them that Napoléon III caused the island to be occupied in 1853. The following year the first batch of convicts was sent out and New Caledonia became a penitential colony. Probably New Caldeonia forms part of that great continent in the southern seas which was submerged, leaving only its highest summits above the sea level. The climate is more temperate than might be expected in this tropical region. If the penal settlement were abolished the island might be enormously developed. Minerals such as nickel, and vegetation such as cotton, with oils, and essences, and precious woods, could be exploited to a much greater extent.

Among the dependencies of New Caledonia are the Loyalty Isles covered with forests, the Chesterfield Isles with their deposits of guano, where fishermen collect mother-of-pearl, and the New Hebrides, which comprise forty islands. The latter were annexed at the same time as New Caledonia and were militarily occupied in 1886. There were protests by British missionaries and the little garrison was withdrawn. France signed with England Conventions in 1887 and 1888 setting up a condominium. A later Convention—1906—made of the New Hebrides a territory where both France and England exercise their influence and are sovereign in regard to their own nationals. Each country is represented by a High Commissioner. The joint court is composed of a French, British, and a Spanish judge. A protocol which was ratified in 1922 contained clearer definitions of the powers of the countries concerned; but it is recognized that the present *régime* is provisional. The soil is particularly fertile.

Among the French establishments in Oceania are the archipelago of the Marquesas Islands; the Tahiti group, known as the Society Archipelago; and three or four other groups of islands of volcanic formation. Most of them are prolific in coral. Until the end of the eighteenth century each island was independent, with its own chief and government, but afterwards an attempt at unification and at political organization was made by the dynasty which reigned in Tahiti. The French occupation began in 1842, and the Queen of Tahiti asked for the protection of the French, which was accorded by Louis Philippe. One by one the Oceanic archipelagos thus came under French authority. Tahiti was annexed in 1880 and the various dependencies were annexed from 1888 to 1901. To-day the islands are placed under a Colonial Governor. Besides the products of the soil, pearl fishing is successfully practised. These French establishments in Oceania are small parcels of territory scattered in an immense ocean. They are admirable little corners of the world where life is sweet and easy, bathed in a luminous atmosphere.

French interest in the Levant is ancient. The Crusaders sent great European populations to the Near East and aroused an interest in these regions which has never flagged. Syria, which has been in turn dominated by nearly all the Asiatic peoples, by the Assyrians, the Chaldeans, the Persians, the Phœnicians, the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Crusaders and by the Turks, has been coveted as few portions of the earth have been coveted. At the beginning of the sixteenth century François I signed with the Sultan the first capitulations, and the French flag under successive monarchs enjoyed special prerogatives in the Near East. French Catholic schools and other establishments were opened up. There were several French expeditions, notably in 1799 and again in 1860. During the Great War, in co-operation with their Allies, the French intervened in Syria. General Gouraud endeavoured to organize Syria and Lebanon and the peacemakers of Versailles placed the territory under a French mandate. To Gouraud succeeded General Weygand, who showed exceptional qualities as an administrator. Syria appeared to be pacified, but for political reasons Weygand was recalled and General Sarrail was appointed High Commissioner. He failed in his mission, and in Damascus, as well as in the difficult country of

Jebel Druse, revolt broke out. The task of restoring order was thereupon confided to a Civil Commissioner, Senator Henri de Jouvenel. The country is divided into several States—the Grand Lebanon, whose capital is Beirut ; Aleppo ; Damascus ; the territory of the Alouites ; and Jebel Druse, whose capital is Soueida. In all probability the people will reconcile themselves to French administration if the French rulers are well chosen and show a judicious regard for the wishes of the population. The economic wealth of the mandated territories is real and the future possibilities remarkable. At present only a quarter of the cultivable land is worked, and large schemes of irrigation should be put in hand without delay. Wheat, barley, cotton, silk, oil, wool, and cattle, are among the principal products.

Although the Colonial history of France is long and checkered there is a sense in which it may truly be said that the conscious Colonial effort of France begins with the Third Republic. It is during the past few generations that the vast domain of France overseas has been built up, and it is during the post-war years that a fresh realization of the potentialities of colonization from the economic, the military, and, let us not forget, the moral point of view has come to the French. The period of conquest which absorbed French attention, the period of adventure and of exploration, has led to another period in which France strives to utilize the immense resources which she has acquired for her own benefit and, it is to be trusted, for the benefit of the indigenous populations. Until lately the necessity of developing the possessions, of organizing them methodically, brought forth no integral programme, largely conceived, ripely elaborated. It is amazing that the Colonial force of France should have grown amid general indifference, ignorance, and hostility, and that France should, as it were, suddenly awaken to an awareness of the heritage which has come to her by scattered, sporadic, and often thwarted enterprise. Individual initiative and local efforts are obviously now not enough, and unless there is popular appreciation of the Colonies and a conviction on the part of the authorities that comprehensive plans should be drawn up and executed, the third French Empire will run the risk of falling into decay as did the first and the second. Hasty improvisations, insufficient finances, precarious designs, are useless in the modern world, and France cannot hope always to enjoy the good fortune that has attended isolated and uncertain endeavours and instable intentions. It is time that France should, if she is to retain her patrimony, have a unity of vision. It is no longer possible for any country in the fierce economic competition of the twentieth century to retain huge territories which she does not cultivate, mines which she does not exploit, waterways which she does not utilize. Economic sovereignty is limited by the rights of all and the general welfare. Sooner or later it will be asked whether France is making the most of her inheritance, and it is incumbent upon her to produce a convincing balance sheet. Unquestionably the French, people and politicians, are newly alive to their duties and are enthusiastic about their privileges.

SOME WORKS TO BE CONSULTED

Albert Sarraut: *Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises*; Vignon: *Expansion de la France*; *La Politique Coloniale de la France,* a series of lectures by authoritative Frenchmen recently published by Alcan; and particularly the valuable book *Ce que tout Français devrait savoir sur Nos Colonies* by Charles Regismanset, Georges François and Fernand Rouget, to which the present writer is considerably indebted. Elisee Reclus: *Nouvelle Geographie Universelle*; Fallex and Mairey: *La France et ses Colonies*; Chailley-Bert: *La Colonisation de l'Indo-Chine*; General Mangin: *Regards sur la France d'Afrique* are to be read, together with various official publications and the *Annuaire Général.*

CHAPTER III

THE MEANING OF MONARCHY

The Historical Contribution—The Church—Fighting Feudalism —Creation of Unity—The Rise of Royalty—The Ancien Régime—Literature and Art—Diplomacy

It is easy to paint a horrifying picture of the miseries and meannesses of the Ancien Régime. Material is not lacking. It is equally easy to dwell upon the magnificence of the French Monarchy. The facts on both sides are to be found in profusion, but the judicious verdict on the thirteen centuries of Monarchical rule would be that the Monarchy rendered inestimable services to France. It was not the Revolution, as is commonly supposed, which overthrew Feudalism: it was the Monarchy. If we confine ourselves for the moment to the Capetians and the eight hundred years which witnessed the rise of a truly French Royal Dynasty we shall discover that Royalty was not the outgrowth of Feudalism, but the national reply to Feudalism. The Monarchy quickly became bourgeois rather than noble—that is to say, it regarded the middle classes as its ally against the feudal lords who divided up the country. Louis XI may properly be taken as the type of the bourgeois King. He was content to live without ostentation, though he had huge conceptions and placed tremendous performances to his credit.

Perhaps in spite of the admirable work of men like Edouard Driault a more comprehensive study of the making of French unity is needed. It would centre chiefly around the eleventh, the twelfth, and the thirteenth centuries when other European nationalities were still vague. There were extraordinary vicissitudes; what was done was frequently undone, and almost everything had to be done again in the fifteenth century. But the Kings of France in general took the side of a responsive people against the barons. In the seventeenth century the principle of Absolute Monarchy came to full bloom and thereafter drooped. It had reached the height of its logical development, and when it became merely a fine flower on a fragile stalk it succumbed. Though it failed in the end it succeeded in its time and built up the France we know to-day. It corresponded to the French dual requirement of an ideal, and of an orderly system. It was not, as it is sometimes represented, a tyrannical institution, arbitrary, without laws. On the whole, if it had enormous faults it set up an efficacious administration, and rulership was based on broad regard for national well-being. Finally, the bourgeoisie found its interests elsewhere, but separated itself slowly and with regret from the Monarchy. To deny the historical value of the Monarchy in France is entirely to misread the teachings of the records.

In the Middle Ages, when Feudalism flourished, everything was grouped around the church, the monastery, and the château. The French when they used the word *pays*, which is translated "country," meant not the French territory as a whole but a narrow tract of land with limited horizons, and their patriotism did not embrace more than this familiar landscape. Life was lived in cellules. Even to-day the peasant, rooted in his own soil, has usually a keener sense of the countryside in which he has his being than of the greater country of which it is a part. In this rural life the local noble was the principal figure. The château was a fortress, the *seigneur* was a protector. Whether the restricted State was good or bad it was the only visible State.

To the barons also praise is due. All local improvements were their work. They built bridges, erected mills, instituted markets, and presided over fêtes. The great earls and dukes wielded real power and sometimes wielded it well. The bellicosity that is attributed to them was chiefly a sentiment of honour and of adventure. They showed considerable negotiating skill. They were moved to undertake far-off expeditions. In the larger wars they played their part manfully and carried French prestige across the seas. They wore their *panache* with elegance, and honour became a national trade. They encouraged the arts and introduced magnificence into the arts. Eventually they were harnessed to the service of Royalty and afterwards declined into mere ornaments of the Court. They continued to possess privileges but had practically no powers. They were a social but not a political force. They have been properly described as superior domestics. They pursued their trivial intrigues around the mistresses of the King. Yet the virtue of the nobility was not altogether sapped. Many nobles escaped the lure of the glittering Court. They turned themselves into gentlemen farmers and continued to exercise an unquestionable influence. As we approach our own day the nobility sustained successive defeats and was unable to adapt itself to the industrial conditions. Napoléon rightly realized the need of an aristocracy though he considered that it should serve obediently. It has not sufficiently evolved with changing times, and although its representatives exist they have been submerged, and the bourgeoisie has triumphed in France.

Nor must the splendid contribution of the Church to modern France be neglected. If the Romans brought civilization, if they built roads, if they stimulated a new economic activity, if they helped to unify the language and drove Celtic and other tongues into outlying regions, if they imposed order and discipline and respect for a central authority, if they set up the idea of the State, if they carried to France their laws, they gave above all to Gaul the great gift of Christianity. When Gaul was converted in the third century a unifying force was felt. It was this link which connected the Franks with the Gallo-Romans. Clovis, the Merovingian, and his warriors, after the defeat of the Romans was baptized, the non-Christian peoples were driven out, and France fell under the sway of a single King. The Bishops counselled the Kings. They joined the dynasty to Rome ; the Church became a sacred asylum, and mighty Monarchs trembled under the threat of excommunication. The Church was an agent of order. When, throughout the Middle Ages, it was predominant, it constantly intervened to soften the harsh rule of the *seigneurs*. It was the inspirer of the Crusades and the Orders of Chivalry, with their exquisite qualities. In their denunciation of brutality the priests were educative. They reconciled the serfs with their masters. In the midst of much distress they introduced the elements of harmony, the blessing of hope. They covered France, in the fine phrase of Michelet, " with the white robe of cathedrals." The Roman churches were low and sombre, but the Gothic cathedrals were an expression of joy and of fantasy. To their creation all classes contributed. The cathedrals were permanent fêtes in stone. In them were embodied the emotions of an age. They leaped skywards. Their rich portals, the gigantic sweep of their arches, their splendid coloured windows, left an indelible stamp on the French mentality. When the schism came the clergy drew nearer to Royalty than to Papacy, and there was on French soil a truly Gallican Church, that is to say, a national Church, until Napoléon, for political convenience, linked the Church again with Rome. In the seventeenth century the ultramontane movement was formidable ; but in spite of the Jesuits, the Gallican Church kept its rights. The Jesuits contributed to Colonial grandeur ; the prestige of Louis XIV in Indo-China, in Canada, and elsewhere would perhaps not have been possible without them. Ecclesiastical dignitaries were employed in the capacity of diplomatists. Not too much is it to say that Richelieu, even more than the King, personified the conception of a Monarchist State, and Mazarin continued the tradition. Certainly the prelates, serving the Court, were frequently irreligious ; but against the wealth of the Church and the cynicism of the Princes of the Church, there must be set the simple figure of the humble *curé*, poor, pitiful, sincere, and helpful. The education of the ruling classes was almost entirely in the hands of the Jesuits. It was an education which drew its inspiration from antiquity, from classical literature. Generally it was not unliberal, and it may be that in some respects it was at least as liberal in thought as the conceptions of the Jansenists. In practice it left much to be desired, but it should not be overlooked that there is indeed an ecclesiastical doctrine of equality which was never completely buried. At the Revolution the Church lost much of its power which it has never reconquered. Yet it preserves in France an authority which no government, however revolutionary, can afford to despise. France is not for nothing " the eldest daughter of the Church." Intertwined with her history from the fourth and fifth centuries is the history of Catholicism.

It would be idle to pretend that the unprivileged classes were not badly treated during the greater part of the pre-Revolutionary days. Those who glorify, for example, the reign of Louis XIV, would find it difficult to make a satisfactory reply to Fénelon who graciously addressed to the King these grave words: "Your people, that you should love as your children, die of hunger. The cultivation of the soil is almost abandoned; the towns and the villages are depopulated. All the trades languish and no longer nourish the workers. Commerce is annihilated. You have destroyed half the real forces of your State to make and to preserve vain foreign conquests. Instead of trying to extract money from the poor people, they should be given charity. . . . The people say that if the King had the heart of a father he would make it his business to give them bread rather than to keep frontiers which cause war." Indeed, the extreme misery of the people, contested by certain historians to-day, is denounced and deplored by the contemporaries of Louis XIV. Vauban and Saint Simon are in accord on this point. There is a celebrated passage in *Les Caractères* of La Bruyère in which the peasants are described as wild animals scattered about the country-side, black and burnt by the sun, attached to the soil which they dig and delve with an invincible obstinacy. Félix Gaiffe has collected sermons and pamphlets and chansons which are conclusive, and the official reports, the testimony of memoirs and of letters of the epoch, prove that the Monarchial system was, in spite of appearances, already falling into decay at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. Food-stuffs were relatively dear, the taxes were so badly distributed as to be crushing for the lower classes. It was precisely when Royalty had attained its apogee that it had accumulated faults which were eventually to ruin it. Two out of every three years of the long reign of Louis XIV France was at war. There are few periods of French pre-Revolutionary history which were not perpetually troubled by war, and the peasant in particular suffered. The peasants constituted a hardy race. They were almost the entire population of the country, and from the fourteenth century, when the serfs began to recover their freedom, they made immense efforts to obtain property and succeeded, though they were under the tremendous handicap of feudal and Royal impositions.

Rural activity was greatly intensified during the fifteenth century. These men who laboured and suffered for many hundreds of years are the stock from which the France of to-day has come. When they were finally liberated by the Revolution they were invincible. The bourgeoisie rules to-day, but it is afraid of the peasantry. The growth of industry was slow, but the grouping of workers in a sort of family circle probably rendered them less unhappy. Master and worker and apprentice were closely associated, and if they were poorly paid they had few expenses. They developed that tradition of hand labour which is not wholly lost, for though France is striving to place herself in the forefront of industrial nations in our age of machinery, arts and crafts are practised by individuals as in the old days.

But if we cannot accept the suggestion that France was happy under the Ancien Régime, neither can we refuse to recognize that Royalty fought Feudalism, rallied the provinces, and protected France against rival nations. Languedoc and Champagne and Dauphiné were successively added to the royal domain. Provence and Anjou and Maine and Burgundy and Picardy followed. Auvergne and Béarn and Brittany and later Lorraine and Corsica came into the French fold. Normandy and Aquitaine were taken from England. The Bourbons recaptured Artois and Flanders and Roussillon and Franche Comté from the Maison de Bourbon which became the Maison d'Espagne; and, from the Austrian branch of the same family, Alsace. Tares were springing up, but there was being developed by the provosts, the bailiffs, the governors, the intendants, the tribunals, and the parliaments which were courts of justice, a system of administration and of finance. Diplomacy was being learnt; literature was being encouraged. France was learning to turn to a single head. The Monarchical institutions finally became obsolete and altogether inadequate; they were eventually shot through and through with corruption; but they were a necessary stage on the way to popular government. The essential thing for France was to bring order out of the chaos of provinces and duchies and counties and baronies and municipal republics and ecclesiastical principalities, which were to culminate in the modern State.

It was the Monarchy which, while accepting services of the Church, which was the custodian of knowledge and of culture, eventually emancipated letters and sciences from the bondage of theology, and set up the Lay State of which Republicans make their proudest boast. It was the Monarchy which recruited among the middle classes its intendants, its councillors, its ministers, and gave real power to the Third Estate. Thus it is perfectly permissible to assert that the Revolution, in destroying a dynasty, did not destroy the work of Royalty, but completed it. It reinforced a centralized administration, and in affirming the sovereignty of the State simply transferred the State from the King to the Nation.

In so far as the ecclesiastical temporal power, and feudality, and provincial and municipal autonomy, were obstacles to the authority of the Kings, the Kings destroyed them; and it was a relatively easy task for the Revolution to finish what had been already begun. Obviously, Royalty could not entirely crush the forces out of which it arose, and when it established its hierarchy, with the clergy and nobility around it, it accorded privileges to those classes which were an effective obstacle to sound methods of taxation, justice, and administration. Its mistake was to show timidity in respect of historic rights, and tyranny in respect of the people in general. There was neither liberty of conscience nor security of persons and property. Equality could not be realized by the Kings and it was towards equality that the minds of men were moving. Albert Sorel, deprecating the despotism of the later Monarchs, pays a tribute to French Royalty because it created the unity and grandeur of France, and smashed the strength of the old dominating classes. Unfortunately, it tolerated many exceptions and in upbuilding Absolutism it disregarded public liberties. The Revolution was no accident; the way had been prepared from the days of Hugues Capet (A.D. 987). Each century saw some progress. The towns began to emancipate themselves under the first Philippe (1060) and the country-side had a long struggle for comparative freedom. The end of the fifteenth century was marked by the Renaissance of letters, sciences, and arts; the sixteenth century with ideas of religious liberty; and in the eighteenth century the influence of freethinking philosophers and economists was decisive. Locke was known to an increasing number of the French, and Montesquieu and Rousseau taught the rights and duties of men in society. In England parliamentary rule had been obtained and some social equality had been introduced. In France a violent upheaval was necessary because France is at heart conservative and sticks to her old institutions until in a moment of anger she sees the necessity of overthrowing them.*

Had the Monarchy been wise, had it known how to adapt itself to circumstances, things would have passed very differently, but Louis XVI was irresolute, uninterested, and unintelligent, and every reform was attempted when it was too late. Not until the Treasury had reached the lowest ebb of distress were the Etats Généraux convoked. The Third Estate, that is to say, the people, were ironically granted a double representation without additional voting power. The army had been alienated but the soldiers were expected to dissolve an Assembly which the nation regarded with hope. It would seem that every possible blunder was committed. It is foolish to keep men without political education and then suddenly to call them into political consultation. It is suicidal to keep the masses without instruction and expect them to behave calmly and with discretion. Had the King's advisers helped him to play his cards properly, Royalty would have retained its popularity ; but the King manœuvred himself into a position in which he was in blank opposition to the desires of the nation. Money was needed by the State but the nations' representatives who were called upon to vote fresh taxation were treated high-handedly. No genuine attempt was made to organize the iniquitous system of farming out the collection of taxes to syndicates of financiers. In the midst of their miseries the people were squeezed unmercifully. Antiquated and iniquitous *aides* and taxes and subsidies and requisitions of all kinds, including the *gabelle* (the tax on salt of which certain quantities had to be consumed) with vexatious penalties, had fallen more and more heavily upon the people without profiting the State. Insolent fraud and flaunting magnificence meant intolerable oppression and utter misery. No wonder that the French learned to hate taxation and have even in our day not forgotten the tribulations of their forbears. The *fisc* remains something which it is almost a duty to evade.

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* See Chapter I, Book III, of Rambaud's *History of French Civilisation.*

To understand the old French Monarchy one should turn to Bossuet, who writes that the State resides in the person of the Prince. In him is expressed the Nation. The King alone made the law without regard to the general will; he was the living law and above the law. He was the delegate of God; His representative on earth. He did not draw his power from the people but held his crown by Divine right. It must not be supposed that the notion was altogether exempt of dignity. In its highest form it placed the Crown above the King, made the Royal domain inalienable, and was intended to operate in the permanent interests of France. But to place such power in the hands of any man, who was scarcely hampered by the nobles or the chiefs of the Church, who were content, after Royalty had cleverly turned Feudalism to its profit, with their privileges, was dangerous. There was a perpetual desire for aggrandizement. War was a way to aggrandizement. That the King and his Court should be separated by a great gulf from the common people was not deprecated, since the separation increased the sense of power. Hence general illiteracy was taken to be desirable.

The Ancien Régime—and this in the eyes of French democracy is the strongest criticism against it—was built on inequality. That there should be social distinctions is inevitable, perhaps; but nothing does the Frenchman demand so emphatically as equality before the law, equality of opportunity, equality in respect of civic duties, and the equality of common manhood. He will admit acquired superiority of position. He will acknowledge with good grace the hierarchy which has necessarily fashioned itself, because he realizes that the rank which is achieved by capacity has its utility. But he has a horror of hereditary honours, which must imply as their counterpart hereditary subservience. The stations of men were determined by their birth. If they were noble they enjoyed prerogatives in every domain. If they were lowly-born they were subject to oppression. Even the exercise of a trade was not free. The old guilds were close corporations, jealous of each other, and the rules which they laid down for their members were far more severe than those laid down by the trade unions to-day. If one were a shoemaker, for example, one had to be careful not to repair shoes.

Pre-Roman Gaul had its aristocracy and its Druids. Roman Gaul had its nobles and its slaves. The Middle Ages had their lords, their villeins, and their serfs. It was for the Revolution to declare that the only nobility was the nobility of character, knowledge, and service. It was for the Revolution to declare that justice was not to be bought or to be transmitted as a family apanage, that the tremendous traffic in blank *lettres de cachet*, which were openly sold, should cease. It was for the Revolution to decree that local rivalries and confusion of customs should be abolished with the abolition of the provinces; that there should not be Bretons and Flamands and Provencaux, but merely Frenchmen inhabiting the Loire Inférieure, the Nord, and the Bouches du Rhône; that there should be no boroughs, no towns, no villages, but only communes. It was for the Revolution to lay down the principle of fraternity and to establish a system of public assistance for the needy, to substitute uniformity for disorder, equality for privilege, liberty for bondage.

When the French people rebelled against the Monarchy and against the surviving Feudalism they set in motion forces which shook the world. They laid down principles that were either accepted or fought for—for the fight is not ended—in every quarter of the globe. They released the pent-up aspirations of mankind. There were reactions, it is true, but the Revolution shattered the foundations on which European order was constructed in the eighteenth century, and those foundations have never been repaired. A new ideology which made a powerful appeal to the peoples came into existence, and since France was its cradle the French were confirmed in their view that they are the missionaries of civilization. In the Middle Ages, when they pointed the way to Palestine and fought the Infidel, the French thought themselves to be the Soldiers of God. Later France was persuaded that she is the Soldier of Right.

We should keep in mind the main threads of French history after the decline of the Roman power. Various peoples invaded the country—the Vandals and the Huns endeavouring to profit by the weakness of Rome and the comparative helplessness of the Gaul. But of all the invaders the Franks were militarily and politically the strongest, and Clovis defeated the Romans at Soissons (486), the Alamans at Tolbiac (496), the Burgundians at Dijon (500), the Visigoths at Vouillé (507), and achieved a momentary unity. The Merovingians extended their power over the Basques, the Bretons. throughout Germany, and along the Danube. But the succession was divided among the sons of Clovis. They had an army of officials, and these officials gradually took possession of real authority. There was no national or provincial Assembly. The *Rois Fainéants*, idle Kings, were guided by Mayors of the Palace. With the land parcelled out, without effective leadership, the country became the battle-ground of ambition, avarice, crime. The State was despoiled ; bishops and landowners ruled, themselves beyond and above the State laws ; and courtiers exempted themselves from taxation. The nobles farmed out their land to men who owed them rent in the shape of produce, service, obedience, and it is in this degenerescence of the Merovingian Monarchy that are to be found the origins of Feudalism.

France was broken up into two or three hundred independent States. It is remarkable that the dynasty nominally endured so long. Finally, Pépin le Bref, a Mayor of the Palace, assumed the Crown at Soissons, and seeking the protection of the Church was anointed by the Pope. He was the son of the Frankish Duke, Charles the Hammerer, who had beaten the Arabs at Poitiers and at Avignon and at Nîmes. He began the formidable task of restoring authority in a dismembered State. His son Charlemagne greatly extended the Empire, establishing the dynasty of the Carlovingians. He was an extraordinary fighter and centralizer. The Lombards in Northern Italy, the Arabs in Northern Spain, the Saxons, the Barbarians, and the Huns upon the Danube, all succumbed to him, and eventually he was crowned Emperor of the West by the Pope in Rome in the year 800.

Shortly afterwards the Norman raids of France began. By the Treaty of Verdun in 843 the mighty Empire split asunder. One of the grandsons of Charlemagne took Italy, Alsace, and Holland; another the German lands; and a third a France which was bounded by the Rhône, the Saône, Argonne, and the Scheldt. The French King annexed territory which is now known as Lorraine, but the single authority was again destroyed. There were scores of large fiefs and a multitude of petty despots at the end of the tenth century. The feudal system truly established itself. The Court of the King was merely a convenient centre. The hereditary principle was affirmed. Small proprietors were bound to place themselves under large proprietors. There was by now a definite hierarchy with an elaborate convention of obligations in the shape of military service and of offerings. Dynastic disputes fill the record of the times. In the year 987 the notables at Senlis elected Hugues Capet, then a feudal lord among other feudal lords, as their chief, and the Capetians reigned in a direct line to the first quarter of the fourteenth century, when the Valois took up the succession.

The personal domain of the King was small, but it was gradually extended by wars, by treaties, and by marriages. Considerable ability was often shown, yet the struggle to construct a united kingdom was prolonged and was subjected to the most violent vicissitudes. Burgundy, for example, was lost early in the eleventh century and was not recovered for three hundred years. The Crusades, which began in the year 1096, helped the Kings. The absence of the lords was an advantage, and, moreover, they needed money and were obliged, in order to obtain it, to abandon their prerogatives. The Normans made themselves felt in Italy and in England. In the course of the attempt to subjugate the unruly vassals, the English and the French fought fiercely. Louis VI regarded Henry I of England as his vassal, but was routed by the English at Brennville (1119). Louis VII in 1152 disastrously divorced Eleonore of Aquitaine, who thereupon married Henry Plantagenet. Henry was already master of Anjou, Maine, Touraine, and inherited Normandy and England. He personally conquered Brittany and received from Eleonore, Guyenne, Poitou, Saintonge and Angoumois. For three hundred years the feud between France and England continued with varying success on either side.

When in 1328 Philip VI came to the throne, Edward IV of England claimed the succession, and what is known as the Hundred Years' War began. By the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360 the ransom of the French King, who had been taken prisoner, was fixed at twelve provinces and three cities; and about this time English was substituted for French in the English courts. But presently the tide of battle turned, and the English possessions in France at the end of the reign of Charles V (1380) were small. The English were, however, to have their revenge when the Armagnacs and the Burgundians fought. With the Burgundians as Allies, the English entered Paris (1420), and Henry VI of England was proclaimed King at Saint Denis two years later. At first Charles VII reigned over only five provinces in the centre and the south of France. But then came the miracle of Joan of Arc. Orleans was relieved (1429); the Burgundians were disarmed (1435). The English left Paris (1436) and were routed in Normandy (1450). Then it was possible for a national policy to be resumed. A permanent national army had been created; the lot of the peasant had been improved; and in the next century, though the hostility between the workers and their "patrons" had become acute, it was possible to place their relations on a better footing. Louis XI was the most active and implacable enemy of the independent nobles. They formed leagues against him, but he resolved to make royal power prevail and with cunning and skill re-fashioned Monarchical France. In 1528 Francois I stated in Letters Patent that he held again the majority of the ancient duchies and counties.

The religious wars then troubled the Continent and divided France. Not until Henri IV, a Bourbon of pure French blood, came to the throne in 1594, was there a possibility of pacification. Henri was a Huguenot whose claims were supported by Queen Elizabeth of England, but who was opposed by the Catholics, who relied upon Spain. When he saw that the only obstacle between him and the possession of the kingdom was his religion, he abjured his religion. "Paris," he said, "is worth a mass." And Paris indeed opened its gates to him, and the Spanish garrison left the same day. He delivered Burgundy from the Spaniards; and regained Picardy; and Brittany, the last defender of the "Ligue," submitted. Then it was that he, by the Edict of Nantes (1598), gave a legal status to the Protestants, wiping out the memory of the massacre on St. Bartholomew's Day a quarter of a century before. He was perhaps the wisest and ablest of the long line of French Kings. His reign was enriched by the reforms of Sully. He restored royal authority. He framed a scheme for the permanent peace of Europe through a European league and by means of arbitration. He prepared the way for the ultimate triumph of Absolute Monarchy. But it remained for Louis XIII, assisted from 1624 onwards by Richelieu, to carry the principle of Absolute Monarchy to its zenith.

What is commonly called the Ancien Régime begins about the end of the sixteenth century and continues with Louis XIII, Louis XIV, Louis XV, and Louis XVI, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But France during this long space of time was by no means immobile. She did not present a fixed form but from generation to generation underwent multiple modifications. If one is sometimes compelled to generalize, it should always be remembered that, as Frantz Funck-Brentano has pointed out, social life under Louis XIII offers greater contrasts with social life towards the end of the seventeenth century, than the social life of the declining seventeenth century offers with the social life of post-Revolutionary times. He goes so far as to question whether the reign of Louis XVI should properly be included under the general description of the Ancien Régime, because during that reign political and social transformations were important and rapid. Perhaps the Revolution began with his accession.

Louis XIII became King in 1610, but it was fourteen years later that the influence of Cardinal Richelieu made itself fully felt. His brilliant intelligence consolidated the supremacy of his royal master and gave France complete consciousness of herself. By the most skilful diplomatic and military action France was enabled to overcome her Spanish and her Austrian enemies. Alsace was conquered (1639), Arras was retaken (1640), Rousillon was regained (1642). The policy of Mazarin, Richelieu's successor, and the subsequent sage administration of Colbert, made the reign of Louis XIV—the longest in European history—a series of triumphs, until towards the end serious mistakes and unfortunate wars weakened the King and the Roi Soleil became a setting sun.

Expenditure was on a lavish scale and many of the wars were " wars of magnificence." An important date is that of 1648, when the Treaty of Westphalia was signed, ratifying the French annexation of Alsace. Catholic Austria and Catholic Spain, who ranged the German Protestants on her side, were most formidable rivals. England with her Continental Allies declared war against France and victory vacillated. Although the French kept Strasburg they lost their Flemish and Italian conquests. Prussia became a kingdom as the eighteenth century opened, and England obtained Gibraltar. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) was an attempt to impose upon France a single religion—Catholicism ; but Louis proclaimed the rights of the French Church and opposed the pretensions of Rome. In consequence of the Royal decrees tens of thousands of Protestants exiled themselves. New industries were established with the support of the

State—woollen goods at Abbeville and other places, porcelain at Sèvres, pottery at Nevers, tapestry at Aubusson, and so forth ; and British, Italian, Dutch, and Flemish workers were brought into the country. Trades were protected from foreign competition and administrative order was introduced in the realm of commerce. A mercantile marine was created in emulation of the Dutch, and monopolies were granted to various companies for the exploitation of the commerce of the East and of Africa. A navy was also built. Richelieu had already realized the importance of a strong marine, but little had been done for its development until Colbert took the work in hand and increased the fleet to 270 vessels, which were manned by the seamen and fishermen in accordance with a roll which was drawn up. Canals were dug and roads were improved ; ports were equipped ; and generally France took a foremost place. That place was soon, in spite of the splendours of the Court during the Regency and under Louis XV, to be jeopardized. There was a financial catastrophe through Law's system of speculative finance, and France was again fighting against Russia, Austria, England, in Italy, in Poland, in the Low Countries, in the Mediterranean. Eventually she lost Canada and India and Louisiana and the great colonizing movement ceased. Nevertheless Lorraine was definitely united to France (1766) and Corsica was purchased.

Louis XVI signed with the Americans, who were in revolt against British rule, a Treaty of Alliance and of Commerce (1778), and Benjamin Franklin was received in France with enthusiasm. Volunteers such as Lafayette embarked for America, and the peculiar friendship of the United States for France is due to this intervention, anti-English in intention. Unhappily the King, ill-advised, unable to understand the new forces which were at work, beset by financial difficulties, failed to take the leadership in reform that would have averted the Revolution. But the second half of the eighteenth century was nevertheless a period of progress; perhaps it was precisely because of that progress that the Revolution came. Foreign historians such as the German Wahl and the Russian Ardascheff, who have carefully studied the epoch, arrive at conclusions which are scarcely in conformity with the current ideas, but which are justified. Wahl finds that progress manifested itself principally in the towns, and the ascension after the death of Louis XV was swift. Agriculture, however, also benefited. Lavasseur writes that the development of agriculture is one of the characteristic traits of the economy of France in the second half of the eighteenth century. New methods, such as alternate crops, were taught by numerous agricultural societies, which were encouraged by the Government. The intendants furnished seed to the peasants and organized committees of cultivators to advise on the best measures. The use of manures was generalized. External commerce was quadrupled in the interval between the reign of Louis XIV and the Revolution. Maritime commerce grew at a greater pace in France than in England; and Bordeaux, Dieppe, Le Havre, La Rochelle, and Cherbourg, were prodigiously improved, while rivers were more and more rendered navigable. Between 1737 and 1789 France constructed thirty thousand miles of additional roads. Senac de Meilhan writes: " Industry is animated and commerce becomes every day more flourishing. The ports of Nantes, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Rouen, are filled with ships. The Atlantic is joined to the Mediterranean and the treasures of the two worlds flow and reflow to and from all the provinces of the Kingdom. The town of Lyons, the centre of the national industry, imposes our modes upon three quarters of the world. In the smallest towns more commodious and better ornamented houses are to be seen." Necker computed that in the dying days of the Ancien Régime the taxes on articles of consumption augmented by two million francs a year. In the domain of letters, science, and art, such names as those of Lavoisier, Guyton-Morveau, Berthollet, Monge, Laplace, Lagrange, Daubenton, Lamarck, Jussieu, are to be found. Turbine steamers were invented by Jouffroy d'Abbans (1776); the Montgolfier brothers experimented with balloons (1783); Philippe Lebon discovered gas for lighting purposes (1786). The greatest of French sculptors, Houdon, was at work, and Fragonard was painting his graceful canvases. Louis XVI furniture attained the perfection of industrial art and the silks of the same epoch executed on the designs of Philippe de Lasalle are incomparable.

Public instruction was seriously undertaken. The French artillery was the best of its kind and the navy, which had sadly fallen, was revived. Of the French philosophers we shall speak again. The verdict of Funck-Brentano is that in spite of the feebleness of the Monarch the reign of Louis XVI was the gloriously crepuscular end of the Old France. Although vital reforms were not introduced, it is wrong to suppose that nothing was done for the people. Free buying and selling of grain was decreed, and in a Royal edict we read that: "The right to work is the most sacred of rights and any law which conflicts with it, violates the natural right." Protestants acquired their civic liberty and the Jews were relieved from financial obligations which bore upon them. Religious cults were respected, and (declared Louis XVI) "the natural law does not permit us to refuse to non-Catholics the registration of their births, marriages, and deaths, in order that they may enjoy, like the rest of our subjects, the civil effects which result from registration." Torture was banished from the judiciary procedure. An attempt was made to abolish *lettres de cachet*. The dungeon of Vincennes was closed and the demolition of the Bastille was officially decided. Provincial assemblies were instituted and some sort of decentralization might have been effected had not the towns themselves protested.

A great social transformation was taking place. The family, which was the basis of French society, was being modified. Paternal authority had been absolute, but the foundations of family life were shaken before the Revolution struck the final blow. France traditionally had become a series of family cells enclosed in larger communal cells, which in their turn were enclosed in a provincial cell; and there were between the different districts, in spite of the unifying work of the Monarchy, solid barriers. The classes had been close corporations. There was still great diversity of customs and of legislation. What helped the Revolution was the spontaneous popular movement; the breaking down of these barriers by the extension of social relations. Commerce and industry demanded larger spheres. The national sentiment was given a new impetus. There would, without the Revolution, have been a general evolution. Between the weak, hesitating King and the people there were intermediary bodies; strong, active, armed with traditions, privileges, wealth; and a terrific shock was produced.

Yet if there was opposition at the end which resulted in an enormous upheaval, there was, properly considered, no break in historical continuity, and Royalty itself led France to the Revolution. The Revolution was possible because under Royalty France had become ripe, by gradual changes in family, communal, provincial, and administrative life, for a fresh formal expression of herself.

From the earliest days there had been assemblies of a more or less national character, but the dignitaries who met with their retainers under the Merovingians and Carlovingians were scarcely representative of the people. They were rather Councillors of the King. Often indeed they were merely called together to receive orders. The chronicles show over a hundred formal assemblies were convoked by the Merovingians. Conventions were also held under the Capetians, but the notables stayed away, and Louis IX—known as Saint Louis—one of the leaders of the Crusades, had the habit of consulting with the burghers when difficulties arose. The commoners in the thirteenth century frequently took part in deliberations with the clergy and the nobles, and when in 1301 Pope Boniface insisted that the Papacy should be obeyed rather than the King and called the French bishops to Rome, Philippe le Bel organized a counter-demonstration at Notre Dame to protest against the Papal claims. In this counter-demonstration the commoners took part though the three classes deliberated separately. In later years—for example when the King was offended by the Order of Templars, and when war was contemplated—this measure was repeated. The system of convoking the States General—the meeting of representatives of the country—was developed further under the Valois in the fourteenth century. France was open to the English ; help was urgently wanted. Northern France at this time spoke the *langue d'Oil*, and Southern France spoke a separate language, the *langue d'Oc*. There was need of union, there was need of as wide and common expression of loyalty as was possible. On this occasion the three estates consulted together and voted men and taxes for the defence of the realm. It would hardly be too much to see in this assembly the origin of the modern Parliament. After the defeat of Poitiers

(1356) another session was held under the joint leadership of three men representing the three classes—the Archbishop of Rheims, the Duc d'Orléans, and Etienne Marcel, a Paris draper.

There were further meetings, but the demand that the nation should be taxed only by its free consent was relinquished. At Tours (1484), when all the provinces were represented, a bolder spirit was displayed, and the deputies demanded the right of accepting or rejecting proposed taxes. Nominally the claim was admitted but the promises were not in fact fulfilled. The habit of meeting together in a representative capacity fell into desuetude and was seldom practised during the sixteenth century. What proved to be the last meeting for a long time was held under Louis XIII in 1614, when Richelieu was among the clergy. The orders quarrelled among themselves, and it was these divisions which were in great part responsible for the abandonment of the parliamentary experiment. Throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries the nation as a whole was inarticulate. Other countries, notably England, were in possession of a Parliament, but in France the King and his ministers ruled withuot hindrance. During the eighteenth century the doctrine that the people should be the supreme arbiter of its own conduct and destiny was preached and widely approved. How are the wishes of the people to be ascertained? The discussion in France has never completely ceased. The Revolutionary chiefs frequently changed their minds. Unanimity is of course impossible, but what are the rights of the minority if it is convinced that the majority is wrong on a vital issue? Does the deputy hold a specific mandate or, once elected, is he free to follow his own judgment? How is he to be elected? Even the Revolutionaries at first considered that the payment of certain sums in taxes alone should give the right to a vote. The Empire, the Restoration, the July Monarchy, all denied universal suffrage, and Napoléon III, like his uncle, preferred to consult the people in his own chosen time and in his own chosen way by plebiscites. French thinkers in the Third Republic are convinced that the ideal democratic method has not yet been found, and it is because France is still in the stage of experimentation that there is governmental instability.

French literature, as distinct from the purely Latin, starts with the Middle Ages. The troubadours of the South composed graceful lyrics in the *langue d'Oc,* while the Northern *trouvères* composed epics and compiled chronicles in the *langue d'Oil.* Influenced by the culture of the South the Northern bards became more refined, while losing nothing of their vigour. These earlier epics have been divided into three cycles. There are the Frankish narratives, which group themselves around Charlemagne; the *Chanson de Roland,* which is an anonymous production of the eleventh century, is commonly known, and is typical of this cycle. There are the Celtic Arthurian legends, which tell of the Round Table and Tristan and Lancelot and the Quest of the Holy Grail. These legends have been adopted by the English, and Wagner has retold the Quest of Parsifal—who is the French hero Percival. Again, there is the classical cycle of Troy Town, which has also inspired English writers. The Roman de Renart based upon folk-lore has also been retold by Chaucer and Goethe. Upon the Roman de la Rose, Chaucer and Spenser modelled their verses. *Mystères* and miracles, farces and moralities, abound in the Middle Ages. The drama, one may say, was born in the Church. At first it was liturgical and afterwards the language was vulgarized. The *mystère* is a piece which is based upon the marvellous, and in it there is a curious mixture of tragic and comic. It obeys none of the rules of classical drama. Among the farces which have come down to us that of L'Avocat Pathelin is a masterpiece. The moralties, which are usually comic in character, are allegorical. Later—in the middle of the fifteenth century—François Villon, the first authentic French poet, adopted a simple and energetic style; while Charles d'Orléans is remarkable for his elegance and clarity. Philippe de Commynes is sometimes described as the first French historian, though he had been preceded by such chroniclers as Joinville, who wrote the story of Saint Louis, and Froissart, who traced a remarkable account of the chivalric society of his time. Admirable as Froissart is, picturesque as his narrative remains, he lacks the critical spirit of Commynes, who is a philosopher as well as a narrator, and endeavours to draw from his facts the historical laws that explain them. There are, besides, primitive prose romances, among which should be mentioned that naïve and fresh work *Aucassin et Nicolette*.

The influence of Christianity was exceedingly fruitful. Although for the most part the people were illiterate, and the Church was for a long time the sole teacher, education became gradually freer with the founding of the University, and its organization after the eleventh century. Theology, law, medicine, and the arts, made headway, and were by no means confined to the monasteries. The Crusades from the eleventh to the latter part of the thirteenth century stimulated French interest in the East, not only from a commercial point of view but from a cultural point of view. The long wars and the national divisions retarded the movement, but by the end of the fourteenth century letters and arts were protected. With the Renaissance and the installation of the first printing presses at Paris, the French language became equal in wealth and dignity to the classical tongues. The poets of the Pléïade, of whom Ronsard is the most famous, wrote charming lyrics, unequalled in their kind, until Victor Hugo, in the nineteenth century, freed French poetry from the fetters which had been placed upon it and gave new wings to lyricism. The poets of the Pléïade were at once the most correct and the sweetest of the French lyricists. In this wonderful sixteenth century, Rabelais, one of the fathers of the modern French language and of modern French thought, propounded his problems with a robustness, with a wealth of words, with a richness of humour, that have never been surpassed. His tremendous satire, his healthy criticism, were clothed with amazing erudition. Under the apparent buffoonery there are pregnant ideas of reform. He fulminated against the prevailing conception of justice. He attacked Rome in so far as Rome had become a stultifying agent. He showed what education should be. There is no great question which he has left untouched.

Calvin was beginning to write in French and was transforming the old theological conceptions. Montaigne, who is in some respects the most French of all French writers, was pleasantly expounding his views on human life. They were views which were shot through and through with scepticism, yet not persuaded that reason was sufficient, he held that faith was necessary. In him there is an acute sensibility. He is moved by an immense curiosity. He aims at clarity. The formation of judgment is for him better than the acquisition of precise knowledge, and the acquisition of precise knowledge is excellent only if it helps in the formation of judgment. The translation of Plutarch's *Lives* by Amyot marks the progress that was made in fixing the French tongue. Generally there was a tremendous stirring, a universal seeking. Scholasticism in its worst sense, that is to say, in so far as it was a prison, was being beaten down. But the rejection of the immediate past did not mean that the pure classic sources were ignored. On the contrary, men turned to them for inspiration, though resolved to live in their own age; and they founded a fresh culture.

In the humanist movement scientific work was given an important place. The State encouraged the arts and accorded posts to the artists. Architecture began to make use of Italian ornamentation. The next century brought concision and elegance. France soon became the chief intellectual centre of the world. She caught up the mantle of Italy. Polish, refinement, preciosity, purity, classicism, were brought to their highest pitch. Poetry suffered; versification became too strict; individuality, lyricism, spontaneity, could hardly survive the rigorous rules. Yet it was a splendid period during which great writers weeded the vocabulary of useless foreign words. In 1635 Richelieu founded the Académie Française. Its purpose was to survey the language, to purify it, to compile a standard dictionary; but it was also to be a *salon* which would give the tone to society. Doubtless Richelieu saw in the Académie a means of imposing, in the spiritual sphere, a discipline upon France. The forty "immortals" were to strike a key-note. The learned professions flourished. There was by now not only a nobility of the sword: there was a nobility of the robe. France was populated by about nineteen million people. Over a million belonged to the clerical and the aristocratic classes. If the nobles were falling into futility and the prelates were idle courtiers, there was also a widespread love of literature.

Corneille produced *Le Cid*, the first notable tragedy in French. The lines are filled with energy and with colour. The themes of honour, of heroism, of grandeur, are glowingly elaborated. Patriotism, devotion, pity, are virtues which are expatiated upon. Corneille cannot be too greatly admired, though his grandiloquence and excessive use of antithesis are not to be imitated. The most profound effect, however, was produced by the publication in 1637 of the little work of Descartes—*Discours de la Méthode.* Brief as the discourse is, it was destined to produce durable results on the French character. French education is cast in the Cartesian mould. The discourse is filled with the *bon sens* which he extolled. Everybody, he says, naturally possesses this good sense. It is the method of cultivating it and of applying it that matters. Without method much study may produce only a consciousness of ignorance. He insisted on contact with life. He demanded that reason should occupy itself with the diversity of manners and opinions and ascertain the truth of all things. There is nothing that should not be questioned. It is by constant inquiry and careful meditation that one must perfect oneself. Descartes lays down four rules: one should not accept as truth anything that cannot be recognized as such by a consideration of the evidence; difficulties should be boldly faced and analysed with the utmost minuteness; thought should be conducted by order, commencing with the simplest propositions; there should be the fullest classification. Throughout he insists on the need of evidence and of analysis. Throughout he declares that whatever comes from or is imposed by education, imagination, or sentiment, should be subjected to doubt. His doubt is almost universal, but he starts with the premise that he thinks and therefore is. He also accepts the idea of perfectibility, which can, he supposes, come only from God. Descartes opens the way to modern philosophy. He escapes from mere scholasticism, from theological concepts, and with him living philosophy enters literature. It would be hard to match this brilliant exposition for the exactitude of its expression. He concentrates his vast theme in a few pages.

In some contrast with him is Pascal, the greatest of the Jansenists established at Port Royal. He was educationalist and moralist. With his rapid, nervous style, he touched everything with genius. He argued that reason was not enough without revelation. In him were combined the two characteristics of the French mind, for he too, though a believer, was also a sceptic who called for evidence and for analysis. There is in him a trace of that pragmatism which is peculiarly French, for he argued that if religious belief is erroneous one loses nothing by accepting it, and if it is right one gains everything. In some sense he, with all his enthusiasm, completes Montaigne. It is not in reason or in the senses or in the imagination or even in the human judgment that truth can be discovered. What is accepted as truth this side of the Pyrenees appears to be error on the other side, and the heart has its reasons that the reason cannot know. Pascal is a pessimist in that he holds the destiny of man cannot be attained on earth, and he is impressed by the contradictions of human nature—with its grandeur and its misery. There is in his argumentation a real dignity, and though naturally eloquent he despises useless ornament. His irony is scathing and the subtlety of his style denotes the comprehensive thinker. Particularly in his *Lettres Provinciales*, in which he demolishes the casuists, is his suppleness shown.

Another aspect of the French spirit is revealed in the cold brilliance of La Rochefoucauld. His maxims are sharp and glittering. They speak of disenchantment, of disdain. They bitterly assert that the mainspring of action is *amour propre* and self-interest. Totally different is La Fontaine, with his bonhomie, his universal sympathy, his accessibility to every emotion, his interest in the panorama of life. It should not be forgotten that the French are brought up, as it were, on La Fontaine. The Fables of La Fontaine are learned by heart by every school-child. His verses are currently employed. You can scarcely open a newspaper without finding in the headlines a verse of La Fontaine which recalls one of his little stories and its moral. You can scarcely engage in a conversation without some reference to La Fontaine. He has given the French their images of everyday life. His apparent naïvety is made up of the keenest observation and of verbal perfection. His animals are pretexts for the painting of humanity in all times and in all climes, and his morality is the lesson of experience. He takes sides neither with the weak nor with the strong ; he merely sets down what veritably is and draws no dogmatic deductions. What is the use of not accepting things as they are ? he appears to ask. He will not grow indignant at the foolish spectacle. In this he typifies a certain side of the French mentality for that mentality is manifold. La Fontaine presents a good example of the manner in which writers were protected in his age. He lived on the liberalities of the great and was accepted because of his talent, although the King opposed his admission into the Académie on account of the licentiousness of his *contes*.

With Racine came the great creation, in this age, of the classical drama. Corneille had Roman and Spanish ancestors. Racine had only Greek ancestors. He accepted the " unities "—singleness of interest, of time, and of place. The visible drama is relatively small : the conflict is psychological. Racine generally eschews high-sounding words. He is in strong reaction against the heroic and the romantic. His action springs from the character of his personages. He is all nuances. It is, however, upon Molière that the true French theatre rests. He went neither to Greece nor to Rome: he modelled himself on the old French story-tellers; he revelled in farce; he scorned solemnity. In many ways he, with Montaigne, is more French than any other French author. Ridicule is a French virtue. Raillery is a French force. Molière turns whatever is foolish or odious to derision, but he does this with good-humour. He sees through all pretensions and he pricks glittering bubbles. Whoever would wish to understand the French must read the authors I have enumerated, but above all he must read and re-read Molière. When Molière unmasks his personages he does not try to correct them: the chief thing is not to reform them but to laugh at them. Like Beaumarchais in the eighteenth century he prefers to laugh rather than to cry, but he will not preach. Hypocrisy, misanthropy, miserliness, coquetry, prudery, are amusing: they need not be taken tragically. With what gusto he paints his portraits of his men and women! But they tend to become types rather than persons. He generalizes freely. The intrigue is of little importance. What he aims at is acute exposition, which is always comic. Writing for the Court, he could not refrain from mocking the Court, this master of the comedy of manners.

Others who should be mentioned as belonging to the age of Louis XIV are Malherbe, the poet; Bossuet, the eloquent divine; Boileau, the eminent critic; and Saint Simon, who in his memoirs has left an incomparable portrait gallery of the epoch. There was an extensive patronage of arts in general, since this helped to minister to the glory of the King, but many of the artists lost their independence. The painters were expected to deal with mythological and antique subjects. Le Brun, who was mediocre, was most admired in art. Yet Claude Lorrain was producing his masterpieces, and Nicolas Poussin, who lived in Rome, was pursuing his career. The Château of Versailles is an example of the architecture of the time. In music, Lulli pandered to the Italian taste of the Court. The eighteenth century it will be convenient to deal with when we write of the Revolution, for it was dominated by the philosophers who gave an impetus to the Revolution, and social and political problems commanded the attention of the intellectuals. Yet there were authors, such as Le Sage, who wrote picaresque novels; André Chénier, a warm and colourful poet; Bernardin de Saint-Pierre with his *Paul et Virginie*; the Abbé Prévost, who in *Manon Lescaut* admirably depicted character. In architecture an imposing style was adopted. Soufflot built the Panthéon; the Little Trianon was erected for Marie Antoinette and was decorated with the *fêtes galantes* of Watteau, Boucher, Fragonard. The over-sentimental Greuze was highly appreciated. Rameau, the first great French composer, produced his musical gems. In science there were among others Réaumur and Lavoisier, Buffon, Cuvier, Lamarck, the eminent naturalist.

The policy of the Kings of France was not only to form a homogeneous nation, a coherent State, and to reduce the individual power of the feudal lords, but also to assure by solid frontiers the independence of the nation and by its strength to protect it against outside attack. If one looks at the maps of Europe in successive centuries one will be struck by the perpetual and considerable changes which were taking place throughout the Continent while France remained fairly fixed as regards general shape. Nevertheless, though the sea and the mountains determine the general outline of France, there were on the Northern and the Eastern sides swellings and shrinkings. As Royalty became more powerful it dreamt of a mightier kingdom and the grandeur of France in Europe was often supposed to be dependent upon mere territorial area. It is a mistake which was to be repeated by Napoléon. The greatness of France reposes upon other things, and it is fortunate for her that she possessed natural frontiers which could not be materially altered for long. France, unlike the Empire of Central Europe, was not an amorphous mass, but was from the earliest times a sufficiently concentrated country which might indeed spread out a little in this or that direction, or might be reduced a little now and again, but which on the whole retained its fundamental shape and size. Arrested by the ocean, by the Pyrenees, by the Mediterranean, by the Alps, the expansion of France could only be in Flanders or in Lorraine and Burgundy. Much of French history is the tale of the conflict between France and the Germanic States for the possession of this intermediate territory in the North and in the East.

Albert Sorel, in his illuminating account of French diplomacy, well remarks that though pretexts change and theories are modified, though the means employed are different, there has, in the nature of things, been a diplomatic persistence in a single purpose in France, and a sort of constancy in the pursuit of French designs. Throughout revolutions in ideas, and in spite of upheavals of customs and transformation of institutions, a singular course of circumstances created and sustained the French tradition.

French policy was perhaps sufficiently indicated by French geography. The mysterious instincts inherent in the origin of the nation were not accidental. They became the dominating laws of French progress, and it would be difficult to imagine these laws to be other than they are. But if there was something restrictive in the geographical conformation of France, the rulers were often misled by mere accidental historical episodes. There brooded over the French Monarchs the immense shadow of Charlemagne and his gigantic Empire. At first they indulged in vague aspirations, but gradually these aspirations became conscious and concrete. When the English came to have less sway in France, the successors of the great Emperor were anxious to restore the Empire in some measure and to carry the influence of France into Germany. Above all, on the Rhine they wished to rule. The Rhine was a French obsession and still is in atavistic moments. It was not only the Kings who cherished ambitions, but even in the Middle Ages a whole body of men came into existence with one idea, that of creating a Western Empire.

There were negotiators, legists, churchmen, warriors, who championed the cause of a Greater France. In the poetry of the Middle Ages one may find the notion of an Empire that should contain Bavaria and Normandy, Anjou and Brittany, Lombardy and Navarre and Tuscany ; and in 1300 Pierre du Bois, a lawyer addressed to Philippe le Bel the development of a scheme by which a Universal Monarchy should be established which would extend through various members of the French royal family as far as Constantinople. The Pope was to be dependent on the French King and to be compulsorily his ally. Germany was to come under French governance. The notion was chimerical enough but it was supported by the most significant arguments. The leadership of Europe had, it was urged, been carried ever westwards—from Greece to Rome and from Rome to Germany and thus to France in the person of Charlemagne. The Empire of Charlemagne had comprised not only Aquitania in the South of France ; Neustria in the North-West of France ; Burgundy in the South-East of France ; but also Austrasia in the East and included Bavaria and the Dalmatian coast on the Adriatic and afterwards extended to Saxony and Bohemia and the greater part of Italy.*

Such an epoch cannot be forgotten. It persists not only in the imagination of Monarchs but in the minds of the people. Yet it was necessary that France, which had been broken up into a multitude of States, should indeed become independent, united, free from the invader, before she could expect by war and diplomacy and alliances to recover far-reaching boundaries. Not until France was in process of deliverance from the English could these ambitions really be reawakened. In the fifteenth century the Germanic countries were divided and the Holy Roman Empire sprawled across the Continent, huge but comparatively feeble, with its princes ranged against its Emperor and its towns ranged against its princes. An alliance was solicited by the Emperor with Charles VII against the Swiss, and by the Duke of Lorraine against the Imperial towns. About Lorraine the frontiers were uncertain. In a wide region princes and *seigneurs* were vassals both of the King and of the Empire. About this period the French claimed rights in Alsace, with a Rhine frontier, and demanded that the towns between the Meuse and the Vosges recognize French authority. Toul and Verdun agreed to the protectorship of the French, but Metz put up some resistance.

The marriage of the heir of Burgundy to the Austrian Prince began a bitter rivalry between the French House and the Austrian House, which was later to be joined to the Spanish House. Legal arguments were evoked. The doctrine of the natural limits of France, of the providential disposition of the country, was elaborated. The scholars wrangled. It is true, as Sorel remarks, that French designs in Italy, whether they were those of Charles VIII, who led an expedition to Milan, Florence, Rome, and Naples, with the inevitable result that the Italian princes allied themselves with Spain, Austria, and England, and obliged the French to leave, or of Napoléon who wished to provide Italy with a King of his blood, were pure diversions, foolish aberrations. It was in the Netherlands and on the Rhine that French diplomacy was bound to exercise itself seriously. There were repeated campaigns in Flanders which met with more or less success, whereas Italian wars were obviously hopeless.

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* The diplomatic chapters in the first volume of Sorel's great work are laid under contribution.

Again, it was around Lorraine and Luxemburg that the French expansionist efforts were truly directed. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries France was torn with internal troubles. Italy was hopelessly lost by François I. When Henri IV came to the throne, more realist conceptions began to prevail. The illusions of the Charlemagne legend began to disappear. The fight against Spain was formidable. Sensible men saw that it was necessary to limit French ambitions and to conquer only what France could keep. Sully wrote with enlightenment, attempting to moderate the French ardour of acquisition. Yet great designs were not altogether set aside. Henri IV himself believed that permanent peace would be obtained by a European confederation. The dominating power would be France, though the Pope would nominally be President of the League. The idea of buffer States—that is to say, States which would be neutral but would nevertheless be dominated by a supreme France—was born ; and the possibility of breaking up Western Europe for the benefit of France was examined precisely as it was examined by the peacemakers of Versailles in the twentieth century, when the ramshackle Austro-Hungarian Empire was shattered by sledge-hammer blows and French military men and French officials, who were not repudiated by Poincaré, endeavoured to shatter the German Reich about the Rhine.

A tradition had already been established, of which Richelieu was the continuator; but Richelieu had a keener sense of opportunities and of possibilities than some of his predecessors. His attention, though not altogether confined to the Rhine and Flanders, for he too had his Italian expeditions, was chiefly concerned in educating the public mind as to the need of fixing once and for all the natural frontiers of France on the Rhine and in Flanders. Under his inspiration during the reign of Louis XIII there were composed a number of works insisting on the necessity of such a policy. It is not without an appreciation of the irony that is induced by historical studies that one finds the seventeenth-century publicists declaring that once these proper French limits are permanently fixed peace will remain in perpetuity between France and Germany. Unfortunately, however, some of the arguments that were used in respect of Alsace and Lorraine were used in respect of other territories which were far more doubtfully genuine acquisitions to France.

The French were scarcely amenable to prudential considerations in their love of power, and the successors of Richelieu—among them the Revolutionaries—were not satisfied with the so-called natural limits. When Mazarin took up the task of Richelieu, and afterwards when Louis XIV became his own Minister, the affirmation that ancient Gaul was France was employed to perverted ends. Many of the wars of this time did not in the long run strengthen but weakened France. Louis XIV foolishly engaged in "Guerres de Magnificence," by striving for the Spanish succession with its twenty-two crowns. Louis forgot that French might, if not employed in moderation, would raise coalitions against France. In these coalitions England was the soul and Germany the army. French victories were often unavailing: there are military successes which are dangerous. Moreover, while France was engaged in Continental strife she encountered England in her attempts at colonial expansion.

When the grandson of Louis inherited the Spanish crown he found it difficult to reconcile himself to the exclusion of this grandson from the French throne, for he saw a grandiose possibility of a single reigning family in Southern and Western Europe, from Holland to Sicily, with a strong hold on North and South America. Well might he exclaim that the Pyrenees had been levelled to the ground! But such an artificial and monstrous Empire could not be contemplated by the rest of Europe. The French sustained heavy defeats, which darkened the declining days of the Roi Soleil.

The Spanish Bourbons, in the interests of peace, had to be barred from France. The situation was painfully restored. Lesson after lesson had been lost on the French Monarchs, who, despite many sage counsels, were perpetually departing from the true diplomatic tradition. Although France has made great conquests in Europe the French have never managed to retain their conquests. It is only when they return to their national doctrine that they can hope to be successful.

In the reign of Louis XV, in addition to further fighting against Russia, there was further fighting in Italy, Bohemia, Alsace-Lorraine, and elsewhere. Canada was lost and so was India, though Lorraine was finally won. As Austria was weakened Prussia was strengthened, and when later Austria and France tried to work together it was already too late. Austria was the hereditary enemy of France. For two hundred years the French Court had been consistently hostile to the House of Hapsburg, yet the Ambassador of Maria Theresa at Paris was skilful in negotiating an alliance in 1756 against Prussia. Russia, Sweden, and Saxony also agreed to join in a concerted attack on Prussia. It would seem that Prussia was threatened with annihilation, but Frederick well earned his title of The Great. He routed his enemies and was master of the situation. France had not won a new friend but she had created a new enemy. One of the reasons for the unpopularity of Marie Antoinette when the Revolution was unchained was that she was the daughter of Maria Theresa and was bitterly described as the Autrichienne.

It was during the lifetime of Louis XIII and of Louis XIV that international law was remarkably developed. The first great treatise on international law was published by Grotius in 1625. Later writers endeavoured to lay down diplomatic rules and to discover other methods than those of war of settling disputes. Certainly they were not successful in putting an end to war but they showed how States should be governed in their relations with each other both in peace and in war.

The Treaty of Westphalia (1648), though open to strong criticism, is a model of its kind, and whatever was the subsequent behaviour of the French Monarchs, there is in this Treaty a certain expression of the diplomatic maxim that States which are excessively large cannot endure. It was realized that aggrandizement is perilous, and although France has frequently acted in defiance of her conviction, it is a conviction which has been confirmed by events. Highly distinguished French generals and diplomatists during the past few years have in public utterances and in private conversations enunciated the view that France can only enfeeble her centre by expansion. Any weight at the extremities which destroys French homogeneity is unwise. Yet they make important reservations regarding the Rhine. In the North, French boundaries must be somewhat artificial, but the principal object is to have no foreign additions, to keep the contour of France as clean and clear and solid as is possible. France has not always observed this sensible doctrine, but it is nevertheless the guiding idea that has fashioned the French tradition in diplomacy.

At the beginning of the reign of Louis XVI, Vergennes strongly pleaded for such a voluntary, self-denying ordinance; and Barthèlemy declared that riches were not to be found in the invasion of the domains of others but in the proper exploitation of one's own domains. Yet always opposed to this spirit was the belief that peace could be based on universal authority. The Revolutionaries could not dispossess themselves of the spirit of conquest. They felt that they were missionaries, and that somehow by the spread of French enlightenment abroad, and the re-tracing of the map of Europe at French dictation, peace could be achieved. It has taken many generations to assure the general acceptance of the true French diplomatic tradition, but it would now seem that it has prevailed.

WORKS TO BE CONSULTED

There are many important historical works which deserve study, and in particular the writings of de Tocqueville (*L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*), Taine (*L'Ancien Régime*), Thierry, Fustel de Coulanges, Mignet, Michelet, Guizot, should be read. Lavisse edited a remarkably sound history; and in my opinion the work now in course of issue in fifteen volumes under the general direction of Gabriel Hanotaux dealing sectionally with every aspect of French history is altogether admirable. But I also recommend Ed. Driault's *L'Unité Française,* Louis Bertrand's *Louis XIV*, Funck-Brentano's *L'Ancien Régime*, Saint-Simon's *Mémoires*, Jacques Bainville's *Histoire de France*, and for a compact impartial account Victor Duruy's *Short History of France*. The best short textbook on French literature is that of René Doumic. See also Strowski's *La Sagesse Française.*

CHAPTER IV

THE RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION

Monarchy Outgrown—The Bourgeoisie—The Philosophers—Rights of Man—Course of the Struggle—The Convention—Constitutional Conceptions—French Eloquence—Peasant and Worker—New Nationalism—Lasting Changes

The French Revolution of 1789 is the most notable event in modern history. Its effects are felt more to-day than at any time. It has utterly transformed the outward institutions of society not only in France but throughout the world. Yet we may go far back to find the principles of the Revolution plainly enunciated. In the admirable work of Augustin Thierry on the Tiers Etat one may read that an orator at the meeting of the Etats Généraux in 1484 affirmed "Kingship is an office and not a heritage. It is the sovereign people which designates the Kings. The State belongs to the people. The people is the whole of the inhabitants and the Etats Généraux express a common will." The Revolutionaries three centuries later were emphatically to assert the same principles. Their conception of the national chief, of the sovereign people, of the State, and of Parliament, was not different. Yet there was certainly no widespread opposition to Absolute Monarchy until the eighteenth century, when the philosophers began to expound their theories, and with a wiser King who could have sufficiently evolved to have taken the leadership of the nation, France would have escaped the gigantic upheaval.

The need of a reconstruction of the State had become obvious. The Ancien Régime had fulfilled its purpose but was obsolete. It did not correspond to the requirements of a more enlightened society which was fast developing. Personal power, arbitrary rule, unmerited privileges, suppression of the masses, who though inarticulate were learning to think and were conscious that they were badly guided, were repudiated. Increasing education resulted in the general triumph of rationalism. There was nothing which was not criticized. The Church was criticized, but so was religion. The King was criticized, and so was Royalty. The Nobility was criticized, and so were the nobles. The institutions of the day were subjected to the closest examination and it was found that they had been built on a wrong basis. There was a universal challenge. The existing state of affairs was no longer taken for granted. Men were not content with superficial views; they went to the roots of all great human questions. The edifice, which had stood so long, was assailed in its foundations, and those foundations proved to be far from solid.

Taine and de Tocqueville and Sorel are in agreement on the paradox of the French Revolution: they suggest and sometimes state with a wealth of evidence that the Revolution broke out in France not because the abuses, social and political, were worse than in other countries, not because there was more despotism and more misery, but rather because the constitution of society was crumbling. It was largely because the Ancien Régime was already in process of disappearing that it was violently thrown down. There are yokes which become less supportable as they become lighter. There are slaveries which grow intolerable precisely as they are gradually lifted. It would seem that tyranny can only be exercised if it is exercised completely. If it is relaxed the very relaxation provokes revolt. While the peoples are crushed they are content with their lot. The dangerous moment is that of concessions. In France while there were indeed material reasons for a reversal of the old Monarchy, the moral reasons were probably of greater importance. The progress of civilization had made the populace more conscious of themselves. They were more easily exasperated. Serfdom had vanished except in certain regions of France and the peasant had become proprietor. Yet the peasant found himself worse off in some respects than he was in the thirteenth century.

Royal authority had subjected feudal authority and local authority. In Spain, in Austria, in Prussia, and in other countries which remained calm, there was greater oppression than in France. While the peasant was obliged to work for others he did not particularly complain, but when he worked for himself and discovered that a portion of the fruits of his labours was taken from him he was irritated. Moreover, the lords, while enjoying privileges, neglected their duties, and no longer protected the peasant. The State, which had begun to liberate him, contrived to render him impatient. It has been pointed out with perspicacity by Sorel that it was in the provinces where the Ancien Régime persisted in its fullest vigour that the people were most recalcitrant to revolutionary ideas. This was notably the case in Brittany, in Vendée, and in Poitou. Wherever the nobles really mingled with the country-folk they were respected ; the lord and the humble farmer had a common cause ; they were loyal to each other. It was where there had been a divorce of the classes, where the separation was most marked, that the nobility appeared in the eyes of the workers to be usurpers.

Yet one should not push this paradox too far. Out of about twenty-one million people on the land it has been calculated that only half a million were full proprietors, and the dues which were required of them kept them down to the bare necessaries of life. Although nominally freed, the bulk of the labourers were by the conditions of their labour and by their unquestionable poverty practically slaves. Foodstuffs were during the later years of the reign of Louis XVI far too dear. In the earlier years of his reign there had been relative prosperity, and this prosperity itself made the countrymen more sensitive to the subsequent distress. Only a small percentage of them were literate, but nevertheless notions of reform had spread like wildfire. Revolutions as distinct from merely political *coups d'état* may be fanned from above, but they come from below, and once they are started it is impossible to stop them.

The peasant, proprietor or labourer, was by far the largest section of the community, but the other four million inhabitants of France had seriously to be reckoned with. There were at this time about two and a half million artisans. They were extremely badly off. They were subjected to the sternest rules. They were not allowed to combine for higher wages. The family system, which with all its disadvantages had kept the worker fairly happy, had given way to the beginnings of the modern factory system. The coal-mines of France were exploited. The Creusot metal works were founded in 1742 and already there were hundreds of blast furnaces. Weavers and other workers in velvet, silk, cotton, were organized, though badly organized. British mechanical contrivances had been introduced on the Continent ; machinery for the production of painted papers had given an impetus to this trade, but there was the usual discontent at innovation. In the making of porcelain the French were foremost, but here too there was, owing to the inefficiency displayed in these early years, a commercial crisis. General industrial conditions were unsatisfactory. There was much unemployment ; wages were inadequate and the town dwellers were often in open rebellion.

The clergy held a fifth of the French territory and received tithes. They paid little in taxes and the ecclesiastical dignitaries who were recruited from the nobility for the higher offices revelled in magnificence and indulged in scandalous impiety. It must not, however, be supposed that the lower clergy were irreligious or opulent men. Numbering about 130,000 they were poor and devoted to their charge. They at least were not arrogant and their sympathies were rather on the side of the people. The nobles numbered 150,000. Often absentees from their domains, they were greedy in their demands for money. They lived on extortions from the less fortunate classes and on royal bounties. They speculated too on the exchange, ran into debt, were cynical and elegant and intensely provocative. Those who remained in the provinces were frequently impecunious and should be placed in the category of discontented subjects. The lesser nobles entered the magistrature, which was distinguished by its cupidity and its venality. Instead of bringing order into the realm they were an element of disorganization.

In a spirit of prophecy that is not to be commended, Louis XV had exclaimed: "Things will last my lifetime." He was not blind to the incapacity and corruption, the extravagance, the financial chaos, the libertinism, which were to end in State bankruptcy and in national disaster. He was not concerned that after him should come the deluge. The hapless Louis XVI was to be pitied. He could hardly be expected to cope with the difficulties which presently beset the exchequer. Marie Antoinette appears to have been unaware of the realities of the situation, and opposing reform, exercising an evil influence, squandering recklessly, earned for herself the title of "Madame Déficit." Turgot as controller undoubtedly did his best and in general ranged himself with the far-sighted philosophers. He showed disinterestedness and a genuine desire for the public good. He endeavoured to spread secular education, and, in so far as he was allowed, to straighten out the complicated finances. He introduced free trade in grain, but when there was a bad harvest was denounced by his enemies. A friend of the people, privileged persons fell upon him, and when he was dismissed, lesser men like Necker tried in vain to save the Monarchy, which was succumbing in a morass of financial muddle and economic misery.

The most important order in France, as it is to-day, was that of the bourgeoisie. They were by this time a million strong. They were richer and more cultivated than they had ever been. Among them were the financiers, who were powerful and unscrupulous. Perhaps thirty thousand persons were collecting taxes, selling offices, making profits, legitimate and illegitimate, and preying by their exactions upon the community. But there were also scholars and writers and artists of great influence. They could now live without patronage; they had attained a true independence. There were doctors and lawyers and professors and tens of thousands of officials drawn from the middle classes. There were merchants and industrialists who were benefiting by the economic development and were subscribing to the royal loans. Rightly considered, it was the bourgeois who made the French Revolution. Everything he turned to good account. Driault has aptly described France as a nation of peasants governed by a middle-class élite. Nowhere has the bourgeoisie grown more harmoniously than in France. We have already seen that even during the early days of the Monarchy the bourgeoisie acquired some influence and was instrumental in the making and unmaking of Kings and counselled those Kings who were sagacious enough to seek their aid against the feudal lords. Particularly from the days of Louis XI did the bourgeoisie flourish. The great writers of France nearly all come from this class—for one cannot, in this connection, pay any attention to the new titles of the nineteenth century. The lawyers and State advisers were men of the middle classes. Had it been possible to keep the Tiers Etat on the side of Monarchy events would have marched differently. For some time it seemed that they would indeed range themselves with the Monarchy, for when the popular push made itself felt, the bourgeoisie identified its ideas of liberty with sovereignty. The middle classes had outgrown the monarchical system which they were willing to defend, and did not at first see that the Monarchy, though opposed to Feudalism, yet leaned upon an idle and a frivolous nobility whose usefulness to the State had departed. There was a simple and natural reversal of the rules, the bourgeoisie rightly taking the place of the old nobility. Eventually the bourgeoisie was in its turn to become tyrannical. When the people, the great anonymous masses, had to choose representatives their choice inevitably fell upon those bourgeois who were, outside the nobility, the best-known citizens, and for the most part the bourgeois thus chosen were legists, who predominated in the National Assemblies as they have since predominated throughout the nineteenth century.

One of the consequences of this choice was that the lawyers who were men of words, often mistook abstract principles for realities, and France from 1789 onwards—with exceptional periods—has been governed not so much in accordance with realities as with abstract principles which in the process of translation into practice became the opposite of what was intended. Thus although Liberty was an idol to which the men of the Revolution bowed down, they were content with anything that pretended to embody that principle, whether it was a single man like Robespierre, or a Committee which became more tyrannical than the Kings. The sovereignty of the people—an impersonal despotism—was wielded through individuals and was in the result a personal despotism. The elected persons enjoyed a sovereignty not dissimilar from the sovereignty of the Monarchs, and it is here that we put our finger on the fatal flaw of so-called democracy as it is understood, at any rate in France, in recent history. It is this tendency of the representatives of the people to be more royalist than Royalty that determined the furious oscillations, the actions and reactions, of the nineteenth century. Power in France passed consciously into the hands of the bourgeoisie, and in so far as one judges contemporary France it is for the bourgeoisie to render an account of its stewardship.

Whatever are the faults and the excesses of the democracy, and whatever are the virtues of the democracy, are in this stage of social evolution to be chiefly attributed in the country we are now considering to the bourgeoisie. Their strength lies in the fact that they are indeed the élite of the laborious classes and that their ranks are constantly being recruited. They draw fresh vigour from the perpetual renewal of new blood infused into them by the populace. Let it be repeated that if they have reached their culminating point of power to-day, they had for numerous generations played a determining part in the formation of France. Kings and nobles and clergy and artizans and peasants contributed to that formation, but it is impossible to emphasize too strongly the work of the bourgeoisie in the political and social organization of the country. They were foremost in fostering the industrial activity created by the Crusades. They stimulated the imitation of the artistic objects of the East. They united in rich corporations which rose against the feudal oppression. The *bonnes villes* and their burghers were the allies of Royalty; and Monarchy which would long before have been impossible without the bourgeoisie was destroyed when the bourgeoisie finally turned against the Monarchy. They had manned the magistrature; they had supplied savants in Roman law who were illustrious throughout Europe. Names like those of Etienne Marcel must be associated with the beginnings of Parliament in the fourteenth century. When the University of Paris was founded it became a new bourgeois force. Chancellor Duprat under François I was recognized as a great authority. Michel de l'Hôpital made remarkable efforts to save French unity from the religious passions which menaced it. Fouquet was an extraordinary administrator for Louis XIV, and Colbert helped to lay the foundations of the French Colonial Empire. The *salons* of the eighteenth century, which did most to prepare the way for the Revolution, were bourgeois *salons*, and the philosophers who were instrumental in directing the movement were for the most part bourgeois.*

One writer has gone so far as to question whether there is as great a difference as is generally thought between the Ancien Régime and the new. Under the old system, he says, the bourgeoisie governed by and through Royalty. They have continued to govern without Royalty. This is carrying the love of paradox too far, but there is a certain element of truth in the contention. Nor did the men of the Revolution altogether abandon their bourgeois instincts even when they preached most loudly their doctrines of equality. They clamoured for universal suffrage, for example, but they imposed the test of tax-paying as a qualification for the vote.

* See Driault's *L'Unité Française.*

The Convention was elected on a basis of universal suffrage, but it was composed of bourgeois; and with the Directoire the tax-paying test was reinstated. Bonaparte was a bourgeois who inflicted defeats on the bourgeoisie, but nevertheless during the Consulate and the Empire governed with the bourgeoisie. The Revolution of 1830 was a bourgeois Revolution which placed Louis Philippe, a bourgeois King, on the throne. The intellectual bourgeois, the industrial bourgeois, the commercial bourgeois, and the financial bourgeois, are the real rulers of present-day France.

The intellectual movement of the eighteenth century undoubtedly led to the Revolution, though whether some of the *philosophes* were conscious pioneers of the Revolution is another matter. There has been endless controversy on this subject. It may well be that the thinkers of the age would have been shocked had they known the consequences of their teaching. It may well be that they played with ideas often without any deliberate desire for their application. They had a propagandist purpose but what they intended was a leavening of the lump. The thinker is inclined to study and write in a void. It is, he supposes, not his business to consider when and where and how the dynamite of his ideas will explode. The dispute between those who, like Mario Roustan, make the *philosophes* primarily responsible for the Revolution, and those who, like Emile Faguet, deny that the spirit of the *philosophes* created the revolutionary spirit, and that the men of 1789 were the sons of Montesquieu and Rousseau, Diderot and Voltaire, is only possible because the question is badly posed. The truth is that without the thinkers of the eighteenth century the French Revolution would probably never have occurred, but this is a totally different thing from asserting that the Revolution is their work. Their work was entirely different. They were concerned rather with theories than with facts. There were a multitude of causes for the French Revolution: a surfeit of wars, deplorable financial mismanagement, inadequate harvests, decay of institutions which could not be adjusted to the new conditions, and so forth.

The *philosophes* were those terrible persons who without special regard to consequences stir men's minds to systematic questionings and novel challenges. It is likely that they would have looked upon the Revolution with horror, but they nevertheless prepared the way by breaking down the old beliefs in divine right, in hereditary privileges, in the excellence and permanence of a society eaten by abuses, shot through and through with cynicism, mouldering in an irremediable rottenness. It would perhaps not have been enough had they simply influenced the middle classes, who in their turn influenced the masses. It was necessary that they should also complete the degeneracy of the aristocracy. They helped to shatter the last convictions of the aristocracy itself. Had that aristocracy maintained a sound conviction in its own rightness, it might have successfully imposed itself, have resisted the rush of an angry populace. But not only did the swirling waters batten against the monarchical system, but the monarchical system with its buttresses was already weakened and could not withstand a timely attack. The Court, though it generally opposed the people, did so without an absolute faith in itself. It was conscious that it was obsolete. It frivolously smiled at its own demoded fashions.

It would not be difficult to show that the excessive licence of manners and of morals expressed in the lighter literature and in the tone of the *salons* was as instrumental in the undoing of the aristocracy as were the profounder reasonings of the *philosophes.* And indeed the most typical *philosophes* themselves combined licentiousness and serious utterance. They were frequently wanton, while their habitual attitude was that of scepticism, and their common weapon that of irony. Certainly there was not lacking audacity of thought, warm sentiment, sincere rationalism. The literature of the preceding century was concerned with the unchanging problems of the unchanging human heart. The literature of the new century was concerned with the changing conditions of political, social, and religious life. It was destructively critical. It was an arm of combat. The scientists, the economists, the sociologists, broke with the spirit of their predecessors. They were interested in man's place in society and they attempted to construct a political philosophy. Classicism is static: the men of the new century, in so far as they are characteristic, endeavoured to create a dynamic literature. They had a formidable action on the *salons* of the epoch, and those *salons* in their turn reacted on them.

The Duchesse du Maine in her Court at Sceaux represented that need of amusement which widely manifested itself in the midst of public misery. The *salon* of the Marquise de Lambert represented the renaissance of preciosity. Madame Geoffrin provided a meeting-place for the encyclopædists and graver questions were debated in her *salon.* But it is the *salon* of Madame du Deffand which best personifies pre-Revolutionary society; the dominant trait of its moral physiognomy is a dryness which translates itself in continual raillery and incurable ennui. In strong contrast was the *salon* of Mademoiselle de Lespinasse, where the imagination was exalted, and the romantic Rousseau was regarded as a model. There were, besides, political *salons* and atheistic reunions. Various currents existed simultaneously—preciosity, frivolity, scepticism, idealism, and a sincere search for social and scientific truth.

Pierre Bayle, who died in 1706, was a precursor. His "dictionnaire" is his capital work and from it emerges an anti-religious doctrine, a demolition of prejudices, a gospel of negation. To him Voltaire and the encyclopædists were greatly indebted. The effect on the mentality of the aristocracy of this stirring of thought was, from the point of view of the Ancien Régime, disastrous. A discontented people and an aristocracy that had ceased to believe seriously in its mission, which permitted itself to be ridiculed and which ridiculed itself, meant, if circumstances should be propitious, a collapse of the existing edifices. The Comte de Ségur has indicated how shaken the nobility was: "The smiling philosophy of Voltaire amused and captivated us. Without plumbing the depths of the more serious writers we applauded them for the courage with which they stood up against arbitrary power. We were disposed to follow the philosophical doctrines of these witty and daring men of letters. Rousseau touched our hearts. We experienced a secret pleasure in the attacks on an ancient construction which seemed to us Gothic and absurd. And so in spite of our rank and all its privileges and the fact that it was the time-honoured power of our own class that was being undermined, this petty warfare tickled us. The idea of liberty, whatever form of expression might be given to it, pleased us by its audacity and the idea of equality by reason of its convenience." Those who were the traditional conservators of society entertained themselves by running after novelty and left the fortress to be taken. In short, the influence of the *philosophes* was as effective on the defenders of the citadel as on those who assailed the citadel. What they accomplished was a revolution in thought. They probably did not seriously contemplate the violent Revolution which they helped to render inevitable.

The greatest name of this time is Voltaire. That he was in earnest has sometimes been doubted, and there is a good deal to justify this doubt. Those who regard him as an enemy of the Monarchy, a partisan of the people, are surely mistaken. He loved to frequent the Courts and was essentially aristocratic. Repudiating his modest origins, he was at his ease in the refined *salons*. He was an incorrigible flatterer, addicted to gallantry. He had hard words for the *canaille*—that is to say, the people. "When the populace begins to reason everything is lost. One cannot tolerate the absurd insolence of those who wish us to think like our tailors and our washerwomen." Even when he was an apostle of tolerance he indulged in the most misplaced wit. Yet he was, when he made himself an advocate of liberty, capable of exaltation. His penetration was unparalleled and his words were sharp as swords. His was a universal spirit, attaining eminence in every intellectual department. His ideas proliferated and his style was precise and simple. Locke furnished him with an armoury of thoughts and the study of the free British institutions when he was exiled in England served to shape his philosophy. His satire was powerfully directed against religion and generally his writings were a dissolvent acid. Voltaire indubitably stands for a brilliant facet of the many-sided French character.

On the other hand, we have Montesquieu, more judicious, less dazzling, the first of the great writers of the eighteenth century. He too made a profound contribution to the arsenal of ideas which was later to be utilized to such subversive purpose. Much in his Esprit des Lois was to be rejected, but his jurisprudence, developed with exceptional literary skill, was largely to guide subsequent modifications of society. He studies laws in their relation to government, to religion, to manners, to customs, to climate, and he travelled across Europe to prepare the fine work which occupied the best part of his life. He, too, was struck with the British system of Parliamentary Monarchy and foresaw a nation which would govern itself and in which there would be a separation of powers. He also wrote the *Lettres Persanes*, and the remarkable *Considerations sur les causes de la grandeur et de la décadence des Romains*, in which he evolved a philosophy of history which borrowed nothing from theology.

Jean Jacques Rousseau provides a strange antithesis to Voltaire though he moved in the same general direction. It is curious to observe that frequently the greatest influences on a country come from the borders of that country or even from outside. Rousseau was born in Switzerland, yet he is typically French. Others had destroyed but he attempted to construct. Others had been cynical, satirical, ironical, but he was passionate and even chimerical. The revolt which he led was romantic and was inspired by a sensibility which was sometimes morbid. He had a deep sense of justice, demanding equality of opportunity. While others had expressed themselves with a cold brilliance he expressed himself in a wonderfully warm rhetoric. While others were irreligious he struck a religious note. While others had scoffed at society he insisted on the inherent goodness of the natural man and extolled the beauties of nature and of virtue. From Rousseau, in my opinion, far more than from Voltaire, has flown the political and literary ideology that has dominated the nineteenth century. His denunciation of the corrupting effect of civilization, with its letters, its sciences, and its arts, must be understood in a relative sense, for he too has his system of education: that education should be regulated by the natural relations of man to man. His conceptions are to some extent artificial and false, but if he hopes too much from a free development of natural instincts, the reminder that education may, improperly understood, falsify the human spirit, is valuable. The sentiment of personality, the renaissance of religious feelings, the new flight of lyricism which marked the close of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, owe almost everything to Rousseau. But it was the political theory of the *Contrat Social*, which was published in 1762, that gave the Revolution its gospel. That men should be free, that they should be equal, that they should be brothers, became the device of the Revolution, and the Convention endeavoured to apply his teachings.

The Encyclopædists were a body of men who, composed of mediocre writers under the direction of Diderot, himself an author of uneven talent, set themselves the task of compiling a work which should be as comprehensive a collection of the sum of knowledge as possible. To their work they brought preconceived notions, and sought throughout to fit the facts to their principles. They tried to animate the mass with a single spirit, and despite the diversity of pens there is a general end to which the articles upon science, art, literature, and politics converge. Buffon among others had given an impetus to natural studies some years before; but while his aim was to observe acutely and describe objectively though picturesquely, the aim of the Encyclopædists was to draw a moral from material which was most recalcitrant. They did not altogether succeed in their purpose, but they built on a foundation of materialism. There was in this work a higgledy-piggledy assortment of bad and good, of true and false, of serious and flippant; and Voltaire rightly reproached Diderot with mixing in a strange salad hardy views and the poorest platitudes. D'Alembert, the mathematicism, who was one of the principal contributors, acknowledged that there had been pieced together a Harlequin suit. Yet the tendency is manifest: Locke is preferred to Descartes, and established dogmas and institutions are undermined. There is nevertheless in the Encyclopædia, debatable as it is in method, and imperfect as it is in execution, a mine of ideas which served the reformers. Altogether the century, with all its aberrations, brought a quickening of intellectual curiosities, an efflorescence of ideas. This activity in the realm of thought could hardly fail to produce positive results in the realm of action. The economists, who demanded industrial and commercial freedom, postulating that wealth comes primarily from the soil but secondarily from human energy; the philosophers, who in sapping religious belief were sapping the Throne, the Church, the Aristocracy; the politicians, who called for personal liberty and fiscal equality; were digging the grave of the Ancien Régime which the men of the Revolution were to slay.

The Revolution was political because it transferred sovereignty from the King to the nation and allowed the nation to express itself through elected bodies. It was social because it proclaimed the equality of all citizens before the law and opened posts to all talents. It was economic because it redistributed property. It was religious because it established liberty of cults. It was these things in principle, but in practice it fell far short of its ideals. In its religious aspect it hurt respectable sentiments and created divisions and, moreover, was largely agnostic. Economically it committed injustices in redressing injustices. Socially it secured the triumph of the bourgeoisie. Politically it fell into confusionism. The people abandoned their passivity, but they also abandoned moral discipline. It was hard to find the true centre of authority, and the search resulted in the formation of factions and the bloodiest of clashes. In short, the history of the Revolution is the history of the violation of principles. Monarchy was dethroned only to produce a struggle for dictatorship. Monarchial wars were condemned only to produce the greatest military *épopée* of modern times. Yet when France emerged from the troubled years Absolutism was rendered for ever impossible. Often since then French rulers have been arbitrary and reactionary, but they have always pretended to draw their power from the people. That is, after all, the highest contribution to human progress that the Revolution made, and if the dispute as to how the people can express its will is not yet ended, we have been carried an important stage forward. But one cannot speak of the Revolution as a single uniform event. When the famous play of Sardou, *Thermidor*, was hissed off the stage of the Comédie Française because it constituted a criticism of Robespierre and The Terror, Clemenceau coined the phrase : " The Revolution is a *bloc*." For Frenchmen in the mass to-day the Revolution must be accepted as a whole : the Revolution is Republicanism. But this conception calls for many reservations. The Revolution certainly gave France a new Constitution, but that Constitution has been altered frequently since 1789.

Alfred Rambaud counts no fewer than seventeen different Constitutions. That of 1791 was Monarchist ; that of 1793—the year III of the Revolutionary era—was Republican. In the years VIII, X, and XII, there were organized the Consulate and the Empire. There was the Charter of 1814 and the additional Act of 1815 when, after the downfall of Napoléon, the Restoration placed Louis XVIII, brother of the ill-fated Louis XVI, on the throne. There was the Charter of 1830 when Louis Philippe, after a few days rioting, succeeded Charles X. These three instruments were those of a Parliamentary Monarch. Then in 1848, after Louis Philippe's abdication, there was a Republican Constitution, to be followed, on the election of Napoléon III as Emperor of the French, by the Bonapartist Constitution of 1852, which was modified by Acts in 1853, 1860, 1867, and 1869. The Republican Constitution, once more adopted in 1875, a few years after the defeat of France by Prussia, has been slightly changed on several occasions.

Apart from these legalized *régimes* there have been *régimes* of fact—Provisional Governments, Governments of National Defence, National Assemblies, and so forth. Nevertheless modern ideas of government in France are all contained in the first Declaration of the Rights of Man. It was one of the earliest manifestations of the National Assembly, and every line, every word, of it is pregnant with meaning. It was much more difficult to base a Constitution on the political principles thus enunciated, but Frenchmen have kept those principles in mind and have endeavoured to approximate to them. French Government should be representative of the French people as a whole. It was proclaimed that ignorance, forgetfulness, or contempt of human rights, can only cause public unhappiness and governmental corruption. Those rights are said to be natural, inalienable, and sacred. They are essential to the well-being of the community. Men, it is laid down, are born free and equal, and social distinctions among them should be founded only upon common utility. The objects of political association should be the conservation of rights, the protection of liberty, the security of property and of persons, and resistance to oppression. The source of all sovereignty resides in the nation, and no individual can exercise authority which does not emanate from the nation and is expressly delegated to him. Liberty is defined as freedom to do whatever does not hurt other members of the community, but the boundaries of liberty are reached when such liberty prevents other members of society from enjoying liberty. These boundaries must not be arbitrary. They must be determined by law. Laws should be made in order to protect society, but whatever is not prohibited by law cannot be stopped arbitrarily. These laws should be framed by general consent and must be the same for every citizen. There can be no exceptions. Each citizen should be admitted to the enjoyment of those dignities, offices, and employments, for which he is fitted by his capacity, his virtue, and his talent. Nobody, it was affirmed, should be accused, arrested, detained, except according to the due forms of law. Penalties should be applied only when they are strictly necessary and in the degree that they are necessary. Criminal laws must not be retroactive. There is a presumption of innocence until a citizen is, after trial, found guilty, and therefore detention should be exempt of rigour. Nobody should be molested for his opinions, social, political, religious, provided the manifestations of his opinions do not upset public order. There should be free communication of thought and therefore a right to speak and to print freely unorthodox as well as orthodox views. Public forces are a necessity, but they should be used for the advantage of all and not for particular interests. Taxation is defined as a common contribution equally imposed in accordance with the means of citizens, and this contribution is intended to defray the expenses of the administration of the country. The citizens through their representatives check the employment of public money and determine the conditions of taxation. Society may demand from public agents an account of their conduct.

In this Declaration the possession of property is regarded as inviolable except when public necessity calls for the deprivation of particular citizens, and just indemnities must then be paid. A separation of powers, legislative and administrative, is essential. Although this Declaration was subsequently elaborated it was never bettered, and it contains the vital points which appealed to the men of the Revolution and appeal to the men of to-day.

There was, however, no necessary antagonism between the King and the representatives of the nation; and the Constituent Assembly, though disposed narrowly to circumscribe the King, was willing to give him a suspensive veto. It favoured a unique Chamber to make laws, to vote taxes, to control the army and the navy and the issues of war and peace. The British example had its weight, and at first it seemed that Monarchy, had it been reasonable, would have survived. The French, too, had sympathized with the establishment of the American Republic, with its two Assemblies, one of which acted as a counterweight and a moderating influence; but eventually the Constituante, apparently afraid of the aristocracy, decided to reject the American example. The Radicals of the twentieth century stick to the view that there should be a single Chamber, and from time to time deliver a half-hearted attack on the Senate.

It is to be observed that the Constituent Assembly was disinterested enough to decide that its members should not be elected to the Legislative Assembly which was to succeed it. This was a fault because, inexperienced as it was, it left to men still more inexperienced the task of putting in practice the Constitution it had voted. The consequence was that the King could conspire against the Legislative Assembly and so rush to his own destruction. The Parliamentary bodies had not clarified their desires, and it was not until September, 1792, that the Convention showed more energy and proclaimed the Republic.

It would be well briefly to trace the course of events, for they furnish the proof that revolutions cannot be made in accordance with a preconceived plan. They are not subject to guidance. They arise out of circumstances and follow a path that can hardly be foreseen by those who strike the first blow. When the King, beset by financial difficulties, felt himself obliged to convoke the States General, which had never assembled since 1614, the men who met in the Palace of Versailles, and so instituted a continuous Parliamentary system for France, were Conservative. They were not anti-Royalist. But they were gradually stirred to real action, and the Third Estate declining to be swamped by the votes of the two privileged classes, the nobility and the clergy, sat separately, taking the name of the Assemblée Nationale Constituante. Many of the clergy decided to join them. The Court was angry at the unexpected turn which the deliberations had taken and closed the rooms reserved for the meetings. Then it was that on June 20 in the Salle du Jeu de Paume the members took the oath not to separate before they had given France a Constitution. They made Bailly, the astronomer, their President. Louis, although readmitting them into the Palace, opposed his veto to their decisions. His courtiers would not tolerate a popular government, and while they were debating German hired troops were being brought to Paris. Owing to the folly of the Queen, Necker was dismissed. Mirabeau had at once warned and defied the King; while in Paris itself other more violent orators were calling on the people to arm. The people was suspicious and inflammable. On July 14 the crowd marched on the Bastille. The feeble garrison quickly surrendered. Even now it would not have been too late, but the nobility saw in the fall of the Bastille a symbol of the collapse of the *régime.* "This is a Rebellion!" said the King. "No, Sire," answered a courtier; "it is a Revolution." The emigration began. Some of the nobles merely wished to put themselves in safety. Others went to find military aid against their own countrymen. The King was perplexed; but considered it advisable to rally to the people. Lafayette who had played a conspicuous part in the founding of the American Republic, was recognized as the chief of a new National Guard. It was a noble who proposed the abolition of the feudal and ecclesiastical dues and the sale of offices; and on the night of August 4 Feudalism was dead, the titled and the ecclesiastical members of the Assembly voluntarily surrendering their privileges. But the King failed to keep his promises and did not ratify the decisions. He could not reconcile himself to being "a true Constitutional Monarch." The counter-Revolution was misguidedly engineered; and finally in June, 1791, the King fled from the capital with the Queen and the Dauphin. He was caught at Varenne and brought back to the Palace of the Tuileries, where he was virtually imprisoned. The Constitution was framed by the end of September; and once more the King was lavish with his promises. But when the Legislative Assembly was formed, the people had become more and more exigent. Democratic ideas had been popularized by Danton and Robespierre and Marat. They saw that the Constitution was in danger of being wrecked. Prussian troops were marching on the capital, and the French had declared war on a menacing Austria.

The situation of Louis interested the Continental Kings though that situation was comparable, in spite of the Revolution, with that of an English King. In France there was exasperation against "Monsieur Veto," as Louis was called, though the Constitution had given him the right of veto. The cry that the country was in danger was raised, and there marched from Marseilles volunteers for the defence of the Patrie, with a new song which came to have a profound significance—"La Marseillaise." Men like Robespierre, though Jacobins, foresaw that the excitement engendered by war would lead to a dictatorship; but there was now nothing to be done. Constitutional Monarchy had failed in France, and Louis was deposed in August, 1792. "Audacity, audacity, still more audacity," cried Danton. There was a tremendous patriotic rising. The French people for the first time became truly conscious of themselves as a nation. They fought the Prussians and beat them. They saved the newly-born Republic. These were mighty moments when the French showed that under the stress of emotion they are invincible. But passions had reached a terrible height. The Convention took the severest measures. It behaved despotically. Revolutionary justice was speedy and pitiless. The law of "suspects" meant wholesale denunciations. No citizen was secure. The nobles and priests who lay in prison were put to death. Louis was beheaded in January, 1793. The Kings of Europe were challenged "by the throwing at them of the head of a King." The Terror was established. The guillotine worked unceasingly. Marie Antoinette shared the fate of her husband. The Montagnards, who stood for centralization, overruled the moderate Girondins, who stood for federalism; and Girondins as well as Royalists were massacred. The author of The Terror, Robespierre, himself became its victim.

When one thinks of the tragically tormented times with France assailed at once by the rising of Royalists in Vendée and a coalition of foreign armies invading the French soil, one must admit that the record of the Convention, though terrible, is amazing. It is amazing not merely because the Convention compelled the enemies of the Republic to sign terms of peace, not merely because Alsace was regained, Belgium and Holland conquered, a Batavian Republic created, and the French domain extended to the Rhine, but because the Convention found time to reorganize the country. It tried to convert the Public Debt. The task was formidable. The possessions of the clergy were sold as a guarantee for the issue of assignats which in six years reached forty-five milliards, and eventually became worthless. The Church of France was separated from the Papacy; and with uneasy intervals the majority of the clergy have since been implacable enemies of the Revolution and of the Republic. Robespierre would have made the worship of the Supreme Being a State religion, but there was also a violent atheistic movement led by Anacharsis Clootz. The Convention largely drew up the Civil Code. Uniformity of weights and measures was ordained by the metric system. The Natural History Museum was founded. The École Normale, the Polytechnique, Central Schools for secondary education were set up. The programmes of popular instruction which were elaborated, chiefly based upon the work of Condorcet, were ambitious. It was beyond the resources of the Convention to realize these programmes entirely, but much was actually accomplished. In each *département* was to be a central school characterized by the place which should therein be given to mathematics, physics, chemistry, philosophy, history. These subjects indicated a vast improvement on the former curriculum of letters and dead languages. Unfortunately, the Convention could not provide professors. The École Normale was intended for the recruitment of teachers and the most eminent masters were installed. There was a School of Oriental Languages. The Museum of the Louvre, formed by pictures from the Royal Palaces, and afterwards enlarged by pictures brought back as spoils from the conquests of Holland and Italy, was given its present form. The Bibliothèque Nationale was expanded from the Bibliothèque du Roi, and became the legal depository of all printed works. The National Archives were put in order. Ancient monuments were classified and cared for. The Collège de France was renovated. The Institute of France, the Conservatoire, and the Academies, established as we now know them, were the work of the Convention.

These things are the glory of the Convention and they offset the deplorable excesses which marred this period of the Revolution. It is little short of marvellous that men who were occupied in fighting each other and in fighting the foreign invader should yet have constructed so well. They lived in a state of exaltation and were able to multiply their activities incredibly. The abnormal excitement explains at once the most creditable and the most discreditable aspects of their rule. They were sincere patriots, resolved to defend themselves without faltering against any foe. Believing the country to be in danger—as indeed it was—they were obliged to institute a sort of dictatorship. The whole body of the Convention was too large and unwieldy in the dangerous conditions which called for instant action, and the setting up of committees with executive powers was obviously necessary.

The Committee of Public Safety, which carried out its duties vigorously and rigorously, the Committee of General Surety, which pursued conspirators and gave them up to the swift-moving Revolutionary tribunals, were deadly machines; but without them the Revolution would probably have collapsed. The Jacobin spirit has been handed down to our day, and still there are large sections of the community which are perpetually vigilant, and men who regard themselves as a potential Committee of Public Safety. They have, as it were, made a corner in Republicanism and do not admit opposition from the Right. They truly believe that the Republic is endangered by fairly mild Conservatives. These inheritors of the tradition of 1793 do not, of course, resort to drastic measures, but they are fired by any suggestion that the Constitution is imperilled by the Reaction. They are ready to vibrate with enthusiasm for this cause and against that cause, precisely as one supposes the men of 1793 to have vibrated. Hence the exceptional bitterness that is to be remarked in French politics.

The Constitution which it was sought to set up in the Year III—for the calendar had been reformed and the Revolutionaries, picturesquely renaming the months, had begun a new era—was feeble and clumsy and never succeeded in getting itself put into operation. Under it the laws were to be proposed by the Legislative Corps; and Primary Assemblies in each canton were to accept them. Thus a sort of plebiscite was contemplated. The Executive Council would be chosen from a list drawn up by the electors who would submit one name for each *département*. The Assembly was to be elected every year. Even had the circumstances been more propitious it is doubtful whether such a scheme could have worked, but in the prevailing anarchy it was unthinkable. In 1795 a new Government came into being which is known as the Directoire. Legislative power was divided between two Assemblies—a Council of Five Hundred and a Council of Elders. The Five Hundred were to propose the laws which the Elders were invited to approve. But the executive power lay in the hands of five Directors. The Directors and the Councils were to fulfil their functions separately.

In the meantime the war was renewed and a young man was attracting the attention of the French people by his victories in Italy and in Austria. Bonaparte attempted to strike at England through the East, and after a series of genuine successes (broken by checks) mingled with much theatricality, he returned to France when the situation was critical. France was torn by intrigue and the Councillors were indulging in interminable debates. They had lost the faculty of rapid decisions. Europe was thoroughly aroused by the Republican agitation and the French were loosening their grip over Germany and Italy. The way was prepared for the Consulate, and on XVIII Brumaire (November 9), 1799, Bonaparte broke up the Parliament and imposed a new Constitution. The Directoire was replaced by three Consuls appointed for ten years of whom Bonaparte was the Premier. The wheel was turning full circle and authority was again concentrated in the hands of one man ; for the Consuls who were adjoined to Bonaparte were comparatively helpless. Bonaparte was already more than a king in spite of the elaborate but perfectly impotent bodies which he created to disguise his dictatorship. The Assemblies were a Council of State, a Legislative Body, and a Tribunal. The Council prepared the laws and the Legislative Corps had to vote silently after hearing three members of the Council and three members of the Tribunal. A more extraordinary conception of government has never been seen. The rôle of the Senate was to decide whether the laws were in conformity with the Constitution. The Tribunal could discuss the laws but could not vote upon them. The Legislative Body was called upon to vote them but was not allowed to discuss them. It was an Assembly of dumb persons. It was tongueless and eyeless, and was only permitted to have ears in order that it should obey. The Council of State was nominated by the Premier Consul from a list of notabilities. The Legislative Body and the Tribunal were then chosen by the Senate from the same list. The Senate thus became the grand elector, and as it was appointed by a commission which was devoted to Bonaparte, he was, even during the Consulate, in complete control of the nation. Each succeeding Revolutionary team had devoured the preceding Revolutionary team, and despotism had come out of it all.

Yet the Revolution had not failed. At the moment France, fighting fierce battles, was compelled to submit to authority. The desire for liberty had to be temporarily set aside if France were to survive, and the newly awakened national consciousness exhibited in an ardent patriotism had need of an iron-handed director. For a decade Napoléon was to endure because power became more important than liberty. Without a Strong Man who was also an able military chief the young Republic could not have repressed disorder at home and opposition abroad. Napoléon when he later became Emperor was Emperor not of France but of the French. He became such at least in outward form by the free consent of the people. He possessed a mandate; he was entrusted with a mission. His methods were not democratic, but they were held to be needful if the long duel with England was to be won and the Germanic nations to be neutralized. Although finally the hereditary principle was again accepted, in the inception there was a vital difference between a Plebiscitary Dictatorship and a Kingship by divine right. Dictators may come and go. They were fashioned by events. They depend upon circumstances. But the essence of Kingship is that it remains. France submitted provisionally, and throughout tight-packed years did not think of reversing Napoléon. He had become the indispensable man. Nevertheless the Revolutionary ideas, which had not managed finally to express themselves, were not crushed. They had been irrevocably planted. They were living forces which, momentarily suppressed in the stressful times, could not but manifest themselves. Even the old Monarchy was to come back, and France was to oscillate between this and that system of rulership. But Monarchy, though it might be revived for an instant, had had its day. France tried many *régimes* in a hundred years, but never were the principles of the Revolution forgotten, and if they were in abeyance at intervals they have not ceased to influence French history. It is still possible to imagine a Dictatorship in France. It would have its uses in a grave emergency; but Monarchy is dead and nothing can restore it. Parliamentarism, with its eternal bavardage, is often a check on action, and occasionally democracy seems to have lost its virtue. But despite vicissitudes, the Republic was irretrievably established after the deposition of Louis XVI. Episodes, even such tremendous episodes as that of the Empire, have no lasting consequences. From 1789 the choice for France was between three solutions—Royalty, Bonapartism, and Republicanism.

Royalty is impossible whatever a handful of Royalists may think. It is impossible for many reasons, but one will suffice: quite apart from the connotations of Royalty, there is no royal pretender sufficiently imposing to have the smallest chances of success. Bonapartism led France into disasters the memory of which cannot be obliterated. Republicanism may have to be modified, but though it may be necessary to reconcile Republicanism with a greater exercise of authority, the essential principles of Republicanism must continue to prevail. It is true that the French often feel themselves to be ill-governed, or rather insufficiently governed, and that all the political parties, from the extreme Left to the extreme Right, propose solutions which are clearly authoritarian, though they differ on the modalities. Perhaps the most interesting political phenomenon in France, that which is worthy of the closest observation, is the evolution of a new authoritarian Republic.

Never under the Revolution was there universal direct suffrage. Indeed, the restrictions frequently were such as rendered the exercise of political prerogatives less liberal than under Louis XVI. Nor did the French really enjoy the right of public assembly. There were plenty of meetings, but if they expressed sentiments which were not in conformity with the prevailing sentiments ruthless suppression followed. It was natural enough that in the Revolutionary days reactionary persons, or persons who were regarded as reactionary, should, in spite of theoretical liberty, fall under the law of "suspects." Yet the Revolution was a great school of eloquence. There was a plethora of perfervid oratory. In this college of declamation the French learned as they had never learned before to manipulate speech. The lesson has not been lost. The Frenchman to-day is perhaps the supreme specimen of the speaking animal. Scratch any Frenchman and you will discover the voluble orator. In their clubs and in their public demonstrations and in their

Parliaments, they let loose a flood of fine words. They were more given to the discussion of principles than of the application of principles. They insisted on doctrines rather than on interests. They became fond of huge generalizations. Even their most memorable document is entitled "The Rights of Man"—not of the Frenchman. These qualities persist. Robespierre, with his cold logic, is not quite typical, though the French pride themselves too on their logic, which they sometimes carry to extremes, forgetful of realities. Rather the thundering of Danton and the picturesque force of Mirabeau indicate the character of French polemics. The journalistic tradition, which is also polemical, has its starting-point in the Revolution. Not that the Press was free. It has rarely been free in France. It has been violent ; it has been defiant ; but except at such times as the July Monarchy and for a short period under the Republic of 1848, and in theory—though there are still laws of exception—in the later days of the Third Republic it has been subjected to restraints—restraints which result in the most formidable outbursts. During the Revolution itself it was closely watched and during the Empire its liberty was sternly curtailed.

It is worthy of note that the theatre in France was generally on the side of the Revolution. Certain commonly accepted legends about the French theatre are totally misleading. There is certainly a purely commercial theatre which takes for subject the conflict of sex and treats it more or less wittily. But the theatre has always been a force in France. Playwrights have always struck a social note. They have put in the forefront of their plays social ideas. A true history of the French theatre would lay special stress on the rioting, on the controversy, which have attended numerous productions. Molière himself narrowly escaped the severest expressions of displeasure. It is not therefore surprising that the playwrights of the Revolution should have adopted Revolutionary ideas. They cast them in a classic mould—a classicism which was emphasized under Napoléon. There is little that has endured, but a survey of the theatre of the epoch amply reveals its tendency. If one cares to follow the development of the theatre throughout the nineteenth century one will discover that more and more does it dwell upon social problems.

The position of the peasant was vastly improved. He had, it is true, been gradually emerging from the lowly condition described by La Bruyère, but his lot was unenviable. Now he was master of the soil. His emancipation came in several stages. The Constituante was not particularly daring, and although it abolished many proprietorial rights which had been left by Feudalism it often only substituted one burden for another. When the proprietors freely consented to a bargain the charges were only changed in name. The rents which were demanded from the peasant would have been as oppressive as the former demands on him. The Legislative Assembly went much further. It refused to recognize a distinction between a Dominating Feudalism and a Contracting Feudalism. But it was left to the Convention to proceed to the logical conclusion. It committed many injustices, turning the tables completely on the noble proprietor. The destruction of the aristocracy was a conscious aim. What was called the triumph of Democracy meant in part the burning of title-deeds. The peasant was gratuitously enfranchised. In the material sense he was the chief profiteer of the Revolution. The countryman was generously endowed. First there was the common land, which had often been taken by a usurping proprietor. This was given back to the communities and, with the exception of the woods, was divided. The Church lands and the confiscated lands of the nobles were nationalized and were disposed of for the discredited paper money for which they were a guarantee. There were capitalists who speculated and who made handsome profits in these transactions, but either immediately, or in the long run, the land fell into the hands of the peasants, or into the hands of the soldiers of liberty who were thus recompensed for their devotion.

The most powerful rural democracy was founded, and that rural democracy was profoundly conscious of itself and of its powers, because it suddenly came out of centuries of humiliation to be flattered and fêted and favoured and to assist not only in the government of France but in the conquering of Europe. Small wonder that the country-side clings tenaciously to its privileges and that its Radicalism is really a form of Conservatism. It may be that France is ceasing to be an essentially agricultural country and that the lure of the town, the growth of industry, are transforming the character of France; yet there remains, and will remain, constituting the fundamental strength of France, a large peasant population, laborious if somewhat backward, thrifty, prudent, jealous of its prerogatives and suspicious of the townsfolk. The scattered population of the country-side is over-represented in Parliament and exercises an immense influence over the timid Deputies.

The French farmers now pay a totally inadequate sum towards the upkeep of the State, but in their defence it must be urged that the bulk of the landowners are so small that they must necessarily profit from exemptions at the base, as do the owners of small businesses in the towns. Nor is there any prospect of land passing into the hands of those who would conduct agriculture on a larger scale and therefore in a more economic manner. The law requires the distribution of property in settled proportions among the children and the consequence is that there is a continual breaking up of cultivated ground. The disadvantages of the system are obvious : it requires a greater expenditure of energy for less results to work a few acres than to work large holdings. The disadvantage is only partly remedied by co-operative methods, by communal aid, by the collective possession of up-to-date agricultural instruments, and by propaganda for the adoption of modern devices in intensive cultivation. It would not be difficult to demonstrate that the Revolution made for individual happiness, but from the point of view of the modern State the heritage bequeathed by the Revolution to the peasant is deplorable in that it makes for inefficiency and is nationally disabling.

Industrially the Revolution was progressive. It established patent rights for inventions. It broke the power of corporations. But in setting its face against coalitions of employers or trade unions it proclaimed the right of every citizen to work. In the inevitable economic crisis it set up national workshops—an experiment which was not then or at a later date successful—but which was nevertheless a suggestive attempt to solve a problem which is always with us. When it was obliged to close them, it encouraged the enrolment of the unemployed in the army. Under the Directoire, in the thick of the fight for France, there was promoted the first national industrial exhibition. A natural result of the war was a battle of tariffs, and there were adopted protective measures which went as far as prohibitions. At one time death sentences were pronounced on exporters of grain, and importers of British goods were sentenced to twenty years in irons. The buyers too were punished. Contraband was not thereby abolished, and it was finally found that the artificial fixation of prices meant the most undesirable kind of jobbing. Thereupon the authorities reverted to relative freedom of exchange. On the whole, in spite of blunders and of severities, industry and commerce were advanced.

If we briefly sum up the causes and consequences of this period of unparalleled agitation, we must conclude that with all its contradictions, and indeed because of its contradictions, the Revolution was purely a French phenomenon that could not have happened elsewhere. We shall find that the Ancien Régime had by the evolution of society outgrown its utility, was mined from within and was ready to fall. We shall find that the spreading of the ideas of the philosophers of the eighteenth century was possible because the French as a people are fond of generalizations and are at once metaphysical and romantic. They are far less logical than they themselves suppose, and in the application of their principles they falsify them. Accepting certain ideas, they preached them with enthusiasm and worked themselves up to the highest degree of exaltation. They had the faith which moves mountains but which fanatically fails to discriminate between worthy and practical objects and unworthy and unpractical objects. Convinced themselves, they wanted to convert Europe. They could not keep the truth for themselves but became hot gospellers in the cause of humanity, and launched upon a Revolutionary Crusade as centuries before they had launched upon the Crusades for Christendom.

Events were precipitated by such material causes as the vacillation of the King, the shortsightedness of the Court, the bankruptcy of the State, and the misery of the people ; but the determining impulse was ideological. The Revolutionaries identified the

Revolution with France, and, as they had to defend their country from the *émigrés* and invaders, they acquired a fiercer nationalism. They were prepared to make any sacrifices for the Revolution—that is to say, the Patrie; any sacrifices for the Patrie—that is to say, the Revolution. There was born a new sense of patriotism which, however, was the offspring of the old patriotism. Formerly the King was France; now the nation was France. But with this intenser patriotism, which engendered a horror of all things militating against it—Royalty, nobility, ecclesiasticism, and reactionary foreign powers—and mercilessly subdued them, even though the subjection often implied injustice, often meant the negation of the very principles which inspired the Revolutionaries, there went, paradoxically enough, a conception of a larger Patrie, a Patrie extending beyond the bounds of France, a Patrie of intellect and of sentiment, a Patrie which should include all lands where there were aspirations towards liberty; a universal Patrie of Revolutionary ideas.

Thus after the successful defence of their own frontiers, and therefore of their own Revolution, they pushed further in their mission of emancipation. Generous thoughts underlay the movement of liberation, but the French passions soon turned to a thirst for glory, a desire for conquest, and resulted not in the shattering of shackles but in antagonisms. In the French there is an indelible strain of heroism, a love of victory and adventure. The memory of the chivalry of the old chansons remains, and the legendary *panache* beckons irresistibly. Yet it may truly be said that if the ardent spirit of the Revolution was turned to alien purposes and the original impulse was forgotten, France not only conquered Europe for a season but converted Europe permanently. And when France was reduced to her proper proportions, when Napoléonism with its repressions passed, there was left upon France and upon Europe a deathless mark. Among the changes that had been brought about was the abolition of corporal punishment, the sweeping away of torture. Civil marriage and divorce were admitted. The old laws of primogeniture had been altered in favour of fairer inheritance laws. Protestants and Jews were treated as citizens. The Lay State was established. There was equality before the law. Privileges no longer existed and the sale of offices was done away with. The principle of voting at the age of twenty-one was recognized. The peasant possessed his land. The institutions, social and political, the ideas and ideals of the Revolution could be assailed again and again, could be momentarily submerged, but France could never again be the France of the Ancien Régime but was for ever the France of the Revolution.

WORKS TO BE CONSULTED

For English readers Carlyle's *French Revolution*, though debatable, is a most magnificent piece of writing. Aulard's *Histoire Politique de la Révolution Française* takes the Republican standpoint. Rambaud's *Histoire de la Civilisation Française*; and, of course, Albert Sorel's erudite but never arid study of the French Revolution (on which the writer has freely drawn) are among the multitudinous books to be recommended. Taine's *Origines de la France Contemporaine* is brilliant. Henri Martin, Mignet, Michelet, must be read. Hilaire Belloc has contributed some excellent studies in *Danton*, *Robespierre*, *Marie Antoinette*, and *The French Revolution*.

CHAPTER V

BONAPARTISM OR THE PLEBISCITARY DICTATORSHIP

Napoléon's Opportunity—The Plebiscite—Administrative Genius—Concordat — Code — Education — Legion of Honour—Comédie-Française—Banque de France—Warfare—Diplomacy—After Napoléon

Nothing appears to me more idle than endless controversy about the character and the merits of an historical personage. There have been some most judicious commentators on the purpose and the performance of Napoléon Bonaparte; but there have fought around him a host of admirers and detractors. Even on the subject of his military accomplishments there are opposing opinions. One authority shows that he had a better appreciation of the possibilities of artillery than any captain before him, and dwells complacently upon his victories and upon the devotion which he knew how to inspire in his soldiers. Another authority insists upon his blunders and his gigantic failures and deduces from his defeats that he was not an exceptional general. It may be that in all military success there is a large element of luck, but surely the fortune which attended Bonaparte—for in spite of frequent checks it cannot be disputed that for years he dominated the finest armies that Europe could throw against him—was aided by his remarkable knowledge of military matters, of mathematics, of history, of human nature; and whatever were his motives at any particular part of his career, he did indeed develop a hardness of design, a brilliance of execution, an irresistible self-confidence, an active imagination, that made of him a formidable and impressive figure. It is easy to denounce the vanity that proved his undoing, his inordinate ambitions, his ruthlessness; these things were bound to grow with the growth of an unprecedented power; but to deny his extraordinary competence, as is now the fashion in some quarters, seems to be absurd.

In the confusion of the Directoire days, the impotence and the fatigue that followed the long Revolutionary efforts, a Man was needed, and there was nowhere in France a man of such decision, such love of order, as the young Bonaparte, around whom a legend was already being created. It was the Republic which he saved, although in saving it he temporarily destroyed the last vestiges of Republicanism. Of his campaigns it is impossible to write at length in this place, but whatever may be the verdict of cold critics, it is certain that he knew how to inflame his followers by vivid words of which he alone had the secret, and it may be that vivid words are more important than aught else, in war as in peace. " Soldiers," he cried, pointing to the Pyramids in Egypt, " think that from the summit of those Pyramids forty centuries contemplate you." He had, too, a genius for organization. Even in Egypt he demonstrated this gift of administration, establishing institutions wherever his troops set foot. By his Italian successes he had been confirmed in his admiration for the Roman Empire, which was as notable for its colonization as for its conquests. In his reading of Roman history he was struck not merely by military exploits but by the orderliness which was the mark of the Latin spirit. His plans were regular and symmetrical, harmonious and simple. The curse of all conquerors is that they can never stop; but if Napoléon was led further and further on, his greatest and his lasting achievements were in the realm of administration.

At the beginning, as there is evidence to show, he accepted the Republic from which he had issued, a Republic reposing upon the foundations of equality, of morality, of civic liberty and of political tolerance; but as the years passed he repudiated the political results of the Revolution though accepting the economic results and consolidating the social results. He came to consider himself as continuing and carrying to perfection the work of the kings. He was the inheritor of Louis XIV and of Charlemagne, and he built up around himself a system which depended upon himself. The consequence was that when he fell a large place was left empty which numerous pretendants were to dispute for several generations. Had he been able to ensure, as he hoped, the centralization of power in a dynasty, the nineteenth century would have been entirely different. France would not have been subjected to *coups d'état* and Revolutions, with returns to the Monarchy, with returns to the Republic, with a return to a Second Empire based like the first on a plebiscite.

There had been introduced into the French Constitution a mass of contradictions which nobody could reconcile, and there had been installed in the body politic a number of claimants who were ready to take advantage of any passing weakness. On the one hand Napoléon stabilized the Empire, and on the other hand he made it exceedingly vulnerable by concentrating it in himself without the safeguards for the future that were furnished by the royal tradition. The great difficulty of all statesmen—the difficulty which even Napoléon could not overcome—is to make men electors and pretend to give them power of choice, before they have first been citizens versed in the complicated art of citizenship. He was able to manipulate the plebiscite with an ignorant populace, precisely as politicians to-day can manipulate votes; but the problem of democracy is to keep the minds of the people consistently oriented in one direction, and whatever is based upon the will of the people, is, with changing desires, constantly shifting conditions, liable to be overthrown. While the electorate is ill-informed, unintelligent, and altogether unstable, the doctrine of the divine right of Royalty (if it can be believed) alone offers prospects of stability. The Republic, which was shaped by men who hardly knew what to do with their new-found liberty, was vacillating and was at the mercy of any "Providential Man" who should appear. Napoléon was that Providential Man, and he in his turn, though building deep, was compelled to impose himself by unremitting exertions, rapidly succeeding blows, that created the illusion of his indispensability; and by displaying a magnificence and a despotism that was more arbitrary than the despotism of Kings.

If the Revolution had permitted an immense release of forces, if it had been sustained by the wildest enthusiasm, if it had constructed as well as destroyed, it nevertheless fell with the Directoire into a state of lassitude. The country was exhausted. The Revolutionary ideology had run into marshlands. There had been extravagance, and promises had been unfulfilled. Political liberties had been found incompatible with proper government, and the pressure on France from the exterior had been relaxed only to become stronger than ever. There was a financial collapse; the issue of paper money attained monstrous dimensions; two-thirds of the Public Debt had to be wiped off; and ruin was widespread. Such taxes as those on doors and windows were levied amid angry protestations. The French were disgusted with politics and scornful of politicians, who chiefly knew how to talk. In the Frenchman this disgust and this scorn have persisted: he has always been better than those who profess to represent him. Since Royalty was extinct the successive Parliaments had elaborated excellent principles. They had even founded capital institutions, but although they had framed Constitutions those Constitutions were unworkable.

Nor must it be forgotten that the leaders of the Revolution were by no means Socialists. They were far from denouncing property. On the contrary, they had expressly proclaimed its inviolability. When it was sought to introduce Collectivism the bourgeois mentality was shocked; and Babœuf, who went much further than the prevailing views, was executed. Further, there was a rage of licentiousness which was as bad as anything that was seen under the Regency—a rage of licentiousness that perhaps must always follow social upheavals. Scandals of all kinds, the most flaunting luxury, the complete decadence of morals, in short, the utter degeneracy that had followed the first élan, were such as to call for a master hand.

When Bonaparte was recalled by Siéyès from Egypt the country was in a terrible situation. Abroad its armies had been beaten by the Russians and the Austrians. They had evacuated Italy. The British had invaded Holland. At home there was, in the absence of real authority, complete anarchy in all the administrations. The financial disorder, the political scandals, the extreme licentiousness, had produced an appalling spread of brigandage, and the police were helpless against the veritable associations of crime. The streets of the capital and the main roads of the country were infested with bandits who operated in the full light of day.

What the bulk of peaceful and orderly people demanded was a chief who could save them from the invader; and in the interior suppress the criminal enterprises. They longed for a government which should at once be energetic and liberal. They were afraid of the conspiracies on the one side of the old Terrorists, and on the other side of the Royalists, who placed themselves under the orders of British, Austrian, and Prussian generals. As soon as he arrived, Bonaparte, preceded by his prestige, covered with glory, the cynosure of French eyes, presented himself before the Directeurs and offered to "place at the service of the State a sword which would never be drawn except for the defence of the Republic." The generals, who did not disguise their contempt for the "reign of advocates and of fine speakers"; politicians such as Talleyrand; the sombre Fouché, Minister of Police, disgusted by the increasing criminality which the Directoire would not give him the means of crushing; were ready to group themselves around the victor of Italy and of Egypt. The five Directeurs themselves were conscious of their own impuissance. The Chambers were divided. Among the Anciens, Bonaparte had many partisans, but the Cinq Cents were dominated by the Jacobins. There was a general inertia, and Napoléon decided to act.

The Anciens, in virtue of an Article of the Constitution, transferred to the Château of Saint Cloud the seat of the Assemblies, and by the same decree nominated Bonaparte commander-in-chief of the Paris garrison. This was the XVIII Brumaire of the Year VIII (November 9, 1799). Thereupon Bonaparte gathered three thousand soldiers in the Jardins des Tuileries and in his discourse declared: "The army is with me. In what state did I leave France, and in what state do I now find it? I left you peace, and I find war. I left you conquests, and the enemy now passes our frontiers. . . . With a good administration the citizens will forget their factions and become Frenchmen again."

But among the Cinq Cents there were whispers of "conspiracy" and of "plots" for the Dictatorship. The Anciens accepted the explanations of Bonaparte, who told them that if he had wished to secure supreme power he could have done so: it had been offered to him: but he would receive it from no coterie, he belonged to the great party of the French people. The Cinq Cents were not thus easily to be mollified. They vented their imprecations on Bonaparte and even menaced him with their poignards. Thereupon Lucien Bonaparte, who was their President, called in the grenadiers, who penetrated into the Assembly Room and put to flight the members who, fearful of the vengeance of the people, flung away the special costumes which distinguished them. During the night the Anciens and about forty members of the Cinq Cents voted for the Consulate, with three Consuls—Bonaparte, Siéyès, and Roger-Ducos. A few weeks afterwards the Constitution of the Year VIII was constructed and the three chiefs who were definitely appointed were: Bonaparte as Premier Consul for ten years, and two other Consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun.

The Corps Législatif was composed of 300 Deputies; the Senate of 80 life members; and the Tribunate of 100 members; there was besides a Conseil d'Etat, whose members were nominated by the Consuls and could be revoked by them. The Executive Power had the initiative of laws. The Conseil d'Etat prepared them; they were discussed by the Tribunate and voted by the Corps Législatif. The rôle of the Sénat Conservateur, as it was called, was simply to ascertain that the Constitution was not violated and to choose from a "national list" the members of the Tribunate and the Corps Législatif. Although nominally every French citizen who had attained the age of twenty-one was an elector, the system of voting was so complicated that in reality Napoléon was given the fullest powers.

Napoléon was not the first to avail himself of the deceptive method of a plebiscite. The Constitution of 1793 had been submitted to the people and only a thousand votes had been recorded against it. The Constitution of the Year III had likewise been endorsed by public opinion and that which set up the Consulate, which was altogether contrary to previous Constitutions and was not even preceded by the Declaration of Rights, was passed by over three million votes. Only fifteen hundred people expressed themselves against it. In the same way when Napoléon was made Life Consul in 1802 over three and a half millions voted for him and only sixteen hundred against. He was again to test the utility of a plebiscite, which takes power from the people under the guise of giving them power, when two years later he was declared Emperor. He had the same faithful following, and the opposition had dwindled to two thousand. It would appear that the masses will vote for anything positive if no concrete alternative plan is put before them. And how can there be a concrete alternative plan if the men in power themselves frame the questions? Certainly the masses will always vote on a particular name if no other name is suggested to them. Napoléon carefully chose his moment and submitted himself precisely when he enjoyed popularity. It was, of course, rather upon a name that the people voted than upon a text, and it did not matter that the Constitution which was projected was obviously reactionary and was obviously in contradiction with the ideas for which the country had fought. The people were easily persuaded that loquacity meant muddle; and Napoléon posed as a realist in the bankruptcy of romanticism. Bonaparte had complete control of the Commissions and of the Legislative and Executive Bodies. In reality he alone could nominate and revoke Ministers and Ambassadors and functionaries of all kinds, including the majority of the judges. He had supreme command of the army and navy. He manipulated the police. He issued mandates of arrest which were not dissimilar from the old *lettres de cachet*. In external affairs he had charge of the negotiations and was empowered to declare war and to conclude alliances and peace treaties. If he had to submit documents to the approval of the Legislative Body the fact had little importance. At two stages in the making of laws his power was unquestionable. He had the initiative and he had the promulgation of laws; while in the intermediate stages he could at any moment intervene and stop the preparation, the discussion, the vote, and the confirmation of the laws. He scarcely wore a mask to hide his Absolutism. The Press was entirely at his disposition. Nobody afterwards dared to assert himself against the master who showed what he was capable of when the Tribunate, taking itself seriously, opposed him: he promptly expulsed the members. By appealing to the plebiscitary system which had made him Dictator, he was always able to affirm that he, and he only, was the true representative of the people. If Louis XIV had exclaimed "*L'Etat, c'est moi*," he in his turn could exclaim, "*Le Peuple, c'est moi*. Rambaud has utterly condemned the plebiscite on which Napoléon rose to power, in writing: "The plebiscite cannot be the free and sincere expression of the national sentiment. It is the government which formulates the questions submitted to the people and it can frame its questions in such a fashion that the people are forced to sanction, not merely what they approve but what they disapprove. They cannot demand explanations and propose modifications as in an Assembly. To the most complicated proposals they can only say yes or no. A government which fears discussion by free Assemblies will always prefer to consult the people by means of a plebiscite. The plebiscitary *régime* is contrary to the Parliamentary *régime* and can be safely adopted by the most absolute Government."

Bonaparte shrewdly appreciated the advantages of a system by which the national sovereignty could only manifest itself in an act of abdication. He, Napoléon, the elected of the nation as a whole, could afford to be contemptuous of the representatives of circumscriptions. He was entitled to regard himself as the nation incarnate. He was the living embodiment of law and therefore might reorganize the magistrature to his service. It did not much matter whether he was called Consul, or Life Consul, or hereditary Emperor, for he had even the power of nominating his successor. When everybody was subservient to him; when he was greater than Louis XIV; when taxation and conscription were in his hands; when institutions became nothing and he became everything; what imported the precise description? It is curious that even when he became Emperor he, thinking of ancient Rome, preserved for France the name of Republic. The coins issued at this time bore on one side the words "French Republic" and on the other "Napoléon—Emperor." Yet the new title enabled him to create a new nobility and so to increase his prestige by pomp and ceremony. Nobody knew better than Napoléon how to make use of whatever instrument he could secure. He was, for example, by no means friendly to religion, but his pragmatical mind saw that religion was an asset of government, and the Church could be made to do his bidding. He placed himself above the Pope, whom he regarded as his vassal. The Pope was compelled to assist in his Coronation and was afterwards held captive by Napoléon. There is evidence that Napoléon dreamed of becoming the religious chief and of making Paris the capital of the religious world. In catechisms which were prepared on his instructions one may read the following questions and answers:

Q. What are the duties of Christians towards Princes and in particular towards Napoléon?

A. Christians owe to Princes and in particular to Napoléon, love, respect, obedience, fidelity, military service, tributes ordered for the preservation and the defence of the Empire and his Throne. Further they owe him their fervent prayers.

Q. Why have we these duties towards the Emperor?

A. First, because God, who creates Empires according to His will, in endowing our Emperor with talents both for peace and war, has made him our Sovereign and the Minister of His power and His majesty on earth. To honour and to serve the Empire is to honour and serve God Himself.

Q. Are there any special reasons which should attach us strongly to Napoléon?

A. Yes, for he is raised up by God in difficult circumstances to re-establish the cult of the religion of our fathers and to be its protector. He has restored and preserved public order by his profound and active wisdom. He has defended the State by his powerful arm and has become the anointed of the Lord by the Consecration received from the Sovereign Pontiff, the Chief of the Universal Church.

Q. What must one think of those who fail in their duties towards the Emperor?

A. According to the Apostle Paul those who resist the order established by God Himself become fit for eternal damnation.*

Even the clergy were regarded as his agents. Any person or body which was not directly dependent upon him was ruthlessly crushed out. The localities which had won a certain liberty came under his tutelage. The prefects whom he appointed had full power, and the municipal officers could do nothing without the consent of the central authority. The commissaries of police were the direct agents of the Minister. It is true that the Constituante had given too many powers to the local authorities. They had been entrusted with the collection of taxes and with recruiting for the army. Autonomy pushed to these lengths meant anarchy, but Napoléon in insisting on centralization went too far in the opposite direction.

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* Quoted by Rambaud.

Yet the administrative qualities of Napoléon are beyond dispute. The Duc de Broglie, not without reason, wrote: "The Eighteenth Brumaire was a deliverance, and the four years which followed that date were a series of triumphs, abroad over the enemies of France, and at home over the principles of disorder and anarchy. These four years are, with the ten last years of the reign of Henri IV, the noblest part of all the history of France." He began by releasing the Royalists who were still imprisoned as hostages. He also allowed exiled Jacobins to re-enter the country. The laws of proscription were abrogated. The Catholics could attend Mass without danger. The financiers had confidence in Bonaparte and the Treasury, which had fallen into extraordinary penury, was replenished. The *départements* were reconstructed, wheel fitting into wheel. Appeasement and organization were his principal objectives. Presently realizing that the majority of French people belonged to the Catholic faith, he went further than to reopen the churches and to recall the priests: he gave the Church an official status. In July, 1801, a Concordat was agreed upon, and it was promulgated in the following year. Since France lived under the Concordat for more than three-quarters of a century, it would be well to examine Napoléon's purpose. He saw on the one hand the advantages of a State religion, with its hierarchy of priests, of bishops, of cardinals, but he saw on the other hand the disadvantages of permitting the Clergy to acquire excessive authority and to create a State within a State. It was necessary therefore to give the Church the means of freely practising, but it was also necessary to maintain a hold on the Clergy so that their influence could not be exercised against the Government. According to the agreement which was reached, the First Consul was to nominate the bishops and the Pope was to invest them with their office. The Government did not propose to restore to the Clergy the ecclesiastical domains that had been taken by the Revolution, but by way of legitimate compensation it promised to pay a regular salary to the ministers of the cult. On the occasion of the promulgation of the Concordat the Te Deum was sung in the Cathedral of Notre Dame, and for the first time for ten years the bells rang out accompanied by the deeper notes of the cannon. It was still necessary to draw up rules of internal administration, but this was quickly done, and the rights and duties of bishops and priests were indicated in organic articles. The interference of the Clergy in political matters was circumscribed. The Conseil d'Etat was accepted as the tribunal charged with judging infractions of the rules.

Bonaparte then turned his attention to the preparation of a Code. In spite of the arbitrary administration of justice under the Revolution, an attempt had truly been made to codify the laws of the Republic. It had only been partly successful, and it remained for Napoléon to appoint a Commission charged with the task of extracting from the tangle of customs and laws a complete and simple statement of a uniform practice. Men like Portalis, de Tronchet, de Malleville, worked uninterruptedly for three years before their gigantic labours were finished. The Code Napoléon is rightly given the name of its inspirer, for Bonaparte presided over the sittings of the Commission which proposed the articles, and over those meetings of the Conseil d'Etat which discussed them. Thus there was set on foot a clear statement of legal dispensations—perhaps the clearest statement that has ever been drafted. Modifications there have been, but after more than a century the French Code remains essentially what it was. Then he proceeded to draw up the Penal Code and generally to organize the administration of justice; with Justices of the Peace in direct contact with the citizens, instructed to settle litigation as far as possible by conciliatory methods; with the Tribunals of First Instance to judge misdemeanours and disputes between private persons; with the Appeal Courts; with the Assize Courts at which juries were impanelled; with, above all, the Court of Cassation whose mission was to fix jurisprudence and survey the strict observance of the laws.

He conceived education to be not only useful in itself but as part of the political machinery. Here, too, he aimed at centralization and at uniformity. He wanted citizens of a certain type, and there was taught in the schools fidelity to the Imperial order. The University was a remarkable creation. It had been planned out by the Convention but it was brought to practical perfection by Napoléon, who became its Grand Master. It controls the whole system of instruction, from the elementary schools to the schools which fashion the professors. On the side of science and on the side of letters there are three grades—the baccalauréat, the licence, and the doctorate.* Napoléon has himself expressed his intention: "It was necessary for me to create a civil profession, disinterested, grave, which would work in the interests of letters and of science. That is the ideal of my University. Its members should not be subject to removal. Above all, I insist that it should devote itself to letters. I love the mathematical and physical sciences; algebra, chemistry, botany, are excellent though partial applications of the human spirit; but letters are the human spirit itself. The study of letters is the general education which prepares for everything; it is the education of the soul." To-day there is still chiefly an insistence on Latin and Greek in the schools, and the Napoléonic idea of culture prevails. There are signs that the tradition is somewhat menaced but it will be a long time before it is uprooted. One source of French strength, and perhaps one should add one source of French weakness, is this fidelity to the humanities in education. Even in the mechanical age in which we live, the French attach the greatest importance to classical education.

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* The *agrégation* is a competitive distinction sought by candidates for professorship.

There were instituted three orders of *enseignement*: primary, secondary, and superior. Teachers for the primary schools were at first appointed only in the communes which were rich enough to pay them, and Napoléon counted upon private initiative. He was particularly interested in secondary education for the middle classes, for he realized that it was from these classes that the citizens who would direct opinion would emerge. The *lycées* which he founded were almost military in their regulations, and the monachal system has only lately been relaxed. But if Napoléon laid stress on *belles-lettres*, he did not neglect the École Polytechnique; and he established other engineering, mechanical, and trade schools, besides schools of law and of medicine.

After Napoléon had accepted the Imperial Crown amid the acclamations of the whole French people (the Pope himself coming to Paris to consecrate him) he surrounded himself with newly-made dignitaries, an imposing hierarchy of officials, and on July 14, 1804, under the dome of the Invalides distributed the insignia of the Legion of Honour, which he had instituted two years before, in a fête of unparalleled splendour. Nothing better demonstrates Napoléon's understanding of the psychology of the French people. The desire for decorations is an amiable human weakness, and France had no sooner by a Revolution, which reshaped not only France but created the modern world, abolished all distinctions between men, than she decided that a new order of chivalry was necessary. Dukes and Barons might well disappear, or rather become ci-devants; the nobility might well be deprived of its prerogatives and privileges; the Frenchman, whatever his birth or station, might become a simple *citoyen*—but, nevertheless, despite doctrines of equality the deep-rooted desire for distinctions had soon to be satisfied. Napoléon, who understood the human heart, did not hesitate to establish the Legion of Honour, which is now the most famous body of its kind. Napoléon had theories of government which were partly cynical and partly poetical. He knew that many a man, like the hero of Browning's poem, could be won over by a title and would render devoted services "just for a ribbon to stick in his coat." He went of course much further and founded a new aristocracy with Princes and Dukes and Barons, and so forth, on an even larger scale than the Ancien Régime. His aristocracy was ephemeral as was the aristocracy of the Restoration; and although the Counts and the Marquesses still figure in international marriage ceremonies, they have no longer, as Frenchmen, any legal right to any other title than that of Monsieur. Only recently the French Government decided formally to repudiate titles, and the sixty thousand "aristocrats" who belong to the Ancien Régime, the Napoleonic period, or the Restoration, are, so far as official recognition is concerned, non-existent. Yet even in the Republic—indeed particularly in the Republic—the Legion of Honour flourishes, and the ambition of every Frenchman is to wear a narrow strip of red ribbon in the buttonhole.

Hardly a month goes by without a long list appearing in the newspapers of civilians and military men who have been appointed or who have been promoted in the Legion. It was intended that the numbers should be strictly limited. Napoléon fixed the full contingent at about 6,500; but the civilians alone must, according to the statistics, reach 30,000, while the soldiers who are distinguished in this way run to well over 100,000. In instituting the Order in 1802 Napoleon said: "I am uniting under one interest all classes of the nation. It is a deep-rooted institution which will long survive my system." He did not foresee that it would be cheapened by excessive awards. To-day it goes to officers almost automatically, while civilians obtain it whenever they fill certain posts, whenever they render certain services, whenever a Minister wishes to be generous—and Ministers always wish to be generous. Each Government department, it is true, has only a limited number of the coveted decorations at its disposal, but there have been many abuses and every special occasion is taken to draw up an extraordinary list of recipients. Nevertheless the Order has included many remarkable servants of France, and by arousing a harmless ambition has stimulated the French to a noble rivalry in civic services. Napoléon knew his countrymen exceedingly well.

Far back in the twelfth century a number of Orders of Chivalry, of which the most celebrated is the Order of the Templars, sprang up in France. They were in their turn modelled on earlier Celtic Orders. The Templars particularly distinguished themselves in Palestine. They were the soul of the Crusades. Afterwards these military and religious associations, zealous, chivalric, heroic, became so rich and powerful that they were a menace to the Kings of the Middle Ages. Philippe le Bel seized their vast possessions, caused their Grand Master to be arrested, and instituted proceedings against them. At the beginning of the fourteenth century they were suppressed by the Pope at the instigation of the French King. The unity of France, which was being achieved, would, it was contended, have been jeopardized by a Society which was a law unto itself. There is, of course, to-day no such antagonism between the State and the modern Order which has been patterned on that of the Templars; on the contrary it is fashioned and controlled by the State and represents in theory at least the cream of the citizens of the State.

Napoléon also realized the importance of a national theatre which would strike the classical note which he always affected. The Comédie Française, the principal French repertory theatre subsidized by the State, was begun by Louis XIV in 1680 seven years after the death of Molière by the fusion of the two main theatrical companies then existing in Paris. It continued happily enough until the Revolution. At that time it did not accept Revolutionary ideas as did other Paris theatres. It remained Conservative. A competitor arose which called itself La Théâtre de la République. Then the Convention disestablished the theatres, and eventually the company of the Comédie Française were arrested. After the Terror the old Comédie was revived, but there were unfortunate rivalries which resulted in the creation of a second theatre called the Odéon. In 1803 Napoléon framed for the Comédie Française, which was now housed near the Palais Royal, a precise constitution ; and in 1812, in the midst of the difficulties of the ill-fated Russian expedition, he signed another constitution for the Comédie which, with certain minor alterations, is in force to-day. The theatre is managed by a State official but the artistes promote themselves, choose their plays, and allocate the profits, subject to the approval of the Minister of Public Instruction and of Beaux Arts. It is possible to make the somewhat foolish criticism that the Comédie Française is old-fashioned, but its purpose is to preserve a high standard of dramatic literature and of acting which shall not depend upon the fluctuations of public taste. Certainly the classical drama of Corneille and Racine and Molière cannot be appreciated as it should be unless one has heard and seen the actors of the Comédie. Moreover, they render a real service in the careful study of French pronunciation.

There is no doubt that Napoléon was a sincere lover of the dramatic art and in particular of the antique tragedy. He found an inspiration in the heroes of Greece and of Rome. Sophocles, Æschylus, and Euripides captivated him ; and he regarded Corneille as their modern successor. " If Corneille were alive," he said one day, " I would make him King." Racine he found less vigorous. Talma, the most illustrious tragedian in French history, was his personal friend ; and when he was so powerful that he could call together the Kings of Europe, he brought Talma and the actors of the Comédie Française to Erfurt, saying : " I have composed for you to-day a *parterre* of kings." It cannot, however, be claimed that intellect flourished under Napoléon. Chateaubriand and Madame de Staël, one a precursor of the romantic school, and the other a popularizer of foreign literature, were in exile. In art he encouraged David, to whom he gave the title of " First painter of the Emperor." David is cold, and his pompous talent is less admired to-day. But perhaps he represented a healthy reaction from the enervated art which had chosen for subject scenes of gallantry and of sophisticated nature.

In music one can find only two names that matter —Méhul and Chérubini, though Beethoven composed one of his finest symphonies in honour of the victorious general. A new style in furniture was evolved—a style solid in form, severe in its lines, but richly ornamented with bronze. Napoléon stimulated public works, constructed roads, canals, and ports. He improved connections with the Vendée and with Brittany, and drove the routes of Mont-Cenis and the Simplon. The canal of the Ourcq and the canal from Nantes to Brest are due to him. The streets of Paris are filled with his monuments. The rue de Rivoli was pierced; the Madeleine was built; the Panthéon was finished; the Louvre and the Tuileries were united. At Lyons and at Bordeaux and at Cherbourg and in many other towns he directed excellent public works. His chemists extended the use of the beetroot for the manufacture of sugar. Mechanical weaving was greatly improved and industrial inventors abounded. The scientific movement was protected by him and the scientists were generously rewarded. Cuvier, Monge, Laplace, Lagrange, Gay Lussac, Lamarck, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, are among the savants who in mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, mineralogy, geography, natural history, were true innovators. Berthollet enjoyed his friendship. Of all the titles the Emperor possessed he was proudest of that of Member of the Institute.

Napoléon was also the founder of the Banque de France. Such a national financial institution was undoubtedly necessary, and Napoléon called together the principal financiers and capitalists of the opening nineteenth century. The bank started with a capital of thirty million francs. It was to receive deposits, extend credits, and emit notes which should have a legal currency and should theoretically be reimbursed in gold on their presentation to the bank. It was administered by a council of fifteen regents appointed by the shareholders and a superior committee of three members. A Governor and two Deputy-Governors are appointed by the State. Fundamentally the bank remains as it was founded in 1803. Generally, Napoléon improved the financial system set up by the successive Revolutionary governments. These governments deserve considerable credit for what they endeavoured to do; but in seizing property, in laying hands on the sources of wealth, they had acted without due deliberation, and their administration had been disastrously wasteful. They had anticipated the receipts from the forced sale of national spoils, and the provisional title-deeds had passed from hand to hand, giving rise to the wildest speculation. The shrewder financiers and the downright swindlers had, as is always the case in periods of social upheaval, enriched themselves at the expense of the State, and even—though the peasants had profited by the distribution of land and the dispossession of the old proprietors—at the expense of the masses. Napoléon stopped the sale of national property, and addressed himself to the citizens to procure sufficient governmental funds. Confidence had been revived and it was possible to institute *rentes* on the State. The public debt was fixed. Taxation was more fairly distributed, and to secure good management and to prevent the dilapidation of public finances Napoléon separated the two tasks of establishing the part that each citizen should pay and of actually collecting that part. The mechanism was simple, and although it has now become outmoded was efficacious. The indirect taxes—levied on goods and not on persons—were easily recovered at the moment of sale and purchase. The direct taxes—taxes on persons calculated according to their holdings and habitations—were recovered by local Percepteurs, who paid the proceeds into the hands of a Receveur, who was appointed in each *arrondissement,* and the Receveur in his turn transferred them to a Trésorier Payeur Général, who was responsible for the whole *département* and rendered an account to the Finance Minister. The key-word was again centralization.

When the young Bonaparte entered the military school he was taught the traditional methods of warfare. The order of battle consisted in putting the artillery and the infantry in the centre, with the cavalry on either wing. This was the classic formation. But the King of Prussia, Frederick the Great, had already profoundly changed the art of warfare. He saw that there was no unique method of conducting a battle : the method should be determined by the terrain—topography was an important part of military science. Moreover, he had aimed at making armies mobile and in concentrating his troops. Napoléon profited by these lessons. He applied the principles of mathematics. The elements of the problem should first be known and the answer patiently worked out in advance. He elaborated precepts which were new but which are sound to-day. " I have," he said, " fought sixty battles, but I have learnt nothing that I did not realize from the beginning." Initiative was essential—an army which remained behind barriers or allowed itself to be surrounded was no longer master of the attack. Further, he saw that mass formation might be irresistible ; and even if an army was inferior in numbers it would win if at a given point, which was the object of attack or defence, larger forces were available than the enemy could muster. This meant that there should always be large reserves which might be thrown decisively into the battle. It meant that the issues of war depended upon rapidity of movement. It meant that the best general was the general who appreciated the vulnerable spots and who without hesitation manœuvred his men against those vulnerable spots. The respective size of the rival armies was a relatively negligible factor provided there could be, thanks to initiative and swift displacement, superiority at a given point. Discipline, mobility, and direction, had a new significance. The enemy might be beaten in detail. Napoléon, who was originally an artillery officer, also knew how to make better use of artillery than any of the older captains who opposed him. Yet, regarding the army as an instrument of precision, he personally strove to perfect each part. He foresaw everything and ordered everything himself. Nothing escaped his observation—the recruiting and drilling of his troops, the quality of the remounts, the provision of foodstuffs and munitions. To Napoléon the army owes the military unit which is called the Corps d'Armée. This army corps was formed of three divisions, each division of two brigades, and each brigade of two demi-brigades or regiments. Each army corps possessed its artillery and its cavalry. The infantry, supported by the artillery, was the " queen of the battle," and the cavalry acted first as an advance guard, a scout, a reconnoitring body, and then was reserved for the decisive moment. The Garde Impériale, composed of thirty chosen regiments utterly devoted, usually constituted a reserve force. The army was homogeneous, not relying on mercenary and casual auxiliaries : everybody who served the army in a combatant or non-combatant rôle was a soldier. There were times when Napoléon thus commanded nearly a million men. But though Napoléon insisted on complete organization he was far from indifferent to the spirit of the army. He chose his lieutenants with extraordinary skill. His marshals were promoted step by step from the ranks: merit alone counted: every soldier had a *bâton* in his knapsack. Never had any man such loyal collaborators who recognized in him the authority of a master. Never did any man know better how to touch the sensitive chords of his men. In an admirable page he has revealed his acute sense of French psychology: "The French soldier reasons; he judges severely the bravery and talent of his officers; he discusses the plan of campaign and the military manœuvres. He is capable of anything when he approves the operations and esteems his chiefs; but if he does not, one cannot count on success. He is the only soldier in Europe who can fight when he is hungry. However long may be the battle, he forgets about eating; but he is more exigent than any other soldier when he is no longer facing the enemy. A simple French soldier is more interested than a Prussian officer in winning a victory; and he attributes always to the corps to which he is attached the principal part in the victory. The soldiers of other nations remain in their posts by duty: the French soldier by honour. The first are indifferent to defeat, the second are humiliated by defeat. The mainspring of the French soldier is honour."

With the formidable instrument which he had forged Napoléon was fated to advance to his destruction. Great as he was he was bound to become the sport of the machine he had created. Here was his Frankenstein's monster. Diplomacy is determined by opportunity and power. Ambition grows by what it feeds upon. It would seem impossible for a conqueror to set himself limits: the weapon which he wields eventually wields him. After the peace of Lunéville in 1801, with the Austrians out of the field; and the Peace of Amiens in 1802, with England weary of war, it would have seemed that Napoléon could have rested on his laurels. France had regained her natural frontiers and was no longer menaced. The Royalists were recalled; the Catholic Church was re-established; the Prefects were fulfilling their administrative duties in the *départements*; the Courts of Appeal had been set up and the Code elaborated; the Bank of France had been founded; the Legion of Honour was fostering the national spirit; the system of education called the Université de France was operating. There was peace, order, and prosperity. The disappearance of the Republic was scarcely regretted. Napoléon might have remained Dictator for life. But Napoléon by this time was dreaming dreams of universal domination. He had imbibed the ideas of the Roman Empire. For more than seven centuries from the battle of Actium to the advent of Islam, the Roman Empire had imposed its unity, its authority, its organizing laws on the greater part of Europe. It had indeed fashioned Europe, educating the peoples, installing civilization, bringing the unifying, spiritual principle of Roman Christianity. Even after the invasion of the Barbarians, its influence was prolonged by the Byzantine Empire, by the great Empire of Charlemagne, by the Germanic Holy Roman Empire.

How could a conqueror and an organizer like Napoléon fail to believe in the virtue of a universal government? Why should France not be the centre and the controller of the world, with Napoléon as the Supreme Master of the world? The fundamental idea of the Empire was peace, but that peace could only be attained by the unchallenged superiority of a single power. It was a peace, if the paradox be allowed, that reposed upon incessant warfare, or at least upon a perpetual preparedness for war. It has been well stated by both ancient and modern thinkers that peace is not an end in itself but rather the consequence of certain conditions of order. That order it is contended can only be achieved by force and can only be maintained by force. What is sought is the equilibrium between the two principles—that of liberty and that of authority. Unfortunately, the balance is not easy to strike. Sometimes there is an excess of liberty and sometimes an excess of authority, but always does authority propose itself as the protector of peace and of liberty. The Empire, pretend its apologists, was able to compose a synthesis which its successors have failed to compose. There is no doubt that, earlier or later, Napoléon was impelled by the most grandiose ideas of reconstructing Europe on French foundations. Asking whether Napoléonic policy can be excused, Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, in his illuminating book on *Bonapartism*, has enumerated the possible explanations. Had Napoléon a desire to propagate the revolutionary principles that France had enthusiastically espoused? One may doubt whether Napoléon was seriously touched by the ideas of 1789. His predecessors had explicitly renounced conquest, but had discovered that in the modern world it is impossible for a nation which drastically reforms its institutions to defend them except by spreading them beyond its own frontiers. The French offensives were partly defensive, but the Revolutionaries also considered it right to make war on kings for the emancipation of peoples. In their earlier victories in Belgium, on the Rhine, in Savoy, and Nice; in their successful resistance to the repeated invasions of the Allies; they were armed by self-righteousness. But gradually they became professional fighters; they displayed bitterness;

they were no longer missionaries or crusaders; they were hostile to other peoples and tried to wrap around them the Pyrenees, the Alps, the Rhine, and the Ocean. It was Napoléon who encouraged the notion of the deliberate aggrandizement of France. But the aggrandizement of France for the sheer sake of aggrandizement does not account for many of the campaigns. There was another factor: it was the remarkable opposition of England, who as a sea-power was resolved to maintain the power of blockading the Continental coast. France on her part became the champion of the liberty of the seas. The long duel between the two countries continued and the Treaty of Amiens could not stand. It was England who by her gold and her diplomacy raised up coalition after coalition against France.

Nor was this all. Napoléon as Emperor was strongly entrenched, but nevertheless he would probably have diminished to ordinary proportions had he not contrived to keep the people in a constant state of exaltation. He had, as it were, to re-gild his statue if it were to be refulgent in men's eyes. There was, further, the thought of founding a great dynasty; for in Napoléon there was a typically Corsican sense of family, of clan, of the perpetuation of a name. These were the springs of action; but the mainspring, as I think, was in Napoléon's historical memory, in his admiration for Rome. He was steeped in the classical spirit. He had a horror of inefficiency in small as in great things. He had a passion for practical improvement. He was the renovator who was carried on from task to task ceaselessly, untiringly. All these motives were in the man. Had they been less developed he would not have reached the heights from which he fell, but had they been less developed, had he truly endeavoured to stop midway in his career, he would probably have fallen just the same. He could not but go on;

he could not but try to consolidate and to extend his possessions.

Unable to invade England he turned his attention to the Continent. He controlled Italy; he directed the foreign affairs of Switzerland; he beat the Austrians and the Russians at Austerlitz and distributed kingdoms as a rich man may make generous presents to his poorer relations. Prussia lost all her territories along the Rhine, and a confederation of which Napoléon was Protector, neutral, semi-independent, a buffer State between France, Russia, and Austria, was constructed. Holland was handed over to his brother Louis. Naples had his brother Joseph for King. The Duchy of Berg in Westphalia went to his brother-in-law Murat, and afterwards Westphalia was the apanage of his brother Jérôme. These pieces on the chessboard of Europe were interchangeable. In 1808 the King of Portugal was sent into exile; the King of Spain was replaced by Joseph, and Murat was sent to Naples. Army after army which was flung against Napoléon was wiped out. The Prussian armies were shattered at Iena and Napoléon entered Berlin. The Russian armies were rolled back time after time on the Vistula. Spain was routed. Austria was finally defeated at Wagram. British goods and shipping were boycotted, and as the Pope did not approve of the Continental blockade against England he was taken to Fontainebleau as a prisoner, while Louis, having been too lax in enforcing the blockade, was dismissed from the Dutch throne.

By 1909 France comprised 130 *départements* with 100,000,000 inhabitants. The Empire included Belgium, Holland, the Rhine provinces, Germany, up to the Elbe, Italy, Spain, the Swiss Confederation, and with the Illyrian provinces stretched from the Baltic to the borders of Turkey. The relatives of Napoléon were kings of peoples and vassals of the

Emperor. Since Charlemagne nobody in Europe had had such an immense span. Around him was a new nobility. Joséphine Tascher de la Pagerie, the beautiful Martiniquaise, who after the death of her husband, the Vicomte Beauharnais, on the scaffold, had married General Bonaparte in 1796, was barren; and in his Imperial glory Napoléon, for dynastic reasons, for reasons of State, divorced her and espoused Marie Louise, the daughter of the Austrian Emperor. Thus the greatest potentates of Europe with age-long traditions were compelled to do homage to the self-made upstart of an obscure Corsican family. When in 1811 a son was born, the infant was given the title of King of Rome. In this title is the key to Napoléonic policy. Rome had tremendous connotations; the word rang with historic memories of absolute power, of universal peace through military supremacy, of unity under one master. The Roman eagle was to spread its wings over the whole globe and Roman law was to be the unique law. It would seem that Napoléon had everything he could desire in his grasp, but, standing on the tip-top of things, he was soon to be precipitated to the very depths. The Tarpeian Rock still remained by the Capitole.

Spain was the weakest and yet the most deadly enemy of Napoléon. The irregular fighting on the other side of the Pyrenees diverted considerable forces. Wellington, assisting the Spaniards, exploited ably the Spanish discontent. Then Napoléon permitted himself the monstrous extravagance of a march on Moscow. The Russians set the town on fire, and in the winter snows the victorious Grande Armée was obliged to retreat, dwindling as it went from 600,000 to 30,000 men. This was the beginning of the end. Prussia, though only a small country of 6,000,000 inhabitants, was developing what has been called her principal industry—war; and had constructed a well-trained army 250,000 strong. The Emperor, with hastily mustered forces, still managed to prevail over the Prussians; but Austria, too, renewed her attack and the Russians again came into the field. What did it matter whether Napoléon won at Leipzig? He was at bay; the French were exhausted; the obstinate diplomacy of England was nearing its goal. It was Napoléon who was declared to be the enemy of Europe, not the French people. In 1814 France was invaded and Paris was entered. Napoléon was obliged by the Senate to abdicate. Louis XVIII, a brother of the guillotined King, was placed on the throne and he signed a treaty which was not unfavourable to France, restoring the frontiers of 1792. But the fallen giant made a final bid. The new King was unpopular; and Napoléon landing in the South of France at once found his old supporters. He was prepared to grant a new Constitution to France, relinquishing a large part of his power; but the Allies would have nothing to do with him. For a hundred glorious days his star trembled and then set at Waterloo. He was interned at St. Helena, where he died six years later.

France was not dismembered by the diplomatists who met in the Congress of Vienna. There was no desire to humiliate Louis XVIII, and the Prince de Talleyrand cleverly played the Allies against each other. The chief concern was to establish a Balance of Power in Europe. No single nation should, in this system, which was to be accepted by Europe for a century, dominate. In the re-drawing of the map this was the guiding principle. Moreover, these statesmen endeavoured to re-establish autocracy, which had been shattered by the Revolution. They were afraid of the spread of the newfangled notions which France had proclaimed only to forget them. On the whole, the Congress of Vienna had no lofty conceptions, but it did its work, such as it was, ably enough. The decisive influence was that of Metternich, the Chancellor of the Austrian Empire, who in the first half of the nineteenth century was the most commanding personality on the Continent. He looked upon his mission as that of propping up the decaying structure of European society. He execrated the French Revolution and denounced its results in lurid phrases, such as: "The volcano which must be extinguished; the gangrene which must be burnt out with a hot iron; the hydra with jaws open to swallow up the social order." Believing in Absolute Monarchy he considered himself God's lieutenant in its maintenance. Parliaments and representative government, liberty, equality, Constitutions, were pestilential demands. He stood for the *status quo*, and was against national independence and aspirations for self-government. He was the head and front of the European reaction. Yet France could hardly complain of the treatment to which she was subjected. The Great Powers divided out the spoils. Russia and Prussia and Austria particularly profited. They shared Poland and obtained compensations on the Baltic, on the Rhine, in Northern Italy, and in the Illyrian provinces. England added to her Colonial Empire; Holland was allowed to annex Belgium. Generally the sentiment of nationality was ignored. Further, a Holy Alliance and a Quadruple Alliance were established. Alexander I of Russia was a mystical peacemaker who, after grabbing as much territory as possible, submitted a document which stated that it was the intention of the Powers henceforth to be guided both in their domestic and foreign policies by the precepts of Christianity; the rulers would regard each other as brothers and their subjects as their children, and they would aid each other on all occasions. The diplomatists who acquiesced in this extraordinary farce well knew that they were not setting up an idealistic diplomacy. They well knew that they had not been guided by affection, equity, or religion, and that they did not mean to be so guided. The other document signed by Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England called for occasional congresses for the purpose of considering common interests and the needs of Europe. Needless to say the Holy Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance were engines of oppression.

When one considers the behaviour of the European rulers who had denounced Napoléon for his lack of liberalism, and considers the circumstances in which Napoléon was placed, one finds it difficult to condemn the French Emperor. He was a realist who had witnessed the bankruptcy of talkative assemblies. A governing class did not exist in France, or rather it was uninstructed and incompetent. The Revolution, like the Ancien Régime, had in practice placed the *raison d'État* in opposition to personal freedom, and Napoléon was only following in a more efficient manner the example of his predecessors. It is in France almost impossible, it would seem, to have a real separation of powers. There is always some kind of dictatorship, and the Third Republic, with its so-called Democracy has given us a dictatorship of Parliamentarians. M. Louis Andrieux, a former doyen of the Chamber, has (like Alexandre Millerand) bitterly complained from the platform of his experience of the confusion of powers. "We are not content," he writes, "to jerry-build laws; we put our hand in everything; we govern and we administer by the intermediary of a revocable Cabinet. When the number of offices does not suffice for our protégés we create new offices with inspectors to control them. The magistrates themselves do not escape, for by our incessant interventions we dispose of their advancement and of their decorations. The Ministers, hypnotized by their portfolios, can refuse us nothing, and we refuse nothing to those who have helped us to secure a retributive mandate. Everywhere the interest of the State is effaced by their private interest, from the bottom to the top of the ladder, from the breaker of stones on the road to the breaker of judgments in the Supreme Court. According to our electoral designs, our friendships, our rancours, we animate, we decorate, we displace, we revoke, and we control the pirouette of functionaries. If the functionaries to some extent regulate the dance of the Deputies, we may define our Parliamentarism as the dictature of the Deputies tempered by the despotism of the functionaries."

This condition, then, is chronic and indigenous. Napoléon in his day was acutely aware of its disadvantages, and his solution was to take authority out of a multitude of hands into a single pair of hands—a pair of singularly efficient hands. He reduced the Legislative Assembly to a mere fiction, but he made use of it as far as it would serve him; and with his pragmatical mind he made use, too, of religion and of the army. His technical qualities were marvellous. He was the supreme layman. He was capable of a certain cool detachment, but if he was cynical he had a vast, well-ordered imagination. Large as were his plans he attended to every detail. He constructed an admirable machinery which unfortunately was not sufficiently modified as it became outmoded. His success too is partly explained in that he was a common denominator. The peasant wanted to hold the land which he acquired but felt the need of his traditional religion. The bourgeois wanted order. The profiteers wanted a new *régime* to consolidate their gains. Everybody was tired of anarchy and internal struggle, and Napoléon presented himself at the right moment and observed, so far as the State was concerned, some impartiality. He was not a doctrinaire, and the French, though incorrigible generalizers, had, after an orgy of abstractions, altogether failed to apply them properly and were glad to accept a man capable of concretion. After his return from Elba, Napoléon promised liberal reforms, but in fact Bonapartism can only be based upon the most limited liberty of thought, the most restricted personal liberty. If the mighty machine is to work as Napoléon wished it to work, the Press must be subdued, the plays censored, citizens of a particular type fashioned in the schools, and the police be repressive. The fatal flaw of Bonapartism, which was, however, historically necessary, is that it cannot be otherwise than despotic. But no man, even if he be a Napoléon, can carry such a weight of charges on his shoulders. A breakdown is inevitable. He is sure to develop megalomania, to become intolerant of advice, to attempt too much. Yet the downfall of such a man is a tragedy. Chateaubriand in exile with his sovereign in Belgium, an enemy of Napoléon, records with what mixed feelings he heard the guns of Waterloo. Napoléon in his St. Helena days made his own apologia. He was, he says, working for the ultimate liberty of the French in difficult circumstances; his actual system was provisional. One may or may not accept this afterthought, but there is no absolute necessity to deny it. All that one can say is that it would never have been possible for Napoléon himself to have emerged from the provisional system, and that it could not, in more propitious times, have endured.

During the period of Restoration and the July Monarchy of 1830 Napoléon was in eclipse. But little by little the Napoléonic legend revived, and when in 1840 the bones of the Emperor were brought to France and laid under the dome of the Invalides popular imagination was stirred. There was a veritable Napoléonic cult, and perhaps unconsciously men's minds were turning again towards Bonapartism. Cleaned of dross, idealized by time, the figure of the man who had made France glorious among the nations reappeared resplendent. The experience of the French under a variety of *régimes* had been unsatisfactory. There was a constant ebb and flow: relative liberty being followed by repressive reaction. Monarchy had had its second chance, but the spell had been broken, the magic of Monarchy had evaporated. The Revolution and its accomplishments could have been brushed aside only by a powerful genius, and the Kings who presented themselves to take up the broken succession were, compared with Napoléon, feeble creatures. Nor could they sincerely bring themselves to head a party of reform. They hankered after the past, which was not to be recaptured by them, and failed utterly to adjust themselves to the present, much less to point the way to the future. They were living anachronisms; they had forgotten nothing and learned nothing.

On his first accession Louis XVIII, though proclaiming himself King by the Grace of God, was advised to grant a fairly liberal charter. There was to be freedom of worship and the Press was to be unfettered. There was to be equality in taxation and work was to be provided for all. There were to be no privileges; there were to be responsible Ministers. Two Chambers were to make the laws, one composed of hereditary peers and the other composed of deputies elected by those citizens who were paying three hundred francs or more in taxes. But the promises of the brother of Louis XVI were quickly broken. After the unexpected return and whirlwind campaign of Napoléon, the Royalists adopted totally reactionary measures and applied them violently. Seditious utterances were detected in the mildest expressions of opinion and were severely punished. Arrests were of the most arbitrary character. Privileges of various kinds were restored. What was called the "Chambre Introuvable" endeavoured to go beyond anything that could have been reasonably expected by the most conservative person. It sought to abrogate the secular laws and to give the Clergy wide control. The Clergy were to keep the civil State registers, supervise public instruction and regain their old domains. There was something like a White Terror conducted by the "Ultras," who were more Royalist than the King. The tricolour cockade was prohibited as a Bonapartist manifestation. An attempt to return estates, which had been nationalized and distributed, to the Royalists failed, but the King was so embarrassed that he was compelled to dissolve the Chamber. Subsequent Chambers were more liberal. The Press was given a freer hand—though it was not long before the new laws were revoked. The Budget was to be publicly discussed and openly voted. The electoral machinery was improved. It would be fastidious to show how the pendulum swung this way and that. Suffice it to record that if there were now and again glimpses of a liberal spirit they were always blackened out. The censorship was pitiless. Teachers like Guizot and Cousin at the Sorbonne were suspended. Despotism was particularly dangerous because over Europe a great wave of enfranchisement was washing, and the French expedition to Spain in the interests of Absolute Monarchy there caused discontent. On the death of the King in 1824, his brother, Charles X, who had been a leader of the *émigrés*, permitted the most anti-democratic measures. A milliard francs was accorded to dispossessed emigrants. "Printing is suppressed in France," cried Casimir Périer when the ironically named Law of Justice and Love was passed by the Chamber. There was so much popular opposition to the policy of the Ultras that a timid return to more moderate government was imperative. The Cabinet Noir which opened private correspondence was abolished. A Ministry of Public Instruction as distinct from the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs was created; but back went the Monarchy to its former predilections. It could not be otherwise. The Bourbons were incapable of becoming Constitutional Kings. "I would rather hew wood than be a King in the situation of the English King," confessed Charles X. The obligations of the Charter were forgotten. Charles issued ordinances without the advice of the Chambers. Indeed, he ruthlessly sent the Chamber packing. Attempted diversions, such as the capture of Algiers (1830) could not avert the coming storm. The people rose in rebellion, and after a few days rioting in Paris at the end of July (1830) Charles fled to England; and Louis-Philippe, Duke of Orléans, came to the throne. Louis-Philippe was the head of the younger branch of the Bourbons, and his credit was good, chiefly because he had fought in the Revolutionary army at Jemmappes and Valmy. He was ready to accept a revised Charter which contained the usual affirmations: no State religion, equality of citizens before the law, equitable taxation, freedom of conscience, liberty of the Press, responsibility of Ministers, and so forth. He recognized the tricolour flag. He was bourgeois by temperament and during his exile had been poor. He might have governed well had he not joined weakness to amiability. As it was, in the welter of parties, none of whom were particularly friendly towards him—Loyalists, Legitimists, Republicans, Bonapartists—his position was delicate, and for ten years there were almost unceasing disorders. On one side were those who thought that sufficient political progress had now been made, and on the other side were those who regarded 1830 simply as a new point of departure.

Industrial riots broke out. At Lyons the workmen demanding higher wages were masters of the town for several days. In Paris there was street fighting and the barricades had to be taken by assault. There were the usual repressive laws, and from this time may be dated the beginnings of an active Socialism. Even among the Catholics there were those who advocated far more liberal institutions. Their leader was Lamennais. Education should, they contended, be completely unshackled. Guizot had urged the bourgeoisie to enrich itself, and in fact a wealthier manufacturing class came into existence. It was precisely as a result of the increasing wealth of the industrialists that the Socialistic theories of Fourier, Victor Considérant, and Saint-Simon were given practical shape by Louis Blanc and Proudhon. The stream which had been dammed for so long was now flowing fiercely, and at last in February 1848 swept away the bourgeois King. The agitation was for electoral reform—for universal suffrage—but it was not exclusively political, it was also social.

In spite of the blunders of the Louis Philippe administration France had undoubtedly developed under his reign. Economically the progress had been immense. Finances were flourishing; trade was better than it had ever been. The general installation of machinery was transforming France; while apart from the proliferation of new social ideas, such humanitarian reforms as the abolition of branding of convicts, the admission of attenuating circumstances which might be recognized by the jury in criminal cases, and the extension of primary education, were effected. Roads and canals were constructed, and France began to be dotted with prosperous factories. There had, however, been a number of foreign events which did not strengthen the prestige of France. Belgium had been separated from Holland (1832), but the fate of Egypt had been settled by Russia, England, Austria and Prussia without consulting France and French opinion was in 1840 highly exasperated. On the whole, Louis Philippe deserved something better than ignominious dismissal; but when the Republic was, after his flight, proclaimed, the choice no longer lay between the White Flag and the Tricolour Flag but between the Tricolour Flag and the Red Flag, which had become for the people the symbol of a complete emancipation. Lamartine, at the head of the provisional Government, on which sat Louis Blanc, determined on generous concessions but rejected the Red Flag, which has since had for France a peculiar significance. The Second Republic sought the support of the bourgeoisie and the elections went to the Moderates. Universal suffrage was decreed and national workshops, which were later found to be impracticable, were established. After an abortive insurrection of the extreme labour men, the opportunity of the nephew of the great Emperor, Louis Napoléon Bonaparte, who had failed in earlier attempts at a *coup d'état*, came.

The name of Napoléon had been reburnished, and when he appealed to the people he was elected President of the Republic by an overwhelming majority. The Constitution which had been framed provided for the appointment of a President by universal direct suffrage. It was a sure method of giving France a Dictator. Some of the Republicans foresaw this result and would have had the President nominated by the Assembly. The Assembly decided otherwise, and thus played into Louis Napoléon's hands. The sovereignty of the people was his theme. He derived by the plebiscite authority from the whole nation. Like his uncle he was independent of the legislature and he had no difficulty in securing full control of the administration. A plebiscite on a name necessarily means that the elected person stands out predominantly. This is true, in spite of special safeguards, even in the United States to-day. In the circumstances in which the Prince President was chosen by the people it was inevitable that he should be supreme. He could permit himself anything in virtue of the investiture of the popular personal vote, and when, by a *coup d'état* in 1851, he aimed still higher, the people confirmed his action. The Constitution forbade his re-election, but he simply dissolved the Chamber and convoked the electors to vote a new Constitution. The fresh plebiscite was skilfully prepared. Fears of a revolutionary victory had been fostered and Louis Napoléon stood as the representative of order. He was again eminently successful and obtained from the people dictatorial powers for ten years. He took everything into his own hands—executive power, command of the army and navy, the declaration of war, the signing of peace, the initiative of laws, the nomination of Ministers and officials, the choice of his successor; and the people were placed in the flattering position of being his sole judge. The country was carefully worked, the Press was manipulated, the Prefects were won over, and finally another plebiscite gave him the right to call himself Napoléon III. The wheel had once more come full circle, and after Monarchies and Republics was an Empire.

WORKS TO BE CONSULTED

Who has not written about Napoléon? It is difficult to make a selection, but at least there should be read—J. H. Rose: *Life of Napoléon*; H. A. L. Fisher: *Bonapartism*; Philippe Gonnard: *Origines de la Legende Napoléonienne*; Fournier: *Napoleon the First*; Johnston: *Napoléon*; Bingham: *A Selection from the Letters and Despatches*; Las Cases: *Journal de Sainte-Hélène*; and an enthusiastic but accurate short popular account by Commandant Claude Berget: *Napoléon Pour Tous les Français.*

CHAPTER VI

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Royal Currency — Stimulus of Crusades — Etats-Généraux — Cathedrals—Craft Corporations—Renaissance and Trade—Henri IV—Colbert—Farmed Taxes—Banking Experiments—Factory System—Protection—Railways, Ships, and Aeroplanes—Water Power and Electricity—Agriculture—Industrial Revolution—Coal and Iron—Franco-German Co-operation — Immigration — Labour Problems—Finances—Debt — Budget — Borrowings — Gold Reserves — Inflation—Depreciation—Foreign Debts.

It would be fastidious to attempt to trace in detail the economic development of France and the financial problems that have arisen in the course of the ages. But briefly, following Rambaud, we may show how the economic and financial conditions in France have been determined by centuries of slow evolution. In ancient Gaul, before the Roman Conquest, there were four classes of inhabitants. There were the slaves, the people, the nobles, and the priests. The slave class was composed chiefly of criminals, of debtors, and of persons who had been taken prisoner in combat. They were entirely without rights, nor was the lot of the people, who principally lived in the country-side, that of free men. The aristocracy sometimes imposed itself by force, though a chief might also have been chosen by the clan and thus have placed himself in a position of complete authority. In the towns the people enjoyed greater liberty, but the towns were small and few. In those early days agriculture seems to have been confined to oats and rye. Wheat was introduced later by the Romans. There was breeding of pigs; cheeses were made; wines were plentiful. Industrial life was not lacking. Pottery, linen, leather, and copper utensils were manufactured. The iron mines were exploited and iron objects fashioned. Gold was also found. The Gauls exported precious stones and jewellery. Under the colonizing influence of the Romans agriculture and industry took on a new character. The small cultivator practically disappeared and agricultural exploitations were organized on a vast scale. Industrial activities were combined with agricultural activities on the same domain. The products of the soil were treated in various ways: there was, for example, much spinning and dyestuffs were scientifically used. Trees yielding nuts, cherries, peaches, and so forth, were introduced. There was a great exchange of ideas and of goods throughout the Empire which linked the Persian Gulf to the North Sea. Industry proper was greatly improved and Imperial factories were set up, notably for the manufacture of arms. It was, however, in the South that the greatest progress was made. The Mediterranean towns were much more important than the Atlantic towns. Generally, the towns increased in numbers and in population. The tradesmen and artisans were grouped together in colleges and corporations whose members were in certain conditions freed from military service and other charges. The more distinguished artisans even received titles. The distribution of foodstuffs was supervised by the State, and for this purpose roads and waterways were constructed. It should perhaps be noted that the workers in the Imperial factories, whether nominally free or slaves, were subjected to the most rigorous rules and could not, on pain of the severest penalties, quit their employment.

Society was composed of Senators or Patricians, provincial notabilities, slaves both in the towns and in the fields, and farmers—who were reputed to be free save in one respect—that they were attached permanently to their place. If the soil changed hands, if a new master was given to the farmer, he nevertheless remained. Eventually the Roman occupation ended and France was invaded by less enlightened people. Many of the industries were destroyed. Sacerdotal luxury, however, helped to revive the French skill in jewellery and in the weaving of gold tissue and of precious embroideries. The monasteries competed with the lay workers. That industry was rare may be judged by one simple fact: a horse was cheaper than its bridle. The farmers and the slaves were confused; the distinction scarcely existed any longer. Yet the lot of the slaves was ameliorated. Christianity insisted on the validity of the marriages among the slaves, and from the seventh to the tenth century the sale of slaves, at first abroad and then in the interior of the country, was to some extent suppressed. Nevertheless, nobody was really free unless he lived on the toil of others—that is to say, unless he was in some sense noble. The towns did not develop; the kings themselves for the most part lived on their estates. To fix a precise date for the beginnings of the Feudal System would be to risk controversy, but roughly one may venture to say that the Feudal System—which, however, underwent many changes—was in existence from the ninth century. The workers, whether urban or rural, were, whatever was their designation, servile or semi-servile. Two nations were, so to speak, superimposed: there were the nobles and there were their servitors. The first had rights and privileges and entered into engagements between themselves; the second had principally duties. There was a definite hierarchy: suzerains who gave concessions to their vassals who in their turn had vassals. The basis of Feudalism was that of mutual contract. There were the great Dukes; and then at a lower stage the proprietors who were known as Barons; and third, the simple Knights; and finally the poor Nobles. They swore fidelity and rendered military service and were obliged to accord various aids to each other.

The Church itself adopted the manners of Feudalism. The people were the villeins, a term which seems to denote the inhabitants of the *ville* (town) or, rather, villages. The enfranchised villeins had only a relative liberty and the serfs were, in any proper meaning of the word, slaves. The *roturier* was originally an enfranchised villein, namely, a labourer of the soil, but subsequently the term was applied to all men who were not nobles. The real difference between the so-called free man and the serf was that the former had only to pay fixed sums or services, while the serf was entirely at the mercy of an arbitrary master. Neither of them were citizens. It would be difficult to exaggerate, in my opinion, the influence of the Crusades, which sent the nobles of France and their retainers overseas in a common cause. In the first place, the position of the King was immensely strengthened ; if it was possible for the lords to enjoy a virtual autonomy in the different regions of France, they could not each organize separate expeditions, and were bound to recognize in a much more practical way than before a single leadership. In the second place, the lords learned to live and often die in a new comradeship with their subordinates and there was a change of social sentiment. But perhaps more vital still was the complete upheaval of individual situations that always follows in the train of a prolonged war. There was increased expenditure which was sometimes disastrous, and to maintain themselves the feudal lords alienated their rights and even lost their territories. Serfs were permitted to enfranchise themselves and the enfranchised villeins acquired property. The bourgeoisie which traded was stimulated, and grew in numbers and in riches. There was an inevitable increase of industry and of commerce both inside and outside the country. Moreover, the contact with the Byzantine and Arabian civilizations meant a broadening of knowledge. The French learnt fresh arts. They underwent a geographical education. Mathematical sciences were advanced by the association with the East. Agriculture was renovated. A surprising number of the plants now grown in France, especially in the southern parts of France, were introduced by the Crusaders, and the stock of domestic animals was improved. It is probable that the windmill came from the Orient. Europe was initiated, too, in Oriental industry—the making of sugar, the methods of weaving cotton, silk, velvet, muslin (which is supposed to have taken its name from Mosul), carpets, and tapestries. To the East France also owed rich dyes. The Mediterranean commerce, which had languished after the Romans left, was now vastly augmented. Navigation naturally gained and many types of ships were built. The compass appeared during the first Crusades. Incidentally, the French language became the universal language of Europe. Altogether there was an unprecedented exchange of goods and ideas between Europe and the French ports in Palestine and Greece and in general the Mussulman countries. Towns like Marseilles had an enormous new significance, which was in the last century to be prodigiously increased by the conquest of Algeria and the opening of the Suez Canal. Commercial Tribunals, and Chambers which helped to fix the prices, were instituted. Military arms were revolutionized and new modes for the toilet, for the costume, and for furnishings, were brought back by the Crusaders. The Crusades stimulated all branches of human activity; they were the first Renaissance; they were, as Alfred Rambaud puts it, the most characteristic event of the Middle Ages, and prepared the end of the Middle Ages.

The transformation of Feudalism which we noted as beginning with the Crusades of the eleventh century continued as the power of the Kings grew. The Kings were, of course, far from exercising a unique control over the country, but they had agents everywhere in the provinces, and were even bold enough to attempt to limit the right of private warfare in the realm. If there were any cause of dispute between the lords, who were veritable rulers in their domains, it was enacted that there should be a delay of forty days during which royal efforts at reconciliation would be put forth. Moreover, the Kings gradually endeavoured to secure the monopoly of legislation. Partial and unsuccessful as these first steps towards national unity were, they had important results in the economic sphere. More directly, however, it was the royal control of finances that brought about changes of social status. The first Capetians enjoyed merely the revenues of their own lands and their rights as Feudal Lords. Their expenditure for administration was small. But gradually governmental institutions were set up and paid functionaries were employed. Besides, the Kings were compelled to embark on long and costly wars. It became necessary for them to find resources not only from the subjects of their personal domains but from the whole Kingdom. This was a reversion to the Roman principle that taxation should be applied to all subjects. Yet the King was obliged to obtain the consent of the baron to the levying of taxes, and the baron, acting as intermediary, retained a portion of the money collected. A new stage was reached when the King endeavoured to do without the consent of these intermediaries. It was not without considerable difficulty and after a series of advances and retreats that the royal prerogative was established. Again, there was a multiplicity of monetary systems in the larger or smaller States of which

France was composed. Obviously it was essential to introduce a single currency. Once more there was opposition; there was action and reaction. Louis IX made progress when he decided, not that the right of coining money should he suppressed, but that the King's money should have general currency, whereas the money of the lords had local currency. Philippe le Bel ventured to suspend—again not to suppress—the right of coining money, and when he restored the right it was only to a comparatively few lords. Many coinages were completely obliterated. On his death there was a compromise adopted by which the King should fix the weight and denomination of money. Not until Philippe de Valois and Jean le Bon were there repeated and finally effective affirmations of an exclusive royal right in this respect.

A fresh source of income lay in the exemptions from military duty, which were often paid for by half the annual revenue. Armies were largely mercenary. The towns too tended to emancipate themselves from Feudalism, and in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries sometimes possessed local Parliaments. The degree of municipal liberty varied as between the North and the South. In the North the guilds to resist excessive impositions and abuses of power were soon prohibited, but little by little the merchants and artisans either bought their liberty or conquered it. It was not that the civil rights of the communes were in themselves disputed by Royalty, but their political sovereignty was felt to be impossible. Otherwise they would have become miniature republics. The Monarchy prohibited them from collecting taxes and raising loans for their own purposes. Often they fell into bankruptcy, and the King intervened to bring them into fuller subjection. Thus they escaped from the Feudal Lords merely to fall under royal domination. The rural classes from the twelfth to the fourteenth century somewhat changed their status. More and more the *régime* of free contracts accepted by the peasants prevailed. It was found by the large proprietors that it was better to have free men; that they worked with increased zeal. Fixed rents were therefore instituted, and there was even competition among the barons to draw men to their estates by promises of better treatment and by the exact fixing of their taxes and their rents. Not that the change was appreciated by the serfs themselves: many of them refused to buy their liberty; they were used to an irresponsible condition of slavery and preferred it. The Church followed the example of the secular landowners belatedly, and the Revolution in the eighteenth century found the last of the serfs, in the fullest sense of the word, belonging to the Church. In the free contracts families engaged themselves from father to son to serve in the same profession—as blacksmiths, as carpenters, as herdsmen, as bakers, and so forth. During the Hundred Years' War in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries France was overrun by the invader and was divided against herself. The nobility was in decadence; the towns were crushed by levies; the country-side was ruined by cruel repressions; the Church was corrupt; and prosperity was generally extinct.

When the Etats-Généraux were called together in 1351 it was to vote subsidies, but they took the occasion to demand wholesale reforms. Particularly did they desire that the hated taxes on salt and the regulations which imposed the purchase of salt in absurd and arbitrary quantities be applied more fairly, and indeed after a revolt of the peasants a tax on income was substituted. By the Grande Ordonnance of 1357 it was laid down that nobody could collect taxes if they had not previously been voted. It was agreed that the habit of falsifying money by reducing the weight of metal, of which the Kings were guilty, should be abandoned, and reforms, administrative and judiciary as well as financial, were promised. Unfortunately, the ordinance was revoked the following year. The history of the attempts to have subsidies voted is extremely chequered. The 1413 ordinance, which was never executed, called for a proper judiciary system and a Chamber of Accounts, but as the nobility and the clergy were exempt from taxes they disinterested themselves. The theory was that "the clergy paid with prayers; the nobility with the sword; and only the common people in cash or kind." It is not unfair to say that the experiment of the control of finances by the Etats-Généraux during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries did not succeed. Sometimes they momentarily imposed their authority when the Kings were in difficulties, but on the whole they failed. Meanwhile the royal finances increased in importance. The taxation which had been levied with the consent of the *seigneurs* and afterwards with the consent of the Etats-Généraux, was at last levied without the consent of anybody and the King nominated his Commissioners. The normal revenue came from *aides* or indirect taxes, from customs receipts, from the domains, and from the *taille*, which was direct and personal taxation. But this normal revenue was augmented by extraordinary means—by the sale of titles, of exemptions, of offices, by payments to the King for absolution from private debts, by royal borrowings, by the falsification of money, by special subscriptions which were ironically described as Joyful Thank Offerings on the occasion of the accession of a King or his marriage. The year 1464 is marked by a notable economic event; the creation by Louis XI of a service of posts with relays on the roads of France, which was first intended for the use of the King, the Court, and the State Officers, but which was afterwards extended for the benefit of the University, and in 1506 was put at the disposition of private persons.

No account of the economic life of the time would be complete, strange as it appears at first sight, without a swift glance at the architectural accomplishments of the French. They absorbed many workers, and certainly the most permanent form of French labour is the magnificent legacy of cathedrals which we may admire to-day. Roman civilization had left many monuments, but they were not specifically French, though in France. In the tenth century Romanesque architecture was revived, but the Roman art was transfigured by French genius. The style was ampler and the arches more daring. Yet if the buildings were higher they were often bulkier in appearance than the scientifically constructed edifices. There were high towers or steeples, but often the pile was unnecessarily heavy. In the twelfth century, however, what is called Gothic, or rather Ogival, made its appearance. It may perhaps be described as the substitution of a lighter, more open framework, for the former solid masses, with a network of arches thrown across the building, rising and radiating from a few points. The arches met in a centre and there was an abundance of space. The arches too were pointed instead of being semicircular, and flying buttresses sustained the building. Later in the fifteenth century the edifices were surcharged with flamboyant ornamentation. The Ogival art coincides largely with the partial emancipation of the bourgeoisie, and although it was at first applied almost entirely to the construction of churches, as secular life organized itself the new style was employed in the building of châteaux and civic habitations such as town halls and palaces of justice. Yet it is the cathedrals which are the most marvellous monuments, and in them France excels. In spite of their colossal proportions they have the appearance of transparency and lightness. The masses are disguised and these lacelike constructions combine grace with audacity, fantasy with essential solidity. Now they were erected by companies of workers calling themselves free masons, who went from place to place. For the less skilled tasks they could recruit assistants on the spot. Frequently for lack of funds the building was temporarily abandoned and always many long years were spent before the completion of the cathedrals was possible. It was a privilege to belong to these companies of workers. They were treated with exceptional honour. Sculptors were required to carve the saints, the Biblical scenes, and the fabulous monsters which adorned the cathedrals. Glassworkers and painters of extraordinary ability were encouraged. There were wonderful goldsmiths and silversmiths and workers in brass. Altogether the building of the cathedrals gave an enormous industrial stimulus, though that industry had a true artistic inspiration.

The other industries of the time were hampered by the jealousy of the corporations and by the stringency of the rules. These rules had to be approved by some superior authority—that of the King, the Lord, the Commune, or the Church. There were three degrees: apprentice, companion, and master. To ply any trade one was obliged to be a member of the corporation, but until the fifteenth century, at any rate, when there was a tendency for patrons and companions to form separate associations, it was easy to become one's own master. There were few masters with more than two or three assistants, and they worked together at the same tasks, a united family. This industry on a small scale, *en famille,* as it were, has until recent times been characteristic of French craftsmanship, and even in the modern industrial world the old craftsmanship traditions linger in France. They had bizarre symbolic ceremonies and each corporation had its patron saint. There was an aristocracy of trade. Such professions as those of drapery, grocery, hosiery, jewellery, were ranked high, while the bakers and butchers also enjoyed a comparatively high station. Commerce in the sense of an interchange of goods between province and province grew slowly. There were many hindrances. Brigands abounded. There was a lack of routes. There were bridge tolls and there were onerous fees for the right of entry into the towns. Local fairs were indispensable and were made the occasion of fêtes. Sea voyages were dangerous ; but after the Crusades there was an improvement ; Consuls were appointed in the ports and a traffic with Flanders, Holland, England, Germany, Sweden, Spain, and Portugal developed. But besides the variations of monetary values, royal confiscations, and laws against luxury which laid down what kind of clothes everybody should wear, France was particularly backward in setting up proper machinery of credit. It was the Renaissance at the end of the fifteenth century and during the sixteenth century which revealed fresh possibilities. There were maritime discoveries far outside the Mediterranean. The horizons, geographical, social, political, literary, and commercial, were vastly widened. It is not here that we propose to deal with the eagerness displayed in philosophic inquiry or to relate the progress of the immense intellectual movement. It is not here that we propose to show how international relations expanded and diplomacy took on a new meaning. Italy had principally attracted French admiration and France had veritably much to learn from the

Italian States. To recount that marvellous awakening would require many chapters. We must be content in this place with noting that material life was altogether transformed. Foodstuffs hitherto unknown were introduced into France. Scientific researches were pursued fruitfully. The middle classes found themselves richer in resources, in requirements, and in outlook. One of the causes of the commercial revolution was the discovery of precious metals, particularly of gold. From the Roman days the stock of gold had not increased; probably it had actually diminished. Now the stocks were replenished and the whole conditions of credit, of industry, and of trade, were changed. Agriculture in the Middle Ages had been a matter of routine. There was little scientific knowledge and the implements were primitive. Now with the printing of books the study of agriculture was seriously undertaken. Bernard de Palissy, for example, published a work showing how France could multiply the riches of her soil. But the most remarkable treatise was that of Olivier de Serres. He deals with the method of extensive cultures; he shows how beet which had been brought from Italy, maize, tobacco, hops, the vine, and the potato, should be handled. The farmyard was enriched with new species of poultry, notably the turkey, known to this day as the *poule d'Inde*, or more simply the *dinde* or the *dindon*. The French acquired a notion of the commercial balance, the relation of exports to imports. They entered into treaties with various countries. Customs duties were imposed not merely to raise money but to protect national industries. The first French bank was founded at Lyons.

In industry Italian methods were imitated and the Italians too were regarded as masters of commerce. New trades were founded and new corporations formed. After the Reformation and the religious wars in the latter part of the sixteenth century, with their disturbances which reacted on the national prosperity, Henri IV had to face difficult days; Paris was filled with starving peasants; the country was plunged in anarchy and misery; but in a few years, by wonderful work, Henri IV, with the aid of Sully, brought back France to the highest degree of prosperity. At Rouen he convoked an assembly of notables in which industrialists and lawyers and other members of the middle classes were predominant. Evils were pointed out and in some cases eradicated. The "out-at-elbows King" was one of the most remarkable rulers France has ever had. The revenues of the country had for years been taken by the leagues and the officials, which abounded. There had been prodigal expenditure but the Treasury was often empty. Considerable military operations sometimes had to stop for sheer want of funds, mercenary soldiers refusing to fight if they were not paid. There had been a resort to detestable expedients which mortgaged the future and poisoned the sources of public riches. Yet by his vigorous action Henri IV contrived to reduce taxation, and after a few years had large reserves in the cellars of the Bastille. Agriculture was still the principal source of wealth, and it was decided that the peasant should not be harassed but protected. Henri IV did not encourage absenteeism in the landlords; he preferred that the proprietors should remain on their estates to look after their interests and the interests of their dependants, and so, in the long run, after the interests of the State; and not parade idly at Court. It was clear that the simple prohibition of the importation of luxury articles could only profit the smuggler, and the policy of Sully was to transplant foreign luxury trades into France. Thus Olivier de Serres aided in the introduction of silkworms and the manufacture of silk goods. The French were taught how to work in gold and silver thread. From Flanders they learned the weaving of tapestry; from Holland the making of fine linen; mines were exploited as never before and a Grand Master of Mines was appointed. In Eastern waters the French flag was alone recognized by the Turks and the pirates which infested the seas. The principle of tariff reciprocity was adopted and from England, Spain, Switzerland, and Italy, France received commercial advantages. Stern penalties were imposed on bankruptcy. The ways of communication were improved and canals with locks were an innovation of the reign. A gigantic plan was fashioned by which the Seine should be linked with the Loire, the Loire with the Saône, the Saône with the Seine, and the Seine with the Meuse, and navigation be made possible from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean.

Great Minister as Richelieu was under Louis XIII, the harsh despotism which was exercised did not, in the economic sense, facilitate progress. During the long reign of Louis XIV there was an incontestable advance in some respects, but the extravagance of the Court was deplorable, and the nobles, deserting the provinces since now the only honour was to belong to the Court, ruined themselves and lived like parasites. They lost their power but preserved their privileges and were granted pensions and allowances of all kinds. Colbert, who with all his faults had sterling qualities, did his best to bring France industrially into line with England. He would have made France an industrial country, and went some distance towards realizing his purpose. In this he followed in the footsteps of Henri IV and Sully. He imported English workers to reveal the secrets of English excellence in finely tempered steel.

He imported German workers in tin to break down the German monopoly. He imported Venetian workers for glass and for lace. Workshops were set up under the ægis of the State. The renown of the tapestry of the Gobelins, of Beauvais, of Aubusson, dates from this time. Soap was made at Marseilles instead of in Italy. From Sweden, France learned to extract tar and by Holland was taught the treatment of felts and of clothes. The earthenware of France took its very name—faience—from the Italian town of Faenza; and generally we may observe that the immigration of foreign workers in France is not peculiar to our generation but has long been practised. The royal manufactories were given subsidies and enjoyed virtual monopolies. After Colbert less initiative of this kind was shown, but the Sèvres manufactory for porcelain was established in 1750. In spite of these efforts there were many restrictions on trade. Colbert himself was too fond of regulations and imposed further fetters on the jealous conservative corporations which made individual innovation almost impossible. Anybody who applied improved methods was certain to come into collision with the corporations. "Liberty is the soul of commerce," wrote Colbert, but he did not practise what he preached. Industry went on "the crutches of protection and prohibition." Moreover, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes drained France of many of its best workers. There was no unification of measures; that was not to be brought about until the Revolution. The livre, for example, was 16 oz. at Paris, 14 at Lyons, and 13 at Marseilles. Money, too, was liable to changes. The monetary unity, known as the livre, was equivalent to 1 franc 80 under Louis XIV and 1 franc 44 under Louis XVI; and this livre contained 20 sous, which were divided into twelve deniers, three deniers being a liard. The simpler, more logical decimal system in regard to money was also the work of the Revolution.

The lot of the peasant under Absolute Monarchy was in some respects worsened, because he was oppressed by the lords as well as by the King and his agents. Ecclesiastical tithes and feudal rights existed side by side with royal impositions and the peasant had to perform *corvées* (forced labour) for the *seigneur* as well as the monarch. In the collection of the *taille* on land holdings and earnings, villages were considered to be responsible as a whole, and the collectors taxed the inhabitants on their presumed capacity. Hence attempts to conceal riches and to present the poorest possible exterior which is a characteristic of many classes in France to-day. At the best, however, the taxes were onerous, and in some parts of France, for example, a poor worker with ten sous a day paid as much as twenty livres annually as a capitation tax. What made matters worse was the farming out of tax collecting. The proceeds of the iniquitous *gabelle*, for instance, by no means went to the King. He did not turn himself into a salt merchant but permitted a company to force the sale of certain quantities of salt in the most vexatious conditions, and the penalties for the smallest breaches were flogging and the galleys. There were customs duties not only at the frontiers but at almost every step in the interior, and although Colbert tried to abolish them he only succeeded in constructing a *union douanière* in the twelve central provinces. Armies of employees, corruption, embezzlement, contraband, made the yield to the State small. To this day there are vestiges of the system in the *octrois* which make entrance into many of the towns of France a nuisance. Eventually an association of *fermiers généraux* succeeded in absorbing the smaller firms which had bought the right of collecting taxes, but this did not stop bribery. Necker is said to be the first Finance Minister who refused to take a *pot-de-vin* (bribe), but many of his successors reverted to the old custom. The *fermiers généraux* also distributed pensions to the courtiers. Never did the ancient monarchy have a Budget in equilibrium. Indeed, the Budget was not established before Colbert, and the first public Budget was that of Necker in 1781, which was completely misleading. There were perpetual deficits and the State debts rose to what was for the period the prodigious sum of four and a half milliards. In the seventeenth century there were terrible famines in the country-side, and although there were from time to time glimpses of prosperity the records of misery in the eighteenth century are appalling. Young, who visited France before the Revolution, paints graphic pictures which are confirmed by French writers of the squalid depths to which the peasantry was reduced. Yet the nobleman who stayed on the land was in his way even poorer and bit by bit sold his land to the peasants, who greedily acquired small patches with a peculiar passion, regardless of whether crushing charges would be placed upon them and whether they would become slaves of the soil. This desire for the possession of land, entailing the bitterest struggle, is ingrained in the French peasant. He became no richer in reality because he had increased his holdings. There was a lack of grain, of manures, of local roads, of equipment. An acre in England gave 33 per cent more than in France, and according to Young the French peasant had only a quarter of the comfort of the British peasant. He could not therefore buy anything but the barest necessaries and was badly housed and badly clothed and unable, despite propaganda for the spread of knowledge, to work his land properly. In his conservative instincts the French peasant of to-day is the true descendant of the pre-Revolutionary peasant.

In the seventeenth century there were private banks, but it was a Scotsman, Law, who in 1716 had the idea of establishing a bank which could lend to the State. Its notes were declared by the State to be receivable, but soon the circulation was ten times greater than the capital. The great mistake, however, was in uniting the bank of issue with the speculative Compagnie des Indes. After some time the capital was transformed in shares of the Compagnie and the notes were guaranteed by shares which fluctuated in value. These shares soared upwards and were presently worth forty times the amount paid for them. To pay adequate dividends was impossible and there was a swift fall. The bank, which was declared to be a royal bank, engaged in various other enterprises. The note circulation was further increased and was based more and more on speculative values. When the holders of the notes were seized with panic, the notes were given a forced currency. Notes and shares were held to be interchangeable and naturally both were confounded in the inevitable depreciation. For over half a century the idea of such a bank was killed by this experience, and French finances and the French machinery of credit have always, according to English conceptions, been exceedingly backward. At last, in 1776, a discount bank emitting paper money was founded with governmental authorization, but the Government wished to borrow two-thirds of the capital. Publicly it renounced this intention, but secretly it borrowed. Again France witnessed the evil of inflation and again the same remedy of forced currency was applied. The panic was calmed but the bank languished until it was liquidated by the Convention. Association of the State finances with banking has been especially unfortunate in France. A series of financial reforms were undertaken before the Revolution but they were thwarted by politics, and Turgot, Necker, Calonne, Brienne, and others failed to avert the coming storm.

Brief as this account of the economic and financial history of France from the earliest ages to the threshold of the nineteenth century must necessarily be, it surely contains many suggestive points which explain in some measure why France has hitherto neither economically nor financially risen to the height of her opportunities. It may be urged that only in the nineteenth century were there real possibilities of industrial progress as we understand the expression to-day. During that nineteenth century the rumbling of the Revolution was perpetually heard in France's repeated political upheavals. France was handicapped. With the coming of steam and electricity England, who quickly learned to utilize her resources of iron and coal, led the way.

Always has France excelled in mechanical invention though she has often signally failed to exploit her inventions. Certainly French engineers contributed notably in the use of steam. Seguin in 1828 saw that a larger surface could be heated and more steam-power obtained by the tubular system. This helped in the development of industrial machinery and in steam locomotion by land and water. It was only in 1845 that the Chamber voted the establishment of telegraphic tests, though men like Ampère and Arago had long before distinguished themselves by important discoveries. It was after the middle of the last century that telegraphs and telephones came into general use. Telephone subscribers have doubled since 1914 in France. They are now 600,000—relatively fewer than in other Western countries. Recently autographic telegraphy and the telegraphing of photographs has made much progress and the inventions of Belin have been adopted by the State. There are forty wireless stations and as many more are planned. Gas was introduced for lighting purposes in France long after it had been adopted in England. Towards the middle of the nineteenth century public works on a large scale were undertaken: ports, canals, and bridges. Engineering was modernized. Photography was a French invention at the beginning of the last century, Niepce and Daguerre being the fathers of the art.

Agriculture from 1830 onwards became more scientific. A Ministry charged with the development of this department of national activities was created. Industrial exhibitions were frequent after the Revolution. Lyons for its silk began to use the Jacquard machines. In the North cotton and woollen goods were produced by vastly improved mechanical means. Under the Restoration the coal-mines of the North began to yield their riches. Orleans was the centre of the sugar refineries. After the July Monarchy (1830) there was an immense industrial impulsion. Prices were lowered by the employment of machinery and objects which had hitherto been inaccessible were brought within the reach of the working classes themselves. Not so swiftly as in England did the factory system in France crush out the isolated free worker, but nevertheless the masses were now more at the mercy of economic crises. Employers took children into the factories and infants of six years often worked sixteen hours a day. A law for the protection of children was passed in 1841 by which no child under twelve should be employed for more than six hours, while for children over twelve the maximum was fixed at twelve hours. Metallurgy made great strides, such as had not been foreseen when the Creusot made its modest debut in 1742. The true development of the Schneider works dates from 1837, simultaneously with that of its rivals at Essen. France in the early part of the industrial age, when orders for locomotives, boilers, cranes, girders, and iron bridges began to flow in, was inferior to England in execution and to Germany in cheapness.

The Governments tried to encourage the social revolution. Protection, with its charges on importations, was, in spite of the strong current favouring free trade which has always existed in economic circles, definitely installed in France. Often the interests of the manufacturer and the consumer were at variance. Large towns expanded. Paris, for example, numbered 700,000 inhabitants in the days of Napoléon. In the days of Louis Philippe it numbered more than a million. To-day its population is three millions. Squares, such as the Place de la Concorde, were laid out and statues were put up, while Napoléon III added a multitude of monuments and pierced new Boulevards.

France was several years behind England in developing steam locomotion by rail. Thiers declined to take governmental action for some time, but after experiments with small lines had succeeded it was decided in 1842 to create *grandes lignes* and to confide them to the management of subsidized companies. From 1852 to 1858 the six great railway companies: the Nord, the Orléans, the P.L.M. (Paris-Lyons-Mediterranean), the Est, the Ouest (now the State railway), and the Midi, were constituted. They now cover over 30,000 miles. The Alsace-Lorraine lines, controlled by the State, may be amalgamated with the Eastern lines, but ways must be cut through the Vosges if the recovered provinces are to be economically linked with the rest of France. The railways, though now independent for the purpose of ordinary administration, have a common organization, and on this Superior Council, State, public, and private interests are represented ; its duty is to co-ordinate fares and conditions of employment. Many extensions which were interrupted by the war are contemplated. There are particularly schemes of electrification which will cover one-third of the total mileage, especially on the Orléans, the Midi, and the P.L.M. lines, where there are a large number of water-power stations. Generally deficits are shown by the railways, but these are partly due to productive expenditure. Half a million railway servants are employed.

Especial attention has been directed to the utilization of water-power. France is extremely favoured in this respect, and if her rivers and falls were harnessed electricity in its many manifestations could be produced at a low cost. In 1913, 900,000 h.p. was thus engendered. As I write the potential maximum is nearly 3,000,000 h.p. Projects exist by which double that quantity can be obtained and only lack of capital prevents their execution. Altogether the available resources should amount to 9,000,000 h.p. Doubtless progress will be slow, but gradually it is hoped France will make herself independent of the oil and coal of which she is now tributary to foreign countries. It is already calculated that the equivalent of 24,000,000 tons of coal a year could without much effort be procured from the waterways. The picturesque name that the French give to water-engendered electric-power is that of "white coal." It is declared that electricity can be conveyed to the remotest villages for the working of agricultural machinery. The public authorities are co-operating with the private capitalists. In Savoy and Provence every waterway has been assessed. In the South-West the Garonne and the Tarn are already harnessed. There are great schemes which will be applied to the Rhône, the Dordogne, the Truyère, and the Rhine. At Aberwrack the first tidal power station in the world is in course of erection.

The first steamer to cross the Channel was French: this passage was made as early as 1816. It was not, however, until 1835 that steamboats began to ply between Marseilles and Constantinople. Five years later a service of transatlantic packet-boats was created: from Havre to New York; from Nantes to Brazil; from Marseilles and Bordeaux to the Antilles. In 1862 the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique was founded. France was hardly behind in the construction of huge steamers and rapidly built up a powerful mercantile marine. Before the war it was reckoned as fifth among the fleets of the world. To-day, with its 4,000,000 tons, it struggles with Japan for third place, coming after Great Britain and the United States. Possibly France has built too many ships. Undoubtedly in no branch are the post-war efforts so extraordinary as in the mercantile marine, for in 1914 France owned a fleet of only 2,500,000 tons of which well over 1,000,000 tons were lost. The shipowners are entering into working arrangements with each other.

In aviation France has played a leading rôle. The State subsidizes civilian aviation and maintains a formidable military air force. The internal services are scarcely advantageous and on the international routes there is much competition. It is felt that it is in increasing the facilities of flying longer and longer distances without halts that the possibilities of the future really lie. Paris is becoming the principal aviation centre; the starting-point of services to every part of the Continent. An air map before me shows fifty-eight separate lines which cover the Continent like a spider's web. From

Paris one may go direct to London, Amsterdam, Prague, Vienna; to Budapesth, to Belgrade, to Bucharest; and Moscow can be reached by way of Berlin and Königsberg. Warsaw is accessible from Prague, and Stockholm and Helsingfors from Danzig. There are lines from Breslau, Hamburg, Frankfort, Dortmund, Dresden, and Munich. From Toulouse and Marseilles and Antibes one may visit Spain, Morocco, Tunisia, and Corsica. In the African possessions aviation may prove to be exceptionally convenient as a mode of locomotion. Already from Casablanca one may proceed to Dakar or may fly to Rabat, Fez, and Oran. Difficulties arose between France and Germany but they appear to have been smoothed out, and agreements which have been signed permit the flight of aeroplanes over each other's territory. Indeed, in this matter, as in many others, the French and the Germans will probably work in close co-operation. Every year shows an increase in the number of flights, in mileage, in passengers, in goods, and in mails carried.

Jules Méline during the Third Republic realized that whatever the industrial future of France was to be, she could not afford to neglect agriculture. He insisted on the protection of the peasant and the wine-grower. A good deal was done by way of propaganda, by legislation, and by administration, to lessen the lure of the large towns which more slowly than in other parts of Europe, but none the less surely, were draining the French country-side. The decline in the area of cultivated land since 1913 is nevertheless too certain. Before the war six and a half million hectares were planted with wheat, and in spite of the addition of Alsace-Lorraine there are a million hectares fewer. In round figures the French yield of wheat is about eighty million quintals. There is a small shortage but it may be regarded as insignificant. The total area given over to cereals is ten and a half million hectares, that is to say, nearly three millions below 1913. The beet area has, however, been increased, and in sugar France is self-sufficing. Foreign labour for the land, as for the factories, has been imported. In wine growing the pre-war level has been reached despite the closing of a number of foreign markets. Yet a good deal of wine is brought into the country for blending or strengthening purposes.

A hundred years ago only a fifth of the nation was agglomerated in the towns, but since the middle of the last century the cities began to attain their modern size and the agricultural population is now only slightly larger than the industrial population. Unquestionably there are signs of change.

Before the war France, which had lagged behind industrially, was vaguely conscious of the new phenomena of mass production, of trusts, of huge amalgamations, of consortiums having an international character ; but since the war this consciousness has grown by leaps and bounds and the economic machinery which is required in the world of to-day is much better understood. The controllers of raw materials, the manufacturers, and the commercial men, have a wider vision. They have a new technical knowledge and are abandoning the old ideas of keeping their affairs within relatively narrow limits which they might personally control. French trade had hitherto retained a family character and initiative was rare. Indeed, many of the old-fashioned business houses flatly refused to expand. Now we see expansion in all directions. Groups join themselves to groups in a continuous chain throughout the land. They spread out tentacles along the Danube. The need of a Franco-German industrial alliance is recognized and a great deal has been accomplished in making it a reality. Somewhat belatedly, but in the end with surprising vigour, France has taken her place among the world's great industrial nations. There is little doubt that the enthusiasm which was aroused by the sudden conception of trade on an immense scale will be maintained and that the former lackadaisical, complacent, private businesses are being extinguished, and that more impersonal companies with understandings among themselves are being substituted for the contented, comfortable little firms. In metallurgy the movement may be particularly observed, the same associations controlling the ore-mines, the coal-mines, the blast furnaces, the engineering works, not only of France but of several countries. In heavy chemicals and in textiles and in potash there are the same national and international organizations. Even in the distributive trades there have of recent years sprung up great societies controlling department stores which collect under the same roof every kind of article in multitudinous variety. The business banks of an international character have extended their operations. The French have ambitions which are being realized to secure foreign trade in the Argentine, in Brazil, in India, in China, in Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, in the Levant, and they have even invaded England with goods which England formerly exported. The State is taking the most active interest in this foreign development and tries to assist the exporters through statistical departments, through banks, by means of propaganda, exhibitions, fairs, missions to South America, exhibition ships to Australia, exhibition trains which traverse Canada, and so forth. Good observers—for example, Mr. J. R. Cahill—assert, I believe truthfully, that France has considerably reinforced her permanent capacity as a producer, freeing herself from dependence on foreign markets for raw materials, encouraging the home market, developing industrial skill and competitive power abroad. Not merely is France becoming a world purveyor of luxury goods, but also of ordinary goods of general consumption. In command of raw materials and of potential energy, France may prove to be superior, though a latecomer, to Germany and to England. Obviously we must discount temporary conditions, whether they result in an adverse commercial balance or a favourable commercial balance in this or that year. But it seems to be beyond question that the basis of the industrial fabric has been broadened, strengthened, and recreated. Principally France will have to be reckoned with in mining, in the manufacture of iron and steel, in the engineering trades, in textile production, in chemical industries, in the making of fancy articles, and in the luxury trades which are stimulated by the unparalleled tourist traffic. There has been an astonishingly swift recovery of the industrial North, though housing in some parts remains a serious problem. The North will cost around a hundred milliard francs, and of this sum the greater part has already been spent.

Although France still has a coal shortage, the output seven years after the war, in spite of the damage that was done to the pits of the North, was greater than the pre-war output, reaching 46,000,000 tons. That output can be still further increased by another 10,000,000 tons. But in 1913 the consumption of coal was 64,000,000 tons and Alsace-Lorraine needs an additional 11,000,000, of which the restored provinces themselves supply only 5,000,000. From Germany France is entitled to receive large quantities not only of coal but of coke suitable for the blast furnaces, and if the metallurgical trade in France is to become as prosperous as it should be, France will continue to be dependent on Germany for coal and coke supplies whether they are delivered by way of reparations under the Dawes plan or in virtue of free contracts. From the Saar, too, France is entitled to receive coal, but she still turns to Belgium and to England for other deliveries. It would sometimes seem that France has greater deposits of iron ore than she can efficiently work herself. If the production stays around 32,000,000 tons it will be greatly inferior to the potential production. The chances are that a sort of industrial Malthusianism will be practised in the iron and steel trades for many years to come. At present the tendency is upwards, and 8,500,000 tons of pig iron were turned out in 1925 as against 5,500,000 tons in 1923. There were 7,500,000 tons of steel in the same year against 5,000,000 tons in 1923. Now to augment the home consumption even in these days of steel and iron will require much organization, and it is not certain that the limits of absorption are not nearly reached. It will be necessary for France to sell abroad at least half the present output of iron and steel. Here is one of the most important arguments in favour of a Franco-German consortium. The two countries must cooperate or become rivals seeking to ruin each other. The magnates on both sides of the Rhine are well aware of their common interests, and as early as 1920 they met together to devise schemes of collaboration. These were upset by the French occupation of the Ruhr, which was partly an attempt by France to force a bargain on Germany. But immediately after that episode was ended the industrialists again came together to hammer out mutually advantageous arrangements. The precise character of their conventions has been kept secret, but it is not difficult to understand the basic principles of the Franco-German trust. Such a trust is not only natural but is inevitable. Both sides will endeavour to play the preponderant rôle but those who suppose that France must necessarily be swallowed up by Germany in a partnership, and conceive that partnership as similar to that of the Lady of Niger and the Tiger on which she rode, will probably be surprised: they will have failed to reckon with the new industrial spirit of France. In potash France has joined her forces with those of Germany, and the two countries agree on prices and the sharing of world markets for the virtual monopolies which they hold. In the same way the chemical trades of France and Germany have thought well to enter into an alliance, and the textiles of Alsace, which in the process of finishing must cross the frontier into Germany, are subjected to friendly working arrangements with the Rhineland manufacturers.

This internationalization of industry and commerce is bound to grow, for France is aware of the impossibility in the modern world of shutting herself up in a water-tight compartment. Most of the French industries show an unprecedented prosperity: this is true particularly of the woollen and the cotton industries and it is true also of the silk industry. The making of artificial silk is a comparatively new trade. In 1909 the world production was only 7,500 tons. This production had multiplied by 1924 tenfold and is going on multiplying. Eventually it may put the making of natural silk into the shade. In this respect France comes fourth after America, Italy, and Germany. Another interesting feature of recent days is the enormous increase for heavy goods traffic of the use of canals and rivers. Much attention has been devoted to the waterways. The greatest tunnel of its kind in the world, the Rove Tunnel, now pierces the hillside from the Mediterranean to the Etang de Berre, and will displace the older port of Marseilles. The Rhône and the Rhine are linked up. Strasburg has become a busy inland port and Paris itself stands in the front rank of inland ports. A great deal of money has been expended at Havre, Rouen, Bordeaux, Dunkirk, Nantes, Saint Nazaire, Boulogne and Cherbourg for improvements.

France has suffered little from the unemployment which other European countries have experienced since the war, and, lacking man-power, has actually imported three million foreigners, most of whom are manual workers. Out of this mass of foreigners, who will doubtless be assimilated, though at present they tend to form little colonies of their own, 700,000 are Italians, 500,000 Belgians, 400,000 Spaniards, 200,000 Poles, and the rest are Russians, Swiss, Czecho-Slovakians, and North Africans. The British and the Americans in France are usually engaged in business or are leisured persons who avail themselves of the pleasant conditions of life in France. Most of the foreign workers are indispensable: they are specialists in certain trades. The French themselves are indisposed to combine for trade union purposes, and not one-fifth of the industrial workers belong to the syndicates. They are essentially individualists. While the employers are organizing as never before, the employees can with difficulty be persuaded to organize. The right to strike and the right to associate for the augmentation of salaries was voted in 1864 and the syndicates in their present form were authorized in 1884. There have been many strikes but they have not been on the whole successful and wages are accordingly relatively low in France. A law providing for compensation in case of accident was passed in 1898, and various measures for the limitation of hours and for the regulation of the labour of women and children in factories have been put in operation during the lifetime of the Third Republic —the most notable being the law of 1892. After the war the eight-hour day was generally adopted. Old-age pensions for workers under State protection were first mooted as early as 1850, but not until 1894 was an attempt made to put them on a sound footing, and they are still inadequate. Yet the lot of the worker has unquestionably been vastly improved of recent years; the opportunities of education, the institution of popular savings banks, the better organization of public assistance for the poor, and so forth, have greatly changed the situation of the workers.

When all is said and done the principal point on which one must insist in any study of French economic development is the sloughing of the old conservative methods which have hitherto made France industrially backward. No longer are French business men playing for safety. No longer are they content to jog along. They have learned the uses of publicity. They have abandoned former ideas of dignity. They have accepted the universal methods of interlocked enterprises. They are ready for fierce competition, but they are also ready for wider co-operation. They are prepared to accept responsibilities from which they would have shrunk not many years ago. While those nations which were industrialist in the full sense nearly a century ago seem to be in a groove, those nations which have more recently become conscious of their industrial potentialities may display greater alertness, may be more susceptible to change, may accommodate themselves more easily to the new conditions of production and of distribution. Such appears to be the case with France, who is learning the lessons of America and of Germany, who is shaking off economic insularity, who is entering with zest into the common industrial activities of the world. There are in this movement both good and bad features. One may regret the easygoing France where culture and dilettante enjoyment were put before business, and where personal craftsmanship and the individual control of smaller business houses were ideals which were still held in honour. It is significant, for example, that limited liability companies of the British type were only legislated for as recently as 1925. But we must accept the world as it is and the larger industrialism of France is now an accomplished fact. It is perhaps the most noteworthy phenomenon of the post-war period. Will this movement be checked by financial difficulties ? To some extent it was actually helped by the period of financial disturbances which followed the war. The depreciation of money provided an artificial stimulus to French trade. It would be foolish to prophesy, but the industrial equipment has surely been genuinely ameliorated, and France has come to have a more industrial mind.

Although it is not my intention to discuss ephemeral financial conditions in great detail, there is much which must be added to the short sketch of the growth of financial institutions already given. Those financial institutions were outmoded and began to creak even before the war. When the first shot was fired it was certain that whatever was the outcome of the strife on the battle-field, the financial institutions would be shattered. They were antiquated and had never been modified as the economic conditions were modified. In nothing is the conservatism of the French more curiously revealed than in the obstinate clinging to an obsolete financial system. Even cheques, which have long been in general use in other countries, were looked upon with suspicion in France, and anybody who has done business with a French bank must have become aware of the excessive and clumsy regulations. In the service of the Government the highest officials of the Finance Department were exceedingly ill-paid, and were far too frequently tempted to pass into the service of the private credit establishments. France failed to raise up the British type of civil servant, perfectly disinterested, devoted to his task, completely trusted, with an unchallengeable technical authority. The civil servant was not permitted to expand: he was treated as a subordinate at the mercy of the politicians. In the lower ranks he was often inefficient and sank into a deadly routine. The people, too, were ready to believe that tax-dodging was commendable. Leading French financiers have endeavoured to explain to me that the people were so oppressed by the arbitrary tax-gatherers of the pre-Revolutionary days that they traditionally look upon all fiscal agents as enemies and all governmental demands as tyrannical, to be resisted or evaded. Yet France has passed through many crises: indeed, her whole history is scarred with repeated financial crises. That which was caused by the Scotsman Law at the beginning of the eighteenth century seems still to leave its traces. It would hardly be too much to say that the financial difficulties are chronic, and one is sometimes tempted to suppose that the French have a congenital incapacity for public finance. They indulged in ruinous wars and met their obligations by successive expedients. Necker complained of the inextricable complexity of the financial machinery. It was simplified after the crash of the Revolution, when the assignats became worthless and a fresh start was made, but the machinery again became more and more complicated and to-day the 40,000 fiscal agents seem unable to extricate themselves from the mass of papers and the infinity of operations which are required from them, if they are to carry out the accumulating and contradictory laws. One of the principal vices is the demagogy of a Parliament which has never become indigenous and the practice of concealing expenditure by the vote of additional credits and supplementary estimates. The principle of a single Budget has been largely ignored and straightforward statements are almost unobtainable. All calculations of French expenditure must be more or less approximate until a number of years have passed, and it is probable that before the war almost every year showed some Budgetary deficit. The whole French financial machinery is out of date, unwieldy, and unworkable, and drastic reforms were needed before the war but were postponed. Perhaps there would have been no particularly evil consequences had not the war precipitated the smash. During the war there was reckless squandering of money, for not unnaturally it was believed that no heed should be paid to anything but the winning of the war. After the war the most foolish illusions were cherished, such as the possibility of extracting from Germany gold in profusion. It took some years for France even to begin to realize the truth, and then there was a subdued but unmistakable inclination to panic and a confusion of counsels which completed the chaos.

When a clean start was made after the Revolution the public debt was small and a considerable proportion of it was incurred by public improvements. By 1914 it had grown to 33 milliards. In 1926 it was over 300 milliards and was still increasing. There was besides an external debt more difficult to calculate but probably to be reckoned at about 40 milliard gold francs. Half of the public debt was floating or short-term debt, and when confidence was smashed the calls on the Treasury were beyond its capacity unless the Treasury obtained huge advances from the Banque de France, which meant an inflation of the fiduciary issue. During and after the war France had lived on borrowings, until at least half the Budget was absorbed in the service of the debt. Before the war the service of the debt took 20 per cent of the Budget, namely, about one milliard francs. In 1926 the service of the debt and of pensions amounted to twenty-four and a half milliards out of a Budget which was nominally one of 37 milliards, but which, with special obligations of the Treasury such as the amortization of foreign commercial debts, should really be about forty milliards. The expenditure of the State as analyzed by Senator Henry Chéron was as follows:

Public debt, consolidated or floating, including sums affected to the amortization of certain parts of that debt	18,750,000,000
Pensions, civil and military, including the expenditure of the Ministry of Pensions (of which 4,200,000,000 represent war pensions)	5,750,000,000
Army and Navy	6,400,000,000
Expenditure of other Ministries	9,100,000,000
Total ..	40,000,000,000

Before 1914 the expenditure on the army and navy was 1,723,000,000 gold francs. If one applies a coefficient of 5—corresponding to a rate of exchange for the franc of 125 to the pound instead of 25 as in pre-war days—France should have spent 8,615,000,000 paper francs on the army and navy in 1926. The sum of 9,100,000,000, devoted to the services of the Ministries in general, was made up as follows:

Finance Department	3,000,000,000
Public Instruction	1,770,000,000
Public Works	1,900,000,000
Health and Labour	800,000,000
Justice, Foreign Affairs, Home Office, Commerce, Colonies and Agriculture	1,630,000,000

Before the war the corresponding expenditure was 1,988,000,000 gold francs. In spite of the depreciation of the franc the departmental expenses had therefore only been multiplied four and a half times. Now it seemed impossible to reduce the amount allocated to the public debt and to pensions, and any serious diminution of the expenditure on the army and navy could hardly be contemplated. Altogether serious economies seemed impossible—unless, indeed, France resolutely repudiated in one form or another a portion of her public debt.

How did France come to raise her Budget from about 5,000,000,000 gold francs before the war to forty milliards twelve years later? The depreciation of the franc chiefly accounts for the swollen Budget, though there had been a natural growth of expenditure for educational and military purposes throughout the nineteenth century. Values had changed and the wealth of the country had increased. Under the Republic the method of supplementary estimates was more and more abused. There was prodigality; there were loans; there was a lack of clarity; there were colonial expeditions, and everybody even in 1913 felt that France was overloading herself. Her finances were irregular. Rarely was the Budget passed before the financial year opened on January 1, and it became the ordinary practice to ask for a series of provisional monthly credits. Already the difficulties which were afterwards to become so oppressive were accumulating, and when the war broke out France was financially unprepared. Until 1917, in spite of the enormous expenditure for munitions and the maintenance of the army, something less was collected in taxation than in 1913, and only in 1918 was something more collected. In all, during the dreadful years only 26,098,000,000 francs were contributed, although 169,929,000,000 were spent. In 1914, according to M. Caillaux, there was a deficit of 5 milliards; in 1915, 16 milliards; in 1916, 22 milliards; in 1917, 38 milliards, and in 1918, 49 milliards. It is true that a war profits tax was imposed in 1916 but it yielded little during the course of the war, and only 14 milliards altogether. A business turnover tax which was a tax on commodities was also relatively infructuous. The income-tax which it was decided to apply before the war was actually postponed until 1917, and until recently its yield has been insignificant. There was being piled up a huge liability against the day of reckoning which was bound sooner or later to come. After the war the same system of borrowing was pursued. If from 1915 to 1917 there were no real Budgets, from 1918 to 1921 there were two Budgets, one of which was described as "normal" and the other as "extraordinary." The extraordinary expenditure was met by repeated loans. Further, in 1920, there was instituted another Budget of so-called "Recoverable Expenditure." The credit side contained only France's expectations on Germany. The illusion that Germany would pay was maintained for several years before France could make up her mind to revert to the principle of a single Budget. In one year the actual income was seven milliard francs against an expenditure of 57 milliards. By 1923 the revenue from taxation rose to 22 milliards, and there was a progressive reduction of the annual deficit. Yet true Budgetary equilibrium was not attained even in 1926. M.

Caillaux states the deficits (his figures are approximate) at 42 milliards in 1919, 38 milliards in 1920, 24 milliards in 1921, 24 milliards in 1922, 11 milliards in 1923, 7 milliards in 1924, 3 milliards in 1925. In point of fact, it could easily be shown that the deficit from January to July, 1926, was about 8 milliards. The post-war borrowings exceeded the war borrowings, and France was crushed under a mountain of debt. Undoubtedly the damage in the devastated regions was overestimated. Money was paid out like water. No sufficient check was kept, for the whole nation, including the authorities, believed that it was not France who would ultimately pay compensation to the war victims but Germany. In the light of what has happened it is easy now to declare that the reparations policy was deplorable. France would have been better off had she abandoned the idea of an indemnity and had set to work with a will from the beginning to achieve her own salvation. At first the dreams of Rhine gold were incredibly vast. It was thought that as much as 400 milliard gold marks might be obtained. By 1921 the amount was fixed by the Reparation Commission at 132 milliard gold marks, of which France was to receive 52 per cent. But even the 132 milliard gold marks could not be wrested from Germany, and in the end there was general agreement that about 50 milliards was the limit that could be attained. The mark fell swiftly, especially in 1923, when the Ruhr was occupied by the French, and even reparations in kind were suspended. Then the Dawes Committee was established, and although its report does not set a total liability for Germany, it is obvious that the receipts from beyond the Rhine on which France had counted will be comparatively small.

The flight from the franc may be said to have begun in 1924. Nobody would lend any more. The National Defence bonds and the Treasury bonds which were repayable at short notice had been popular, but now they no longer sold and too many maturity dates were concentrated in 1925. With the ebbing of confidence the strain on the Treasury was appalling. Since the long-term loans were not found attractive, although the real interest offered went up nearly as high as 9 per cent, the State had no other recourse than to borrow from the Banque de France, which in its turn had no other recourse than to manufacture fresh paper money. Inflation had begun and nobody could tell where it would stop. When M. Herriot and the Bloc des Gauches triumphed at the polls in May, 1924, they bewailed the bad management of their precedessors, but they themselves at once frightened and antagonized the possessing classes. They entered upon a policy of combat, raising political issues which had long been dead and shattering the national unity. The result was that they were forced to inflate, and though at first the inflation was secret it was presently publicly acknowledged. Three times in 1925 was the legal limit of the note circulation—for in France there is a limit fixed by law—raised, not on account of commercial needs but on account of Treasury needs. Yet there was much speculation which worsened the position of the franc. In 1926 the paper money of France should certainly not have been so low as was registered on the money markets of the world. It would be well to consider the monetary situation as it presented itself towards the middle of 1926. It was by no means as bad as it was made out to be.

As everybody is aware, the value of any national currency depends upon its hypothetical convertibility into gold. This does not mean that a note should necessarily be reimbursed on presentation to the bank of issue but that ultimately it should be reimbursable in gold. The issue should be based upon gold reserves and other substantial holdings, and there should not be, if the money is to remain sound, any excessive disproportion between the guarantee and the paper issue.

What, then, was the position in France? What were the prospects of reimbursement? In 1913 the gold reserves of the Banque de France were 4,517,000,000 francs. The circulation of notes was 5,713,000,000. In 1926 the gold reserves were 3,684,147,000, and the silver reserves 338,944,000. In addition there were gold reserves deposited abroad, subjected to certain restrictions, amounting to 1,864,320,000 gold francs. The circulation of notes in May reached (these figures varied from week to week but those given are substantially accurate) 52,657,505,000 paper francs. The limit as fixed in December 1925 was 58½ milliards, while the limit of State borrowings was 38½ milliards.

At first sight the disparity between the gold guarantees and the circulation was enormous, but we must not stop there. There are other perfectly good guarantees. The Banque held bonds, etc., which it valued at 4,543,067,000 francs, and various advances on title-deeds worth 2,389,940,000. Other available deposits which should be added may be placed at half a milliard. Altogether, even without the gold which was held abroad, there was a total of realizable securities of 11,530,232,000 francs. To this sum must be added perfectly sound securities which were not so readily realizable, including the gold abroad: Treasury bonds discounted for advances to foreign Governments (5,335,000,000), various holdings (3,543,000,000), extraordinary advances to the State, which may be computed at between 35 and 36 milliards. Thus we have an additional total of nearly 46 milliard francs all of which the Banque held against its issue. If we put the two sums together we will find that the guarantees are larger than the circulation.

But obviously everything hinges on whether these items which the Banque regarded as guarantees are genuine, whether they are sound, whether they are good credits. It will be observed at once that four-fifths of the note circulation of France was justified by the credits of the Banque on the State. The Banque had advanced to the State for its own purposes and on account of foreign Governments over 40 milliard francs. The State owed the Banque that amount of money. Was the Banque entitled to believe that the State would sooner or later pay back these advances? When one thought of the enormous resources of France on which the State could draw, it was extremely hard to suppose that when once the State had adopted a proper financial system and collected the taxation which could properly be imposed, it could not refrain from further borrowings and begin to meet its obligations towards the Banque. The State actually promised to pay back to the Banque at the rate of 2 milliard francs a year. It failed to keep its promise. It was not alive to the urgency of the financial problem. But afterwards it was aroused to the danger. If the State tackled the problem aright it could balance its Budget, and do more than balance its Budget—make provision for repayment to the Banque. Certainly if the State allowed matters to drift an impossible situation would arise. But there was every sign that the drifting period was passing, that a halt had been called. Was not the Banque, therefore, completely justified in looking upon the State debt as a good debt? In that case the cover for the paper issue was not inadequate, and the fears that were entertained by the French themselves and by foreign countries were groundless. But if one assumed that the State, though ceasing to indulge in inflation, which is the inevitable result of borrowings from the Banque, would be unable to meet its obligations: even in this almost incredible case, since the credits of the Banque on the State are put at four-fifths of the note circulation, surely the franc was sufficiently protected to be worth intrinsically at least one-fifth of its former value, that is to say, 25 to the dollar, instead of 50 to which it fell, and 125 to the pound. Apart from the advances of the Banque to the State the circulation of notes created for purely commercial purposes was probably not more than 12½ milliard francs, which were comfortably covered. The Banque had managed its own affairs excellently, and nobody looking at its balance sheet could raise objections to anything other than the large State borrowings. If those credits on the State were wiped out completely the franc should not have depreciated until it was worth only two sous—a tenth of its pre-war value.

These figures show that the franc was unjustly treated. Yet its fall was steady. In April, 1924, just before the Bloc des Gauches won the elections, it was quoted at 67 to the pound. In May it went to 74 and in June to 86. It stayed around 90 to the pound for several months, but in the spring of 1925 dropped to 104. In October of that year it was at 110; in November at 126, in December 135. By March, 1926, it had fallen to 143; in May to 159; and then it spectacularly plunged in a few days to 178. Finance Minister after Minister seemed utterly unable to control the franc, and counter-speculation on behalf of the State on the money markets was a stupid expedient. Finally confidence completely broke; there were the beginnings of a panic; 200 to the pound was reached—220, 230, 240; and on July 20, 1926, when M. Herriot formed a second Ministry, the franc touched 250 to the pound. The Treasury was empty and the holders of bonds immediately reimbursable—to the amount of 50 milliards—were presenting them for payment. Everybody who held franc securities was selling. Could the rot be stopped or was this the end ? Was France to follow the path that Germany had taken ? Then it was, on July 23, that M. Poincaré, in response to a popular call, formed a Ministry of National Union, with six former Prime Ministers in the Cabinet — Briand, Barthou, Painlevé, Leygues, Herriot, and himself as Finance Minister. It was high time that the party strife which had been disastrous should cease.

M. Caillaux, who was Finance Minister for eight months in 1925, had been singularly inactive, living on the proceeds of inflation, apparently without a plan, except that of constituting a Sinking Fund for the redemption of the floating debt. He was thrown down in November, 1925, by his refusal to accept the principle of a capital levy as suggested by the Radical Congress of which M. Herriot was President. M. Painlevé, who succeeded Caillaux as Finance Minister, favoured some kind of forced consolidation of the floating debt—that is to say, a refusal to pay such bonds as were presented. He fell and M. Loucheur, in the succeeding Briand Cabinet, lasted just long enough to pass fresh measures of inflation. M. Doumer pinned his faith to increased indirect taxation. He too went. M. Raoul Péret quickly got into difficulties and was obliged to appropriate the Morgan credits, which had been granted to combat speculation, to the pressing needs of the Treasury. M. Caillaux, coming in a second time, realizing how hopeless was the prospect of obtaining any positive vote from the Chamber for any concrete plan, boldly asked for full powers. M. Herriot, descending from the Presidential chair of the Chamber, denounced the attempt to take its prerogatives from Parliament. Then it was that he, with de Monzie as Finance Minister, without programme, without clear ideas, was forced to form a Ministry, which collapsed on the day it presented itself to Parliament. A Committee of Experts had been appointed by M. Péret. Its report is interesting though scarcely remarkable. In it was recommended a progressive voluntary consolidation of the Defence Bonds by the offer of advantageous loans to the holders of existing bonds. In the meantime a special fund should relieve the Treasury of demands for reimbursement. It should be alimented by a Budgetary annuity equal to the interest on the bonds in circulation, an annuity of amortization also provided for by the Budget, and as an initial endowment part of the proceeds of foreign loans. The tobacco monopoly might be regarded as a guarantee. In the meantime temporary advances should be obtained from the Banque de France.* Speedy stabilization of the franc was urged, for the idea of an integral revalorization of the franc is absurd, and it would, were it possible, completely crush the French taxpayer. For the purposes of stabilization fresh foreign borrowings were said to be indispensable, and these borrowings could only be obtained by the acceptance of a debt settlement with the United States and with England. Now, the French were strongly opposed to a debt settlement, believing that there was danger of falling into the grip of Anglo-Saxon finance. If France failed to pay on the stipulated dates, as was indeed possible, then might not America—and England—impose a sort of Dawes Plan on France ? Might there not be foreign participation in French industrial concerns ?

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* By September, 1926, M. Poincaré had worked the franc to about 160 to the pound and 33 to the dollar, driving a bill providing over 11 milliards in fresh taxation through the Chamber, establishing an independent Sinking Fund in a special National Assembly at Versailles.

Might not national property be alienated? Might not the politics as well as the finances of the country be directed from abroad? The theme that France was in peril of becoming a vassal country was elaborated. Had she escaped from German domination to fall under American domination? There was a cry that at all costs France should save herself.*

With a fluctuating franc it would be absurd to attempt to estimate the total national wealth in paper francs. Such estimates as there are are based on insufficient data and they range from 1,000 to 2,000 milliards. The most convincing calculation is that of M. Edmond Théry, who in 1912 put the fortune of France at 300 milliard gold francs. It is fair to assume that the fortune of France has increased, though such authorities as Professor Gide do not acknowledge any considerable augmentation despite the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. Personally, after carefully working out the available figures, I am inclined to fix the French fortune at about 350 milliard gold francs. To ascertain the national wealth in terms of paper francs one has only to multiply these figures in accordance with the existing rate of exchange; the 350 milliards is based on the old value of the franc at 25 to the pound.

What financiers feared was that France would not put her house in order before it was too late and the old currency had become worthless, thus ruining most of the members of the middle classes who had placed their money in presumably safe investments; who had saved francs; who had pensions which were expressed in paper francs. The stabilization of the franc was long prevented because too many people believed it would be possible to bring it back to the pre-war value. The consolidation of the floating debt was delayed because it was felt to be discreditable on the part of the State to repudiate in any measure the obligations it had contracted. Budgetary equilibrium was postponed, even when most of the earlier illusions had been dismissed because there were quarrels as to the incidence of taxation, and in fact many of the new taxes were wrongly applied and fell as an impossible burden on industry. The funding of the Foreign Debt was not undertaken, though it weighed heavily upon all French finances, because there was a secret hope that neither England nor America would insist upon repayment, and because the doctrine of the "common cause" was long cherished. That Foreign Debt was divided into two parts. There was the so-called political debt and the so-called commercial debt. The political debt to America with interest amounted to over 18½ milliard gold francs, and to England over 15½ milliard gold francs. There were in addition market loans and bank credits, and so forth, due to the United States, to Great Britain, to Japan, to Holland, to Argentina, to Uruguay, to Canada, and to Egypt, amounting to over 5 milliard gold francs. Now France insisted that in any event these debts should be paid out of France's receipts from Germany. If the receipts from Germany should diminish French payments should diminish proportionately. If the receipts from Germany should cease French repayments should cease. America declined to consider such a safeguarding clause as France demanded in the negotiations for a settlement. Provisionally M. Henry Bérenger, by the end of April, 1926, agreed at Washington on behalf of France that in principal and interest 6,850,000,000 dollars should be paid in sixty-two years. England urged that she could not forgo her claims on France since she was obliged to pay back her own borrowings to the United States, and a large part of those borrowings had been actually used by France or in the service of France. England, too, was reluctant to transfer any portion of the responsibility from the French Treasury on to German shoulders, and asked that a similar settlement to that which had been concluded between France and America should be concluded between France and England. On July 12 M. Caillaux reached an agreement in London with Mr. Winston Churchill. Under it France should make the following annual payments: 1926, £4,000,000; 1927, £6,000,000; 1928, £8,000,000; 1929, £10,000,000; 1930 to 1956, £12,500,000; 1957 to 1988, £14,000,000. M. Caillaux in a letter intimated that if reparation receipts should diminish by half a new situation would be created, and the French Government reserved the right of asking England in such an event for revision of the debt agreement. Mr. Churchill replied that if any modification were made there should be equal treatment of creditors, and other creditors of France should make corresponding concessions. In the temper of the French Parliaments these American and British agreements could not be put forward for immediate ratification. Indeed, a campaign began outside France for the reconsideration of all war liabilities, and it seemed safe to prophecy that sooner or later an international conference would be called to study in a generous spirit the single problem of war liabilities, whether incurred by Allies on account of borrowings, or imposed on the defeated belligerents by way of reparations.

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* This was the real objection to the ratification of the debt settlements which M. Poincaré favoured. Without ratification and foreign loans would he be able to stabilise?

One of the reasons why France faced the facts of her financial position so late was a curious inability to believe that countries victorious in war and apparently prosperous in the economic sense could possibly witness any catastrophic depreciation of their money. France thought that everything would right itself. She continued to resort to expedient after expedient, neglected to treat these questions in a comprehensive manner, and could not make up her mind to scrap the old machinery and to erect efficient up-to-date machinery. The past furnished plenty of severe lessons, but they were unheeded. We have glanced at some of them. One would have thought that in particular the history of the emission of assignats and afterwards of *mandats territoriaux* by the Revolutionary Governments would have been remembered by the French. Those assignats were paper money based upon property which had been taken over by the Revolutionary Governments and were used as ordinary currency. Under the Constituante the emission was moderate and the Legislative Assembly also kept within bounds. The first issued assignats for 1,800,000,000 and the second for 900,000,000, but the temptation to print more and more notes was irresistible, and finally 100,000,000 assignats were emitted daily. In all there were 48 milliards. The Directoire, when the notes were worth one-quarter per cent, replaced them by territorial mandats which a year later were in their turn worth one per cent. On the enormous State debt not even interest could be paid, and in 1799 the debt was reduced by two-thirds. It is strange that remembering this well-known episode, related in every manual, the French should have blandly continued to assert that what had happened in Germany and in a number of Central European countries after the Great War could not happen in France, that any kind of State bankruptcy was incredible. State bankruptcy of the most devastating kind had happened to France in circumstances not altogether dissimilar from those of our day. Yet the French could not open their eyes, and once more we were forced to conclude that historical examples are entirely unprofitable to a nation.

The protracted dispute in France about taxation has many phases, but perhaps the chief struggle was between the supporters of indirect taxation and the proponents of direct taxation. Direct taxation is that which applies to the individual and is based largely upon his revenue. Indirect taxation is that which is based upon commodities. In direct taxation one is paying on what one receives. In indirect taxation one is paying on what one spends. In our day it has been generally recognized that direct taxation is fairer than indirect taxation, for the rich can thus be made to bear the principal burden, and payment is according to means. The tax on commodities may become exceedingly onerous for poorer persons who can barely afford even the necessaries of life. Those necessaries naturally increase in price if they are taxed. Yet it is curious that in France one of the causes of the Revolution was precisely the iniquitous system of direct, that is to say, personal, taxation which existed under the Ancien Régime. It was to repudiate the excessive demands that the people revolted. Yet it should not be forgotten that the system of direct taxation which was in operation before the Revolution was not fairly applied. The rich and privileged were exempted. It was the poor who were oppressed. To-day it is usually contended that direct taxation without exemptions for privileged persons is far more democratic than indirect taxation. France is slow to recognize this democratic doctrine. It is argued that even the income-tax, which is essentially a direct tax, is eventually passed on to the consumer. It is above all argued that the tax on commodities, whether it be called the turnover tax, the sales tax, or the tax on payments, is more easily collected than the direct tax and cannot be fraudulently evaded as can the latter. Income-tax is regarded as the tax for *poires*—that is to say, for simpletons—and it is certain that it has never yielded the sums which ought to be forthcoming. In 1925 it still brought less than 8 milliard francs. The opponents of the income-tax also are afraid of the reversal of the Revolutionary idea, which was to abolish personal taxation. They forget that the real objection to personal impositions lay in the extraordinary iniquitous manner of their application. Again, it was held that, with the franc depreciating, a tax on commodities produces immediate resources for the State without the erection of any special machinery, and that if prices rise as the franc falls the receipts from taxes on commodities automatically increase. Precisely as the expenditure of the State reckoned in francs augments, so under a system of indirect taxation does its revenue augment. There was some validity in this suggestion in the peculiar situation in which France found herself, but that validity was purely temporary. In normal circumstances it is worthless.

It would be wrong to conclude that the French do not pay direct taxation. The receipts from direct taxation and from indirect taxation are about the same. But among the direct taxes must be reckoned the heavy death duties. They are in some cases far too heavy, while registration and stamp duties for the transference of property are high. Nevertheless, the income-tax, for which M. Caillaux among others fought before the war, has not been thoroughly accepted. The French consider it to be inquisitorial. They are secretive about their personal finances. They think that their privacy is violated by the obligation to disclose their income. They fear that the disclosure may be used for political or personal ends. Besides, they have often no proper system of book-keeping. The habits and traditions of the people are against the income-tax, and it will not be easy to overcome the objections. It is impossible to judge the riches of a Frenchman by exterior signs, as can usually be done in England and America. There has never been any accurate assessment, and if one were to take the tables of income-tax one would suppose that the French live on very little. It is indeed true that wealth is fairly evenly distributed in France, but it is impossible to believe, for example, that in 1924 there were fewer than 300,000 taxpayers with incomes of 6,000 to 10,000 francs, and about the same number with incomes ranging from 10,000 to 20,000 francs. Only 31,000 people acknowledged incomes between 50,000 and 100,000 francs, though 100,000 francs at that time represented roughly £1,000; 1,600 admitted incomes of between 300,000 and 500,000 francs; and those who paid on incomes of over 500,000 (that is to say, £5,000) numbered altogether about 800.

It appears, therefore, that the financial task of the French is particularly arduous, first, because of the war borrowings; second, because of the work of reconstruction; third, because of the prevalence of illusions; fourth, because of the obsolete administrative system; and, fifth—and this is the most important reason of all—because of the fiscal ignorance of the French. In the past the French have paid an excessive homage to the law of the least effort, and have been content to live on loans and to hide from themselves by bad accountancy the fiscal facts. This particular kind of indolence could sooner or later have only one result. But when the French awoke to the danger of their position they feverishly constructed more or less ingenious plans, which collapsed one after the other, and themselves blackened their situation and shattered the credit of the State. After all, there is only one method, simple and classical, of possessing sound finances: that of balancing the Budget. The French for many years have failed in this elementary duty; the defaults of the financial organization are not new and accidental, they are permanent. The Frenchman has been a bad taxpayer and fraud has been common. It is not surprising, since French fiscality is a monument of incoherence and of injustice, that taxes are wrongly established, wrongly distributed and wrongly collected. There has been a constant and evil intrusion of politics in the financial domain. According to M. Octave Homberg, the contributive faculty of the French (if the franc is estimated at about 125 to the pound) may be placed as high as 50 milliards. But it is necessary to undertake the fiscal education of the average Frenchman and to teach him that there is a fiscal patriotism as well as a military patriotism. In England few persons endeavour to evade their obligations to the State because they have confidence in the technicians and in the control of Parliament. In France the technicians are discouraged and the politicians are discredited, and there are perpetual quarrels between the representatives of the agriculturists, the representatives of the banks, the representatives of industry; and the weakest go to the wall. Since 1918 it is stated without contradiction that eight high functionaries have quitted the most important post in the Finance Department of the Government to occupy themselves with the more remunerative affairs of the private credit establishments. The State is unable to keep its best collaborators.

Whatever may be the immediate future of France, she will never reach the height of her possibilities unless and until she renovates from top to bottom her financial conceptions and renews the instrument of their application.

WORKS TO BE CONSULTED

For a compressed economic history of France the reader cannot do better than take the remarkable work of Alfred Rambaud, to which reference has already been made. The writer has followed fairly closely in this and other chapters the facts set out by that painstaking authority. The report of the Committee of Experts, though debatable, is indispensable, besides M. Clémentel's *Inventory*. Germain Martin's *Les Finances Publiques* is sound. Mr. J. R. Cahill's Annual Report is invaluable as showing the new spirit of industrial enterprise. George Peel's *Financial Crisis in France* is useful. The publications of the Bankers' Trust Company of New York are excellent. I commend too the writings of Jacques Duboin. For fresh light in the Law speculations one should read *Le Bureau des Rêveries* by C. J. Gignoux et Legueu, and on the revolutionary inflation Jean Morini-Comby's little work *Les Assignats* : they have more than an historical interest—they are relevant to our day. The standard work, however, is Marion's *Histoire financière de la France.*

BOOK II

BETWEEN TWO WARS

CHAPTER I

FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC

Alsace-Lorraine the Pivot—The Advent of Napoléon III—Empire meant War—Prussia's Growing Power—" A Light Heart "—Sedan—The Commune—Royalist Folly—Defects of the Constitution—A Single Vote

THE pivot of recent French history has been Alsace-Lorraine. The politicians who were born before 1870, when Alsace-Lorraine was wrested from France, when the Empire succumbed in the dust of Sedan, when France was humiliated and the triumphant German Empire was constituted, were influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the memory of the dark days of defeat. It is only fifty-six years ago that French prestige was smashed, and therefore there were alive in 1914, and to-day in 1926, many influential public men who have vivid recollections of the Prussian attack. Georges Clemenceau, for example, was at the opening of his public career—he was Mayor of Montmartre—when the blow fell, and unquestionably the events which led to the founding of the Third Republic coloured his spirit. Raymond Poincaré, though younger, is a Lorrainer whom I have heard refer with unmistakable emotion to the disasters of which he was a youthful witness. There is little doubt that the later policy of these and other Frenchmen was to some extent dictated by the bitter experiences of their earlier years. 1870 dominated 1914, and particularly did it dominate 1919 and 1923. Gambetta, with his somewhat demagogic Nationalism, gave France her motto when he exclaimed : " *Pensez-y toujours, n'en parlez jamais.*" France did not talk overmuch of Sedan, and indeed there were attempts to forget the old unhappy, far-off things. But for the men of a certain generation it was hard to accept the *status* *quo*. They did not consciously or deliberately favour or facilitate a new war ; but there existed in France, and probably on the other side of the Rhine, what it has become the fashion to describe as a " complex." Psychologically, the question of Alsace-Lorraine became all-important. Whatever happened seems to relate itself to the loss of these provinces. Diplomatic conflicts in which France and Germany were involved peculiarly touched the susceptibilities of the French. Every manifestation of German military might and commercial enterprise was considered suspiciously and sometimes provoked pangs of rage and regret. No French patriot would admit that Alsace-Lorraine was definitely ravished from France.

How the return of the provinces was to be effected nobody knew. Gambetta seems to have hoped for some time that, seduced by French grace, moved by the political necessity of consolidating the German Empire, Bismarck would voluntarily surrender the rapt regions. There were others who, in a more realist spirit, saw that France neither by her charm nor her strength could reverse the decisions which had been taken, and believed that a new system of alliances in Europe would create such a menace to Germany that, alarmed, she would seek accommodation with her rival. This was largely the explanation of the later movement to surround Germany with potential enemies. Obviously those who relied upon such a weapon had no adequate conception of the rapid development of the youngest of the European Powers. They did not appreciate that she was filled with the ardour and the confidence of youth. Her commercial prosperity was extraordinary. She was militarily by far the most formidable nation on the Continent. Destiny called to her and she listened to the voices with a calm faith in her future. Would it not have been better for France to have accepted the *fait accompli*, to have resigned herself to the existing conditions, to have dismissed for ever the dangerous obsession of Alsace-Lorraine? It is Alsace-Lorraine which has poisoned the life of Europe. Strasburg, the capital of Alsace, stood in the great Place de la Concorde of Paris, a beloved female figure in stone hung with crape and wreaths, bearing on a shield the date of the capitulation and the significant question "When?" France did not want war, but such brooding on her grievances meant, if the Nationalists had thought out the implications, an ultimate recourse to arms. It is not by diplomatic pressure that any country is induced to give up its territorial possessions, however they have been acquired. Paul Déroulède, the poet of patriotism, sang his songs which kept the fatal flame alive, and men like Maurice Barrès urged their compatriots to look with longing eyes in the direction of the Rhine. It would be difficult to say that any positive policy grew up in France, but, nevertheless, while there was a determination never to attack Germany, never to be guilty of aggression, never to provoke willingly an uncertain conflict, there was also an obstinate resolve never to acquiesce in what was considered to be an international crime.

In the annexed provinces, which it would not be unfair to say are neither German nor fully French but have a special character of their own, there was a desire for autonomy. With their marked individuality, with their regional patriotism, with their dislike for the excessive centralization which is the keynote of French administration, they aimed at some sort of independence. Their position has been admirably defined in the phrase that they are morally isolated from Germany and materially isolated from France. Their culture, in spite of the language difficulty, is French, but they have increasingly become dependent in the economic sense on

Germany. They may be regarded either as a hyphen between France and Germany, or as a dividing line. In present circumstances it is possible that they will gradually be absorbed in the French polity, but the movement cannot be hastened. There would, in spite of their sympathies with the mother-country, be a strong reaction were they to be assimilated too quickly ; and already it has been observed that the attempt to introduce the whole of the Republican legislation, instead of respecting the local customs and laws, caused considerable resentment and an incipient revolt. The problem which Alsace-Lorraine presents to France is still unsolved. France no more than Germany can afford to offend the people of Alsace-Lorraine, who after nearly fifty years of submission to the German yoke refused to give their allegiance to Germany.

Germany saw her error, saw that it was not by repression that the nationality of populations can be changed in these days ; France, too, is conscious that, although the anomaly of a State within a State cannot be permitted, the complete incorporation of Alsace-Lorraine can be obtained by persuasion, not by coercion. The demands of Alsace-Lorraine for autonomy might conceivably have brought healing to the Franco-German quarrel. There is much evidence that after two score years of an unsuccessful attempt to subjugate the provinces, Germany herself about 1910 saw the necessity of milder measures which might to some extent meet the wishes of the population. The path of politics is strewn with might-have-beens. It is useless to shake one's head mournfully over blunders that have been committed, for they do not even serve as lessons to succeeding generations. Possibly had France been able to reconcile herself to the compromise which was envisaged a few years before the Great War, the clash would have been averted. It would be too hazardous to affirm that other statesmen than those who were in office could have negotiated an agreement between France and Germany which would have procured autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine and have ended the long feud ; but one may venture the opinion that what rendered such an international settlement, which would incidentally have satisfied Alsace-Lorraine, impossible, was the French conviction that the disannexation of the conquered provinces from Germany was only a matter of time. The records have it that a secret German negotiator began his soundings in March, 1912, at Paris but was quickly disillusioned.

Unless stress is laid on the continuance of these French sentiments in respect of Alsace-Lorraine throughout the years of restless peace, an essential factor in the relations of the two countries will be missed. It is not suggested, nor would it be true to suggest, that there was a wish or urge towards war in France ; what may be suggested is the existence of a belief in France in the immanent justice of the French claim, the superstition of Nemesis. The mentality of French politicians—that is to say, of those politicians who prided themselves upon their patriotism—was clouded by the wrong that their country had endured. When one has analysed and sifted all the immediate causes of the war, when one has shown that Germany showed a scandalous disrespect for international engagements and precipitated the Continent into an appalling conflict, one has still to recall that in 1870 an act was committed which kept France simmering in a state of indignation and expectation, which made two peoples, neither of whom perhaps willed the war, glare at each other across their frontiers like china dogs on a mantelpiece. There was here the moral cause of the war which is much more important than the material causes.

The Versailles Treaty itself recognizes that here was the underlying reason which shaped the diplomatic debates of 1914 to their dreadful end. The conscience of peoples cannot be violated with impunity. Sooner or later there must be a revolt, and such revolt may unwittingly be led by the wrongdoer himself. When President Wilson addressed the American Congress just before the effective entry of America into the war, he declared that the wrong done to France by Prussia in respect of Alsace-Lorraine, which had troubled the peace of the world for fifty years, had to be righted before peace could be assured. He spoke the truth; had the war not restored Alsace-Lorraine to France it would probably have been followed by another war for the same stake. How many people outside France thought with pain of Alsace-Lorraine, which became for the world at large a symbol of injustice?

When M. Poincaré was made President of the French Republic in 1913 there was a general feeling that the fatal moment was approaching. Nobody foresaw Sarajevo; but with or without Sarajevo the struggle which had been pursued in the secret places of men's souls would have been carried on to the battle-ground. The exact sequence of diplomatic events might easily have been other than it was; the precise events might have been replaced by totally different events; what was certain was the conclusion. Poincaré grew pale at the responsibility which fell upon him. He was aware that he was but the *porte-parole* of those who had long been persuaded that French resentment and German arrogance must express themselves bloodily. He was a timid man and certainly did nothing which in his view could hasten the day when the collision should occur, but the mentality which he represented could not but help to produce the shock. There was a French thesis that war could not be averted, and therefore everything should be done to prepare for the defence of France. No nation can brood upon its grievances, even though it intends not to be guilty of the smallest act of aggression, without drawing upon itself the war it shrinks from, fears, and will yet accept with a solemn joy.

Yet it must be noted that in France during the preceding twenty years there openly took shape the opposite thesis that a reconciliation was possible, and that such a reconciliation would change the whole outlook. The twentieth century saw the economic rivalry between England and Germany approaching a crisis. The centre of political gravity in Europe had been displaced. France might choose her friends—and her enemies; and diplomacy has always regarded the right choice of enemies to be supremely important. In the first few years of the century there was a consciousness of danger in Germany, and Bethmann-Hollweg could not regard the increasing association of France, England, and Russia without misgiving. It might not have been unduly difficult to have effected a Franco-German *rapprochement*. France might have made use of her agreement with England in two ways: one was to complete the encirclement of Germany; the other was to make overtures to Germany on a footing of equality. But Alsace-Lorraine stood in the way of the second alternative. Was this objection insuperable? Those who thought with Caillaux were apparently persuaded that it was not. Those who thought with Poincaré were apparently persuaded that it was. These two men, whose doctrines have probably been distorted, whose positive action has been unquestionably exaggerated, did come to stand in the public mind for two opposite theses. The dilemma was that if a Franco-German understanding was the only guarantee of European peace—as it is to-day—it also, in the existing circumstances, meant the consecration of the *status quo* and the definite renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine ; while anything less than such an understanding implied, with the creation of anti-German alliances and *ententes* on the one side, and the growth of Germanic alliances on the other side, the division of Europe into hostile camps, and preparation for an immense battle. Doubtless some intermediate course might have been found, but it would not have been easy to follow. At any rate, what has been called by French writers the Caillaux policy (though it was scarcely so clear-cut in the mind of Caillaux) was doomed to failure ; and what has been designated the Poincaré policy (again accepted by its putative father with many reservations, many hesitations, and many protestations) was doomed to a still more disastrous failure.

Examined thus summarily it would appear that the modern history of France might conveniently start from the Franco-Prussian war, which bequeathed to Europe a dispute which could culminate only in one manner. But the Franco-Prussian war was itself the sequel to the accession of Napoléon III to the Imperial throne. Every impartial student must acknowledge that the Empire meant war. Napoléon was necessarily the continuator of the Napoléonic tradition. "*L'Empire, c'est la paix,*" he exclaimed in a famous speech, but this assurance was belied throughout his reign. One may deny the continuity of history and assert that everything might have fallen otherwise at the hazard of a spun coin ; that it only needed the smallest chance to deflect the whole current ; but in fact there was no break, there was no hazard, and the causes, it would be seen, if one could disentangle them, had to produce predictable circumstances, which in their turn were transformed into causes. Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte had merely to appear on the scene, and his name sufficed for his acceptance by the French people. Lamartine and General Cavaignac could not, in spite of their presumed popularity, win against the man who presented himself at a time when France was weary of disorder and longed for the reassertion of authority. In the character and in the policy of the third Napoléon, the nephew of the great Emperor, and in his ultimate crash, one finds an impeccable fitness. It is thus that matters were worked out: they could, it would seem, work themselves out in that way alone. Always is one impressed with the orderliness of history: one believes that if one were wise enough and could comprehend all the facts one could foresee everything that happens. Perhaps this is the illusion of retrospect, but however that may be, there has always appeared to me an extraordinary inevitability about the nineteenth century.

There was the reaction against the first Emperor, and then, as always happens, when the memory of the reverse side of glory has been obliterated by the passage of a generation or two, there was a revival of Napoléonism. The Emperor came out of eclipse: he shone bright in men's eyes; there was a Napoléonic cult, and after the disappointments of the Restoration, the discontents which manifested themselves under the reign of Louis XVIII and of Charles X, the eighteen years of Louis-Philippe were for a large part filled with riots. There was spreading over Europe a spirit of revolution. The Second Republic was born in an epoch of trouble and tumult. Monarchy had been tried and found wanting. Two Kings in succession had been compelled to abdicate. There was an exasperated mood of Liberalism; but although there was a momentary enthusiasm for the provisional government, France had begun to be assailed by doubts. Mere political changes were not enough. Neither Republicanism nor universal suffrage, were ends in themselves. The people who turn out one set of rulers to put in another set of rulers wake up in the morning after the night's rejoicings and look out upon the world with sad eyes, realizing that nothing fundamental has been changed. The aspect of the cities remains the same; the daily task—too quotidian as the French say—has to be done as before. Politics quickly appear to be what they chiefly are—a childish play. Republicanism is not enough. It is an idle term. It demands a definition. There is Bourgeois Republicanism, Conservative as any Monarchism. There is Radical Republicanism, reformist and again political in the narrowest sense. There is Socialist Republicanism which would demolish the existing social structure. Was the Revolution then to be purely political or was it to be conspicuously social? If the White Flag had been broken, did there not remain in presence the Tricolour Flag and the Red Flag? Against Lamartine must be set Louis Blanc. National workshops were established to give work to all, but the experiment was a failure and they were shut. Universal suffrage, decreed on March 5, 1848, did not assure tranquillity; for what is universal suffrage if the Government is floundering in a financial bog, if there is excessive fiduciary inflation, and unpopular additions to taxation?

When the National Assembly proclaimed the Second Republic the Executive Power was given to a commission, composed of Arago, Garnier, Pagès, Lamartine, Ledru-Rollin, and Marie, which was resolutely anti-Socialist. Such Socialist leaders as Blanqui, Barbès, and Raspail were arrested and Louis Blanc was prosecuted. The Workmen's Clubs were incensed and an insurrection broke out. It is commonly charged against France that she is fickle, founding *régimes* in a burst of zeal only to throw them down with equal fanaticism. The nineteenth century furnishes arguments to those who take this view. The truth is that ever since the Revolution and the Empire there has been a search for stability, and it is not to be expected that stability should be attained without many mistakes. The ferment was as formidable as any ferment in the records of mankind. Great waves of ideas which had receded kept sweeping back from the past. Nor were the forces altogether internal: at all times there broke over France the seething waters of a turbulent Continent. What France wanted was peace—peace at home and peace abroad; but the equilibrium having been disturbed there was much rocking and roaring, sudden ebbs and violent floods, a continuous commotion of discontents and *coups d'état.* France must not be judged by the long aftermath of the Revolution of 1789. She oscillated between the two poles of extreme Liberalism and extreme Conservatism because her life had been deeply disturbed.

It was in such conditions that Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte found his opportunity. There was practically no Bonapartist party: he had no organization: the Legitimists and the Orleanists though submerged yet hoped for a new Monarchy. Soon after the throne was swept away the Comte de Chambord (the grandson of Charles X) and the Comte de Paris (the grandson of Louis-Philippe) had many followers. Legitimists and Orleanists could not, however, agree between themselves, and the two branches of the royal family were in antagonism. Neither of them could succeed without the support of the other and neither of them wished to succeed with the aid of the other.

The Second Republic was short-lived because it behaved ruthlessly towards the Socialists and dispersed its popular following, while arousing by its strong methods an appetite on the part of the possessing classes for a powerful government without altogether satisfying it. Louis-Napoléon at this time was in exile, but such was the magic of his name that in his absence he was elected deputy. There was a clamour for a great anti-revolutionary figure. It is said in France that everything ends in chansons; it is true that the Second Empire began in chansons. Popular songs calling for Napoléon were sung at street corners. Certainly the Government suppressed rioting, and General Cavaignac showed that he was capable of being a Dictator. For several days there was a pitched battle in the streets. Generals were killed, and the Archbishop of Paris also fell. There were wholesale deportations. When the Constitution was adopted and a Presidential election called for, Cavaignac was the logical choice. But Bonaparte saw that his hour had struck. He came into the field and was elected by an overwhelming vote. Many real Republicans were aware of the danger of a plebiscite of the people on a name. It was fatal for the Republic. Although Napoléon was made President for four years, the Second Empire really dates from December 10, 1848.

The President denied that he was a Pretender to the Throne but the Ministers he chose were, with one exception, hostile to the Republic. Surrounded by reactionaries he asserted, though somewhat timidly —for at heart he was at once vain of the name he bore and frightened by it—his personal supremacy in government; while flattering the people by asserting that he drew his strength from them. The hero of a plebiscite, he was bound to laud universal suffrage, even while Thiers in disgust was talking of the "vile multitude." But, in fact, limiting laws were passed unfavourable to the workman; and a number of anti-Republican measures were adopted. The President's early intervention in favour of the Pope at Rome gave the keynote of

Napoléonic action. The Catholics were wooed and education was practically surrendered into their hands. Restrictions were placed upon newspapers. Finally by the *coup d'état* of December 2 (1851), Louis-Napoléon proclaimed the Chamber dissolved and ordered new elections. Two hundred deputies were arrested. Thousands of men were interned and deported. But Napoléon managed to place himself on the side of the people, announcing that universal suffrage would be re-established, and the Committee of Resistance, headed by Victor Hugo, was regarded merely as a defender of the Assembly which had curtailed the civil rights of the people. So potent is the magic of a name that in a new plebiscite Napoléon was more successful than ever. He had apparently popular approval for his energetic action. The powers which were attributed to him were tremendous. At the end of February in the following year elections which were held strengthened the position of the Prince-President. Yet another plebiscite resulted in the full title of Emperor being conferred on the man whom Victor Hugo, exiled in the Channel Islands, called Napoléon the Little.

Jacques Bainville, who in an able work has told the history of France from the standpoint of a professed Royalist, is emphatic in his view that what the Emperor crushed was not the Republic but the Monarchy. Such an opinion may easily be defended. The Second Republic could hardly have lasted in any case, and the demand for a Restoration, could the Royalists have composed their differences, would have been irresistible. The time was ripe for reaction: a fairly liberal Representative Monarchy would have suited the majority of the French. The Monarchists were ill-led and the Democrats were alarmed at the excesses of the extremists. The Great Powers who had pronounced against the return of the Bonapartes in 1815—for Bonapartism could only mean the destruction of the treaties which regulated the European polity—did not look with kindly eyes on this challenge to them; but on the whole they thought it better to risk diplomatic upheavals rather than check an anti-revolutionary movement. Their greatest concern was lest the Continent should become a prey to the revolutionary spirit. Moreover, Prussia and Austria were on bad terms and had other preoccupations. Russia was regarded by England as dangerous; and England considered it advisable to preserve good relations with France. It was essential for Napoléon to prevent a coalition of the Powers against France if his ambition of re-tracing the map of Europe and upsetting the work of the Congress of Vienna was to be achieved. This necessity was fulfilled by the fostering of wars which ranged the Powers against each other.

England in 1854 was persuaded to join France in arms against Russia, who menaced the integrity of Turkey. The real cause of the Crimean war was Napoléon's need of firmer foundations for the dynasty he attempted to establish. He had actually tried to consolidate his situation by marriage to a Hohenzollern, but the royal house of Prussia declined the doubtful honour and Napoléon (perhaps with conscious emulation of his great predecessor) married a Spanish noblewomen, Eugénie de Montijo. Though the Crimean war served to render a hostile coalition of the Powers impossible, and though France appeared in the rôle of the leading European Power at the Paris Congress of 1856, the victory did not produce the results which Napoléon had expected. The questions of nationality which the Emperor tried to raise—particularly the problems of Poland and of Italy—were firmly set aside by England, and England detached herself from France. A menacing figure came on the scene in Prussia. Bismarck realized that German unity could only be effected by the humiliation of Austria. We cannot here pursue the ramifications of the cunning and far-sighted policy of Bismarck, but it should be noted that in 1856 he wrote, " Germany is too narrow for Austria and Prussia. We shall in the near future have to defend our existence against Austria, and it does not depend upon us to avoid a collision." Napoléon was to benefit to some extent from this antagonism of Austria and Prussia. Without it an attack on the Rhine might have put an end to the prospect of Napoléonic conquests. The man of " blood and iron" watched the disastrous attempts of Napoléon to stir up popular feeling in his favour with vigilant interest. Napoléon was affecting a Liberalism abroad which was the cover of his designs for conquest and prestige. He renewed his espousal of the cause of the Poles, giving unsought advice to the Czar, and persuading Austria and England to protest with him to the Russian Government. Bismarck watched grimly, and gained the goodwill of the Czar. Napoléon also championed Italian freedom, and in 1859 Bismarck was gratified with the spectacle of a Franco-Austrian conflict. It was an utterly foolish conflict, because although Austria was easily beaten at Magenta and Solferino, the liberation of Italy " from the Alps to the Adriatic " which had been promised was not brought nearer, and the diplomatic consequences were by no means advantageous to France. True, the Liberator obtained Nice and Savoy as the price of his intervention, but he had ruffled Prussia, antagonized Austria, made Russia and England suspicious, and greatly grieved Victor-Emmanuel and the Italian patriots by the unsatisfactory armistice of Villafranca. Even in France Napoléon was treading a perilous path. What was to happen to Rome in the event of Italian liberation ? Was it to become Italian or remain Papal? Were the French Liberals or the French Catholics to be offended? Ultimately Napoléon adopted reforms at home and promised the maintenance of Papal sovereignty, but he pleased nobody in endeavouring to please all parties.

The mistake of Napoléon—a mistake inherent in the *régime*—was that of "endeavouring to cast a mantle of glory over French disunion." He had to pursue prestige, and where Napoléon I failed it was impossible for Napoléon III to succeed. Nevertheless when French intervention might really have been useful he refused it. He washed his hands of the affair of Sleswig-Holstein and allowed the Danes to be dispossessed. The expansion of Prussia may well be said to date from that episode. Consider the dilemma: in aiding Italy against Austria he favoured Prussia; if he placed himself on the side of Austria against Prussia, from which came the growing threat to France, he renounced Italy. He was entangled beyond hope in the commitments of Empire. Bismarck had been clever enough to promise Venetia to Italy in the event of a common war against Austria. When the struggle came the Austrians were defeated at Koniggratz (Sadowa), and ultimately Austria by the Treaty of Prague was excluded from Germany, Venetia was ceded to Italy, and Hanover, Hesse, Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfurt were annexed to Prussia, which became the dominant power in the North German Confederation.

It would be unfair to Napoléon III to make no mention of the economic development of the country under his reign. Behind the glorious façade of empty triumphs dreadful things were preparing, but trade increased and large industrial enterprises were founded. Financial societies which to-day are flourishing were established. Railways were extended; the Suez Canal was cut by Ferdinand de Lesseps—a great piece of engineering by a great engineer who afterwards fell into undeserved obloquy. The merchant marine was increased. Agriculture was favoured. Trade treaties were concluded. Public works of considerable importance were undertaken; and Paris was transformed into a modern city by Baron Haussmann. Against this good work must be put the encouragement of speculation and the scandalous pleasure-making of the Second Empire, the Court setting the example of magnificent fêtes. In the latter years there were many political concessions. But keen-eyed observers were aware that the glittering Empire was in decline, that the rouge on the cheek spoke not of health but of disease. Thiers uttered his memorable warning, "You cannot afford to commit another fault." Fault after fault had indeed been committed. They had been committed because the dominating idea of the Emperor was to consolidate himself by a succession of military triumphs and diplomatic victories in the true Napoléonic tradition. Nothing that is founded on such shifting sand can endure for ever: it is a miracle that the Empire endured so long, for the methods of Napoléon were clumsy and he was blind to the development of new forces in Europe. The Empire still looked solid but it was a hollow construction which would be shattered by any considerable blow.

The Mexican fiasco sadly shook it. It was in 1861 that France, Spain, and England made a naval demonstration off the Mexican coast and entered into negotiations for the resumption of payments to foreign creditors. There was no idea of conquest. Napoléon, with his fatal and irrepressible ambition, formed other designs. He saw the opportunity of a resounding blow which would add to his fame.

England and Spain would have nothing more to do with him, but Napoléon, undaunted, sent an expedition with the purpose of putting a Hapsburg on the throne of Mexico. It was a strange mad choice: what interest had France in the Archduke Maximilian of Austria, brother of the Emperor Francis-Joseph? The search for a bubble reputation was unutterably silly. Into the morass of Mexico men and money were poured without avail, and by the end of 1866 the French army had been enfeebled and Napoléon had lost his popularity. The United States were torn by the Secession War, but when it ended the United States remembered their doctrine of resisting any attempt of a European State to secure a foothold on the American Continent. The struggle had to be abandoned. Maximilian was shot and the French were humiliated in the eyes of the world and Napoléon in the eyes of his countrymen. France had alienated her friends and was becoming an easy prey for the astute Bismarck.

In so far as European diplomacy can be represented as a duel between Napoléon and Bismarck—and such a dramatic presentation has a certain validity—the odds were all on the side of the Prussian statesman. Napoléon was like a gambler who was compelled to make desperate throw after desperate throw. Sooner or later he was bound to be beggared. He had betrayed Italy, irritated the Vatican, offended Russia without accomplishing anything for Poland, incurred the displeasure of England, and allowed Austria to be diminished by a Prussia which was growing in strength from year to year. The great changes which were coming upon Europe were unseen by him. Yet Sadowa was ominous: it rang the death knell for the French Empire as well as for the old Austria. Bismarck was not inclined to push his success against Austria too far: he might have need of her.

The Prussian military conventions with the Southern German States opened the eyes of the French. At last they realized that they had been working for the King of Prussia. Prussia was the coming Power: it was the virtual master of the Germanic States. French security had been compromised; the peril was apparent. It was useless for France to seek compensation in the shape of Rhineland territory. The refusal was peremptory, and Bismarck secretly rejoiced in the suspicion which was fastening itself on France as the disturber of peace. Napoléon turned his attention on Belgium, which he desired to annex. He thought of Luxembourg. Bismarck played with customary skill, completely outwitting the Emperor. He obtained draft proposals from France, temporized, and then, when the Prague Treaty was signed, ignored the French. Thus Napoléon was left empty-handed. His country had expected that he would offer it territory, political triumphs, honour; and he and the French had been duped. He had promised peace but he had provoked war everywhere; and what was worse, war had been profitless. No wonder that Henri Rochefort wrote in *La Lanterne*: "France has 36 million subjects, without counting the subjects of discontent." Napoléon was no longer needed as the representative of authority against insurrection. He was ill and weary. The Opposition was led by Léon Gambetta, and Clemenceau was beginning his career. In the Republican party there were also to be found Jules Ferry, Floquet, and Brisson. Eugène Pelletan wrote in *La Tribune*; Victor Hugo, still in exile, issued *Le Rappel*. Yet it cannot be said that the Opposition was outwardly strong: it was waiting for its opportunity and that opportunity would not come unless some gigantic outward event shattered the fortune of Napoléon. Alternately liberal and repressive, the Emperor tried every device. Emile

Ollivier, whose political evolutions have been described in harsh terms, formed a Ministry at the beginning of 1870. Parliamentary reforms were granted, and the Emperor, faithful to his favourite method, once more made a popular appeal. A plebiscite, as before, gave him an overwhelming majority for the proposed *régime*. Superficially, it might have seemed that the Empire was stronger than ever. Such a conclusion was utterly fallacious. There were many reasons why the appeal to the people yielded this result. But the greatest of all reasons is that of public inertia. The French, politically speaking, have long periods of passivity, but their energy is sudden and unexpected. The occasion to pronounce against Napoléon had not yet arrived. It was shortly to arrive. Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall.

The responsibility for a declaration of war is the heaviest responsibility that a statesman can be called upon to undertake. Ollivier, the Minister of Napoléon, accepted the responsibility for the war with Germany with a light heart. "*Cette responsabilité, nous l'acceptons d'un cœur léger.*" It was an unfortunate word, and only served to stimulate the excited people of Paris to louder cries of "*A Berlin!*" Doubtless Bismarck wanted his war with France, but that France should have gratified his wishes so readily is to the eternal discredit of the Emperor. The facts about the 1870 war must be re-established. One had thought that they were well enough known, but of recent years propaganda has sought to prove the unilateral culpability of Germany, and there has been repeated a thousand times the somewhat misleading statement that France has been repeatedly invaded since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The statement is misleading because it suggests that the invasions were unprovoked, that they did not occur in the course of fighting for which France at least shares the blame. It is important if the Franco-German feud is to be forgotten that there should be a more judicious appreciation of the circumstances surrounding the "repeated invasions." It will hardly be contended by any serious person that the penetration of foreign armies into France in reply to the challenge of Napoléon I, who had overrun the greater part of Europe, can be ranked among French grievances. Without judging the Man of Destiny, it is sufficient to say that he took up the sword and could hardly complain if the sword were taken up against him. Nothing can be more mischievous, not only from the general point of view but from the French point of view, than the recent attempts to represent France as invariably the victim. Nationalists in every country depict their own nation as entirely in the right and other countries as entirely in the wrong. Thus public opinion is manufactured.

Certainly Germany cannot be absolved: she was partly guilty in 1870 as in 1914. The Prussian diplomatists coldly and calculatingly founded the German Empire on the conscious exercise of military might. But the French Government, less able, and the French people, less disciplined, called upon themselves the disaster of 1870. The French diplomatists were badly informed, and the French Emperor was caught in a net of his own weaving. They thought —as the French officials thought in 1923, when they considered it possible to detach the Rhineland provinces from Germany and even believed that Catholic Bavaria could be joined to Austria in opposition to Protestant Prussia—that Southern Germany could be separated from Northern Germany. Bismarck knew better: he knew that if France could be made to appear the aggressor, North and South would rally to the common cause of German independence, and the Confederation be welded in war.

Napoléon III was in reality smashed in Spain as Napoléon I was smashed in Spain. When there was an uprising against Queen Isabella and the Church, there was considerable dispute concerning the kind of Government which should be substituted. A King was sought and the choice fell upon a Hohenzollern. Prince Leopold at first refused, then accepted, and afterwards withdrew. Absorbed by questions of dynasty, considering the strategic disadvantages of having a German King in Spain as well as Germanic rulers on the Northern side, desirous as always of obtaining an indisputable French victory, Napoléon and his Foreign Minister, the Duc de Gramont, demanded an explicit promise from King William of Prussia that the candidature should never be renewed. Since Leopold had already abandoned his candidature such a move seemed superfluous and somewhat arrogant. It was unquestionably dangerous, for public opinion had been worked up to fever heat. An excuse may be found for the *démarche* in the recollection that four years earlier Prince Charles, the brother of Leopold, had been chosen as sovereign by Rumania, and in spite of the interdiction of the Powers had gone in disguise to Bucharest. The French Ambassador Benedetti had an interview with King William which was on the whole amicable, although the Prussian Monarch naturally declined to give any pledge. Napoléon thought proper to intimate his intention of demanding a personal letter from the King, who thereupon declined to see Benedetti again. The King sent a telegram from Ems to his Chancellor relating the circumstances. About this telegram there has been much controversy. Bismarck, with malicious design, published it. He published it in an altered form. His editing of it make it appear more offensive than it was meant to be. But to describe it as a forgery is to go too far. Moltke has defined it as a flourish in answer to a challenge. At any rate it awakened violent Nationalist sentiments in both countries. The French Government, with its "*cœur léger*," instantly declared war. How rapidly events had moved may be judged by two dates: on July 12 Leopold had withdrawn his candidature; on July 19 the French, who had obtained all that was necessary, had taken the final and fatal step. They were led to undeserved misfortune by their fatuous Emperor with his dreams of Imperial power.

It would be difficult to parallel this grotesque blunder. The folly of warfare has never been demonstrated with such staggering force. The causes were frivolous, and on the French side a worse moment could hardly have been selected. The army was totally unprepared. Diplomatically France was in wretched case. She could look for no help from any other country. The ambitions of 1866, when France sought compensation and put her demands in writing, were revealed. It is almost incredible that France could have so under-estimated the strength of the adversary, and over-estimated her own. Marshal Lebœuf, the French War Minister, declared that if the war lasted six months not a gaiter button would be missing. The idea of an invasion of France occurred to no "light-hearted" statesman. Thiers and Gambetta and Grévy were in an insignificant minority in attempting to calm their compatriots. Prussia was regarded as a second-class nation, and the Germanic States were ignored. The invasions of 1814 and 1815 were explicable, but that in a single month the despised Prussia, whose progress had been unheeded, should enter Alsace and Lorraine and shut up the army of Metz under Bazaine was unbelievable. The "League of Neutrals," formed by Lord Granville, refrained from all interference. England, rightly or wrongly, could not contemplate the aggrandizement of France with equanimity, and Italy awaited the hour when she might enter Rome. Austria was well aware of the power of Prussia, and Russia had been too deeply wounded to intervene in favour of France. Every fault had been committed, as Thiers had informed the Emperor. When Marshal MacMahon went to relieve Bazaine he was beaten at Sedan, and 100,000 men, among them the Emperor, were taken prisoners on September 2. This was the end. The seven million votes which the Emperor had obtained a few months before in the national plebiscite were of no avail. Two days later the Republic was proclaimed in Paris.

It is not the purpose of this book to relate the incidents of those days, but it is necessary to understand, if one would rightly survey the forces which are working in France to-day, the conditions in which the Third Republic was established. It is generally agreed by Frenchmen of all political parties that the Constitution has many defects. The Parliamentary system, as we shall see, has not yet succeeded in France and is still on its trial. Governments rapidly succeed each other in a Chamber which is in a perpetual state of flux. While they last they are armed with supreme powers, which they often use to reverse the decisions of their predecessors, and they rarely stay long enough to carry out necessary reforms. There is a recurrent solution of continuity : there is no guiding purpose : and too often the spirit of *après-nous-le-déluge* prevails. With such swift governmental changes it would seem to be desirable that the President of the Republic should have large powers, that he should represent the element of stability. In fact, he is regarded as irresponsible, and the moment he endeavours to impose a personal policy of some consistency he is rudely reminded that the business of a President is to preside—which means that he should be a mere figure-head. One day a drastic revision of the whole system of government, presidential, ministerial, parliamentary, and administrative, will have to be undertaken ; but the politicians who are looked upon with suspicion by the people find that the existing arrangements work satisfactorily enough for them, and, moreover, they are afraid that if the Constitution is touched at all it will be altered in a sense contrary to their interests.

The Conservatives would like to strengthen Presidential powers, but the Liberals, and indeed the bulk of the French people, in normal times dread the emergence of a Dictator. Has not France had too many Dictators and has she not always suffered from them ? The experience of Napoléon III had, it would seem, cured her of the desire for personal authority ; and when MacMahon or Boulanger, or even Clemenceau or Caillaux or Millerand display the smallest hankering after Dictatorship they are promptly broken. Idols are cast down more suddenly than in any other country. France is emotional and readily makes idols, but soon the mass memory, the mass instinct, the mass fear of domination, become alert, and the popular creation is destroyed. This is one of the natural results of the Second Empire. If, on the other hand, it is proposed to make the Constitution more elastic and democratic the same misgivings arise ; it might well be that some dexterous manœuvre would defeat the object of the Liberals. Perhaps it is better, it is argued, to leave matters alone. The paradox of the French Constitution is, however, that it was made by men who had a lingering love for Royalty and who were reactionary. The Constitution was meant to be provisional, but in France there is a saying that it is only the provisional that endures.

When the Republic was founded by the deputies forming themselves into a Government of National Defence, one of its chief preoccupations was to resist the revolutionary movement which was anticipated. It resolved not to allow power to fall in that troubled period into the hands of the Socialists. It was essentially a Bourgeois Directoire. General Trochu, the Governor of Paris, was its president. Jules Favre who conducted fruitless negotiations with Bismarck, Jules Simon, Ernest Picard, and even Thiers desired an early peace, realizing that nothing more could be done, and also realizing that everything might be lost in the *émeutes* which were threatening. It is true that Thiers, who stands out as the most conspicuous, the most experienced, and, except for his brutal repression of the Commune, the wisest figure of the time, sent missions to London, to Venice, to Florence, to St. Petersburg, beseeching intervention, but his hope was merely to save something out of the wreck. Favre at first made a brave show of defiance, affirming that France would not yield a stone of a fortress, an inch of her territory, but he was quickly disillusioned when in his meeting with Bismarck it was made clear to him that Germany meant to take Alsace. It was not enough for the Chancellor that the Empire had collapsed: France, Republican or Imperial, had to pay the price. There could be no honourable compromise. It was necessary to submit. But there was another party which patriotically meant to fight to the bitter end. It was led by Gambetta. He believed that a *levée en masse* could yet retrieve the situation. Gambetta left Paris by balloon and at Tours tried to organize resistance. With the regular army out of action—Bazaine capitulated with 170,000 men on October 27—the volunteers of Gambetta were comparatively helpless. Paris was invested and all attempts to relieve it failed. The winter was rigorous; L'Année Terrible had begun. The insurrection broke out at the end of October, and although it was overcome it was the precursor of the Commune. The bombardment of the starving capital hastened the surrender of January 19, 1871; and the armistice followed nine days later to permit the convocation of a National Assembly.

In the meantime the most significant European event of modern times had taken place: in the Galerie des Glaces at Versailles, William, King of Prussia, was proclaimed German Emperor, and a new and most formidable nation was welded. Bismarck, who had been far-sighted enough not to press Austria in defeat, undoubtedly made a mistake, which was afterwards to recoil on the head of Germany, when he pressed France in defeat and allowed himself to be persuaded to take part of Lorraine as well as Alsace. Such a territorial arrangement could not be final, and France was bound to build up a system of alliances in the expectation that some day Germany would give an opportunity in far less favourable circumstances for herself of a reversal of the Treaty of Frankfurt, which was signed on May 10, 1871. Germany demanded an indemnity of five milliard francs, which was speedily paid. Her troops occupied Paris, marching down the Champs-Élysées. Everything was done to brand the defeat on the forehead of France.

No wonder that the people of Paris rose in revolt. The incompetence of most of their rulers was glaring. The Republicans were divided and went to the polls in scattered formation. In their disarray they gave the victory to the Royalists; and out of 650 deputies, 400 were either Legitimist or Orleanist. The revolution known as the Commune had other causes, but it was in part an advertisement against the making of another Monarchy. The people had suffered greatly and were in desperate mood. They called for personal freedom and the liberty of the Press. They demanded free secular education. The demands had a Socialist tinge: the worker it was affirmed should receive the whole of the profits from his work. The Red Flag was their symbol. The National Guard constituted their army. Napoléonism, as represented by the column in the Place Vendôme, was symbolically as well as literally destroyed, and symbols are more abidingly important than realities. Thiers, with his head-quarters at Versailles, sent troops against the Paris workers, who had proclaimed universal brotherhood. There was bitter fighting, but the Versailles army obtained the mastery after two months of hostilities. The excesses of the Communards were terrible; the reprisals of the Government of Versailles were unspeakable. Thiers must be given credit for much, but he must be given also the discredit of having tens of thousands of insurgents shot and many more arrested, often on the flimsiest evidence. The war councils which supplanted ordinary civil jurisdiction operated for five years. The whole episode is one of the most lamentable pages in French history.

It may be asked why the Constituent Assembly eventually established a Republic at all. It was clearly not Republican in its sentiments. But the by-elections were overwhelmingly Republican in their results and the Royalists were unskilful in their tactics. The two branches of the Bourbon family had forgotten nothing and had learnt nothing. They did not disguise their reactionary ideas. They could not agree upon a single Pretender. At the

Extreme Right were the followers of the Comte de Chambord; at the Right, the followers of the Comte de Paris. Towards the Centre were Parliamentary Orleanists; while the so-called Opposition—as if these groups were not opposed to each other—was composed of a Moderate Left Centre, a Left which was mildly Republican, and an Extreme Left which may be described as Democratic. On the Right were to be found the Clericalists; and throughout the half-century-old Third Republic Clericalism has always been regarded by the Radicals as "the enemy." The Royalists were not in a hurry. They believed that it would be better to leave immediate responsibilities to the Republicans. They did not want to be guilty of mutilation of French territory or of harsh repression. They considered it skilful to encourage a Government of transition. They postponed their action, thinking that the Republic would incur every reproach. The motives of Thiers were mixed, but whether the first President of the Republic was a convinced Republican or not, he believed that for the restoration of France a temporary Republic was needed. "The Republic," he said, "is the Constitution which least divides us"; and above all he aimed at order.

That is why he, with the full support of French provincial opinion, fell on Paris, where the insurrection was concentrated, and crushed the Commune without mercy. The consequences were that in the rest of the country he became personally popular, and that the Republic as such ceased to frighten the Conservatives. He demanded a loyal trial for Republicanism, asserting that it must be Conservative or it would cease to exist. Even Gambetta, with his opportunist spirit, in his profession of faith avowed himself to be on the side of a Conservative Republic. Nevertheless there was still a Royalist majority which had finally set its seal upon the

Comte de Chambord. But this majority could not accept the White Flag. Time passed, and the solution of the problem was still adjourned; and as time passed the Republic, which in a memorable word had been said to be a Republic without Republicans, tended to consolidate itself. The campaign of Gambetta made progress, and the majority melted month by month. The situation became impossible for Thiers, who though an old Royalist restrained all attempts to overthrow the Republic, and though accepting the Republic governed with the Conservatives. He was obliged to resign his position as Chief of the Executive Power towards the end of May, 1872, and a candidate of the Right, Marshal MacMahon, was elected in his stead.

The founding of the Third Republic presents extraordinary paradoxes. MacMahon was by all his associations a Monarchist. The Duc de Broglie, who was chosen as the Chief Minister was also a Monarchist. Everything was prepared for a Restoration, and had the Comte de Chambord not displayed an amazing obstinacy in declining the conditions which were proposed to him it is probable that he would have been made King. When at last in 1875 France was given a Constitution, this Constitution was intended to pave the way for a King who would be less exacting than Chambord. "If we cannot create a Monarchy we will create the nearest thing to it," said the Comte de Paris. The Republicans were reluctant to accept a Constitution from the hands of the Conservatives, with the organization of a Senate which was contrary to democratic doctrine; and the Royalists were reluctant to give their consent to a compromise which might appear as a surrender to Republicanism. It was by one vote only that the Wallon amendment which definitely adopted Republicanism was passed. One vote—that of the obscure deputy whose name will always be attached to the amendment—is the foundation on which the Third Republic is built. There have been many vicissitudes, and occasionally the Republic has been in peril. It has survived many shocks. It has been moulded by the passing of years. But one vote determined the Constitution of France and the course which French history should take. This is one of the most important facts of the longest-lived Constitution in France since the Great Revolution. The Constitution when put together in February, 1875, was the fifteenth law of the kind the country had known since Louis XVI. It was slightly modified in July, 1879, and in August, 1884; but, broadly speaking, it has endured unchanged, and has been interpreted very differently from the sense which was intended by most of the men who voted it.

The Royalists still hoped that it was sufficiently vague and non-committal to be revised at a later date; the Republicans had at least introduced the word which was hateful to their opponents, and had set up institutions which have endured. If one regards the sequence of events since 1875 one is driven to the conclusion that in spite of oscillations the drift has been Leftwards. France has passed through a long period of constant upheavals from the days of the Terror, but there is nevertheless a deep respect for whatever is established and only when things become impossible is the *fait accompli* seriously challenged.

The Constitutional Laws—for in reality there were three acts which, put together, form the Constitution—are short and are silent on a number of subjects. It was not desirable to complete them when they were framed, and there has always been the utmost reluctance to stir up controversy by overhauling and strengthening them. For better or for worse they must, it seemed, be left alone; but by long practice they have been adapted to the needs of the Republic. The Executive Power is confided to a supreme magistrate, the President of the Republic; and the Legislative Power to two assemblies, a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate. The President governs with his Ministers, who are representatives of the Executive Power in Parliament, and of Parliament to the President. The Ministers must resign if they cannot govern with the consent of the elected bodies. It was laid down that the Chambers might separately declare the need of modification of the 1875 laws, and should both Houses pass such resolutions they might unite as a National Assembly at Versailles to revise them. This obviously left the door open to drastic changes, and in 1884 Jules Ferry took great pains to close it. It was decided on August 14 of that year that the Republican form of government cannot be called in question by either House. This means that a Monarchial system can only be substituted by way of Revolution.

Theoretically a retiring President may again be nominated, but in practice Jules Grévy alone has been twice elected, and he resigned before he had completed his second term of office. Though there is nothing to prevent a President remaining at the Élysée for several septennates, French feeling would be resolutely opposed to the renewal of the powers of any man. There is indeed a fair chance that the President will not fulfil his mandate. Four Presidents have resigned, and, if one counts Thiers, who was in office before the Constitution was adopted, five: Thiers, MacMahon, Grévy, Casimir-Périer, and Millerand—the list of broken Presidents in the Third Republic is impressive. In addition, death cut short the Presidential careers of Carnot, Félix Faure, and Paul Deschanel. The French Presidents have been unfortunate. Until we reach Emile Loubet, who was elected in 1899, the security of tenure of the Chief of State was hardly established. With Loubet, however, began a period of Presidential stability. His successor, Armand Fallières, and Raymond Poincaré who followed Fallières, served the full seven years. Misfortune befell Deschanel and Millerand after the war of 1914–1918. The present holder of office, Gaston Doumergue, appears to have the conception of his functions, which commends itself to the French people.

The truth is that if the President possesses personal initiative he will encounter insuperable difficulties unless he tempers his initiative with consummate tact. Poincaré chafed under the helplessness of his position at the most critical moments, and was compelled to submit to the will of strong-minded Ministers such as Clemenceau, whom he was obliged to call to office. The true type of French President is perhaps Fallières. The Élysée has been picturesquely but fittingly described as a prison. The Chief of the State is not directly responsible to the country; if he were allowed to appeal to the country at his own time and in a manner chosen by himself he might easily become a Dictator. On the other hand, it is not thought wise to make the President responsible to Parliament. That was the mistake of Thiers, who may properly be said to have combined the rôles of President and Prime Minister. The President must be a somewhat lofty and remote figure; there is a convention that he shall be not discussed at the Parliamentary tribune. The French President is nothing like the American President, who has effective power; he is more like the British King, who transfers responsibility to Ministers. The business of a President, say the French, is merely to keep the scales level, to assure fair play, to keep out of party controversy, to pronounce speeches which, though high-sounding, contain nothing but platitudes. The President presides—but he does not govern.

The system has been compared with that of Constitutional Monarchy, and as Constitutional Monarchy works well in other countries it may be asked why it does not work well in France. The reason is that with a perfectly helpless President, France has not the true Parliamentary tradition. Parliament is undisciplined: it boils up on the slightest provocation. It upsets Ministers, is without true party organization, and is a welter of personal ambitions. The multiplicity of groups permits all kinds of combinations. If the political centre of gravity is in the Ministry, it shifts perpetually. Rarely does a Prime Minister look for a long life. Even in the most favourable circumstances, when he seems to have a substantial majority he knows that his majority will vanish mysteriously at an early date. I have myself after a prolonged experience of the French Parliament come to regard huge majorities as the certain precursor of a Ministerial crisis. When a Président du Conseil obtains a quasi-unanimity of votes then is the moment to beware. The tremendous weight of that quasi-unanimity is likely to turn over on him and crush him. It is the first part of an operation in two movements: the first movement is, as it were, to achieve unity, to prepare an irresistible weapon; the second is to employ it against the unfortunate Ministry. Only three or four men have been able during the lifetime of the Third Republic to master the Assembly for any considerable time. Occasionally a Combes, a Waldeck-Rousseau, a Clemenceau, may impose themselves; but for the most part Ministers come and go with astonishing rapidity. It is, I suppose, natural that they should make the most of their situation while it lasts. It is obvious that they cannot give the same undivided attention to the permanent public interest as they could give were they assured of a reasonable span of power.

Sometimes a Minister appears, disappears, and reappears with extraordinary regularity. A typical case is that of M. Briand, who has been ten times Prime Minister, and who always falls in such a manner—to the Right or to the Left—as to assure his return. When once a man enters the ranks of the *ministrables* he is sure of forming part of this or that combination, although the succeeding combinations may have totally different complexions. Now and again a Minister will be recognized as particularly useful in a special post and will be retained under various chiefs at the head of his department. One may instance the case of M. Le Trocquer, who won a reputation as the Minister of Public Works and stayed in spite of the chances and changes of ministerial life in his expert job for four years. A better example is that of M. Delcassé who was left unmolested as Foreign Minister for seven years. But such examples are rare. Generally the departments lose their director before the director has learnt his business, and there is no guarantee that the new-comer will not reverse the decisions of his predecessor. Notably this occurred in education: one Minister would make Latin and Greek compulsory; another Minister would make them optional; a third would restore them fully to the curriculum. Plans which are prepared are seldom executed. With such perpetual upheavals it is not surprising that there is less progress made than is desirable if France is to retain her place among the nations. Sometimes a law will be rushed through Parliament and with the fall of the Ministry will become a dead letter. More often a project of unquestionable utility will remain in the cartons and never get on the statue-book.

The Parliamentary system in France does not impress the observer as efficient. Perhaps nowhere is it efficient. Distinguished critics have ventured the opinion that Parliament as at present constituted is the least worthy part of any community. It is a drag on Democracy rather than a democratic institution. Certainly one should not judge the French people by their Parliament. It is not Parliament which leads the way. The advance of civilization is due to non-Parliamentary organizations: it may be that the University, the Chambers of Commerce, the Academy, associations of all kinds, and individual writers, thinkers, artists, and indeed workers in every sphere, are of far more importance than the band of politicians who sit at the Palais-Bourbon. It may be that far too much attention is directed upon the official world. The deputies do not strike one as in the mass the best elements of France. The debates are conducted far too often in a veritable pandemonium; the banging of desk lids, the exchange of angry epithets, and shameful fisticuffs, have too often in recent years marred the serenity of the deliberations, and the President of the Chamber has a strenuous task in the keeping of relative order. Stormy scenes have become almost the rule, and supporters of Parliamentary institutions will find much to deplore in the exhibitions which are frequently given.

What is the remedy? It would be difficult to indicate it, but Democracy as we understand it may have to find fresh channels of expression. It is impossible to think of a reversion in France to the days of the Second Empire, when the Parliamentary system was stifled: but there have yet to be established satisfactory Parliamentary traditions and to be adopted methods which will make for the good of the community. As we have already noted, several times the manner of election has been altered. The uninominal manner has been condemned, and rightly condemned, as producing offensive " stagnant pools." A candidate in a single-member constituency will promise the electors anything they demand. He will use his influence with the central authorities—and that influence is often considerable—in the interest of the locality. There is bound to spring up a sort of official bribery, and bargains between the deputy and the Government which is always seeking support are rendered possible. The temptation is increased by the excessive centralization of government in France. In every *département* there is a Prefect and in every *arrondissement* there is an under-Prefect, and these men are Government nominees with large executive powers, which are often used to political ends. They can be recalled at any time at the pleasure of the Government. It has been said with much truth that the question of Prefects is the chief question which the Government has to handle, but it is regrettable that attention should be thus distracted from serious questions. The Government may choose the officials who are in most sympathy with it. Thus there is everywhere intrigue and pressure. In order to destroy some of the evils of the single-member constituency the French have tried the *scrutin de liste*. The *scrutin de liste* purports to be a species of proportional representation. Large areas are taken for which there may be half a dozen representatives. Groups which have very little in common may in accordance with local exigencies form unholy alliances and agree to " divide the spoils." Thus Socialists, who in theory at least are Revolutionary, may join hands with the Radicals, who are essentially Bourgeois. Doctrines are forgotten and the public weal is disregarded. Everything is done to capture the largest number of votes. Sometimes there is a Bloc National composed of Radicals and Conservatives against the Socialists. Sometimes there is a Bloc des Gauches, which is composed of Radicals and Socialists against the Centre and the Right. In the Chamber the component parts of the *bloc* may split asunder and a Ministry which began as a Ministry of the Left may be metamorphosed into a Ministry of the Centre or may even evolve to the Right. If the *bloc* holds together it is at the price of eternal compromise. The tendency is to mark time or engage in futile demagogic agitations. Very little can thus be accomplished. It is a mistake to suppose that there are clear-cut boundaries on the benches of the Chamber. If from time to time it would seem that there are roughly two parties in Parliament with totally different conceptions, the process of merging the groups, of confusing the issues, of blurring the divisions, will not be long delayed. The French Radicals, for example, share the responsibility of the war, and the after-war events, such as the making of the Versailles Treaty and the occupation of the Ruhr, with the deputies who sit further to the Right; and the Socialists entered the War Ministries. In this way there is always a widespresd responsibility, or rather a shrinking from responsibility, and although for the sake of political expediency a party or a group may dissociate itself from other parties and groups, its natural impulse is to play on both sides. It may be doubted whether the Parliamentary system has developed on the right lines. But, indeed, how could it develop on the right lines, when, as we have seen, the Constitution was a haphazard affair, never clearly thought out, intended by both Royalists and Republicans as a provisional compromise? It betrays its origins. In its working it resembles neither the British Parliamentary Monarchy nor the American Plebiscitary Presidency. There is no true tradition, and parties in opposition do not respect the party in power, as in the Anglo-Saxon countries. They are perpetually trying to trip each other up, and only the gravest emergency will bring about unity. I think, too, that England is protected by her remarkable Civil Service—Permanent Officials who are efficient, disinterested, high-minded, and who in the last resort carry on the real administration of England; while the United States are protected by a Press, which may be criticized as sensational, but which at any rate is utterly fearless, is not intimidated by libel laws, and will quickly uncover any scandal. In France it would be hard to find a solid *point d'appui*: it is not in the helpless Presidency, it is not in the short-lived Ministries, it is not in the traditionless Parliament, it is not in the Civil Service, it is not in the Press. That one vote of an obscure deputy, in the conflict and confusion of parties, with the Imperial downfall and the National defeat still rankling, was perhaps not a sufficient basis on which to build the Third Republic.

WORKS TO BE CONSULTED

Here is a short selection: Fyffe: *History of Modern Europe*; Lebon: *Modern France*; Philipps: *Modern Europe*; *Cambridge Modern History*; Forbes: *Napoleon the Third*; Headlam: *Bismarck*; Robinson and Beard's writings; G. de la Batut and George Friedman's *History of the French People*; and some of Gabriel Hanotaux' volumes on this epoch.

CHAPTER II

REPUBLICAN THOUGHT

Metaphysics—Science and Invention—Education—Literature—Art—Architecture—Music

To trace the connection between thought and action is a fascinating but baffling pursuit. It is dangerous to try to synchronize the reign of a particular philosophy or of a particular literature or generally of a prevailing cast of mind with the development of national policy. How far the ideology of nations is shaped by events and how far the events are shaped by the national ideology are matters not easy to determine. There is rarely any real unity in thinking. Yet in the pre-Revolutionary thinking, while there was scepticism and destructive criticism, one feels justified in asserting that there chiefly emerged warm, vague doctrines, constituting a sort of Gospel of Humanity, giving to the French people their motto of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. So I believe that, in spite of Comte and Taine, in spite of Positivism and critical analysis and Naturalism, the Third Republic has on the whole been definitely marked by the continuation of the Romantic movement in the philosophical domain. It is not true of France that she became materialistic. The spiritual interpretation of the Universe, the mystic belief in such abstractions as Justice and Progress (and capital letters generally) have undergone vicissitudes and variations and vigorous counter-attacks in a country which has neither a State Philosophy nor a State Religion ; but Renouvier undoubtedly struck the key-note to which most of the philosophers of the Third Republic attuned their teaching. There is hardly an intellectual worker in France, whatever his " system," who has not in one manner or another insisted on "vital impulses," transcending physical causes. Perfectibility is postulated as a goal to which we move. The aim of man, said Renouvier, is the perfection of his nature; and Bergson wrote, "Mankind is one countless host galloping through space and time in an impelling charge which can break down every resistance and overcome many obstacles including death itself." Renan attributed a "soul" to the nation; and Pasteur made many references to the "infinite eternal source of greatness, justice, and liberty." These may not be strictly philosophical dicta, but they represent the outlook of the accepted thinkers of the nation and are typical of the French mind which, with all its precision, its objectivity when objectivity is needed, is prone to indulge in flights which are anything but Voltairean. Indeed, one may declare the French to be particularly subject to illusions, with the result that in their national life they often experience bitter disillusionment.

At no time did the professorial philosophers separate themselves from politics. They were aware of the implications of their doctrines. Until the foundation of the Republic, Philosophy had been discouraged by the Church and by the Government. The Empire was conciliatory towards Theology. The schools were controlled by the Clergy. Napoléon III for a time forbade the teaching of Philosophy, making an exception only for formal Logic. Afterwards such studies were stimulated and became, with the founding of many chairs and the publication of five or six admirable manuals, one of the most important branches of learning. The teachers were not disposed to follow a set pedagogic course: they attained remarkable freedom. Commonplace in their conceptions, they often displayed great originality in expression. They forgot their quarrel with ecclesiastical despotism and enlarged their scope to embrace ethics, psychology, sociology, mathematics, history, and indeed all contemporary activities in a system which is fundamentally "spiritualist." I think that the most characteristic feature of modern France is this amazing renewal of metaphysical speculation, which enters every sphere and profoundly influences the thought and the behaviour of the French people. Philosophy is now the most popular subject in the French schools, and the results can be traced in all writing and action. There is a surprisingly widespread love of "general ideas" which differentiates the French from the Anglo-Saxons, and accounts for very much in their national life.

Although eclecticism is the mark of the French mind, involving contradictions, the general drift is obvious. French philosophy does not, like German philosophy, love to shut itself up in rigid systems. At all periods when it has been free it has found a large place for intuition, and has preserved its antagonism towards dogma, whether that dogma be scholastic, ecclesiastical, moral, sentimental, or scientific. If it has loved clarity, orderliness, and what Descartes called *le bon sens*, it has been afraid of fetters. Pascal himself was aware that human opinions depend on chance, that laws are conventional, that beliefs are matters of habit and temperament; and it would not be difficult to discover in most of the men who have shaped the French mind a persistent mysticism. Yet it was in the days of the Third Republic that this mysticism was most deliberate; the metaphysics which were evolved answered a new national need. To me, in spite of the parrot-like repetition that Voltaire represents the French spirit, the brilliant unbeliever in a brilliant Court, who had no faith in Humanity or in Providence, is the negation of the Revolution and the antithesis of the Republican Radical. Men are often misled by superficial resemblances. Voltaire in his very gibes at the Ancien Régime stood for the Ancien Régime which was scintillating to ruin.

In recent years Boutroux and Bergson have particularly proclaimed individual freedom, have insisted on the " contingency " of natural laws, have pointed out the value of swift assumptions, immediate perceptions. Even the most distinguished mathematician of the Third Republic, Henri Poincaré, was brought to share their views, and in researches which would seem to admit only of careful step-by-step procedure indulged with dazzling effect in brilliant guesses. " Thought is but a flash of lightning in the depth of a long night," wrote Poincaré, " but that flash is everything."

It was held that physical theories do not amount to explanations and so-called laws are merely symbolical relations; they are neither true nor false; they are approximations; they are provisional. In the modern world in which dogmatic materialism has made such progress France has been refractory. It is only necessary to quote one of the best-known passages of Bergson to make it clear how absolutism is deprecated, and how arrogant pride in human reason, which is erroneously attributed to the French, is repudiated. " We call," he says, " intuition that intellectual sympathy by which we place ourselves inside an object and feel what is unique and therefore unutterable in it. . . . That there is a link between consciousness and the brain is not to be denied, just as there is a link between an article of clothing and the peg on which it hangs. Shall we therefore state that the shape of the peg determines the shape of the coat ? " I cannot agree with those who hold Bergson to be " unfrench." On the contrary we have had fifty years of French idealism; and French philosophy both before and after Bergson is largely Bergsonian. The French are on the whole subjective; their scientists may be keen observers and may be objective enough, but their philosophers are introspective.

Victor Cousin and his disciples in the nineteenth century tried to reconcile opposite doctrines, finding the "soul of truth" in each of them and indulging in a spiritualistic verbalism. There were, it is true, violent oscillations: Comte endeavoured to re-establish dogmatism and to become the Pope of Reason. One must not minimize the influence of Comte, who was comprehensive, his religion of mankind concerning itself with all human activities. But these fluctuations of thought, these attempts to make a science of philosophy, were not enduring. Comte himself displayed an exalted mysticism towards the end of his life. Littré followed on the lines of Comte and was rewarded by the new *régime* for his encyclopædic labours: he was made a member of the Académie Française and a Life-Senator. Littré was cold and conscientious but he was not unmindful of the pitfalls of empiricism.

The idealism of the eclectics swiftly asserted itself, and with Renouvier, Ravaisson, Lachelier, swelled into full current. How should one classify Renan? Certainly not as materialist. He is erudite and sentimental. He almost asserts that æsthetics are the measure of truth. In short, he is essentially with all his knowledge an artist. He doubts the future of science and finds "a spiritual purpose to which all things tend." In the dying days of the Empire Hippolyte Taine was teaching the determinism of history, and was to continue for another generation, an *esprit fort*. One is alive to the danger of simplifying movements of thought, for exceptions appear and awkward dates arise, but it seems to me impossible to doubt that the transition from the Second Empire to the Third Republic turned the stream, and that we must place about 1870 a livelier feeling in favour of spiritualistic explanations. It is natural enough that the men of the older generation whose minds had been formed should pursue the path they had already set for themselves. But most of the men of the older generation were obliged to modify their views; and more and more was the tendency away from rationalism.

Renouvier for twenty years directed the review *La Critique Philosophique.* Whatever may now be thought of him, he is a most representative figure. He stands for neo-Kantism and has been called the French Kant. He taught that the universe possesses initiative. It has a conscious and creating will. "The aim of man is the perfection of his nature. . . . We know reality in ourselves. . . . The object is in the subject." Ravaisson, who was a high official in the University, carried the French in the same direction, and although much of his work was written before the Franco-Prussian war it was after the war that it found its opportunity of expansion. There was need for a fresh orientation: something like a religion was evolved which was, if the paradox be admitted, Republican and Laic. Jules Lachelier was also anti-materialist. In December, 1871, he published his *Du Fondement de l'Induction,* and this powerful work, coming immediately after the war, constitutes a landmark. Professor René Lote has thus described his doctrine: "He believes in something superior which resides in the consciousness: spiritual liberty. It resides in the active consciousness, acting through intelligence, and not merely by moral will. The intelligence by successive stages, by degrees of reflection, attains to the conception or, still better, the immediate perception, of liberty. That liberty—the supreme power—is reached in three steps: there is first the consciousness of the world in one's own thought; there is, second, consciousness of the thought itself; and there is, third, consciousness of one's consciousness in order to direct oneself freely towards the Good." It will be seen that he is not far from treating the external world as an illusion belonging to us for the purpose of realizing the moral perfection conceived by our intelligence. "The world is a thought that does not think itself, and hangs on a thought that does." His lectures delivered to those who afterwards themselves became professors had an enormous influence. Alfred Fouillée with his *idées-forces* has deservedly become famous. Ideas are not, according to him, the reflection of events or the plaything of material facts, but have an active rôle and are a force of nature. To Fouillée at the École Normale succeeded Boutroux in 1877; Boutroux afterwards succeeded Paul Janet as Professor of Modern Philosophy at the Sorbonne. It is only recently that he died, and throughout his long career he helped to direct his contemporaries. The expression which he coined—"*Contingence des lois de la nature*"—sufficiently suggests the compromise which he effected between a rigorous determinism and a complete freedom. He had taken with remarkable skill precisely the attitude which was acceptable to both parties in the battle between science and metaphysics. The origin of things remains inexplicable, and the possibility of other causes having other consequences, or of the same causes producing different results, is indicated. If it is objected that the world must be accepted as it is, it may be replied that the world as it is has not been discovered by science and that its supposed laws are only convenient inventions. His criticism of science remains irrefutable but must not be confounded with a condemnation of scientific research. It is merely the affirmation of an intellectual curiosity which refuses to be satisfied, which declines to accept stereotyped knowledge, which is not willing to admit finality. It is the unmistakable sign of a living interest in living things. As for Bergson, he is subtle and unseizable, but that his writings are another challenge to materialism cannot be doubted. Bergson put the tombstone on French materialism. It is in the *vie intérieure* that he finds his inspiration. His great hypothesis is the *élan vital.* Sentiment, desire, the urge of the will, are not less than scientific knowledge or abstract reason; and intelligence is not so much comprehension as life itself, which is in direct contact with reality. Everything is constantly changing; mechanism has no place in Bergson's system. Each successive state of evolution, which is a new creation, is nevertheless a synthesis of all the past. This ceaseless movement has been called mobilism. We here reach the apex of a mystical liberty, a spiritualist philosophy, but from this high peak set out the various practitioners of occultism, of esoteric sciences, who abound in France, and who have lost themselves in magical mists where it is unnecessary for us to follow them. Bergsonism can be traced in every department of French intelligence—in literature, in art, in knowledge; and is the fine flower of modern French culture.

To compile a list of those who have attained some distinction in later years would be a tedious and unthankful task, but one cannot overlook men like Lévy-Bruhl, Séailles, Auguste Sabatier, and among the psychologists Théodule Ribot, who is a veritable *chef d'école.* The brilliant expositions of Julien Benda, in more popular vein, are to be commended. Jacques Chevalier has written much and always suggestively. Ernest Seillière has given a philosophic basis to Imperialism. René Gillouin and Leroy are admirable propagandists. Frédéric Rauh, Victor Basch, Henri Marion, Ferdinand Buisson, are moralists of distinction. Georges Sorel, with all his violence, is an inspiring sociologist; and although the Comte de Gobineau (who died in 1882), with his theory of the inequality of races, is somewhat "demoded," he has furnished much matter for inquiry. Georges Renard and Charles Gide are sociologists who become socialists rather than sociologists, pleading for solidarity and co-operation. Gustave Le Bon approaches philosophy from the biological side. Gabriel Tarde studies the relations of the individual to society. Izoulet would have the masses respect the élite; while Durkheim believes that the élite has the duty of accepting the opinions of the masses. Certain writers, such as Félix Le Dantec, endeavour to defend science against the attacks which have been directed upon it. Broadly, we may declare that modern French thought accepts ideas as forces which have a practical value, and whether the prevailing idealism is illusion or not it must profoundly modify human life. Often it would seem that this is not a philosophy but a faith, though it is vividly conscious of itself, making pragmatic use of science and sentiment.

In mathematics France has always held an honourable place. Such names as Fermat, Galois, Lagrange, and again Descartes and Pascal, will be readily recalled. Monge, Lalande, Ampère, Navier, Legendre, Laplace, d'Alembert and many others are exponents of the purer sciences. Yet particularly during the Third Republic has the progress of mathematics been most extensive and varied. The work of Picard, Bertrand, Hermite, Jordan, Darboux, Laguerre, Tannery, Halphen, Appell, Painlevé, Borel (the two last-mentioned professors lately occupied

Ministerial posts in a Government which was largely drawn from and supported by the University), though known chiefly to specialists, is substantial and illuminating. Henri Poincaré, who passed away in 1912, is famous throughout the world but has nevertheless received inadequate attention. It would carry us too far into technicalities to describe their contributions to mathematics. In biology also the world owes much to France during the nineteenth century. Lamarck—the first observer to propound the theory of evolution as it is understood to-day—Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, and Georges Cuvier were great continuators of Buffon and Lavoisier. Milne-Edwards demonstrated the tendency to variation, and Naudin discovered laws of heredity, afterwards known as Mendelism. To-day Le Dantec may be regarded as the leader of neo-Lamarckism. Félix Dujardin gave the name of *sarcode* (protoplasm) to the substance of which life is made and is a true precursor. In palæontology, Bernard Palissy led the way; and this is a science of French creation. Gaudry in 1878 stated the laws of palæobiology, and about the same time Brongniard drew up a classification of fossils. Nobody with the smallest interest in physiology can neglect the capital work of Claude Bernard, and in our generation those of Paul Bert, Dastre, Charles Richet, and Carrel, who preserved and transplanted living tissues. It is within comparatively recent days that the cellular theory, the rules of physiological experimentation, the germ theory, and the theory of evolution, have been laid down and French scientists have been among the keenest workers. In histology, which has been chiefly developed in Germany, France can put forward Louis Ranvier. In experimental embryology we must note Chabry who died prematurely in 1893. Experimental parthenogenesis has been particularly enriched by Bataillon and by Yves Delage.

Emile Maupas made suggestive studies of the reproduction of infusoria. In botany France at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth made great progress. Van Tieghem (1839–1914) has given us an excellent classification of plants and has made important discoveries in plant physiology and in palæobotany. In popularizing astronomy Camille Flammarion and the Abbé Moreux are excellent, and there are many serious investigators. Noël Bernard made some remarkable studies in respect of the symbiotic life of orchids. Henri Fabre, who died in 1915, delightfully described insect life and has inspired younger entomologists. It is possible to doubt the efficacy of developments in medicine and surgery, but one is obliged to observe that it is in this field that France has indisputably taken a foremost rank. Louis Pasteur is held to be the most fruitful worker in bacteriology. There are many monuments to him, but his principal monument is the Pasteur Institute. When he died in 1895 he was succeeded by Pierre Roux, who twenty years ago was awarded the Osiris Prize for his discovery and use of serums. It was in the Pasteur Institute that Mechnikoff and Marmorek conducted their investigations, although they are of Russian and Austrian nationality. André Chantemesse, the sanitary authority, was also associated with the Institute. Doctor Yersin began his career there. Doctor Doyen is famous for his researches in bacteriology, and along the same lines Doctor Calmette pursues his researches. Laveran, Gustave Martin, Professor Vallée, are among those who cannot be neglected. Neurology owes much to Charcot; sero-diagnosis was discovered by Widal, and asepsy was recommended by Terrillon in 1892. It is clear from this summary enumeration that the new France is as active in medical science as the France which invented and applied iodine (Courtois in 1811), chloroform (Soubeiran in 1831), quinine (Pelletier and Caventou in 1820), the method of auscultation (Laënnec in 1822), and opotherapy (Brown-Sequard in 1856). It should be added that electrotherapy was applied by d'Arsonval, and that Richet and Héricourt elucidated serotherapy, which was originated by Raynaud. In surgery P. Reclus, Doyen, Ollier, Labbé, and Pinard must not be overlooked.

Marcellin Berthelot attained a rare eminence in chemistry, and the services that he rendered to the industrial arts are immense. When France was defeated he turned his attention to explosives, and his discoveries have revolutionized modern warfare. He founded thermochemistry. Pierre Curie, in collaboration with Madame Curie, gave the world polonium and radium, and his researches into radio-activity have had a profound effect on our notions of energy and the composition of the elements. Pierre Weiss—now Professor at Strasbourg—made valuable inquiries into the mysteries of the atom. The magnetic properties of bodies, the application of the X-rays and cognate subjects have of late years deeply engaged the attention of French physicists. It is since 1870 that there has been this renewal of scientific curiosity which had been largely lost under the Second Empire.

A new impetus has been given to archæology, and the descendants of Champollion have in Egypt, in Morocco, in North Africa generally, in the Near East, and farther afield, made interesting discoveries. Chinese studies which were begun in the early eighteenth century have been continued and have a peculiar fascination for the French. It is supposed that the French are not great travellers, but in fact it was Jacques Cartier who in 1535 discovered Canada and Cavelier de la Salle who first explored Louisiania, while the first white man to look upon Niagara Falls was Hennequin. The past fifty years have been marked by unceasing exploration. One may recall the exploit of Capitaine Trivier, who crossed Africa in 1889, and of Bourg de Bozas, who went through Ethiopia in the first years of the new century. The valleys of the Congo and the Nile were explored in the 'nineties. Asia was crossed on a number of occasions. Cotteau went from Russia to Japan in 1881; and Siberia, Thibet, and other countries were visited by Martin in the 'eighties and 'nineties. Bonvallot and Prince Henri d'Orléans went to Tonkin, and one of the earliest voyagers to Indo-China and Japan was Marcel Monnier. Arabia attracted several Frenchmen, including Gervais, Courtellemont, who reached Mecca as a pilgrim, and Charles Huber. There were South American expeditions in the first and second decades of the new *régime*, while the Arctic and Antarctic coasts were reconnoitred by the Duc d'Orléans and Doctor Charcot and others. One of the greatest geographers of all times is Elisée Reclus, whose volumes were published from 1875 onwards. In oceanography there has been much patient research. It is impossible to pretend to any comprehensiveness, but enough has been said to show how eager has been the French spirit under the Republic.

To the leading inventions of modern times France has contributed a fair share. The Marquis de Dion was one of the earliest constructors of automobiles and the motor-car industry has been greatly encouraged in France from the first, just as from the beginning the French adopted the bicycle, perfected it, and made it the instrument of one of their chief national sports. An electric locomotive was built by Desprez in 1882. The first practical submarines were constructed in France in the 'eighties.

From the days of the Montgolfiers, France has prided herself on her supremacy in the air. Her record is impressive. Gambetta's spectacular journey from Paris in a balloon seems to have produced a new appreciation of the possibilities of air travel, and there were within the next few years many experiments, which resulted in the adoption of electric motors. Tissandier, Renard, Kreps, preceded Santos-Dumont in controlled flight, and the Lebaudy Brothers, Deutsch de la Meurthe, Clément, and a number of others improved the dirigible until a fair speed could be obtained. The first rigid dirigible was that of Spies. But it is in the heavier-than-air machines that the French have truly been pioneers. Penaud, between 1872 and 1877, invented a stabiliser and thought out all the problems of flying. He took out a patent for an aeroplane as long ago as 1876 with planes, rudders, twin propellers, and motor. A year or two later compressed air was applied by Tatin to the aeroplane. It was not, however, until twenty years later that real results were attained, and even then it required much work and the passage of another ten years before Santos-Dumont, the Wright Brothers, and Farman made each in their own manner authentic air journeys in France, while Blériot crossed the Channel in 1909. The progress that has since been made is fresh in everybody's mind.

In the same way Republican France can claim credit for the development of photography, and especially of the cinema. Daguerre and Niepce have been succeeded by Demény and the Lumière Brothers. Belin invented more recently a method of telegraphing photographs and handwriting, and the process has been taken over by the State. Lippman showed the possibility of colour photography. In electricity Becquerel with his permanent batteries, Lesage with his electric telephone, Baudot with his electric telegraph, are among the notable figures; while the coherer of Branly was several years earlier than Marconi's wireless apparatus.

The wireless telephone is also claimed as the invention of Colin and Jeance. Emile and Pierre Martin industrialized and improved the Bessemer process of steel making, and in the Creusot factories the investigations of Osmond and later of Charpy resulted in important improvements. Prache, Manhes, and David worked in other branches of metallurgy.

In physics and chemistry the French have indeed demonstrated their exceptional qualities, and a long list could be drawn up of the new bodies and processes which they have discovered. The engineering feats accomplished by the French since 1870 are numerous. The Suez Canal was finished just before the overthrow of Napoléon III, and the Panama Canal—which unfortunately gave rise to scandals in which the great Ferdinand de Lesseps was himself involved—was immediately afterwards designed and begun. Tunnels under the Mont Cenis, under the Saint-Gothard, and under the Simplon were pierced. The Eiffel Tower, one of the highest structures in the world, now used as a powerful wireless station, and such lighthouses as that of Penmarch with a visibility of 145 miles, were built.

The Republic has freed education from the fetters which were placed upon it. It is perhaps in this domain that we should look for the greatest and most permanent changes. There is a sense in which Jules Ferry may be regarded as the most constructive statesman of the Third Republic. He helped to establish primary education on a triple foundation; it is compulsory, gratuitous, and non-religious. Unfortunately, the fight in France for education has in large measure been a fight against the Religious Congregations. Doubtless the Jesuits in other days did much to keep the torch of knowledge burning, but they became associated with a class and with a policy. The Revolution swept away the Teaching

Orders and Condorcet drafted an admirable plan of State-controlled education.

The first Napoléon established the system which to a large extent exists to-day, but the Restoration subjected the University to the preponderant influence of the Clergy. Primary education was officially placed in the hands of the Bishops. There have been many bitter struggles, which have, it would seem, finally driven the priests from the school. The ecclesiastical authorities were foolishly anti-Republican. They showed it in every possible manner. Gambetta denounced them as "the enemy." In the schools the Church was training children to believe (as Ernest Vizetelli says) that the Republic was odious in the eyes of God, who had commanded obedience to Kings and Princes. When Jules Ferry became Education Minister under the Premiership of de Freycinet, and afterwards when he was himself Prime Minister, he endeavoured to put down Clerical intrigues. The ecclesiastics were excluded from the Educational Councils and the right of conferring degrees was given to the State Faculties alone. Moreover, he sought to prohibit members of unauthorized Religious Associations from directing any public or private school. There was opposition in the Senate and many of the politicians of the time, including Clemenceau, blamed Ferry for not taking more drastic measures. He and his followers were called Opportunists, while those who refused all compromise were given the name of Radicals. But Ferry probably went as far as was possible at the time. His ejection of the Jesuits and other recalcitrant communities amid tumultuous scenes provoked the greatest commotion in the country. Preachers declared that the reign of Antichrist had come and true believers were urged to overthrow the wicked atheistical Republic. The echoes of this war between Church and State are still to be heard, though one had thought that they belonged to a past generation. It was not without difficulty that education was laicized.

In one of his circulars Jules Ferry wrote to the teachers: "You are the auxiliaries of and the substitute for the father. Speak to the child then as you would like your own to be spoken to—with vigour and authority whenever an incontestible truth is in question, or a precept of public morals, but with the greatest reserve as soon as you touch upon religious sentiments, of which you are not the judge. If at times you should be embarrassed to know to what point you may go in your moral instruction here is a practical rule which you may adopt: when you are about to give a precept to your pupils, ask yourself whether there exists to your knowledge a single good man who could be hurt by what you propose to say. If so, refrain from saying it. Ask yourself if one father, present in your class and listening to you, would refuse you his assent. If so, refrain from saying it. If not, speak out boldly, for then what you say to the child will come not from your own wisdom but from the wisdom of the human race. It is one of those universal ideas which after many centuries of civilization have become part of the heritage of humanity. However narrow such a circle of action may seem to be, make it a point of honour not to go beyond it. Remain on this side of the boundary. You can never be too scrupulous with regard to that secret and delicate thing, a child's conscience."

The principles expressed in this circular are to-day widely accepted, but in the 'seventies and 'eighties they were considered by good people to be rank blasphemy. It may be convenient to note here that the conflict was continued by Waldeck-Rousseau, who in 1901 passed a law by which unauthorized Congregations were to be disbanded. The Combes

Ministry during the following three years applied this ordinance unflinchingly, and often soldiers had to be employed to enforce respect for the State command. A further law prohibited unauthorized Congregations from teaching. The Pope naturally protested, and in 1904, after various incidents, the French Ambassador at the Vatican was recalled.

It was Aristide Briand who in 1905 proposed the separation of Church and State. The Concordat which had been signed in 1803 was annulled. All forms of religion were tolerated but none were to be favoured or subsidized. Clerical possessions were to be held by groups of citizens for the purpose of public worship. The Pope, condemning the separation, opposed the formation of Religious Associations for the maintenance of public worship; and after an inventory was drawn up, many of the possessions of the Clergy went to the State.

It is not my business in this place to approve or denounce; but unquestionably under the Empire education was in a most backward state. The statistics for 1860 show that three-quarters of the population, and in some *départements* five-sixths, were utterly illiterate. It is obviously dangerous to permit illiteracy and universal suffrage to exist side by side. The Republic has failed to perform many of the great social duties which were imposed upon it, but it has not neglected education. Not only is education accessible to the masses but its basis has been broadened. It is no longer an affair of reading and writing and arithmetic with the catechism thrown in; it includes a variety of subjects which are fairly efficiently taught. One might assert that the French curriculum is overcrowded and that an attempt is being made to stuff too much into the child's brain. There was a conviction after 1870 that it was by education that France could regain her position in the world.

"The nation," writes Bracq, "shrank from no sacrifice. Beautiful schoolhouses, spitefully called *palais scolaires* by the reactionaries, were erected in the villages; and *lycées* and college buildings in the cities. At one session on July 3, 1880, Parliament voted that twenty-seven *lycées* be built. In important centres fine edifices were constructed for higher education." Moreover, it is affirmed that the illiterate have fallen to 4.26 per cent. The number of evening schools runs into tens of thousands. Schools of apprenticeship and professional schools have been opened. Wherever there is a particular local industry there is a technical school which is meant to foster the regional art or craft.

For the most part the *instituteurs* keep their anti-Clerical bias: it is part of their training and tradition; and often in the villages there is continued hostility between the Church and the School. Secondary schools have also increased and have improved. It was common to put the boy as a *pensionnaire* in the school and to isolate him from family life, but these monachal habits are disappearing. While Latin and Greek are regarded by many educationalists as essential, the school programme has been modernized. English and German are freely taught. The sciences are put in a place of honour. Literature is thoroughly studied. Philosophy, as we have seen, has become a part of school life, and every instructed Frenchman is aware of what has been said by the great thinkers on the fundamental problems. Opportunities for education of women have multiplied exceedingly. There were few institutions for them fifty years ago, but by the 'nineties there were well over a hundred institutions in which higher instruction was given to girls. It is from the ranks of women that a large proportion of the teachers is recruited. In superior education the progress is enormous. In 1889 there were twice the number of Chairs in the University as in 1876. Students in philosophy and literature had increased in the same period nearly twenty-fold and students in science over ten-fold. The total number of students at the universities was five times greater in 1906 than at the beginning of the Republic.

It will already have been gathered that the professors have made the most valuable contributions to science and philosophy: they are not merely pedagogues but are original workers. The Ecole Normale Supérieure has turned out many famous men. The Sorbonne, the Collège de France, the Museum, and a number of special schools which have been founded for the study of social sciences, art, agriculture, colonization, archæology, are the centres from which radiate French intellectuality. The museums, which are also educational agencies, have been vastly enriched. This is true of the provinces as well as of Paris, and one should add that the movement of decentralization is nowhere more marked than in the sphere of learning, and the provincial universities and public institutions are often equal to those of the capital. Above all, the new ideal, imperfectly realized as yet, is the encouragement of the living mental faculties of the child as distinct from the older method of cramping and confining the intelligence in the chains of knowledge. The teachers are freer and the pupils are freer; they will doubtless become freer still.

It is always assumed that great historical events must change the current of literary tendencies. Doubtless such influences must ultimately be felt, but it would be difficult to divide French literature into periods which correspond with well-defined historical periods. There was after 1870 a sort of hush. Traces of the anguish of spirit, of the incipient revolt engendered by defeat, can be found in

Alphonse Daudet, in François Coppée, in Sully Prudhomme; but the older men continued to work on the lines they had already laid down for themselves. Charles le Goffic, whose admirable summary should be consulted, has tried to divide the nineteenth century into four parts, and it is necessary to glance back to the beginning of the modern movement. In the first period, which lasted until 1820, writing was encumbered with rules, with a false Classicism. Poetry was philosophic and didactic. Of the theatrical production little remains. Nevertheless that woman of marvellous intelligence, Madame de Staël, and Chateaubriand, the true initiator of modern literature, worked during this epoch; which is also enriched by Lamennais, Joseph de Maistre, Charles Nodier, the charming Xavier de Maistre, Benjamin Constant, whose *Adolphe* is a masterpiece, and Senancourt. It was not until nearly a quarter of the century had passed that Romanticism began to sweep away false Classicism. The *Meditations* of Lamartine appeared, and the *Odes et Ballades* of Victor Hugo. The poems of Alfred de Vigny completed the revolution. Poetry became lyrical, personal, subjective. The defaults of Hugo, who for several generations reigned over French letters, are apparent; but whatever accusations of verbiage, of an excessive employment of anthithesis, of artificiality, of inconsistency, of buffoonery, and so forth, may be brought against him, his genius is the most formidable—with the exception of that of Balzac—of the nineteenth century. He brought a colour and a rhythm and a puissance into French poetry that were new. His was the most magnificent voice raised on the side of Justice, on behalf of Humanity. His was the thought which vibrated to all the rumours, enthusiasms, and cholers, of his time. He cried for Liberty and Progress and for other abstractions without defining them; but his work remains by its éclat and its extent the most considerable of the century. There was in him enough to fill out the fame of ten poets, and if he lacked restraint he attained grandeur.

The leader of the Romantics carried his lyricism into the theatre. After *Cromwell* and after *Hernani* the classic drama was vanquished. Human life was represented as a *mélange* of the Sublime and the Grotesque. Henceforth there was to be plenty of action, an impetuous variety of events, and importance was to be attached to *décor* and to costume. The dialogue was to be vivid and supple. In fact, the theatre of Victor Hugo was melodramatic, and the construction of his pieces quickly became mechanical. His romances were equally flamboyant, enormous, monstrous, always setting vice against virtue, always contrasting what is noble with what is ridiculous; but his imagination and his eloquence save his romances from oblivion.

In the romantic trinity Hugo has been described as the Father, Alfred de Musset as the Son, and Alfred de Vigny as the Holy Ghost. (Lamartine may be regarded as the Forerunner.) Vigny is the thinker—a melancholy thinker who finds that man is alone in the midst of an indifferent or hostile Nature. He has written some of the most beautiful verses in the language. Moreover, he, after Walter Scott, founded the historical novel. Musset, in spite of his Byronism, had much sincerity from the beginning, and after his unhappy affair with George Sand became profoundly human. His prose work, *La Confession d'Un Enfant du Siècle* is an essay in autobiographical romance. Théophile Gautier picturesquely and delicately set down his sensations, and his stories are delightfully fantastic evocations. The romances of George Sand are largely autobiographical and idealistic. A whole school of writers followed her example, among whom was Gérard de Nerval. Prosper Mérimée, though Romantic in form, is Classical by inclination, and has some affinities with the more sober writers who were to succeed. The masters of the roman-feuilleton were the equivocal Paul de Kock, the extravagant Eugène Sue, and, greatest of them all, the fecund Alexandre Dumas *père*. His faculty of invention, his facility of production, are unparalleled. He wrote loosely, and both style and truth are absent; but what a giant he was! To-day, his most serious rival in popular favour, Paul Féval, is almost forgotten; but the vogue of Dumas is not likely to die.

Henri Beyle, known as Stendhal, stands apart. He does not belong to the Utopists, the Lyricists, the Romantics, or the popular writers. He was original in matter and in manner and himself said, "I will be understood only in 1880." His psychology is exquisite though cynical. Balzac it seems to me represents the transition from Romanticism to Realism, though it could be shown that Realism is merely a branch of Romanticism, and that the theories and labels are misleading. His great *Comédie Humaine* is a picture of manners. He has fixed the physiognomy of his time. He has given us a synthesis of society. With him the crowd enters into the romance. Each group is depicted with its peculiar professional traits. His personages have clothes; they have furniture; they have a language of their own; and their whole environment fashions and is in consonance with their character. Balzac is detached and disinterested; he aims at verity. He realized the importance of money in the modern world. His is a gigantic creation, but he had traversed the early Romantic period and some of his men and women are exaggerated, monstrous, and chimerical. Nevertheless for the most part they are alive, and he prepared the way for the analytical spirit which was to manifest itself towards the middle of the century.

A word should be said about the more critical writers of the second period of the nineteenth century. There was the pamphleteer Paul-Louis Courrier, fearless, forceful, with an admirable style. There were the Universitaires, mostly influenced by the Romantics. There were the first theorists of Socialism, including Proudhon. There were the historians, who, arriving in the full blast of Romanticism, were each in their different ways inclined to make history a pretext for picturesque tableaux. Adolphe Thiers is competent and well-informed, but insists too strongly on the fatality of events. François Guizot has always a political and moral design and regards the past as a lesson for the future. Mignet generalizes and condenses with great ability. Alexis de Tocqueville studied "living" history—studied events as the result of natural forces and national aspirations. His inquiry into the working of democracy in America may be said to initiate a new method of depicting a nation. All these and others were touched by the Romantic spirit; but it remained for Augustin Thierry to adopt to the full measure the Romantic procedure. His principal preoccupation was, as Victor Hugo had recommended in the preface to *Cromwell*, to render the personages and civilizations of the past vivid by the aid of characteristic traits. Moreover, with him the people enter upon the scene. The annals of all nations had neglected the masses. It was Michelet who executed Thierry's plan. He set himself the task of tracing the development, artistic, economic, religious, of France. The first six volumes of his *Histoire de France* are the best; afterwards he allows his imagination, his passion, his lyricism to make the most fantastic play with facts.

In criticism, Sainte-Beuve found behind the book the author, and he attached the author to his time and his environment. He is the *amateur d'âmes*. He analyses the literary tendencies of the moment when the author begins his work, his personal education, and his natural genius. In his effort to make criticism a science he has some affinities with the Realists, but he remains attached to the Romantic School in which he made his *début*.

Not until the third period from 1850 to 1880 did Romanticism begin to lose its positions. There was a reaction against the tyranny of imagination. It was not so much sensibility which was sought as precision. History renounced large syntheses and aimed at careful documentary inquiries. The theatre began to confine itself to everyday life. Criticism adopted the rigour of the natural sciences. It was sought to make the romance an objective memorandum. Even poetry shook off the influence of Hugo. Philosophy lagged behind, and it was only later, under the Third Republic, that, as we have seen, philosophy became an after-flowering of Romanticism. Leconte de Lisle and his disciples proclaimed the necessity of breaking with poetry which was a public confession of intimate anguish, and of returning to the pure sources of Hellenic antiquity. Careful reconstitutions in a sculptural language, impassibility, impersonality, mark his verse. Théodore de Banville composes, chisels, polishes his verse like a marble statue. But both Leconte de Lisle and Théodore de Banville, in spite of their restraint, have real emotion—the former a tragic emotion, the latter a clownesque emotion. Nobody was more attacked than Charles Baudelaire. His Satanism, his love of the macabre, his search for the voluptuous, his perversions, are the manifestations of an essentially analytical mind expressing itself in a somewhat laborious Classicism.

The Parnassians in the dying days of the Empire, which were pleasure-seeking, frivolous, and brilliant, but were secretly gnawed by the *mal du siècle*, were too diverse in their doctrines properly to form a school, but were rather a free union of young poets. Their impassibility soon broke down. Catulle Mendès imitated everybody, and sometimes his imitations were better than his models. François Coppée was an amused observer of familiar details. Sully-Prudhomme is the moralist of the Parnassians. José Maria de Hérédia in the sonnet form is the most representative Parnassian: architectural, erudite, magnificent, but he fails to communicate emotion. The Parnassians prepared the way for the Symbolists. Their art was too narrow and dry, too disciplined. A few years after the founding of the Third Republic Arthur Rimbaud threw off the yoke. Paul Verlaine, who had begun to write in 1867, did not at first attract attention. But afterwards he became a master for the younger men. He is the poet of instinct, of impulse, chanting turn by turn his sensual and spiritual thrills. His verses are full of music, of nuances; his prosody disdains rules. It has been said that he opened the reign of chaos; at least he slackened the too taut lyre. He is the most authentic poet of the past half century. Versification was liberated; it became fluid and changing. It may appear somewhat contradictory that Stéphane Mallarmé, one of the leaders of Symbolism, submitted himself to the strictest rules, but his purpose was to blend thought, sentiment, philosophical symbols, plastic images, in a complete melody.

In the theatre many genres existed side by side. The amazing technical dexterity of Scribe was employed in the "comedy of manners," in which a psychological "realism" was attempted. Emile Augier depicted social types with admirable skill. Alexandre Dumas *fils* affirmed his talent in a virile "realism" and afterwards developed a number of theses. He wished to combat the "decomposition of society, the corruption of riches, the laxity of morals, the vices of education," and other evils. Victorien Sardou, the most expert practitioner of the drama, Meilhac and Halévy, spirituel and light, excelling in the *opéra bouffe*, and even the comic Eugène Labiche, though offering many points of interest, hardly entered the undoubted current which was making for so-called Realism. The most important piece that has been produced in our age is, in my opinion, *Les Corbeaux* of Henry Becque, who began a new epoch in 1882 with a drama resolutely Naturalist. There were many excellent entertainers, as there always will be, in the Boulevard theatres of Paris; but they have no special significance. Becque, on the contrary, opened the door to those dramatists whom it is the custom to regard as serious. Zola and the Goncourts had lamentably failed in their efforts to conquer the theatre because they were not possessed of their *métier*. The success of Becque was not immediate, and indeed it has always been relative, but he nevertheless marks a date. Without the conventional devices, without plot, his work, full of observation, of truth to life, achieved what others had been unable to achieve.

But it is in the novel that the most characteristic work was done. There were idealists such as Octave Feuillet. There were humorists and feuilletonists and narrators. Jules Verne discovered the marvels of science as a theme for the novel. Emile Gaboriau revelled in mysteries. Erkmann-Chatrian struck the patriotic note. Barbey d'Aurevilly, who has not been done justice even in France, was writing romance with fine restraint. Fromentin was classical. Gustave Flaubert, with his *Madame Bovary*, inaugurated a new art which was in essence Realist. This work has dominated modern creative literature. Flaubert was not as happy when he applied the same process to the reconstitution of earlier civilizations. Contemporary Realism has three broad divisions: the Naturalism of Emile Zola, the Impressionism of the Brothers Goncourt, and the Sentimental Realism of Alphonse Daudet. Zola was an indefatigable worker whose pretension was to depict life in its lowest manifestations. It is a strange paradox for those who attach overmuch importance to doctrines and classification in literature that Zola, in spite of his documentation, in spite of his wealth of shameful detail, has succeeded, as Le Goffic remarks, in the romantic composition of great allegories, of enormous and monstrously unreal symbols, and is a "mystic of the mud." Indeed, Zola was inspired by a passionate faith and was in some sort an apostle. Yet the school of Médan deliberately aimed at misanthropy. The writers considered that their subject should be banal and usually painful. Practically the whole of the younger men accepted the theories of the new *cénacle*—Octave Mirbeau, the Brothers Rosny, Lucien Descaves, Jean Ajalbert, Henri Céard, Elémir Bourges, Joris Karl Huysmans. It is true that many of them went their own way afterwards, and in 1887 five of them issued a manifesto, which has become notorious, denouncing the school from which they had issued. Huysmans attained to a mystic Catholicism. Guy de Maupassant had too vigorous a personality to remain with his qualities of the story-teller in the Médan school. He is cruel and penetrating, not nice in the choice of his themes, but interesting and clear though sometimes morbid. The Brothers Edmond and Jules de Goncourt strove for intensity of impression. They endeavoured to give notations of indescribable sensations, and they invented *l'écriture artiste*, tormented, incorrect, violent, and precious, filled with neologisms and rare epithets. They sought the characteristic detail instead of multiplying insignificant details as did Zola. Daudet, while caught in the stream of his time, had the secret of sentiment and had the seduction of charm. He saved the French novel from the dreary marshland in which it was losing itself. Paul Bourget and Anatole France after him were able to restore ideas to the novel. The morbidity, the deliquescence, the decadence, which had not first manifested themselves in literature under the Republic, but which had been emphasized after the convulsions of 1870, were eventually swept aside by a healthier spirit. Paul Bourget issued a series of psychological novels. Many of his problems appear to-day futile. His analysis is overdone. But he helped to lead France away from the terrible pessimism which was afflicting the writers. Maurice Barrès, at once more subtle and more dilettante, was also analytical, but he had grace of style and poetic sense. Though there is a strain of sadness in Pierre Loti he is colourful, and he sent the French in search of exotic effects. Anatole France is probably the supreme master of the Third Republic. Epicurean, ironist, philosopher, and above all artist, he was a formidable critic of his age. The regionalists, such as Anatole Le Braz and Jean Aicard and René Bazin, helped also to put to flight the Realists. Frédéric Mistral, poetic, sane, sweet, is one of the rarest writers in Provençal.

Somewhat apart are the fantaisistes—Henri de Régnier, Jules Renard, Joséphin Péladan, Jean Richepin, and the popular Marcel Prévost. Pierre Louÿs is fleshly and erotic, but he must be given his place in the great reaction. Nor should one forget the prince of humorists, Georges Courteline.

Even in the theatre, which owes so much to Becque, the tendency became symbolist. André Antoine in founding the Théâtre Libre opened the door to a variety of newer methods which had in common their protest against conventionality. François de Curel put ideas upon the stage. Maurice Maeterlinck, who, although Belgian, made his career in France, put symbols on the stage. Georges de Porto-Riche has been described as the Racine of sensualism. Eugène Brieux boldly wrote *pièces à thèses*, as did Paul Hervieu. Henri Lavedan is essentially a Parisian, and Maurice Donnay is a boulevardier. So is Alfred Capus, with his optimistic motto "*Tout s'arrange*." Tristan Bernard has large resources of humour. Sacha Guitry is facile and spirituel. Henry Bernstein is vigorous, even brutal. Henri Bataille had an acute vision, was amoral and passionate. Edmond Rostand triumphed as no other dramatist has triumphed on the Paris stage for half a century; and, strangely enough, it was with a frank reversion to the most unrestrained Romanticism.

It is characteristic of France that it should thus strongly react in every sphere against influences which were depressing. Against morbidity, so-called Realism, dreariness, and pessimism, Cyrano de Bergerac, a truly French figure, flung out his challenge and the enemy was routed. A French critic in capital phrases has declared Cyrano to be the affirmation of French vitality, of the resiliency of a race which precisely when it seems to be beaten down, a prey to pessimism and to prose, is never so ready to spread its wings and rebound towards the stars. Always do the French return to Romanticism.

It is a far cry from the historical writing of Michelet to the historical writing of Fustel de Coulanges and his disciple Albert Sorel. The two sides of the French character can be well studied in these writers. Michelet is always violent, emotional, imaginative, mystical—in a word, a poet. Fustel de Coulanges takes only the texts, examines them in their details, believes nothing that they do not prove, carefully avoids interpreting events in the light of modern ideas. One is passionate and not critical. The other is critical and not passionate. Michelet does not trouble about the enchainment of causes and consequences. Coulanges sees the operation of a mechanism which is hardly disturbed by personal interventions and is not subject to hazard. Michelet paints a succession of isolated pictures. Coulanges shows the continuity of things and their slow transformation. Michelet is Catholic when he writes of Catholicism and Protestant when he writes of Protestantism—he has the same enthusiasm for Danton as for Joan of Arc. Coulanges is precise and, regarding history as an exact science, suppresses enthusiasm. Michelet's judgments are doubtful. Coulanges advances nothing that cannot be substantiated. Michelet is picturesque in his expression. Coulanges is sober. Michelet is colourful and diffuse. Coulanges is simple and concise. Usually you will find French historical writers sharing these qualities and defects, and I have chosen Michelet and Coulanges because they furnish the most complete contrast. Renan and Taine are, with all their differences, much more nearly related. Renan is well documented, but what he obtains from his documents is determined rather by his taste than by his critical faculties. He strives to give a truthful account, but the test of truth for him is whether it looks true or not. He tries to exclude the supernatural, but he is always aware of impenetrable veils hiding the secret of a strange world. He is at once descriptive and evocative. Taine, who passes for a rationalist, seeks to apply a philosophy to the human facts he relates. He repels metaphysics, but he endeavours to generalize, to construct formulas, to bring everything into a system. All the manifestations of social life—religion, art, industry, State institutions—may offer an appearance of diversity, but they betray a common character. Once that character is ascertained it can be demonstrated in every branch of national activity. Such deductive methods tend to warp observation, and a false geometric unity is fashioned. Yet rigorous as his method is, Taine often gives his imagination free play, is descriptive, is colourful, and is forceful. Among other historians may be mentioned Vandal, Elie Halévy, Thureau Dangin, Ernest Lavisse, Gabriel Hanotaux, Henri Houssaye, Frédéric Masson, Langlois, Seignobos, and Aulard. Critics have abounded whose work has the value of creation: Ferdinand Brunetière, Jules Lemaître, Emile Faguet, René Doumic, and Rémy de Gourmont, whose suggestive essays were a joy to us. Charles Maurras has endeavoured to bring back French writers to the tradition of pure Classicism, of order, discipline, and will.

In painting there was towards the end of the Second Empire much confusion. Romanticism had run into an uninspired production of museum pieces. David had bequeathed an unhappy heritage. Delacroix and Ingres, both of whom died before 1870, had no successors—or rather those who attempted to follow them were frankly bad. Even when Ingres and Delacroix triumphed at the first Universal Exhibition of Paris in 1855 they belonged to the past. There was in opposition to them a heretic, a rejected of men—Gustave Courbet—who already announced the coming of the Naturalist school. Delacroix, though displaying imagination and colour, was an indoor worker. Ingres, much more observant, denied his proper genius and much of his output was coldly academic. Théodore Chassériau, had he lived, might have saved Romanticism, which had been heralded at the opening of the century by Géricault, from complete bankruptcy. Men like

Corot, Théodore Rousseau, and Millet; though giving us veritably living landscapes, were idealists.

One man may be taken in painting to be the counterpart of Flaubert in literature, and of the younger Dumas in the theatre, and of Gautier in poetry, and of Fustel de Coulanges in history; he is Honoré Daumier. He was obliged to earn his living by drawing for the journals, but his immense gallery of Parisian types is another *Comédie Humaine*, and if the public in general does not take seriously anything but what it calls *grand art*, all who have endeavoured to trace the movement of the past century in painting have rendered homage to Daumier as the artist who was one of the forerunners of Naturalism. His tone is satirical, while the tone of Millet is essentially sympathetic. But without Courbet, who announced himself as a real chief with his *Enterrement à Ornans*, it would be impossible to explain the subsequent history of French art. The most summary description of modern painting cannot start with the Third Republic; though there is indeed a curious *rapprochement* of dates to make between the beginnings of the new *régime* and the rise of the great Impressionist school. Courbet was the great rebel against both the cold Classics and the conventional Romantics. With his eye for colour he found in the exact depiction of an everyday scene a startling reply to the allegorists. It is surprising that his contemporaries did not discover his genius. "You want me to paint deities," he cried; "then show them to me"; and in this phrase we have perhaps the whole of the doctrine of the group that ranged itself around Edouard Manet. Manet is more refined, less vigorous, more conscious, and intelligent. He abandoned the museum subjects and sought his models in real life. It was about 1872 that the Impressionist school, which brought together a collection of the most brilliant talents that France had produced since the eighteenth century, was formed. But the word school is perhaps to be deprecated. There was a diversity of method which becomes more strongly marked as one continues to study the Renoirs, the Degas, and the Sisleys. Renoir is voluptuous and poetic. Sisley is delicate and aims at simplicity. Claude Monet is dazzling and meticulous. Degas is a virtuoso of attitude—the most original worker of them all. Pissaro has a perfect dignity. They had, however, a single programme—they chose to represent contemporary things. They banned mythological and religious and historical and academic subjects. They desired to give an image of life. Nothing was too vulgar to be included. It was a healthy reaction; but of course it was carried too far and it became almost an article of faith that the more common-place the subject the more acute was the artist's power of observation. They had, too, in common a technical procedure. They studied atmosphere. They painted light. Their love of the open air they derived from Corot. They owed something to the Japanese painters, who represent an instantaneous effect. They were indebted to Turner for the juxtaposition of colours on the canvas. The decomposition of tone was practised. Monet adopted the principle that the right disposition of the *mélange* of colours should be the optical function of the observer. Things in themselves did not count. Form was dissolved, contours disappeared. No object has its invariable quality. A white cloth might be anything but white: it might be blue, pink, green, in accordance with its surroundings.

Louis Gillet thus states their theory: "Everything is reduced to a play of appearances, to an exchange of reflections, to a prismatical irridescence, to a brilliant and inconstant colouring, to a tissue of phenomena resulting from a combination of atoms and of coloured molecules. Thus there remains nothing real but the sensation of the painter, and a sort of conscious intoxication produced by the perception of things. Things are only a motive that the artist interprets, like the variations of a musical theme, in accordance with the momentary nuances of the hour and sentiment." Thus, he adds, we arrive at the astonishing series of Monet—in which the same subject is dealt with in a score of aspects—where nature is only a pretext, where the object disappears in light. The world for the painter is a vibration, a luminous quivering, an ardent mirage—uncertain and unseizable as phantasmagoria. Rightly does he observe that we have here an extraordinary paradox: the French painters by their formulas condemned themselves to a narrow Realism which eventually conducted them to the negation of all reality; the object was mediocre, and they escaped from this mediocrity in the end by the most absolute subjectivity.

All theories in art must, if pursued without respite, lead to absurdities, and great as was the contribution of the Impressionists it is a mistake to condemn or accept without reservation any school or any individual. There are many rooms in the mansion of art. Classicism, Romanticism, Realism, all have their place. The error is always to suppose that the part is greater than the whole, is indeed the whole. We are apt to be buffeted from one insufficient conception to another—reaction provokes reaction. There has recently been a striving in many directions, and it may well be that some more comprehensive art which will take what is good from the multiplicity of experiments will be evolved.

In the meantime there were others who, more classical in style, made in various degrees concessions to the new precepts. There were Luc-Olivier Merson, Cabanel, Henner, Bouguereau, Gérôme, Jean-Paul Laurens. The Third Republic endeavoured to decorate its buildings, and such men as Léopold Flameng were employed. Undoubtedly there was, owing to the diversity of practitioners, an undesirable confusion of effect, for decoration should be single and harmonious. Two decorators stand out —Paul Baudry and Puvis de Chavannes. The first was graceful and elegant. The second was serene and pure. Their compositions at the Opéra, at the Panthéon, at the Sorbonne, and at the Hôtel de Ville are a perpetual delight. Gustave Moreau, much admired in his day, clung desperately to the past: his mythological world is a brilliant mosaic of precious stones.

In sculpture there was no such upheaval. Rude and Barye were already to some extent Naturalist. Carpeaux from 1860 to 1875 laid the foundations on which repose the labours of his successors to the end of the century. His figures are filled with energetic life. They are not abstract. Rodin might have said, as Carpeaux said, " I want the smallest detail of my statue to be in itself interesting." Frémiet is firm and virile. Mercié, Falguière, and a host of others more or less significant might well have made the glory of an epoch. Dalou and Barrias are strong and conscientious workers. But Auguste Rodin is the modern master of sculpture. He sighed for greater opportunities for his gigantic ambitions in a monumental architecture. No great work of ensemble that he undertook could he finish, but he has chiselled masterpieces marvellously modelled, extraordinarily expressive, veracious, vital, subtle, containing a multitude of precise notations, supple in line, *mouvementé*. Rodin belongs to the grand and deathless race of supreme artists.

With these and many other men whose best work was done in the latter part of the nineteenth century

Paris became the recognized capital of the world's art. There are few men of exceptional merit in any country who have not drawn their inspiration from Paris. For fifty years Paris has reigned the undisputed Prince of the Plastic Arts. British, American, German, Dutch, Scandinavian painters owe much to the French, and the younger Spanish artists who have in their turn influenced the French were first fashioned in the likeness of Paris. In architecture the Second Empire, though romantically turning towards the past, began to provide Paris with its modern aspect. Baron Haussmann gave a great impetus to the reconstruction of the city—the driving of great thoroughfares, the destruction of old squalid quarters. Doubtless many precious relics disappeared, but some order was achieved and the ravages which were made were part of the price which had to be paid for cleanliness and hygiene and convenience. The Paris which was planned and which the Third Republic helped to complete is one of the most beautiful cities in the world. The Arc de Triomphe became the centre, with splendid avenues running to every part. A uniformity, an impersonality, a monotony, can be reproached against the Paris which was conceived under Napoléon III. The new life demands new creations—railway stations, ports, canals, bridges, factories, emporiums, schools, museums, theatres, garages, aerodromes, and so forth; and it is not to be wondered at if the modern architects did not at once find a suitable modern style which would join utility to beauty. It is only now that we are discovering the possibilities of iron and glass and concrete, and there may be evolved an architecture that will give a soul to the immense practical constructions which have been demanded by the prodigious progress of industry with its need of rapid transport.

Nowhere can architecture be studied as in France, with its Romanesque remains, its wonderful Gothic cathedrals, its fifteenth-century strongholds, its Renaissance châteaux. The seventeenth century is responsible for many impressive monuments. The eighteenth ran to artificiality, and in the nineteenth century there is little that is pleasing. Nevertheless there are signs of a reviving taste and of an adaptability to modern conditions of modern materials.

The Second Empire was particularly brilliant in the lighter kind of music. The Italian opera reigned. Rossini and Meyerbeer (who incidentally was German) were succeeded by Offenbach (who also by birth was neither French nor Italian). Nevertheless one of the most astonishing musical geniuses of all times, and certainly the richest French composer of the nineteenth century, perhaps the only first rank musician that France has produced—Berlioz—had found a welcome everywhere except in Paris. It is strange that the Romantic in music should have fallen flat in a period of Romanticism. He had unique gifts; his rare orchestral instinct results in harmonies at once enormous and delicate, while his melody is diverse. Henri Heine said of him: "He is a colossal nightingale; a lark as big as an eagle." He stood alone, independent, original, superb, while the two great musical currents from Italy and from Germany flowed into France. Perhaps it was well for him that he had no special aptitude for the theatre. Music was being sacrificed to the exigencies of the theatre. Even Wagner suffered from the theatre. Berlioz, who died just before the clash of arms, must unquestionably be regarded as the most characteristic and the greatest French musician, who opened many doors. Gounod was more ingenious in adapting his themes to the taste of the public, and was the most popular opera-writer of the century. His later oratorios draw their substance from *Faust* and from *Roméo et Juliette.*

With the new *régime* came in the picturesque Bizet, whose *Arlésienne* and *Carmen,* with their crystalline grace, their passionate force, are as popular to-day as when they first fell upon the ears of the French. Massenet followed and for thirty years with his undulous phrases went from success to success. His *Manon* is still sung as often as *Carmen.* There were founded at this epoch societies which had for mission the propagation of pure music. There was a reaction against the theatre. Camille Saint-Saëns was the most notable initiator of this return to the concert platform. In his own work he was essentially the artist. He was concerned chiefly with form and equilibrium. If he never reached the heights of Berlioz his composition was impeccable. He wrote too for the stage; *Samson et Dalila* was first executed in 1877. Edouard Lalo was an exquisite jeweller. César Franck towards the 'eighties (though Belgian in origin he must be regarded as French by adoption) helped to develop a great symphonic school in France. Organist at the Church of Sainte-Clotilde, modest, known only to a small circle of admirers, he increased the resources of harmony and his chromatic language has an exaltation, a nobility, a religious elevation which gives him a place apart. Vincent d'Indy was perhaps the foremost of his disciples, but while developing the technical innovations of his master he has a manner which is all his own. Perhaps nobody has done more for true musical culture in France than d'Indy. In descriptive music Emmanuel Chabrier is astonishing. He has been called an Impressionist in the same sense as the painters of his time. From him have derived Gustave Charpentier and half a dozen other masters. As for Gabriel Fauré, he excelled in chamber music, refined, measured, and sober.

Those were remarkable years for French music which followed the Franco-Prussian war. There was a stirring and a striving, a reaching-out in all directions. There was a true renovation. Alfred Bruneau, writing for the theatre on the themes of Zola, dared to put on the boards men and women in modern attire. The public was shocked but he triumphed. Charpentier at the beginning of the present century gave us with *Louise* a true Naturalist opera. Its picture of Paris, its domestic pathos, immediately won the favour of the public.

There were presently to be other manifestations of French musical talent, which had allowed itself for so long to be subjected to foreign influences, and from 1900 onwards French music was in its turn to dominate.

It will be seen from this summary that there has been an efflorescence of the French genius under the Third Republic. "France is dying: do not disturb her agony," exclaimed Renan; but Renan was wrong. Life flows on in spite of the shortcomings of politicians and the slowness of social evolution, and it would sometimes seem that there is no necessary relation between intellectual and artistic activities which give real character to a nation and political and social developments which are perhaps largely accidental. Renan was not alone in his gloom. Taine had spoken of "spontaneous dissolution"; the loss of two provinces, the ghastly misunderstanding of the Commune, the national divisions, the difficulties of reorganization, seemed to foreshadow irrevocable decomposition. But the French people can withstand shocks. While the Republicans and the Legitimists and the Clericals were still fighting their battles on the noisome ruins of a brilliant but corrupt *régime*, there was springing up a field of flowers.

WORKS TO BE CONSULTED

For this chapter I have used a large number of scattered volumes. Among them may be mentioned—Louis Gillet: *Histoire des Arts*; Fortunat Strowski: *Histoire des Lettres*; Alfred Poizat: *Le Symbolisme*; Ernest Raynaud: *La Mêlée Symboliste*; Charles Le Goffic: *Littérature Française du XIX^e Siècle*; Bracq: *France Under the Republic*; Maurice Caullery and René Lote: *Histoire des Sciences*; Clive Bell: *Since Cézanne*; Léon Werth: *Quelques Peintres*; Octave Mirbeau: *Des Artistes*; Camille Mauclair: *L'Art Indépendant Français* and *Trois Crises de l'Art*; René Dumesnil: *Le Monde des Musiciens*; Emile Vuillermoz: *Musiques d'Aujourd'hui.*

CHAPTER III

REPUBLICAN POLITICS

Crisis on Crisis—The Army—Marshal MacMahon—Lessons of Seize Mai—Anti-Clericalism—Colonization—General Boulanger—Panama—The Dreyfus Affaire—Church and State —Strikes

To employ a convenient newspaper word, " crisis " has succeeded " crisis " for half a century in France. Scandal has followed scandal, and controversy coming on the heels of controversy has kept the country in a state of constant perturbation. For a long time it was doubtful whether the Third Republic was viable, and it was continually shaken by alarums and excursions. The mere enumeration of the great quarrels, which mostly revolved around persons, gives an unpleasant impression of Republicanism as it has been practised. When one examines the causes of the perpetual commotions and emotions one is amazed at the readiness of the politicians to stir up strife and at the lack of strong control over the nation's affairs. Storm no sooner lifted than another storm broke. What is astonishing is not that so little but rather that so much progress has been made during this turbulent time.

Cradled in the Commune, there were grave fears that the Republic after all was a changeling. Men like MacMahon were suspected of having substituted or of trying to substitute a Monarchy. He was broken. Came the fight with the Clericals. Came the Colonial derivative. Came the revelation that honours were being sold like butter by the entourage of the President. Came Boulangism—a wild admiration for a fine-looking man on a fine-looking black horse. Came the Panama crash, which spread ruin and dismay. Came the murder of Carnot, the resignation of Casimir-Périer, the sudden death of Félix Faure. Came the Dreyfus Affaire which was violently to agitate France for years. Came the new quarrel with the Church. There has been upheaval after upheaval. France has rarely been tranquil, but for the most part the series of domestic quarrels was futile when it was not disgraceful.

The new Germany founded on the defeat of France looked on sardonically. These spasms which shook without cessation the nation which had once conquered the greater span of Europe were a guarantee of uninterrupted development for Germany. Every year strengthened Germany's position—or at least seemed for a long time to favour Bismarckian policy. Victor Duruy had exhorted France to discipline herself. By discipline, in the family, in the city, in the State, the soul of the country could, he cried, be reanimated. But such discipline was impossible to impose ; there was after the massacres of the Commune a smouldering resentment against the authorities—a resentment which has now become a traditional part of the Frenchman's make-up. Nothing is more regrettable in a State than this alienation of the governed from the governors. Everybody who has lived long in France is aware of the French reluctance to accept laws which are considered inconvenient ; and even during the rigorous days of the Great War many decrees were completely unheeded. However honest may be the rulers, if they remain apart from the national life, they are apt to form what has been called a République des Camarades.

Nevertheless France recovered herself quickly in two important respects. Material reconstruction was rapidly effected and the French consented to bear heavy taxation and to subscribe freely to the loan which was to liberate them from the dead weight of the indemnity which Germany had placed upon them.* They accepted too the laws which reorganized the army—and which unfortunately meant the intensification of the race in armaments. The working classes were called upon to serve five years under the colours, but there were numerous exemptions. Later, in 1889, the period of service was reduced to three years and in 1905 to two years. The period was again raised to three years on the eve of the Great War. Afterwards it was reduced to eighteen months, and is likely to be reduced still further to one year. It was the fear of Germany which persuaded the French to maintain this system of conscription, economically wasteful for the country and destructive for the individual. The military men themselves are at last coming to see that prolonged military service is, from the technical point of view, indefensible. It does not take five years or three years or even one year to make an efficient rank-and-file soldier. The life in barracks is demoralizing. The actual existence of a huge army is no safeguard against invasion. Reservists can be mobilized as quickly as the men from distant garrison towns can be brought into operation. Covering troops to meet the first shock need not be large.

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* It may be well to give here the cost of the war of 1870–1871 to France. The indemnity required by Germany was 5 milliards. Interest amounted to 300 millions. Expenses incurred in raising loans were 275 millions. The Budgetary deficits in 1870 and 1871 were 2,762 millions. The deficits in the next three years in consequence of the war were 191 millions. To the account of liquidation—chiefly comprising public works and allowances for repairs—is put 2 milliards ; but other indemnities to the invaded *départements* reach 300 millions and losses not compensated 400 millions. Premiums paid to bondholders were 1,678 millions. The material damage suffered by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany is placed at 1,659 millions. The old war material is estimated at 369 millions. The communes raised funds for reconstruction purposes of about 100 millions. Other items give a total of three or four hundred millions more. Thus the expenditure is put at over 15½ milliard francs. Be it remembered that the two invasions of 1814 and 1815, and the later wars of the First Empire, saddled France with a debt of only 2½ milliards. Moreover, industrial and agricultural production had been disorganized. Yet the resurrection of France was swift and impressive. A subscription of 2 milliards for the payment of the war indemnity was authorized in June, 1871. In six hours 4 milliards were received. A new loan of 3 milliards was authorized on July 15, 1872. The subscriptions amounted to 42 milliards—fourteen times the sum demanded !

The doctrines of the "great tribune," Jean Jaurès, are now being adopted. The whole nation should be responsible for its defence, and not a particular number of men who are idly waiting in fortress towns for an aggression. It is possible that with the application of such a theory the French, relieved from the worst features of the military system, will become more efficient industrially and will cease to be handicapped in the fierce commercial competition of nations. It is comprehensible that French political thought should have been influenced by the fear of another attack and by the possibility of *la Revanche.* The bigger the active army the better, it was argued with strange simplicity, was the chance of success. The Frenchman who at twenty-one years of age is called upon to join the forces must hold himself at the disposition of the army chiefs till he reaches the age of forty-nine. There are, besides, the permanent *cadres* ; professional officers, volunteers, and overseas troops. To calculate how much this constant preparation for war, which must not be confused with preparedness for war, has cost France, it would certainly not be enough to add together the naval and military provisions for a long period of years ; the loss of man-power, which might otherwise be used in agriculture, industry, and commerce, must also be reckoned. The perpetuation of the Franco-German duel has meant and means an incalculable drain on French resources.

There could not, however, be any doubt of the hostile intentions of Germany. They were made perfectly clear soon after France signed a convention to pay the German indemnity by anticipation. Germany agreed to end the occupation a year earlier than had been arranged, and immediately regretted the bargain. When Thiers fell Bismarck was distrustful of France; he believed, or professed to believe, it possible that a coalition would be formed against Germany. He shed tears over the evacuation. He proclaimed his design of finishing with France, who was "recovering too quickly." The Duc Decazes, Foreign Minister in the Cabinet of the Duc de Broglie, was prudent, but he discreetly strove to arouse the interest of Russia and of England in a France who was menaced. The *alerte* of 1875 might have had the most serious consequences had the two Great European Powers not intervened. Already the new Balance of Power in Europe was taking shape. The Congress of Berlin a few years later, with its unimportant and ephemeral Eastern arrangements, was to lead to an Austro-German alliance and to a Franco-Russian friendship. France and Germany were to settle down into the permanent rôles of implacable enemies.

Republicanism was meanwhile gaining in strength, and the struggle with MacMahon saw the rout of the Conservatives. Definitely was the movement towards the Left. The President endeavoured to govern against the national sentiment. Conflict broke out over the ultramontane manifestations which Gambetta denounced. On May 16, 1877, the Marshal in a public letter blamed the Chief Minister, Jules Simon. President MacMahon was a somewhat simple, brave man who had been placed in a post for which he was totally unfitted. There is a multitude of anecdotes about him which prove his lack of intelligence. His sentiments were certainly not Republican. He had a profound respect for Authority, and was a Clericalist. As a soldier he was mediocre, but he was sufficiently wise to recognize his mediocrity. Fortunately for him he was struck by a fragment of shell at Sedan and placed *hors de combat*. He escaped immediate responsibilities and did not sign a dolorous capitulation. He had never been prepared for politics and revealed himself as a politician without horizon. Men like de Broglie could easily manipulate him.

As for Jules Simon, he may be judged by his Ministerial statement. When he was permitted by the enemies of the Republic to become Prime Minister on December 13, 1876, the anti-Republicans surrounded him in his Cabinet. Turning to the Left, Simon announced: "My sentiments are profoundly Republican." Turning to the Right, he continued: "And also profoundly Conservative." He informed the anti-Clericalists that he stood for liberty of conscience, and he told the Clericalists that he had a sincere respect for religion. He proclaimed himself devoted to the Parliamentary institution, but he immediately added that they should follow the lead of the President. It is impossible, therefore, to make of Jules Simon a heroic figure defending the Republic against its Royalist adversaries. Indeed, he resigned at the bidding of the Marshal, and the Marshal immediately formed a Royalist Ministry, which promptly dissolved the Chamber. The elections were postponed and pressure was brought to bear on the electors. Republican Prefects were removed. The priests came out prominently against the Republic. In spite of every device the Republicans were victorious. It was useless for the Marshal to form a Ministry of the Right, for the Chamber would not enter into relations with it and refused to vote the Budget. The President was bound, in Gambetta's phrase, to submit or to resign—*se soumettre ou se démettre.* Personal government by a soldier could not be tolerated. MacMahon accepted a Republican Ministry, but he was not happy; and when the Senatorial elections in 1879 yielded a Republican majority and the Government decided to dismiss disloyal officials and Royalist generals he could do nothing but resign.

Several points should be noted about the incident which has, after the French fashion, become celebrated as the Seize Mai. In the first place the quarrel was about the Temporal Power of the Pope. (You can cut where you will in the records of the Third Republic and always find Clericalism at grips with Radicalism.) In the second place, although it is the fashion to regard dissolution of the Chamber as a reactionary measure, MacMahon unquestionably possessed the right of appeal to the people. This right was in no way diminished because the appeal happened to go against him. Yet the unfortunate effect of this Presidential exercise (in conjunction with the Senate) of the right of dissolution which is written in the Constitution has been to prevent his successors from using their prerogative. The defeat of MacMahon in practice removed an important clause from the Constitution. It is in the opinion of good observers a highly necessary clause. Precisely because the deputies are assured of serving their time they do not behave with the same discretion as if the constant possibility of an election were suspended over them. In practice the group system in a virtually indissoluble Chamber means that Ministries must be short-lived. This is one result of Seize Mai.

Another result of Seize Mai is that Presidents have since never ventured directly to address manifestos to the French people. They must not seek to guide the country. They must be colourless. They must be all things to all men. They must be nonentities.

M. Millerand nearly half a century after MacMahon ventured timidly to make known his views, and when the Bloc des Gauches triumphed at the polls he was compelled in his turn to resign. The tradition of Presidential helplessness, Presidential subordination to Ministers, was finally established by Seize Mai. The Bloc des Gauches in 1924 went much further in its claims to gag the President than did Gambetta. MacMahon quite openly, deliberately, and definitely recommended his candidates to popular suffrage. Millerand only furtively intimated his personal desires. Gambetta called upon MacMahon to submit to the country's decision: he did not call for resignation. When the people voted for Gambetta, MacMahon submitted and remained for a time in office. Herriot, taking a much bolder course—so deeply had the doctrine of Presidential impotence rooted itself—demanded not submission, which Millerand was prepared to give, but resignation. MacMahon voluntarily went two years later because as an honest man he could not be associated with the Governmental policies. Millerand was obliged to leave the Élysée immediately because such was the pleasure of the Radicals and Socialists. It did not matter to them that he was ready to choose as Prime Minister the man designated by the polls: nothing short of his demission was acceptable to them. Thus the theory of having a puppet for President has been carried to the highest degree, and in future we may regard the occupant of the Élysée as the altogether powerless plaything of the parties. He is a figure-head without influence whose business is to hold his tongue, and to offer hospitality to distinguished foreigners. Nobody has any real sense of responsibility in France.

Republican writers—and by Republican, Radical is meant, for contrary to the facts it is insisted that

Republicanism is to be found only on the Left—are inclined to assert that a true Republican Government was not founded until 1879, when Jules Grévy became President. But Grévy was a Republican of 1848—he was elected not by the Radicals but against them. His accession can hardly be regarded as a triumph for Gambetta, any more than the accession of Doumergue to the seat of Millerand can be regarded as a triumph for Herriot. Grévy was a representative of the Bourgeoisie. His instincts were Conservative. Neither Reaction nor Revolution, was the motto which was adopted. The political instability is shown in the swift succession of Ministers. The rival groups found it difficult to work together. Their chiefs were continually tripping each other up. Waddington was in office for eleven months, de Freycinet nine months, Jules Ferry thirteen months. Clemenceau emerged as the leader of the Radicals, and Gambetta was dubbed an Opportunist.

There were Moderates and there were Socialists. What held the Left together more than anything else was the common policy of anti-Clericalism. Certainly the Clerical control of the schools had to be broken by any self-respecting government. But had there been no occasion for such a policy it would have had to be invented. In the new France the Clerical menace was as necessary as is the Devil to the Salvation Army. Sometimes with reason, sometimes without reason, the strife had always been renewed when other acceptable programmes have been lacking to the Left.

Jules Grévy was already old—he was over eighty when the scandalous traffic of his entourage in decorations was revealed—and he had even in his youth no strong passions. He had prudently stood aloof from the political agitations which confer on politicians an exceptional notoriety—popularity one day and unpopularity the next. Grévy remained calm, silent, rarely speaking, still more rarely writing. His modesty had aroused no jealousy. His apathy was described as serenity. One could well believe him when in his message to the Chambers he announced that he would never fight against the national will as expressed by the constitutional organs. Yet even Grévy had his antipathies. Gambetta he detested and for years refused to call the flamboyant orator to power. If ever a man was designated by popular opinion to the post of Prime Minister that man was Gambetta. He had taken the popular side when the nation lay at the mercy of Germany. He had tried to stir the country while Thiers was endeavouring to calm the country. His character furnishes a remarkable contrast with that of Thiers—the one ardent, generous, enthusiastic, the other cold, calculating, supple. Thiers was brilliant and intelligent and cautious. Gambetta was florid and instinctive and audacious. When one tries to read the speeches of Gambetta to-day it is not always easy to understand their appeal. They are full of repetitions, loud-sounding sentences which are meaningless, but he spoke in accents of sincerity, he was optimistic amid the worst calamities, he gave an impression of energy and of health. Now jovial, now witty, now incisive, now familiar, now vehement, he warmed his audiences by his torrential utterance. Moreover, he exercised an occult influence. His opponents reproached him for his dictatorial manner and for his luxurious living. It is scarcely surprising that Grévy should have disliked his successor in the Presidential chair of the Chamber, for Grévy was classical in form, rigorously logical, cultivated, sober, and lucid. Therefore he did his best to exclude Gambetta from the Premiership.

We have already seen how Jules Ferry, who became Minister of Public Instruction in the Waddington Cabinet, applied himself to the reform of education. The debates began on March 15, 1879, when the first projects were placed before Parliament. The scholastic reforms in the higher branches of learning were dominated by the idea that members of non-authorized congregations—principally the Jesuits—should be expelled from the schools. Two months later a project applying to primary education, demanding real aptitude in women teachers—that is to say, dispossessing of their functions teaching religious sisterhoods—was deposited. The Government fell before it was passed and de Freycinet became Prime Minister. The Senate was obstructionist. It has always been regarded by Radical politicians in France as obstructionist, and there has always been a movement more or less active for the suppression of the Senate. The Government acted by decree. The Jesuits were given three months in which to evacuate their establishments, and other congregations were obliged to conform to strict regulations. There was a good deal of resistance and many unfortunate incidents occurred in the process of the forcible expulsion of the congregations. It is unnecessary again to relate how Jules Ferry persisted in his educational reform. Not until March 28, 1882, was the Bill making primary education compulsory, free, and secular—or rather neutral—promulgated; and moral and civic instruction, reading, writing, elementary studies in literature, geography, history, political economy, natural sciences, mathematics, agriculture, hygiene, industrial arts, manual crafts, drawing, music, gymnastics placed in the curriculum. Ferry was one of the best men that the Third Republic has produced. He was firm in his doctrine, cultivated, profoundly convinced, writing better than he spoke, vigorous and clear. He did not seduce but he impressed the Assembly by his tranquil force. He did not please but he persuaded. There was no wild applause for Ferry, yet he won respect by his mastery of his subject. In this period of his career he accomplished much that is lasting. At least a relative liberty of the Press and a relative liberty of speech was restored. A general amnesty was granted to those who had been deported after the uprising of the Commune, Gambetta descending from his Presidential chair to support the proposal of an amnesty in a noble discourse in 1880, though he had opposed the election of Trinquet, a deported Communard who, after the French fashion, had been, as it were, plebiscited in an important constituency. July 14th was fixed as the National Fête Day—the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille which has acquired a remarkable symbolic significance in France.

Gambetta was presently to have his chance, and poor use he made of it. The *scrutin de liste* as opposed to the uninominal elections was in the Republican traditions of 1848. Gambetta advocated this method—this false and futile species of proportional representation—but found both Grévy and the Senate hostile. Nevertheless the 1881 elections went overwhelmingly in his favour. He had dreamed of a great Gambettist party. He constituted a Grand Ministère. France has never shown herself partial to Grands Ministères. The tendency is always to split up into smaller groups and Cabinets of All the Talents are looked upon with suspicion. Indeed, the composition of the Cabinet was found disappointing : there were many unknown men included. The success of Gambetta awakened numerous adversaries among the Moderate Republicans and among the men of the Extreme Left. He was thought to be too ambitious. When he sought to touch the Constitution and to inscribe in it the *scrutin de liste*—one of the matters on which to this day France is constantly changing her opinion—he was thrown down. The idol which was placed on its pedestal in November was shattered in the following January. Gambetta, in whom great hopes had been placed, was a beaten man, and before the end of 1882 he died in mysterious circumstances. He was shot in the house in which he lived with Léonie Léon. Had he committed suicide ? Was it an accident ? History is silent on this point.

After some interim ministries Jules Ferry took up office and stayed for two years. He was the protagonist of a Colonial policy. The growth of Imperialism under the Third Republic is a curious chapter. It has been argued that in Colonization there is an outlet for the activities of a country ; if there are Colonial wars there is less likely to be a Continental war. French adventures in Tunisia, in Morocco, in Egypt, or in Tonkin, are a sort of lightning conductor. Bismarck favoured this theory. With misgivings about the recovery of France and the possibility of a French attack, he regarded the Colonial diversion with equanimity. The most perilous incidents have arisen out of France's Colonial policy, and it would be easy to show that the Great War was in part the outcome of the Franco-German quarrels in Africa. The Monarchy of July had begun this policy with the conquest of Algeria forty years before. It cannot be urged that France is an over-peopled country which has need of expansion. It has never been able to send out enough men to colonize successfully. Marvellous projects are drawn up but they are rarely realized or are realized too slowly. The latest attempt was made by Albert Sarraut, who, when he was Colonial Minister under Poincaré, demonstrated in an excellent book the potential riches of the lands under French control. Full commendation must be given to some of the

French ideals. The French accept the peoples of other races as French; and in the Palais-Bourbon are coloured deputies from the French colonies.

But when all is said about the spread of civilization the French, who do not as a rule care to expatriate themselves, have never taken kindly to the various expeditions required by the modern form of Imperialism, and they have become, as it were, against their own convictions and temperament the second Colonial Power in the world. They were prepared to fight for National integrity and even for Continental glory, but they have until recently not reconciled themselves to heavy losses, great expenditure, profitless efforts, in distant territories. The great colonizing movement had been started by England, and France, feeling after her humiliation that she was sinking to the rank of a second-rate nation, found an opportunity for aggrandizement in following the British lead.

There were men who were already thinking of a *rapprochement* with Germany. It is possible that Bismarck would have been willing to try the experiment had it been urged with boldness. But the politicians feared that France would quickly be dominated by Germany. The question which was posed was whether France should establish friendly relations with her powerful neighbour and be content with a subordinate position or resolutely declare for independence and assume a prominent rôle outside Europe. The latter course commended itself to Ferry. Men like Clemenceau, the terrible tumbler of Ministries, the uncompromising Radical, opposed him. Their thoughts were turned towards the pursuance of the immense European feud, which was never abandoned. In the end Clemenceau overthrew Ferry, but not before France had committed herself to the Colonial path.

Ferry proclaimed that France should increase her influence throughout the world, and carry her language, her customs, her flag, her arms, her genius, everywhere. Colonies, he said, were an advantageous investment. Questions of national honour were imported into the discussions. While the chief aim of Ferry was to enable France politically to regain her place among the great European Powers French capitalists were interested. In two-score years the French Colonial Empire was extended enormously. France added Tunisia, Tonkin, Madagascar, Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, a portion of the Congo, Morocco, and other places to her possessions, and has now received a mandate for Syria. Among those who have been the greatest pioneers in this respect may be mentioned Paul Doumer, who, as Governor-General of Indo-China, consolidated the French footing in the Asiatic countries ; and Marshal Lyautey, who spent thirteen fruitful years in Morocco.

The general consequences of Colonial enterprise have not always been pleasant. The Tunisian conquest cost France the hostility of Italy which, despite much rhetoric about the Latin sisterhood, has never been eliminated. The Soudan incidents developed Anglophobia among the French and Francophobia among the British. With the attempt of Marchand to arrest the march of the British the conflict was acute. Happily the Fashoda dispute of 1898 was settled amicably, but while England was engaged in the Boer war the French looked suspiciously and bitterly upon the British, and in spite of *ententes cordiales* their smouldering antipathy is always ready to blaze out. As for Morocco, it has been a powder magazine ready to explode at any moment.

Credit should, however, be given the French for their building of railways, their construction of ports, their efforts to secure order and develop resources, together with their faculty of assimilation, of making coloured men regard themselves as French and of treating them as such. The view of men like Clemenceau and the Radicals who denounced the colonial policy was that conquests and annexations were immoral, that the Declaration of the Rights of Man did not admit the existence of superior and inferior races, that the civilizing mission was a mere pretext and that only financial oligarchies profited, that the national resources were dispersed. Moreover, though Ferry was building greatly he made the mistake of covering up his operations. He was not frank. The Chambers were ill-informed. He obtained credits painfully and repeatedly and was hampered because he could only dispatch "little packets." Perhaps, too, he unduly exploited the facile thesis of the honour of the flag. The result of the grave check of March 28, 1885, was exaggerated alarm in a Parliament which was scarcely aware of the vast plans pursued. The people had never cared about the colonial activities of Jules Ferry and the Langson disaster swept away "the Tonkinois" on March 30th.

Among other accomplishments of Ferry were the conventions with the railways, which, though denounced by Camille Pelletan as scoundrelly, permitted a great improvement of internal transport. He also caused to be passed in March, 1884, a law providing for the legal constitution of Trade Unions. Again, on July 27, 1884, divorce was re-established in France. It had already been allowed in 1792 and was maintained by the Civil Code. Under the Restoration it was abolished because the Catholic religion stood for the indissolubility of marriage. Various propositions in favour of divorce had been defeated until Ferry took the matter in hand. Afterwards the elections yielded characteristic results. Brisson advised a union of Radicals, Opportunists, and Moderates, as against the Conservatives; and his own Ministry, as well as the Ministries of de Freycinet and Goblet, were Ministries of Republican Concentration. It is precisely in this wide field, from which were excluded only the representatives of the Extreme Right and the representatives of the Extreme Left, that Parliamentary intrigue and manœuvring and grouping in multiple combinations can best be exercised. When Rouvier came to office it seemed that even the Conservatives would be included in the coalition, while the Radicals would temporarily be left outside it. The need for a policy of appeasement was felt. The anti-religious war was beginning to displease the country, and the class war—or as it was called the anti-social war—was wearisome. Paris, which is always *frondeur*, was not content with the period of calm and considered the bargain between the Moderate Republicans and the Conservatives immoral.

At this time there was a diversion. The son-in-law of the President of the Republic, M. Wilson, was compromised in the disgraceful traffic in honours. Grévy could not abandon his *gendre*. He was not a big man but he was personally honest and faithful. He had only been re-elected after his first septennate because the politicians were at variance and the people were disgusted with their pettinesses, their jealousies, their foolish rivalries. Grévy was put up a second time because these leaders, realizing their unpopularity, wished to give the country the impression that there was continuity and not hopeless division, that there was political peace when there was only political strife.

One must sympathize with Grévy, who was not personally implicated in the scandal which broke out in 1887. In the summer of that year a General was arrested on the charge of trafficking in the

Legion of Honour and a Senator fled. A number of accomplices were indicated. Many Parliamentarians were involved. Daniel Wilson, living with his father-in-law at the Élysée, was unquestionably concerned in various improper practices. Attempts were made to smother up the affair, but in November a Commission of Inquiry was ordered, prosecutions were authorized, the Rouvier Ministry was overturned. Grévy at first refused to depart, but finally on December 1st the poor old man was compelled, in view of the increasing agitation, to resign. Sadi-Carnot, a moderate, timid, respectful politician, was elected President, while the authorities were trembling lest a new Commune should be declared. Once more the people were clamouring for a Man, as they are inclined to do whenever things go wrong in France. Sadi-Carnot was not that Man. Hopes were placed in General Boulanger.

For a time it was thought that Boulanger would regenerate France, the prey of quarrelsome and incompetent politicians. He had shown himself implacably against the descendants of former reigning families, against whom exiling laws had been passed in 1886, and thus commended himself to the Radicals. The Radicals, too, were essentially patriotic and were Jacobin in spirit. The Chauvinism of Boulanger did not at first distress them. But when he openly put forward pretentions to the Dictatorship, when a Cæsarian party organized itself around him, when he presented himself for election with the programme of Dissolution and Revision of the Constitution, the Radicals reluctantly abandoned him. The Royalists, the Imperialists, and the Revisionists (that is to say, the partizans of Boulanger) were apparently pursuing a "parallel action" against the Republic. Many professed Republicans were discontented with the *régime*, and, hoping for something better, gave their adherence to the new Nationalism of the General. The Comte de Paris and the Duchesse d'Uzès financed his party. Time after time he was elected by huge majorities. His main strength lay in Paris and in the North and West of France. The South and the East were cold towards him. Had he been the Man, had he possessed courage and ability, he would have seized the moment when he was at the height of his popularity and have marched upon the Élysée. It would have been perfectly easy for him to have swept away the whole pack of men in and about the Government offices. It would have been easy —had he been the Man. Unfortunately for him he was not; he missed his opportunity through timidity, hesitancy, lack of intelligence and energy. His adversaries breathed a sigh of relief; they were surprised that they had escaped so lightly; they set to work once more to tinker with the electoral law, and they even summoned up enough courage to institute a process against him in the Senate constituted as a High Court of Justice for "plotting against the security of the State." Then the poor, puffed-up windbag burst: Boulanger fled the country. Naturally, the general elections after his flight went against him; and he committed suicide. Charles Floquet and Tirard may be mentioned as the principal adversaries of Boulanger, but a far more important and successful adversary of Boulanger was the General himself.

It is not easy to account for the popularity of Boulanger. Never did he have much to recommend him. When he first entered the Freycinet Cabinet as War Minister on January 7, 1886, he had a vague reputation for his work in Tunisia but was not particularly known. His inclusion in the Ministry was a surprise. At that time he was regarded as a Republican, and he confirmed this view by sending suspected cavalry regiments, Monarchist in sentiment, away from Paris. The Royalists were not really dangerous but they repeatedly caused alarm. Hence the laws of exile against families which had once reigned over France. Suddenly at the military review of July 14th Boulanger excited the crowd to enthusiasm by his mere appearance. He sat superbly on his black horse, his blond beard uplifted, his white-plumed hat symbolizing some great epopee. Throughout the year the French wove romantic legends about this fine figure of a man, and when on December 3, 1886, de Freycinet fell, there opened definitely that period of confusion, of agitation, of violence, which may specifically be called Boulangist. Germany was stirring. Boulanger was believed to be preparing war. On April 20, 1887, there occurred the Schnoebelé incident. Schnoebelé, a French commissioner at Pagny-sur-Moselle, was arrested by the German police as a spy. He is said to have been tricked into crossing the frontier. There was an uproar, but the matter was settled. The Goblet Ministry, however, fell in a few weeks. The controversy somehow ranged itself around Boulanger. Nevertheless the Rouvier Cabinet was constructed without Boulanger, who was sent to command an army corps at Clermont-Ferrand. Paris clamoured in vain for him. The citizens tried to stop his departure, thronging round his train. Even then he might have obtained supreme power had he chosen. Then followed the nocturnal conferences about the Grévy scandals in which he participated. Again he lost his opportunity. The Floquet Ministry saw a development of Boulangism. Boulanger became chief of the party of discontented citizens who were appalled at the sterility of political quarrels, the repeated Ministerial crises, the futile debates, the absence of reform. His followers sported the red carnation as an emblem. They demanded the dismissal of the Chamber. Boulanger was the hero of a series of triumphal elections, and the Radicals, foreseeing that the virtual plebiscite on his name meant a Dictatorship, turned against him. He fought a foolish duel with Floquet in which the military man and not the civilian was wounded. Even ridicule could not destroy his popularity, and amid the allegations of general corruption he continued to be elected until on January 27, 1889, he was victorious in a Paris election. He was for a moment undoubtedly the master of the capital. The authorities, expecting a *coup d'état*, were ready to fly. But Boulanger's courage failed him and thereafter there was a quick decline of Boulangism. It was on April 4, 1889, that the Chamber authorized proceedings against him in the Senate sitting as a High Court of Justice. When he thought only of his personal safety, taking refuge in a foreign country, the elections swung against him. The Royalists had expected much from him just as the Radicals had expected much, and there was general disappointment. The end came on September 30, 1891, when he shot himself in Brussels on the tomb of Marguerite de Bonnemain.

The Republic, again saved, endeavoured to consolidate itself. A World's Fair was held, the Eiffel Tower was erected, and the Centenary of the Revolution was celebrated with great pomp. Several important laws were passed. Perhaps the most notable were those which established a Protective system. Tariffs which would tend to shut out foreign goods were demanded both by the industrialists and the agriculturists. Jules Méline, the champion of the agricultural classes, initiated and inspired this policy, which France has since definitely adopted, becoming one of the most highly protected countries in the world. There was a reorganization of the parties. A Pontifical Encyclical Letter formally counselled the Catholics to accept the Republic. Doubtless Leo XIII had in view the possible modification of the anti-Catholic laws, especially the educational laws, and saw that while the Conservatives took up a negative attitude and put themselves outside the Government their action would be ineffectual. The Socialists also counted their forces. They were strengthened by the return of the Communards and by the law of 1884 permitting professional syndicates. Yet although the different groups were occasionally brought together there were several Socialist parties: the partisans of Blanqui, formed the Parti Socialiste Révolutionnaire; Jules Guesde, modelling himself upon the German Socialists, organized the Parti Ouvrier Français. Then there were the Possibilistes—the Féderation des Travailleurs Socialistes—who strove for reform. These were not all, and it was not until some years later that a Unified Socialist Party was to have real influence on the policy of the country. In 1890, however, the Socialists instituted May Day as the Fête Day of the Working Classes. The First May Day passed quietly enough, but in 1891 there was the shooting at Fourmies. Clemenceau issued his famous warning that the Fourth Estate—the working classes—was coming into its own and reproached those who endeavoured to prevent its advent with blindness. It may properly be said that from 1889 to the Dreyfus Affaire there was a period of impotence in which the Opportunism which had been initiated by Gambetta revealed its bankruptcy. In all the Cabinets you may find the same men. They simply changed portfolios. The Tirard, the Freycinet (1890), the Loubet (1892), the Ribot (1892), the Charles Dupuy (1893), the Casimir-Périer (1893), the Dupuy (1894), the Ribot (1895), and the rest of the Ministries resembled each other strangely. Yet a few new men were emerging—Barthou, Poincaré, Deschanel, and on the Socialist side, protesting against repressive methods, Millerand, Viviani, and Jaurès.

A strange fatality followed the Republic. The Panama scandals revealed the corruption of politicians. They were accused of having accepted profits from " publicity " and from the share issues of the company which had the work in hand and which went into bankruptcy. It was alleged that 150 members of Parliaments had received three million francs. A Prime Minister was involved. Cornelius Hertz, the friend of Clemenceau, who supplied funds for " Justice," was accused. Everything was done to hide the truth, and though prosecutions were ordered there were only a few nominal convictions. There is no doubt that the outbreak of anarchy was chiefly due to the apathy of the authorities. Many bombs were thrown, and at the end of 1893 a bomb fell in the Chamber. There were rigorous laws against the Press passed in a panic and still sometimes enforced. On June 24th Sadi-Carnot was stabbed at Lyons and Casimir-Périer was elected President. Sadi-Carnot had represented the *petite bourgeoisie*, but Casimir-Périer represented banking interests, and it was freely declared that his family was enriched by undesirable practices. A great popular campaign was pursued against him. One of his traducers was prosecuted. Scathing speeches were made against the President. The traducer was acquitted and Casimir-Périer resigned on January 16, 1895.

The Panama Affair, which largely provoked this series of events was indeed disgraceful, though Ferdinand de Lesseps, the great engineer who designed the Suez Canal and was chosen to design the Panama Canal, doubtless acted in good faith. The Columbian Government had accorded the right to a Frenchman to cut a waterway from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. The capital was subscribed by the French peasants and by the bourgeois class. The work started on a grand scale. There was mismanagement, extravagance, fraud, and many thousands of economical French families saw their savings disappear.

It is curiously characteristic of the French that they are always ready to take a financial interest in grandiose schemes abroad, and without inquiry will accept the assurance of foreign governments with whom France happens to be friendly. Shamefully have the thrifty people been robbed again and again. They were enthusiastic about Turkey and then about Russia; always did they show themselves credulous and trustful. Their frugality and toil have been badly rewarded. As I write banks of a mushroom kind are springing up all over the country and without guarantees the French are making the most doubtful investments. They seem to believe anything that is told them in money matters: witness the extraordinary belief in Germany's capacity and willingness to pay such sums as 400 milliard gold marks by way of reparations. Unfortunately the newspapers, instead of warning the people, often encourage these financial fictions.

There was a tremendous outburst of distress and indignation when the country found its savings swallowed up in the Panama Canal. For many years the older politicians lay under the shadow of this unpardonable failure brought about by fraudulent proceedings. It may be well to add here that the United States afterwards bought the concessions from France, treated with the Government of Columbia, and completed the cutting of the Panama Canal by October, 1913—thirty odd years after the French had begun the enterprise.

The "new spirit" which was announced after the Panama scandal by the Dupuy Cabinet may thus be judged: the intentions of the authorities after the great clean-up were doubtless good, but there was one inherent vice. It was a vice inherited from the Second Empire, but it was more widespread through the inability of the Republicans, after Thiers, to produce anything but a swarm of contending politicians without a fixed centre, without settled principles, without administrative grip. While they battled with each other, often on unreal issues, often for purely personal motives, mainly in a party spirit, there was working underground a deadly evil. A few years ago a distinguished and witty Socialist, Marcel Sembat, wrote a book with the suggestive title *Faites un Roi, Sinon Faites La Paix*. Its application was limited, but the title itself is a sufficient criticism of a warring Democracy. We must all be Democrats nowadays, and France has certainly suffered from her Kings, her Consuls, her Prince-Presidents, her Emperors; but France has also suffered from the lack of a directing hand. Democratic control or Dictatorship—the dilemma is hard: Dictatorship is to be abhorred, but Democratic control, which does not depend upon long tradition, is to be established only after painful experience. Dupuy tried to allay the animosities, tried to stop the rush for the spoils of office. The "new spirit," much vaunted, did not produce its expected fruits. When Spuller spoke of religious tolerance, Goblet cried: "Confess that you have made a Pact with the Church!" Yet a brave attempt to introduce moderation was made by Ribot. Then came Léon Bourgeois, who first conducted a *bloc* of Radicals and Socialists. He has never been given due credit for his efforts to introduce into French life the income-tax. The French are hostile to direct taxation, which involves inquiry into their private affairs. They prefer indirect charges. When it is asserted that they do not pay a fair share of their revenue to the State, it should be remembered that not until the Great War began was the income-tax put into operation and many years must elapse before its collection is properly organized. Bourgeois encountered the hostility of the Senate.

Yet the Senate has sometimes proved itself to be a bulwark of Republicanism. If it is an obstacle to the Radicals, it is also an obstacle to the Reactionaries. Single Chamber Government, especially in a country like France where there are violent oscillations, would be perilous. A Single-Chamber might be formed of men of the Left; it might equally be formed of men of the Right. The swing of the electoral pendulum might, if there were no Senate, result in the most undesirable as well as the most desirable changes. The Senate, nominated in sections of one-third every three years, must necessarily represent the more stable elements of the country. If the Senate during Bourgeois' Premiership opposed the income-tax, in revenge it showed itself more anti-Imperialist than the Chamber and refused credits for Madagascar.

What was the Dreyfus Affaire? Méline, who contrived to maintain himself for a considerable period in the Premiership with the support of the Right, the Nationalists, and the anti-Semites, declared from the tribune of the Chamber: "There is no Affaire Dreyfus." He was mistaken. The Affaire Dreyfus, with all its implications, was (with the exception of the Great War) the most formidable event of the Third Republic. It is difficult to convey to those who did not live through those stormy days, or who have not come into close contact with the men who ranged themselves on one side or the other, an idea of the perturbation that was caused by the wrongful conviction of a young Jewish officer on a charge of offering to Germany a document containing secret information. The incident in itself may appear trivial but it raised the most vital issues. It shook France for years. On the one hand there was the Raison d'Etat, la Chose Jugée, all the forces of Authority—Government, Army, Law. On the other hand were the Rights of Man and the sense of Justice. Edouard Drumont, a virulent polemical writer, exploited anti-Semitism as a new expression of Nationalism and roused hundreds of thousands of people with the cry "France for the French." Clemenceau, though himself an ardent patriot, cherishing the notion of *la Revanche*, gallantly championed the cause of Dreyfus. France was peopled by Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards. The anti-Dreyfusards believed that any methods, including fraud and forgery, were permissible against their adversaries. Men who had been lifelong friends were at daggers drawn. Families were at variance. Rarely has emotion run so high in any nation at any time. Not a Republican institution but was discredited. "My country right or wrong!" cried the upholders of State prerogative—and their country was the infallible Army and the infallible Church. "Let Justice be done though the Heavens fall!" cried Zola, and Jean Jaurès, and others who believe with Blake that

> A robin redbreast in a cage
> Puts all Heaven in a rage.

Since the Revolution France has seen many battles between the Raison d'Etat and the Droits de l'Homme, but the Dreyfus case was the most significant pitched battle between the two principles. The terrible esprit de corps was locked in a death-struggle with the individual.

The facts are simple enough, though they quickly became complicated by considerations which went far beyond the person of the unfortunate officer whose case extraordinarily called from their hiding-places ignorance, obstinacy, lies, corruption, abominations of all sorts, and served to reveal party prejudices, incompetences, egoisms, and "social decomposition." The guilt or innocence of Dreyfus turned on a document known as the *bordereau*. The handwriting experts did not agree about its authorship, but since Dreyfus was a Jew and popular feeling was against him he was condemned in 1894 by a court martial in secret session on secret evidence to military degradation and deportation for life. Six months after he was sent to the unspeakable Devil's Island.

Colonel Picquart, who became head of the Intelligence Department, discovered that Germany was still receiving information. Eventually Major Esterhazy, a Clerical, was openly accused of betraying France and of having forged the *bordereau*. He was tried and acquitted: the authorities did not want the matter reopened, and sent Picquart abroad. Senator Scheurer-Kestner was foremost in the campaign for the revision of the Dreyfus process, but against him were tremendous forces. Zola, whose famous pamphlet *J'Accuse* (January 13, 1898) stirred the world, was at the end of February ruthlessly condemned to a year's imprisonment. Happily he escaped to England. The Brisson Ministry, Radical in complexion, agreed to a retrial, but the War Minister, Cavaignac, reaffirmed the culpability of Dreyfus, presenting a forged document to the Chamber. Then Colonel Henry confessed that he was responsible for the *faux patriotique* and shot himself.

It was during the Presidency of Félix Faure (elected in January, 1895) that the Dreyfus Affaire began to attract attention, and it continued during the Presidency of Emile Loubet (1899–1906). Félix Faure was a Conservative, comparatively obscure until he was elected, but he chiefly desired to live comfortably in the Élysée, and did not hesitate to call to power the Radical Léon Bourgeois. Nevertheless he leaned towards the Right and was soon able to constitute a reactionary Cabinet, which gave every satisfaction to the Clericalists. On the whole, he favoured the bands of Militarists, of anti-Semites, of Royalists, who were ready to fish in troubled waters. His sudden death after the visit of his mistress on February 16, 1899, opened the way to the election of Emile Loubet, who though a Moderate was favourable to a revision of the Dreyfus case. Thereupon he was the object of disgraceful manifestations. He was subjected to repeated public insults. The Press, anti-Semitic and Nationalist, attacked his election as a challenge to patriotism, as a humiliation for the army. The Ligue des Patriotes of Déroulède, and the excited followers of Drumont, the Jew-baiter, provoked disturbances. A regiment was instigated to revolt. There was even an attempt to march on the Élysée. When the President visited the races at Auteuil on June 4th cries of "*Vive l'Armée!*" "*Vive le Roi!*" "*A bas Loubet!*" were raised. Loubet was assaulted. There were counter-demonstrations of workers, students, Socialists, and revolutionaries, for by this time a considerable section of the people had been convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus. When at last Dreyfus was tried again at Rennes in August, 1899, in spite of all that had occurred the esprit de corps once more manifested itself. The officer-judges were as unfair as military judges can be, and after a month's trial again found Dreyfus guilty. Nevertheless by this time public opinion in his favour was so strong that Dreyfus was released as an act of grace. Not until July 12, 1905, did the Court of Cassation legally proclaim his innocence. Not for seven years was he (or Colonel Picquart) fully reinstated in the army.

The fury of the Clericals, who exercised the greatest influence in the army, may be partly explained—though it cannot be in the least excused—by the belief that the successive Republican Governments which had practised an anti-Clerical policy were incited by the Jews and by the belief that the Jews in France were in close correspondence with the Jews in Germany. The anti-Semites were helped by the sharp practices of Jewish financiers in the Panama business.

Anti-Militarism and anti-Clericalism naturally reached a culminating point, and there was a determination to destroy once and for all Clerical organizations, which, not content with their religious hold on the people, had (as good Catholics regretfully admit) associated themselves with the most reactionary politicians and military men. One of the greatest Prime Ministers France has had in recent years, Waldeck-Rousseau, could not but take severe disciplinary measures against the Church. Perhaps it was inevitable that his policy should be carried to extremes three years later by the fanatical ex-priest Combes. Those who would examine this amazing affair in detail and draw from it all its lessons cannot do better than refer to the day-by-day account subsequently published by Clemenceau in seven volumes. These volumes constitute the most magnificent collection of portraits. If they do not utterly condemn the *régime* it is because side by side with the rogues and nonentities who had seized power there are many just men who were capable of any sacrifice, any bravery, any devotion, in the cause of truth and integrity.

Waldeck-Rousseau realized that the Republic was still insecure; all kinds of forces were coalesced against the Republic. Accordingly he formed a Ministry of Conciliation, which included men of many shades of Republican opinion. Millerand, who was a Socialist, was given office, and by his side sat General Galliffet, who had helped to put down the Commune. The Ministry discovered and suppressed a plot of the Right, and Déroulède, among other Chauvinists, was condemned by the High Court to exile. But it was in the Clerical circles that the Republicans were persuaded the real danger lay. With the growth of the modern sentiment of Nationality there has developed in most countries in which Roman Catholicism has any sway a resentment of interference in politics by an International Power whose head-quarters are the Vatican. It is impossible to deny that in France the priest unwisely sought to retain a grip on every institution and on every individual. His supremacy had to be destroyed if Republican ideas were to triumph.

Other countries have fought Catholicism by Protestantism. In France, Protestantism, in spite of the sixteenth-century work of Calvin, has not succeeded in taking deep root. It is not Protestantism but Secularism which is the rival to Catholicism. Catholics would declare that it is blank Atheism which has been opposed to their creed and their control. They assert that the war is between religion and irreligion. The Protestants had great political power four hundred years ago and on their side was the King of Navarre—afterwards Henri IV—Condé, Admiral Coligny, and others. It seemed that France was the most Protestant of all nations. Yet the long struggle between Huguenots and Catholics was in part a dynastic quarrel. When the Béarnais saw his succession to the throne open he renounced Protestantism and was converted. Without minimizing the part played by Protestantism in

French history, it is fair to say that Protestantism instead of developing declined, and in the last century was relatively a feeble force. The spirit of Agnosticism rather than the spirit of Calvinism is the spirit which in our time has been the antagonist of the Catholic spirit. Freethinkers and Sceptics, Revolutionaries and Radicals, Freemasons, anti-Militarists, Socialists and Anarchists are united in their opposition to the priest in politics, in administration, and even in the family.

Many politicians, on the other hand, argue that for the good government of peoples some sort of State-encouraged religion is necessary; that the irreverence of the people, the decay of belief, are baneful; that France in failing to set up a Gallic Church or in establishing a strong Protestant community has seriously weakened herself. It must not, however, be supposed that although Catholicism has been severely assailed and has been thrust out of its former strongholds the Church has altogether lost its influence. The separation of Church and State was admitted by French ecclesiastical authorities to be ultimately good for them, and they have in losing their political power preserved a place in the spiritual life of the country. France is still largely Catholic. There are provinces which are ostensibly anti-religious, but, despite the exigencies of politics, in these provinces the French people attend the churches and participate in the ecclesiastical ceremonies. Even those Radicals who are most hostile to the Church are often deeply respectful of the true mission of the Church. We see the children of Jean Jaurès brought up in the observance of Catholic rites. We see Clemenceau nursed by the Sisters. We hear Herriot speaking with the utmost tenderness of the Nuns and Frères. Traditional customs cannot be abolished: the simple folk adhere to Catholicism —even though they may clamour with the Mayor and the Instituteur of their village against the Curé and at election times applaud the politicians who are most vigorously anti-Clerical. This contradiction must be borne in mind if one would understand what has happened in France, and there must also be borne in mind the undoubted political provocation misguidedly offered by the priests.

The Concordat of 1801 gave the Church, subject to a definite assertion of the supremacy of the civil power, a position not dissimilar from that which it enjoyed under the Bourbons. The French Government nominated Bishops; their appointment was promulgated by the Pope. The priests swore fidelity to the State, which fixed their salaries. Ecclesiastical property which was sequestrated during the Revolution was recovered by the Church. It obtained its church buildings, seminaries and colleges, and much of its patrimony. It augmented its wealth, and by its control of Education, under the Second Empire in particular, its possibilities of propaganda had been increased.

Waldeck-Rousseau, who enjoyed three years of power, was a moderate man, extremely clear, logical, phlegmatic. When he became Prime Minister on June 23, 1899, he obtained a majority of only twenty-five, but in spite of the violent opposition his Cabinet lasted longer than any other Cabinet of the Third Republic, and eventually he spontaneously resigned for reasons of ill-health on June 3, 1902. Though a Conservative he was not systematically opposed to reform like Méline. He promoted measures which improved the conditions of labour, instituted old-age pensions, and fathered a scheme of arbitration to prevent strikes which was not, however, passed. He stood for the Concordat though he was firmly against the militant Congregations. It was not their suppression which he desired. Rather did he seek to provide a statute for them. The law of July 1, 1901, defines associations as bodies of men founded on a convention by which their activities and their knowledge are placed in common for other purposes than that of profit. Associations might exist but they would have no legal rights unless they conformed to certain rules. Those which had illicit designs would be prohibited. Congregations—that is to say, religious associations—were in a different category, because they were not composed of simple citizens, but were collectivities linked by vows, constituting States within the State. There were to be no new Congregations without decree, and the non-authorized Congregations were to be dissolved. There was tremendous opposition but the Bill was carried. The elections of 1902 brought a great Republican triumph, and Waldeck-Rousseau could count upon a majority of eighty-eight. Passions were inflamed and the Radicals wished to go further than Waldeck-Rousseau himself.

Emile Combes, who succeeded Waldeck-Rousseau, was an alert little man, seventy years of age. He had been prepared for the priesthood, but was passionately opposed to the political rôle of the Church. By the decree of June 27th he closed girls' schools kept by the teaching sisterhoods, and on July 10th a circular applied the same procedure to other religious schools. Preaching and commercial Congregations were refused authorization by Parliament. The law of July 7, 1904, denied teaching rights to all Congregations. Waldeck-Rousseau was eventually stirred to protest. Force had to be used to disperse some of the Congregations. Presently Pope Pius X entered into open conflict with the French Government. He refused to nominate the Bishops presented by the Government. He called to Rome Bishops suspected of good relations with the Ministry. When M. Loubet visited the King of Italy in March, 1904, the Pope addressed a protest to the Powers. He could not admit that the Chief of a Catholic State should by his visit to Rome recognize the legality of the Italian King's sovereignty in that city. He urged that the French were bound by the Concordat. The French retaliated by recalling their Ambassador at the Vatican. Combes declared, " Separation is imminent. I hold it to be inevitable. The idea of separation has made enormous progress for two years, and I, who was not partisan of a rupture at the beginning, must now accept it." France was again in an uproar. The Nationalists, who were also Clericalists, redoubled their efforts against the Radicals, and the Government instituted a system of espionage which was frankly offensive. General André, the War Minister, collected *fiches* from the Masonic Lodges which reported the attendance of officers at Mass. Combes was compelled to resign. The *bloc* too was breaking up. The Congress of Amsterdam forbade the French Socialists who adhered to the Internationale officially to support the Ministry.

There was further alarm among the moderate men at the influence of such Socialists as Jean Jaurès, who demanded economic and social reforms. There was nothing for it but a break with the Socialists; and Rouvier, governing with the Centre, resisted the Syndicalist movement but also proceeded to reorganize the relations of the State with the Church. Aristide Briand, a young Socialist, was the *rapporteur* of the Bill of Separation. The Concordat was denounced; all forms of religion might freely be observed but none of them was to be favoured or subsidized; the possessions of the Church were allotted to groups of citizens, formed into cultural associations. The Pope was clearly in opposition with the wishes of the French Catholics in forbidding them to come to terms with the Government. An inventory of the possessions of the Church was taken and a part reverted to the State, though the buildings and their furniture were left to the Clergy for purposes of worship. It should be added that such Catholics as Lammenais, Montalembert, and Lacordaire, had long before in the interest of a free Church advocated such a measure.

It would be wearisome to follow in detail the subsequent domestic history of the Third Republic. Armand Fallières was elected President on January 17, 1906. On October 19 of that year Clemenceau succeeded Sarrien and his Ministry lasted two years and nine months. Labour conditions chiefly engrossed his attention. He had taken into his Cabinet men like Briand, Barthou, Caillaux, Pichon, and Viviani. For Viviani a new post was created. He was made Labour Minister. This nomination strikes the key-note of those years. Clemenceau endeavoured to deal with labour questions—hours of work, hygiene, relations between employers and employees, unemployment, old age, sickness, general conditions of existence, and other social matters. Nevertheless the period is marked by many strikes. There was bloodshed. Particularly serious was the revolt of the wine-growers of the Midi, who experienced hard times. Clemenceau himself took the post of Minister of the Interior—then regarded as the most important place in the Government—and he displayed characteristic firmness. The oratorical duels between him and the Socialist leader Jaurès are memorable. In July, 1909, Briand formed a Cabinet with Viviani and Millerand—three former Socialists who had " evolved." Briand suppressed the railway strike of October, 1910. Thereafter Ministerial instability continued until the war, with the possible exception of the Poincaré Premiership from January, 1912, to January, 1913, when Poincaré was elected President of the Republic. He had succeeded Caillaux, and after him came Briand, Barthou, Doumergue, Ribot, and Viviani in rapid succession. The real interest was turning in the direction of foreign affairs. War was approaching with giant strides. Incident after incident sufficiently demonstrated to all judicious observers that the Great Powers were taking up their positions, that the fatal hour was about to strike.

No impartial survey of the long span from 1870 to 1914 can end on a note of praise for the French politicians. They have constantly elevated issues of secondary importance into undue prominence; they have practised the most deplorable opportunism and resorted to the basest demagogy; they have proceeded from idle controversy to lamentable scandal, and from lamentable scandal to unnecessary crisis. For the most part they have been singularly blind to social needs and to external dangers—and when they were alive to them they acted as in panic. But this is not an indictment of the French people, who are admirable, or of the French spirit, which has never been more brilliant; it is not a condemnation of the Republic, since we have seen that the Monarchy and the Empire equally ended in catastrophe. The difficulties which were encountered by succeeding Governments were formidable, and the processes of building up the new *régime* were such as would have taxed the abilities of the greatest men of impeccable character, exceptional vision, and resolute will, had the French been of one mind and had there not been perpetual mutterings, disconcerting and ominous, from across the Rhine, where a great and well-disciplined nation was growing daily more conscious of its economic and military might, and was unceasingly piling up its arms against the dreadful day.

WORKS TO BE CONSULTED

Andrieux: *Souvenirs d'un Préfet de Police*; Cornilleau: *De Waldeck-Rousseau à Poincaré*; Various authors: *Un Demi-*

Siècle de Civilisation Française ; Zévaès : *Histoire de la Troisième République* ; Béret : *De Gambetta à Briand* ; Reinach : *Histoire de l'Affaire Dreyfus* ; De Freycinet : *Souvenirs* ; Lissagary : *Histoire de la Commune* ; Deschanel : *Gambetta* ; Léon Daudet's *Mémoires* for lively portraits. The works of Hanotaux and of Lavisse contain much information.

CHAPTER IV

REPUBLICAN DIPLOMACY

Socialism and Syndicalism—The Hague—Near East Entanglements—German Overtures—A Search for Equilibrium—France and Russia—Delcassé—The Entente Cordiale—Mediterranean Policy—Germany's Determination—Triple Entente versus Triple Alliance—Agadir or the Two Paths—On the Brink

While the French politicians were thus muddling along from Ministry to Ministry Europe was living in a state of armed peace. It would be ridiculous to suggest that the diplomatists were deliberately planning war, but they were unable to establish conditions in which war would be unlikely to occur. War was always probable from the first years of the Republic to the final crash; and now and again a French statesman—Goblet, for example—would, his nerves exacerbated by some incident, exclaim: "It would be better perhaps to have ended all these German quarrels by war." Gabriel Hanotaux for four years, and afterwards Théophile Delcassé for seven years, were permitted quietly to remain in the post of Foreign Minister. Comparatively little attention was paid to them. They pursued their way in nothing like the limelight of publicity in which move Foreign Ministers to-day. Their general purpose was to find Allies for France against the day when the struggle which had been suspended and not ended should be resumed.

The Franco-Russian alliance, declared in 1897, and the Anglo-French agreement over Morocco, Egypt, and other subjects, in 1904, which began the Entente Cordiale, were the most important diplomatic achievements. Moreover, Delcassé in his Cabinet, working out possible European combinations, had assured himself of Italian neutrality.

The Franco-Russian alliance had always seemed certain, though Russia and Germany were perpetually flirting. Franco-German hostility could always be taken for granted, though there were occasional attempts at a *rapprochement*. What was less assured was the attitude of England, and Franco-British relations were at their worst just before they were at their best. "Our future is on the water," cried the Kaiser, looking on the Kiel Canal, which allowed the German fleet to make its exit from the Baltic; England could not but be alarmed. There were many tentative arrangements, many incidents, before the European Powers were ranged for the fray.

What was wrong was that the statesmen too readily accepted the doctrine of *la guerre fatale*. Germany was concerned like a parvenu with her prestige. France was obsessed by the menace of her great neighbour. In the schools of France there was far too much insistence on "patriotism." The loss of Alsace-Lorraine was told to the rising generations in accents of mingled regret for the past and faith in the future. The Army and the Flag were elements in something like a new religion. It is true that on the other hand there were strong anti-Militarist movements and that the Red Flag ominously made its appearance besides the Tricolour Flag—that Tricolour Flag which Gustave Hervé irreverently planted in a manure heap. It is true also that the Dreyfus Affaire dealt a terrible blow to the army.

While the armaments were being piled up, while Europe was bristling with bayonets and was black with cannon, a new force was coming into being. Socialist doctrines had been preached by Saint-Simon and his disciples during the reign of Napoléon I, but they had taken little hold upon the people. These precursors understood that social injustice had not been abolished by the Revolution.

Later their teachings were vulgarized by Prudhon and by Louis Blanc, but Socialists were still rare at the beginning of the reign of Louis-Philippe. France was not in the modern sense an industrial country: in the middle of the last century three-quarters of the people obtained their livelihood from the soil. Yet the mechanical age was opening and the bourgeoisie of Louis-Philippe began to exploit the workers more systematically. The transformation which was overtaking other European countries was slowly overtaking France. Steam was perhaps the most important factor in the development of nineteenth-century civilization. Iron and coal and other underground materials offered undreamed-of wealth to those classes instructed enough and strong enough to avail themselves of them. For the workers they meant the factory system and wage slavery. Transportation was revolutionized; the State conceded the working of railways to various companies that were formed. The operations of the Banque de France were enormously extended. Currency issues increased. The whole movement, that should be studied in its more characteristic aspects in England, may also be observed in France, though France was somewhat more refractory. A large town population of factory workers began to accept the ideals if not the doctrines of Socialism. There were many strikes marked by bloodshed.

Chiefly we must remark in this place the spread of the anti-war sentiment in the working-classes. The pacific current was encouraged both by Socialism and by Syndicalism. Syndicalism advocated direct action: direct action in the national domain and direct action in the international domain. In the event of war the workers proposed to rise against their own Government. They were opposed to the authorities, they were opposed to their masters, they were opposed above all to the military men, and cherished generous if unrealizable hopes of international fraternity. The enemy for them was not the corresponding class in another country: that corresponding class which in the event of war would be thrown against them by its Government was composed of their brothers in toil. They had, men of different nations, a common enemy: that enemy was hydra-headed—the Government, the Army, the Church, and all that was vaguely comprised in the term Capitalism. It was in 1884 that a law was passed giving the workers the right to form professional syndicates. These professional syndicates were affiliated to the Confédération Générale du Travail, commonly known as the C.G.T. Never have these associations been in numbers anything like so formidable as the Trade Unions in England, for the French worker is rebellious to organization. But their influence has no relation to their numbers. At heart all French workers are Syndicalists. There is always an incipient revolt among them; they are extremely class-conscious. In this they are unlike the bourgeoisie, who are sober, long-suffering, and respectful of authority. They are unlike the peasantry, which is independent, laborious, patient, and conservative.

It may be objected that the behaviour of the workers during the Great War refutes this assertion; the apparent contradiction is not, however, astonishing. When the critical moment came and the workers were persuaded that their country had been unjustifiably attacked their patriotism was reawakened. It was reawakened the more readily because the German workers, well-disciplined and obedient, made no protest against the national call to duty. The French Syndicalist and Socialist leaders thereupon lent their services to their Government. But there was and is a bellicose opposition to bellicosity, and everything that is believed to make for bellicosity, in the French working-classes; a perpetual ferment against authority and a desire for fraternization. Syndicalism was to be reckoned with before the war and to be reckoned with after the war, and Internationalism in the new clothes with which it has bedecked itself in Moscow makes a considerable appeal.

The Socialists with the progress of science, which determined the development of industry, also began to be a political power. From 1889 onwards they constituted a party which could not be left out of account. They were divided on the question of tactics. There were those who were frankly against Parliamentarism. There were others who recommended Parliamentary action. One section stood for the gradual permeation of the working classes with Socialism—an intensive propaganda until the time should be ripe for Socialist measures. The other saw that the ballot-box could be used in the furtherance of their aims. Under the impulsion of Jean Jaurès the party turned more and more to Parliamentary methods. Jaurès was a mighty leader with the most amazing oratorical powers, which he employed in the Chamber as in public meetings—a flowery but inflammatory eloquence which left no hearer indifferent. Yet his addresses were often models of reasoning. He touched France as no other orator, since his assassination on the very eve of the war, has done. Jaurès foresaw the conflict. Against it he directed his supreme efforts. While foretelling the catastrophe he believed it could be averted. It would be misleading to suggest that Socialism directed itself to domestic matters, to the amelioration of the conditions of the working classes, merely in an incidental and secondary manner; but the international aspect of its mission was vividly present to the minds of Jaurès and his followers.

From 1899 until the outbreak of the war, and throughout the war, the Radicals were in office. Conservatives may properly be said to have governed under the name of the Bloc National only from the end of 1919 to the middle of 1924, and even the Bloc National which, after the *union sacrée* of the war years, slightly shifted power to the Right, was a mixture of most of the parties, receiving considerable support from the Radicals. Jaurès had found it possible to work with the Radicals for some years; and a series of social measures, such as insurance against accidents, assistance in old age, and so forth, was passed. The Radicals nevertheless were responsible for the increase of the War Budgets and continued the Colonial expeditions, which increased the tension between European countries. Socialism, as the menace became more apparent, preached more and more fervently the need for European concord. It failed, and its chiefs, Jaurès removed, joined, in defiance of the Amsterdam resolutions, repeated by the French Socialist Party, the War Governments. It should be realized that there were, on the French side, great movements which, doctrine apart, were peace movements.

Nor was it only in the working classes that this reluctance to engage in warfare was articulate: a certain élite of France shrunk from war and demanded peace. French intellectuals—though there are striking exceptions—were persuaded, as Victor Hugo was persuaded sixty years ago, that the twentieth century would see the creation of the United States of Europe. There were great waves of idealism. This idealism was not confined to France. Léon Bourgeois, one of the most disinterested, retiring, amiable figures of the Third Republic, expressed his conceptions of social and international peace in a little work entitled *Solidarité*;

he was the chief French representative at the Hague Conference. It was the initiative of the Czar Nicholas II which led to the meeting of the Great Powers at the Hague. The Czar declared that the competition in armaments was burdensome and perilous; and the Russian circular intimated that the maintenance of peace and the reduction of excessive armaments was an object to which the efforts of the Governments should be directed. Europe was willing to ascertain what could be done. Twenty-six States were represented, but it soon became evident that no accord could be reached on the main issue. The blame for this check is commonly put upon Germany, and indeed German diplomacy, though often successful because it frankly makes use of obvious advantages, is not subtle; in this instance it was blunt and brutal. Germany expressed herself more openly than other nations, but Europe generally was too suspicious to take practical steps towards disarmament. If Germany, built upon military might, led the Opposition at the first Conference in 1899, the Opposition veritably existed without Germany. No delegate was ready to accept for his own country the diminution of its war forces or the limitation of their development. The French, it should be remarked, voted with the Germans. Disarmament is always excellent for one's neighbour, never for oneself. At the second Conference of 1907 nobody believed disarmament possible. Even Russia was hostile to her own propositions.

Léon Bourgeois has well said that disarmament is not a preparation for peace but a consequence of peace. The sense of security must precede it, and in Europe there was no sense of security. A better method of approaching the problem was that of an all-round acceptance of the principle of arbitration. But here again it was difficult to persuade nations that arbitration would work out fairly and would not be detrimental to their special interests. Compulsory arbitration was opposed by nine States, although such arbitration was not to apply to cases which involved vital interests. Both France and England were against obligatory arbitration in matters which touched them to the quick. Arbitration, in short, was held to be good only in minor matters, in juridical disputes. It has been pointed out with considerable truth that the attitudes taken up by France and Germany did not differ from each other in intention, but only were more or less frank, more or less skilful. If diplomatic talent is to be understood as ability to make black appear white, Germany is lacking in it.

If Germany showed an indifference to public opinion it was because she believed she was strong and was growing stronger. She was aware of the alliance of France and Russia, but with vigilance she believed that Germany and Austria could maintain their military superiority. Fabre-Luce writes: " If we compare the military chances of Germany in 1900 and in 1914 we will find that the augmentation of her technical strength was not balanced by the new danger created by the Franco-Russian military preparations and the changes in the diplomatic situation which liberated the French troops on the Italian frontier and made them available for the defence of the North, and guaranteed on the day on which the Schlieffen plan was put into execution the assistance of English soldiers." He also justly remarks that in respect of the Anglo-German naval competition it is to be remembered that England, while forwarding schemes of naval limitation, did so on condition that the relative positions were left as they were. England was supreme on the seas, and, in the Anglo-German negotiations of 1912, posed as a preliminary condition the consecration of that supremacy. In 1907 a superiority of two to one was demanded ; in 1913 sixteen to ten was regarded as sufficient ; and finally at the Washington Conference of 1921 England agreed to keep her navy on the same footing as that of the United States. It is obviously good policy on the part of any country which holds a military or naval advantage over its rivals to consolidate that advantage at a given moment by proclaiming a naval or military holiday.

At the same time Germany was going ahead in industry and commercial countries were alarmed. In France economic considerations did not operate as strongly as in England, but still France was beginning to develop her own industries on the German model, with enterprises interlocking, with companies connected with companies on vertical and horizontal lines. There is a tendency to over-estimate economic rivalry as a war factor ; the truth is that neither Germany nor France nor England could hope to gain anything in these days of economic interdependence by armed conflict. From the German point of view the idea was preposterous : Germany had everything to lose by an interruption of the process of peaceful penetration. It was against the interests of big business to resort to war. Germany's projects in China and in Africa, her expansion in Middle Europe and in the Near East, could hardly be served by the hazards of fighting. A close examination of Germany's diplomacy seems to reveal that the dominant purpose was that of breaking hostile alliances, of making her Empire unattackable.

Other objects emerge from the tangled story of the preparatory years, but supremely influencing events, whether in France or in Germany, were diplomatic conceptions composed of misgiving, pride, suspicion, and traditional animosity. Much more important than the desire for economic, naval, military, or colonial hegemony, as such, was the desire for an unattainable security, and in so far as that security was supposed to be threatened on either side of the Rhine, everything was sacrificed to the exigencies of a diplomacy which was in essence the perpetuation of a feud. All these moves on the chessboard of Europe were not a mere game but were regarded as necessary in the struggle for existence. Bismarck was troubled by what he believed to be the too speedy resurrection of France after 1871, precisely as Poincaré was troubled by what he believed to be the too speedy resurrection of Germany after 1919. He did not think France had been sufficiently crushed. Perhaps the Third Republic was, by its forty years of Colonial expeditions, by its continuous internal dissensions, " bleeding itself white," but in the eyes of Germany, dimly conscious of her blunder in wresting Alsace-Lorraine, which since Louis XIV had freely naturalized itself French, from the Republic, the maintenance of the *status quo* offered a dreadful problem. William I, Alexander II, and Francis-Joseph, the three Emperors of Europe, were at first equally concerned about the *status quo*. But the Czar quickly changed his mind. " A strong France is necessary to us," he declared. " Be strong ! " The Russian Empire had no love for France, but neither had it any love for a powerful German Empire. The League of the Three Emperors was therefore not destined long to survive the Berlin Congress. It was tested and found wanting.

Bismarck was a realist who recognized that contracts between great States are not unconditionally binding when they are contrary to the wishes of the Chancelleries. In 1874, when the French Bishops ranged themselves with the German Bishops against the Chancellor, he told the Russian Ambassador that he did not want war, that France should be permitted to reconstitute her army, but that he would not tolerate a Clerical France seeking to group together the Catholic elements of Europe. Russia was plainly warned against her inclination to defend France. The following year there was a still more critical incident. The French National Assembly created a fourth battalion in each regiment. There were the wildest rumours—Germany was said to be demanding liberty of action against France in return for Russia's liberty of action against Turkey. The Duc Decazes appealed to the Czar and endeavoured in an inspired article to stir England against the alleged German design of " finishing with France." At this moment England was uneasy at the triumph of Germany. There was *démarche* on *démarche*. The germs of the future Franco-Russian Alliance and the Franco-British Entente lie in this incident. Bismarck made some piquant observations on the military men who were " perpetually seeking war," and affirmed his own innocence. Doubtless there was much bluff; in part at least it was " a circus show," in which Germany was represented as ready to fall upon a feeble France, in order that Russia might appear in the magnanimous rôle of peacemaker.

Into the complicated Near Eastern affairs which furnished a subject for diplomatic manœuvres one need not here penetrate deeply, but briefly it must be told how France modestly re-entered the European concert. It was by the provisional settlement of these problems that something of a *détente* was achieved in the West. Russia had need of France and " took her by the hand " when she intervened in favour of the Slav races. Turkey was the " sick man." Austria wanted her part if there was to be a division of the Turkish spoils. Germany refused to be left outside any future arrangements. England was vigilant. These were the circumstances: Bosnia and Herzegovina were in revolt; the reforms promised to his Christian subjects by the Sultan in 1856 had not been carried out; Montenegro openly sympathized with Bosnia and so did Serbia, which was an autonomous but a tributary State; Bulgaria was a subject Power; Rumania was still oppressed; Greece formed a little Kingdom. On the mediation of the Christian Powers the Porte granted ameliorative measures. But the unrest broke out in fresh places and the Turks savagely massacred many thousands of Bulgarians. The French and German Consuls at Salonica were murdered. The Powers threatened drastic action. England held aloof, for she was aware of Russian aims and wished to maintain Ottoman integrity. Constantinople was the heritary dream of the Czars. It was a key to the Straits; it opened the doors of a new Oriental Empire. Russia mobilized against Abdul Hamid, and obtained Austrian neutrality by a secret agreement. In a Conference at Constantinople the Powers attempted to secure peace. There was a hopeless division. England was hostile to Russia, France was in no mood for actual fighting, Bismarck was content to wait. Naturally Turkey, who has always profited by the quarrels of the Powers, declined any overseership of the execution of reforms and continued to suppress the Montenegran rebellion.

In the end the Czar boldly declared war; Rumania proclaimed its independence and marched with the Russian troops. Plevna fell; the Turks were defeated at Adrianople; their capital was menaced. Serbia again came into the strife. Turkey could resist no longer; the Treaty of San Stefano was signed, and Montenegro and Serbia were declared independent, with extended territory. Rumania also received her independence, relinquishing Bessarabia to Russia in exchange for the

Dobroudja. Bulgaria was created as a new State which included Eastern Roumelia and part of Macedonia: an autonomous principality, tributary to the Sultan. Russia took Armenian territories. Turkey agreed to pay an indemnity. As was to be expected, there was a diplomatic uproar. Russia could not be allowed to cut up Turkey in this manner. England and Austria actually began warlike preparations. Rumania was discontented at the obligatory cession of Bessarabia. Bismarck significantly offered his services as "honest broker." This meant that Germany was detaching herself from Russia. A Congress of the Powers was held at Berlin. The proposed Bulgarian State was split up; Turkey was given back Macedonia; Eastern Roumelia was accorded a Christian Governor under Turkish sovereignty; Bulgaria proper was set up as a tributary principality; Bosnia and Herzegovina, though retained by the Porte, were to have Austro-Hungarian administration. Serbia came out of it well with her independence and larger territory. Montenegro was freed from Turkish control and received a port policed by Austria. Rumania did not recover Bessarabia but retained as compensation the Dobroudja and was compelled to emancipate her Jewish population. Greek frontiers were rectified in Thessaly and Epirus. Russia was not permitted to keep the greater part of her Asiatic gains. The Sultan of course pledged himself to grant religious liberty and social and political equality to the Christians in his territories. All this may be Disraeli's idea of "peace with honour," but there were checked legitimate Balkan aspirations and the check could only result in new wars.

Russia was dispossessed to the benefit of Austria, and the regrouping of the Great Powers was rendered inevitable. The Czar was embittered against Germany as well as Austria. The old Europe was ended; a new Europe was born. From the French point of view, which particularly concerns us, the Congress of Berlin (1878) meant the re-entry of France as a European Power through the portals of the East. At first there had been some hesitation. Should France take a subordinate place beside her victorious neighbour in this Conference? Should she thus acknowledge once more her destitution? Both Gambetta and Waddington after ripe deliberations saw that it was better to be represented. They went so far as to foresee the possibility of obtaining concessions from Germany and of founding a "new order" of things. The rival ambitions of Europe might give France an opportunity of recovering her own position.

Alternately Germany showed the velvet glove and the iron hand. A second war against France was difficult; this time there would have been intervention. Therefore while the European Emperors were endeavouring to form themselves into an "insurance society" Bismarck was seeking "counter-insurances." Among other things he was exploring the possibilities of an understanding with France. He it was who encouraged France to seek a Colonial outlet for her activities. His advances went so far as to adumbrate a Franco-German Entente against England; de Freycinet, afraid of duplicity which would leave France solitary in face of England, properly refused. After the fall of Bismarck, propositions of concerted action were launched. In 1894 Germany intimated that she would be willing to work with France in Africa; in 1895 the French fleet was invited to participate in the ceremonies at the opening of the Kiel Canal. Hohenlohe suggested a Continental Bloc which would prevent England from exploiting European divisions ("*diviser pour régner*"). Bulow proposed a "spontaneous parallelism" of French and German policies.

On many occasions it was hinted that Germany was prepared to turn a smiling face towards France. It is useless to speculate on what would have happened had French diplomatists ever considered it compatible with the national dignity to respond whole-heartedly to the Kaiser's indirect invitations to a reconciliation and *rapprochement*. The records of the years are strewn with tentative projects which may have been intended as traps, which may have meant the permanent subordination of France to Germany. The Moroccan troubles did not altogether destroy Germany's faint hope of an accord of a comprehensive character. Perhaps Germany was simply keeping another string to her bow; precisely how serious was the offer of an alliance in 1905 cannot be ascertained; but one cannot suppose Bethmann-Hollweg to have been completely insincere in 1911–1912 after the Agadir dispute in wishing for "progressive confidence" in Franco-German relations.

Some excellent work has lately been done by French writers in bringing together and examining these successive tentative peace proposals, and a tribute should be paid to their spirit of impartiality, their serious search for truth. On the French side the preliminary condition of any *rapprochement* was reparation for the wrong that had been done in 1871. Germany had first to furnish a substantial pledge of her good faith. She had to dissipate the natural belief that she was in one form or another seeking fresh conquests; and her tactics were not such as to inspire "progressive confidence." Now she would shake her fist at France and then she would hold out her hand ingratiatingly. How was it possible to convince oneself of her peaceful intentions? For while there were exhortations to pass the sponge over the past, to forget 1871, Germany was from time to time looking towards England. Moreover, she had drawn Italy into the Austro-German Alliance by the secret Treaty of 1882. Austria was willing to forget her defeat by Prussia; had not the wily Bismarck been careful not to inflict unnecessary humiliation on the vanquished enemy in Central Europe?

Italy had greater grievances against France and England than against Austria. The Austro-German Alliance was obviously the counter-part of a prospective Franco-Russian Alliance. France in allowing herself to be led off into distant adventures had come into conflict with Italy. The "Colonial derivative" had consequences which were not always happy. Tunis was looked upon with eager eyes by Italy; while France, established in Algeria, with England complacent, considered Tunis as her rightful inheritance and announced the Tunisian Protectorate in 1881. In addition France had, as we have seen, adopted Protection, and the system was irksome to Italy. Thus the Triple Alliance of Italy, Germany, and Austria was framed in 1883. Italy, acting in resentment, was perhaps unwise to enter this combination. She was assured of protection against the re-establishment of Temporal Power, but she virtually renounced the Trentino and Trieste and permitted Austria to become supreme in the Adriatic.

France, in spite of Russia's strained relations with Germany, could not for many years completely break the bonds between the two countries. They even entered into a defensive alliance in 1884. Nor could France forget that England was her rival in Egypt. She was still isolated; while England, alarmed at Russian influence in Central Asia, thinking of her Indian Empire, found herself too in a state of "splendid isolation."

In the imbroglio of European diplomacy one meets subtle calculations, stupid misunderstandings, cynical sharp practice, egoism, jealousy, envy, fear, hatred, and mistrust; and one is appalled to find nowhere any solid goodwill, any true friendliness, any altruistic sacrifices, a sufficient peace spirit among the men who were thus gambling with the destinies of peoples. There is a perpetual criss-cross of intrigue: Germany is the enemy of Austria until it suits her, because of antipathies elsewhere, to become her ally; Italy shifts from one side to the other in accordance with her supposed interests; England is watchful lest any of the Powers should steal a march on her; Russia is antagonistic or conciliatory at the behest of circumstances; France wavers towards this or that objective with no more real attachment for Russia than for Germany. Everybody is breathing painfully: there is no air.

So the wretched diplomatic business drags on: instability, uncertainty, no assurance for the morrow, the nations changing camps, placing themselves consciously or unconsciously in the best positions from which they can, if necessary, strike blows at each other. It is surely time to take to heart the lessons of this dangerous diplomacy, which consisted in building up perilous equilibriums in Europe, and to renovate the whole basis of international relations. It is not without importing into the passage a sense of irony that one re-reads the nineteenth-century prediction of Victor Hugo: "In the twentieth century there will be an extraordinary nation. That nation will be great but it will be free. It will be illustrious, rich, intelligent, pacific, cordial to the rest of humanity. It will be astonished at the glory of conic projectiles and will have difficulty in seeing any difference between a general and a butcher. A battle between Italians and Germans, between English and Russians, between Prussians and French, will appear to it as a battle between Picards and Burgundians would appear to us. It will regard the field of Sadowa as we regard the arena of Seville."

That country will be called Europe. It will be the United States of Europe. The true value of any study, cursory or complete, of the pre-war policy of building up alliances which were always directed against another alliance, is the conviction one acquires that such ephemeral enterprises must sooner or later lead to war. They are fragile constructions, continually dissolving, continually taking fresh shape, continually threatening a tremendous explosion. All the coming and going, the hurrying and scurrying on the diplomatic field of Europe which we have witnessed for half a century, is worse than futile.

What is called the Schnoebelé Affaire is an admirable example of the unceasing danger of war in the old Europe. Germany and Russia in 1886 were at daggers drawn on the question of Bulgaria. France would inevitably have been drawn into the strife. Then Boulanger, increasing French forces, almost precipitated hostilities. Germany took counter-measures. Schnoebelé, Police Commissioner at Pagny-sur-Moselle at this moment of tension, was arrested by the German authorities for espionage. His guilt seems certain and his arrest was not, as was pretended, on French territory but on German. The Café-Concert General—the General Revanche, as Boulanger was called—was aflame. A German sentinel shot on the frontier a French *chasseur*. Should France mobilize? "It would be madness," cried Grévy—"it would mean war."

The hotheads in France were suppressed, and Bismarck shrank from the *guerre préventive* which had been vaunted. But there was always Déroulède and his Ligue des Patriotes waving their banners with the device "*France Quand Même!*" to be feared. Passions did not die down: they were kept alive by the Nationalists, who abated no jot of their demands and stoked up the "sacred fires." They were only a minority, but they were a mischievous minority. Germany seems genuinely to have been anxious to avoid incidents. She wanted to consolidate the Empire, not to risk it in useless excursions. It is always foolish for a victorious nation to tempt Providence. Bismarck with remarkable prescience declared that the war of 1870 would be "child's play" compared with a new war at whatever date it came. How terribly right he was we now know.

With the disappearance of the old German Emperor, the accession of William II, and the dismissal of Bismarck, the ties which united Russia and Germany were entirely cut. The French were earning the friendship of Russia—it would not be cynical to say they were purchasing it—by subscribing to the Russian loans which were floated in France from 1889 onwards. These loans were warmly recommended in the French Press. The fact is regrettable, for Russian bonds were obviously not a sound investment. The banks had large commissions and the newspapers carried much "paid publicity." These Russian loans, floated on the Paris market, were not particularly encouraged by the politicians: it was the financiers who consciously or unconsciously pushed the politicians into a path that was to lead to disaster. The two Governments constantly exchanged civilities. Ribot worked actively for an accord. The French fleet visited Kronstadt and the Czar stood on the bridge when "La Marseillaise" was played.

A Franco-Russian accord was formulated in 1891 to meet the "situation created in Europe by the manifest renewal of the Triple Alliance and the adhesion more or less probable of Great Britain to the programme of that Alliance." Two points were defined: (1) In order to consecrate the Entente Cordiale which unites the two countries desirous of contributing to the maintenance of peace (i.e. Russia and France), the two Governments declare that they will put themselves in agreement upon all questions which might jeopardize peace. (2) In case peace is effectively in danger, and especially in case one of the two parties is menaced by aggression, they shall come to an understanding on measures which should be immediately and simultaneously taken by the two Governments.

Conversations were held about a common policy in the Near East; there were confidential instructions given; there were allusions to the situation in Ministerial discourses; but the diplomatic arrangement was secret. The convention was strictly defensive in character and Alexander III was doubtless sincere in his intentions. In France there was, despite the attempts at secrecy, great enthusiasm at the known *rapprochement*. To have secured Russian friendship was regarded as a remarkable triumph. At the same time Leo XIII, the Pope, recognized the Republic. There was a feeling that France was emerging from her isolation and humiliation.

A Protocol was eventually drawn up which confirmed in detail the earlier understanding. If France was attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia would employ her available forces to attack Germany. If Russia was attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France would employ her available forces to combat Germany. In case one of the Triple Alliance Powers mobilized, France and Russia without discussion would mobilize the whole of their forces and transfer them to their frontiers. The "available forces" of France were fixed at 1,300,000 men and of Russia at 700,000 to 800,000 men. They would act in such manner that Germany would be engaged on the West and East at the same time. The head-quarters staffs of the two armies were to keep in touch with each other and lay their plans in advance. Neither France nor Russia were to conclude a separate peace. The convention would be enforced as long as the Triple Alliance lasted. These clauses were to be kept secret. The Protocol was signed by Obroutcheff and General de Boisdeffre. The French General reported a conversation with the Czar in which he affirmed that mobilization was in effect a declaration of war. Not until 1894 did the Protocol come into operation as a Treaty by the exchange of letters, and its full importance was never realized by the French people until a few years ago. The initial text was modified on several occasions.

Germany was not blind to what was happening and reorganized her army. Millions of Continental soldiers were ready to fight, but in the civilized countries of Europe these millions of soldiers were held to be " the guardians of peace." Carnot on the visit of the Russian ships to Toulon toasted the Franco-Russian friendship as " an assurance of peace." Poor peace, that required such a multitude of armed defenders in antagonistic camps ! Nicholas II, when he succeeded to the Russian throne, had an enthusiastic reception in France, and President Faure was equally well received in St. Petersburg. The alliance was officially acknowledged in 1897.

England, on the whole, was on friendlier terms with the Triple Alliance than with France and Russia, for the Asiatic policy of the latter country was distasteful to England and the African policy of France resulted in much friction. The political convulsions of France continued, while Germany, under William II, developed inordinate ambitions. The Pan-German movement was colossal in its designs. *Mittel Europa* was a formula for children ; *Drang Nach Osten* was to be added ; and presently nothing less than a *Weltpolitik* was acceptable. Germany was to dominate the world. In Europe she was to be supreme. In Africa she was to possess a huge Empire. In America she was to have great satellite States. Were not the Germans the Supermen ? Nevertheless Germany made fresh propositions to France directed against England. In the Far East, Germany and Russia were mutually complacent. The Near East was in a state of ebullition, massacres of Christians shocking the whole of Christendom ; but the Western Powers were too divided effectively to intervene, and Russia and Germany did not come into collision. It was France and England who were most dangerously opposed.

France held she had rights which she had never relinquished in Egypt, and England plainly intimated that a French expedition on the Upper Nile which would menace England's position in the Sudan would be an unfriendly act. The real mission of Captain Marchand was to forestall the British and extend French influence. When he ran up the French colours in Fashoda in 1898 the British demanded his withdrawal. The French were not inclined to give way. There was a Nationalist outcry. Russia was opposed to violence. War was narrowly averted, but the French resentment lasted for some years.

The year following the advent of Théophile Delcassé as Foreign Minister was the year of the first Hague Conference. Futile as the attempt to give some moral unity to the Continent proved to be, the Hague perhaps contains the seeds of a better future. There the words which are now in everybody's mouth—arbitration and disarmament—were pronounced, and they have a growing significance for the war-weary peoples. There were other wars to follow which might easily have provoked wars between the great European Powers—the Boer War, the Chinese Wars, the Russo-Japanese War, the Balkanic Wars, and diplomatic quarrels which kept Europe on the qui-vive. Germany declined to associate herself with England against Russia, or with Russia against England.

Delcassé was permitted in a distracted France to work almost occultly at the Quai d'Orsay for seven years. They were seven extremely important years, those from 1898 to 1905. Delcassé has many admirers. He had a limited vision, but he was methodical, persistent, knowing after his first gropings, what he wanted, and striving unremittingly to attain his objectives. To the Franco-Russian alliance he held firmly. The Russian accord was extended; the two countries were to be "preoccupied with the maintenance of the equilibrium of European forces," and the union was to last, not until the break-up of the Triple Alliance, but "as long as the two parties shall have common interests." It was foreseen that the ramshackle Austro-Hungarian Empire might be shattered on the death of Francis-Joseph.

There came the accord with Italy by which France should have liberty of action in Morocco—which would complete the French control of an important part of Northern Africa—against Italian freedom in Tripoli. Italy was careful to inform France that she was not hostile to her Mediterranean colleague, and indeed a few years later signed a secret Treaty of reciprocal neutrality with France.

French criticism of Delcassé is that he endeavoured to develop a grand policy which might necessitate immense forces; and he did not trouble to inquire of his colleagues, military or naval, if his projects were not too ambitious. In diplomacy, as in house-keeping, one should live within one's means. This maxim Delcassé frequently forgot. France was too much absorbed in internal affairs to take an intelligent interest in foreign affairs; and Delcassé came near to dragging France into difficulties on many occasions.

He did not go to the Quai d'Orsay with a ready-made diplomacy. He was, for example, more inclined at first to quarrel with England than to make friends with her. The reconciliation which was effected in 1904 between France and England was unexpected. The two countries had regarded themselves as natural enemies for centuries, and although an Entente Cordiale had sometimes been proposed good relations had never been established on a solid basis. Since the fall of the Stuarts, France and England had been engaged in frequent wars, and in the intervals of these wars there was a precarious peace. Throughout the nineteenth century England perpetually hampered France. She was against French Colonial expansion. Difficulties were created in Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guiana, and in Senegal and Guinea. The French installation in Algeria was opposed; and although in exchange for a British occupation of Cyprus, England looked with a friendly eye on the French claim to Tunisia, she afterwards raised a number of objections. In Western Africa the Niger question provoked ill-feeling and menaces were employed. There was trouble over the Congo. In Egypt, after the purchase by England of Suez Canal shares, the British purpose was to prevent the French from returning to the lands which commanded the road to India. The Fashoda Affaire brought the Franco-British quarrel to its height. But there were other motives of conflict, in Madagascar, in Siam, in Morocco. How was it possible in a few years to bring about a sincere accord between the hereditary enemies? The key to the conundrum is to be found in Egypt.

On the whole, Germany had endeavoured not to alarm the Foreign Office. "In Egypt I am English," said the German Chancellor; and again, "England is more important for us than Zanzibar and all the Eastern Coast of Africa." There were polemics, diplomatic clashes, but the Wilhelmstrasse systematically tried to be accommodating in its relations with Downing Street. An Anglo-German treaty was signed in 1890 recognizing British pretensions on the Upper Nile. Three years later another agreement was entered into with regard to the German Cameroons. The foolish telegram of the Kaiser to President Krüger in 1896 did not prevent secret negotiations on the Colonial question. There was an Anglo-German Pact relative to China. But in the 'nineties the prodigious development of Germany, her economic efforts, her naval programme, her increasing action outside Europe, her diplomatic arrogance, her continual boasting, persuaded England that it was not France but Germany which presented a danger to the British Empire. The British Consuls raised a cry of alarm. Gradually the idea of a Franco-British *rapprochement* grew on both sides of the Channel. There were strong commercial reasons which were expressed by the British Chambers of Commerce. Politically the very defeats which England had inflicted on France in Africa and elsewhere destroyed, as it were, the causes of quarrel. As André Tardieu remarks, France had nothing more to gain and above all nothing more to lose. A reconciliation was possible based on a recognition of the Colonial *fait accompli*. Besides, Delcassé, pursuing his Mediterranean policy, thinking of Morocco, was obliged to turn, after his accord with Italy, towards England.

Whether he at that moment had the deliberate design of isolating Germany is doubtful. It may be that he proceeded step by step without any preliminary consciousness of a vast plan; but in so far as British friendship gave fresh diplomatic guarantees to France it was held to be desirable. King Edward VII visited Paris in 1903. There was some inquietude. Hostile manifestations were to be feared. But the Paris people welcomed him, without enthusiasm perhaps, but respectfully, and soon with sympathy. Two months later President Loubet returned the visit, and Lord Lansdowne said to Delcassé in London: "And now we can talk." The talk lasted for several months. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, and Sir Eldon Gorst worked patiently at the details of the agreement.

In April, 1904, the publication of the agreement produced a profound impression in Europe. It was a general liquidation. The convention concerning Newfoundland and Western Africa was comparatively unimportant; but the declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco had an enormous value and fixed the guiding lines of future policy. England's hands were free in Egypt and France's hands were free in Morocco. No longer was England to hinder France but was to assist her in her task of preserving tranquillity and effecting administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms in the Sherifian Empire. The supreme significance of the accord was not in the Colonial settlement but rather in the European alliance. A new weight was thrown into the international scales. France had increased moral authority. Russia did not take offence at the *rapprochement*, although England was allied to Japan and was hostile to Russia, who was engaged in a war with Japan. Demonstrations of Franco-British friendship were frequently repeated. The subsequent Franco-German quarrel served to cement it. The French always hankered after more precise engagements on the part of England—a formal Treaty converting the Entente Cordiale into an open alliance. When England and Russia subsequently composed their differences there could, in French eyes, be no longer any question of the desirability of the closest Franco-British friendship, and France sought assurances that an adequate British army would be ready for use in Continental conflicts and was disappointed that military reforms were not more seriously undertaken by England. In short, in the French view the Entente, while possessing great political value, had little military value.

It is necessary to survey the situation in the Mediterranean. French statesmen had long described the Western Mediterranean as " the theatre of our action." France had played an important part in the unification of Italy, in the construction of the Suez Canal, and in the Europeanization of North Africa. These were three important events. But France had to come to an arrangement with three Powers who were peculiarly interested in the Mediterranean if she were to exercise the influence which she considered should belong to her. There was first England, who held the keys of the Mediterranean at Gibraltar, at Malta, and in Egypt. We have seen how France and England arrived at a settlement. There were, besides, Italy and Spain.

Italy regarded herself as the natural guardian of Northern Africa. After 1870 she thought of extending her occupation to Corsica, Tunisia, Algeria, Tripoli. Egypt would at a later date not have been too large a morsel for the appetite of Crispi. It would be far too long to recount here the perpetual incidents, some of them ridiculously trivial in origin, which exacerbated Franco-Italian relations between 1881 and 1896. We have seen, however, that Italy eventually was persuaded that her place in the

Triple Alliance was disadvantageous to her: she was a mere puppet of Germany and Austria without receiving any benefit, and the precarious footing on which she stood with France was perilous. What determined a change of diplomatic direction was the need of a commercial Treaty with France—skilfully concluded by the Ambassador in Rome, Barrère—and the need of financial aid which followed the economic crisis in Germany. Paris became the banker of Italy. Delcassé did not lose the opportunity of engaging conversations with Italy. There was an exchange of notes regarding Tripoli and Morocco, and when the Triple Alliance was renewed in 1902 Delcassé was able to explain to the French Chamber that "the Alliance did not imply any hostility between Italy and France." "Neither directly nor indirectly is the policy of Italy," he said, "directed against France. The Alliance (so far as Italy is concerned) cannot comport any menace for us, either diplomatically or by reason of the international military stipulations. In no case and in no form can Italy become the instrument or the auxiliary of an aggression against our country." Nothing was changed in the existing Treaties, but much was changed in their spirit. Italy sincerely regarded the Alliance not as an offensive Alliance but as a defensive Alliance. It may be urged that it had always been thus described, but everything depended upon Italy's disposition to interpret the texts in one sense or another. Further, Italy had some years before come to an understanding with England, and the French understanding with England gave a new value to the Franco-Italian Entente.

There was a third country to be mollified—Spain. Spain had suffered the loss of her colonies; she had neither men nor capital; she was, as Victor Bérard remarks, a farm and a factory which were falling into decay. Morocco was a sort of prolongation of Spain. The Straits of Gibraltar were not a frontier. For centuries Spain had had connections with El Maghrib El Aksa. While the Moors and the Berbers thought always of the Palace of Granada, the Spanish since the days of Isabella had invoked historic rights in Morocco. True, those rights had never been realized. Ceuta, Tetuan, Mellilla, constituted a feeble and scarcely useful footing.

The Morocco of the present day is the remnant of the great Sherifian Empire founded by the Arab invaders who at the close of the seventh century carried their flag across the Iberian Peninsula. There was a long succession of dynasties, but from time immemorial the Government of Morocco had been despotic, barbarian, corrupt. European intervention was held to be necessary. France, because of the proximity of Morocco to Algeria and Tunisia, undertook to restore order. The Franco-British declaration intimated that France would put herself into accord with Spain. The tendency of Spain had been rather to approach Germany than France, and the negotiations between Delcassé and Léon y Castillo, the Spanish Ambassador, were long and sometimes painful. In the end, however, an agreement was reached " fixing the extent of the interests which result for France from her Algerian possessions and for Spain from her possessions on the Moroccan coast." The integrity of the Moroccan Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan was affirmed. France proposed a scheme of reform to the Sultan, with Franco-Spanish co-operation and economic collaboration.

Delcassé has been reproached with not making sufficient and immediate use of his diplomatic success. The severe blow dealt to Russia by the Japanese, the weakness of France divided by the

Dreyfus Affaire and afterwards by the religious quarrel which brought her army and her navy to a state of disaffection, were responsible for the vigorous action of the Kaiser, who visited Tangiers and in a public oration proclaimed the independence of the Sultan and spoke of German interests to be safeguarded. Germany demanded a general Conference on the subject of Morocco. She complained that the accords had not been notified to her. She demanded the dismissal of Delcassé. Prince Henckel Von Donnersmarck at Paris plainly stated that Germany held Delcassé guilty not only of lack of courtesy but of an attempt to turn a friendly power from Germany. The semi-official French newspapers, he said, had made clear that the principal object of the Entente Cordiale was the isolation of Germany, preceding and preparing an early aggression. In disposing of Morocco without consulting Germany, France had deeply wounded the Kaiser and his people. Was Delcassé's policy, he asked, that of France, or was it to be considered as a personal initiative? If Rouvier thought his Foreign Minister was engaging his country in adventures, it was his duty to separate himself from Delcassé. The Emperor did not want war; his principal care was to favour the development of German commerce. Naturally this brought him into opposition with England. The German fleet was only a means of execution of pacific projects, but England by her tradition sought to destroy the fleets of her neighbours. The Prince bluntly declared that if war came and Germany won, peace would be signed in Paris. He did not deny the possibility of a French victory, but he was aware of the germs of dissolution which had been sown in the French army. Suppose England bombarded the German coast, destroyed the German fleet, ruined the German Colonies: it would be with the French milliards that the damages would be repaired. Perhaps England could not be attacked on her own territory, but if French territory was occupied by Germany, England would be powerless to dislodge the German troops. France was invited to become the arbiter between England and Germany and so avert a general conflagration. Delcassé was denounced as a Minister who troubled the peace of Europe.

This declaration, as published by *Le Gaulois*, is extraordinarily illuminating. Delcassé's day was done; he had, according to his colleagues, been "tyrannical"; in any case he would have been sacrificed and already had been largely deprived of his power. Rouvier was content with British friendship; a closer alliance with England might indeed have led to war without saving France from invasion. But it was a pity that Delcassé was so ostentatiously dismissed at the bidding of Germany. It was a humiliation not merely for Delcassé but for France. Germany did not abate her demands because another Minister occupied the Quai d'Orsay. France was in a state of inferiority in the negotiations. She made concessions which in themselves were sufficiently recompensed by compensations on the German side. But it was not the local quarrel which interested Germany. She sought to break the alliances which were being formed and she sought to assert her own preponderance in the councils of Europe.

When the Algeçiras Conference was held the following year (1906) Germany was disappointed. Her earlier easy victory proved to be Pyrrhic. The cards which she held were not as strong as she thought. In a conversation between France and Germany, France was beaten; but in a Conference of the Powers Germany had to surrender. In an interval of a few months France had taken important military measures. Russia had quickly recovered herself and was on the side of France. England took up an unmistakable attitude. Spain was bound to her neighbour. Italy was friendly. Austria was indifferent. A *tête-à-tête* had enabled Germany to bluff; but she could not bluff in the presence of Europe. At first Germany was intransigeant; a rupture was probable. Léon Bourgeois, who succeeded Rouvier, rallied the Powers and demonstrated that France was well supported. It was impossible to break the new friendships which France had contracted; on the contrary, they were strengthened by the test to which they were subjected. German diplomacy, by its very brutality, after its initial successes, lost the rubber. A year later England and Russia defined their spheres of action in Persia, Afghanistan, Thibet; there was an exchange of visits of the sovereigns of the two countries. A Russian loan was floated in London. There were consultations of French and British military experts.

In short, the Triple Entente was consolidated in face of a Triple Alliance in which there were doubtful elements. Everybody knew that in the event of war—if a sufficient pretext were found, if the opportunity were considered favourable—it would be practically impossible to localize the conflict. These pacts between nations, though ostensibly defensive, can rarely, if ever, take the element of aggression into account; it is impossible to obtain unanimity as to what constitutes aggression and every one will decide in accordance with his interests and his sympathies.

In 1909 the Casablanca Affaire again induced some alarm. The German Consul had afforded protection to French deserters; French soldiers, on the other hand, had provoked troubles. Germany offered a reciprocal expression of regret. France declined and Germany suggested arbitration. It was held that both sides were blameworthy. Then

French diplomacy appears to have blundered. A Franco-German "association of interests" in Morocco was accepted to which other European countries were not a party. The Moroccan controversy was reopened in circumstances which could not be helpful to France, and indeed France took commitments which were contrary to those she had taken with her friends. She did not keep them; she did not co-operate with Germany in Morocco or in the Congo, where a *consortium* had been promised, or in the construction of a Cameroons railway, and Germany accused France of bad faith. France placed herself in a false position. When there was a general rising at the end of 1910 and the French sent an expedition which occupied Fez in the following year, both Spain and Germany were resentful.

Germany sent a gunboat—the famous *Panther*—to Agadir (1911). This act was intended to bring the whole matter of Morocco to a head. It was a reminder of Germany's might. There is no evidence that Kiderlen-Waechter meant war; on the contrary, Von Schoen at Paris asked for the opening of *pourparlers*; and private letters which were produced at the Caillaux trial indicate Kiderlen's peaceful intentions. But there was danger in the constant disputes. France was excited and any retaliatory measures on her part might easily have provoked strife. Lloyd George, on behalf of England, adopted a menacing tone. There was even question whether the British fleet should move. The Crown Prince and the other German hotheads were known to be asking for a Moroccan port. Would the Kaiser throw down the gauntlet? The moment was delicate. Caillaux has been severely blamed and has indeed been persecuted for his conduct in the Agadir negotiations.

The chief irregularity charged against him is that of going over the head of his Foreign Minister, de Selves. Yet it would have been foolish for him not to have tried every avenue of escape from the dreadful situation. France was altogether unprepared. Prominent French Nationalists have admitted to me that Caillaux could hardly have acted otherwise. He has set out his own defence at length and it is unnecessary to repeat it. The essential point is that France had already, after Casablanca, mortgaged her freedom and had to buy it back. The purchase price was not great. Many Germans were afterwards convinced that they had been outwitted. England and Russia, according to Caillaux, were opposed to compensations for Germany in Morocco, but were silent about the Congo. A bargain was made by which Germany relinquished her Moroccan claims for a strip of the Congo. It was a perfectly sound deal. Moreover, France was enabled to adjust the limits of the French and Spanish Protectorates, and if the Spanish have failed to enforce their influence the French, owing to the excellent administration of Marshal Lyautey, have, in spite of the challenge of the Riff, vastly improved Morocco by the building of railways and roads, by undertaking public works, by promoting social welfare, by developing agriculture and industry, and by rendering the country relatively safe and prosperous. But the Agadir incident created what it is the fashion to call a " complex," and this complex is answerable in part for the Great War, which was postponed only for three years.

Caillaux and Jules Cambon were justified in their personal action by the rivalry, the ignorance, and the incompetence of certain persons at the Quai d'Orsay. An intrigue was based upon papers known as the Documents Verts, and when M. Poincaré became Président du Conseil reproaches were addressed to

Cambon, who replied: "I confess I am surprised that the right of a Président du Conseil to pen and to receive private letters on matters which affect general policy is brought into discussion. This is the first time that I have heard the authority of the head of the Government questioned." Agadir—or the two paths: thus Victor Margueritte entitles the chapter of his book *Les Criminels*, which deals with the incident; and there is good reason to believe that Agadir was the turning point for Europe. It was not in respect of Morocco that the final disastrous quarrel of the European Powers was engaged, but everything is intertwined in the history of the crucial years, and it was by way of Morocco that we returned to the perilous Balkans.

When there are a multiplicity of secret bargains designed to establish an equilibrium any event in any part of the world disturbs the carefully established balance. If one nation obtains an advantage another nation makes a new demand; and advantages and demands are usually at the expense of a third nation. The occupation of Fez helped to determine the Italo-Turkish war, and this in turn led to the Balkan offensive against Turkey. Russia, not content that others should profit, was more than ever tempted by Constantinople and the Straits. Thus Germany and Austria were excited; and back rebounded the ball into France and England. Nothing is local: the nations are caught in a network, a spider's web whose every strand is shaken at the lightest touch. It is difficult to glance at the pre-war happenings which affected France without casting one's eyes over the world.

On the very day that France and Germany came to an agreement a significant *démarche* was made by Russia, and there entered upon the scene of this narrative two persons who make a strange contrast with each other. Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador, went to the Quai d'Orsay. He there met George Louis, the French Ambassador in Russia, who had been momentarily recalled to assist in the reorganization of the department. Isvolsky's proposition was enormous. Was not every other nation satisfying itself in the Mediterranean ? Had not Italy resolved to "realize the Tripolitan pledge ?" Was not England installed in Egypt ? Was not France consolidating herself in Morocco ? Had not Spain and even Germany made bargains ? What of Russia ? Since Russia had not opposed the French establishment in Morocco, it was only fitting that France should give her Ally, Russia, liberty of action in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. There was also question of Northern China, but the principal demand was a confirmation of Russian pretensions in the Straits. The answer of the French Government was cautious : it was merely a promise to exchange views with Russia if new circumstances rendered an examination of the question of the Straits necessary. Isvolsky was a cunning and unscrupulous diplomatist of the old school. The revelations that have been made of the intrigues of Isvolsky, his ascendency over Poincaré, his distribution of *largesse* to the French Press, throw a sinister light on his character. Georges Louis, on the other hand, was an honest diplomatist striving for peace, refusing to participate in the plots of Paris or of St. Petersburg, and for this he was later to be sacrificed.

Poincaré constituted his Ministry on January 14, 1912, and continued in office until he was elected President of the Republic at the beginning of the following year. He took into his Cabinet Léon Bourgeois and Briand. Millerand went to the War Office and Delcassé to the Naval Department. There is, in my opinion, much to admire in Raymond

Poincaré. He has not zigzagged like most of the Republican politicians. He is a strenuous worker and is not without moral courage. He is exceedingly lucid and intelligent. Unfortunately he had never forgotten 1870. He has confessed: "In my school years my thoughts, darkened by the defeat, incessantly traversed the frontier imposed upon us by the Treaty of Frankfurt; and when I descended from the metaphysical clouds I saw for my generation no other reason for living than the recovery of the lost provinces."

France was not deceived as to the dominating thought of Poincaré. There were many Frenchmen who shared his views, who saw in Germany an implacable enemy with whom war was if not desirable at least inevitable. Keen observers who moved in diplomatic circles, notably Morton Fullerton, for many years Correspondent of *The Times*, have referred to the disillusionment of France when Russia took the initiative of convoking the Hague Conference. In his *Problems of Power* he records that the Franco-Russian Alliance was regarded as a pledge for the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine. When Nicholas II visited the Galerie des Glaces in 1896 his appearance in that hall in which the German Empire was born was symbolic. The Russian Emperor "purified the place of the memory of the German Emperor." The Treaty of Frankfort could be torn up. Now, the Hague Conference seemed to those who cherished this hope to indicate that after all the Alliance was only the consecration of the *status quo*. The disappointment passed, and its original meaning was again attached to the Russian Alliance.

Russia renewed her demand for specific understandings, which would apply in a series of eventualities. The complications which were foreseen in the Near East were the subject of a *questionnaire* which

Sazonoff submitted to the Quai d'Orsay. At first Poincaré was vague, but Isvolsky continued his intrigues. He was annoyed at the sage counsels of Georges Louis from St. Petersburg and worked for his removal. The approaches of Germany, who was suggesting an arrangement in respect of Alsace-Lorraine on the basis of autonomy, were repulsed. "Only complete reparation would permit a *rapprochement.*" Philippe Crozier, the French Ambassador in Austria, was partisan of a Franco-Austrian understanding, but he, too, was recalled. Poincaré was induced to visit St. Petersburg: a visit planned by Isvolsky. The Franco-Russian bonds were drawn closer. With England the bonds were drawn closer too; the letters exchanged in November, 1912, though not obliging England to act in case of menace, constituted an obligation of honour.

Since the fate of France was, in accordance with the designs of Russia, to be staked upon the Balkan card, we must glance again at the Near East. Traditionally, France had sustained the Ottoman Empire, but this attitude was incompatible with Russian ambitions. Turkey was falling into a state of anarchy. Her Christian subjects were discontented. Her neighbours were prepared to fall upon her. In 1908 the Young Turks wrung a Constitution from the Sultan, and with the establishment of a Parliament it was hoped there would be vast improvements. Instead there were greater upheavals than ever. Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Prince of Bulgaria proclaimed himself an Independent Monarch. Serbia and Montenegro put forward claims which were supported by Russia. War seemed imminent, but Russia considered it wiser to beat a retreat when Germany threw herself unreservedly on the side of Austria. The Czar went to Potsdam and an agreement with regard to the Persian and the Bagdad railway was adumbrated.

But in 1911 the Balkan troubles broke out once more. Italy declared war on Turkey, and the Turks by the Treaty of Lausanne abandoned Tripoli. The following year Montenegro declared war on Turkey; and Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia presented ultimatums. The Balkan League overwhelmed Turkey. Macedonia under Turkish rule had been constantly disturbed: as it is to-day, for the question of Macedonia has never been satisfactorily settled. Macedonia was the prey of revolution, brigandage, and repression. The Bulgars were sympathetic to the Macedonians. Greece, which had been reorganized by Venizelos, was willing to strike a blow at Turkey for Macedonia. Serbia having lost Bosnia and Herzegovina looked sympathetically Southward. It was not only, however, sympathy with Macedonia but a common desire to acquire territory which momentarily bound together the Balkan peoples. The defeat of Turkey did not mean an end of the fighting. When the spoils had to be divided Bulgaria attacked Greece and Serbia, and Rumania attacked Bulgaria. By the Treaty of Bucharest, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and Rumania, obtained additional land. Bulgaria was disappointed. Austria was alarmed at the expansion of her Adriatic neighbour Serbia, backed by Russia; and Italy was sounded as to whether she was prepared to make war on Serbia.

Germany, who had favoured Turkey, had sent her cannon, and had directed her armies, did not come out of the conflict with increased prestige. It was certain that matters could not be left as they were; and it was to be feared that it was in the Balkans that the Great Powers would sooner or later fall out. Isvolsky saw that the Balkanic confusion would raise the question with all its historic consequences of the combat of the Slav races not only with Islam but with Germanism. In particular any movement of Austria would upset the general European equilibrium and jeopardize French interests. Isvolsky was convinced that if Russia made war France would make war too. That is one of the determining factors in the negotiations which in 1914 followed the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo and the Austrian demands on Serbia who was backed by Russia.

With the Powers thus ranged, with their interests defined, their sympathies engaged, their promises of support exchanged, and with the Balkans ready at any moment to burst into a blaze, only the most naïve politicians could be unaware that the war was approaching with giant strides. The race in armaments had been accelerated ; Germany had increased her Army and Navy ; England had increased her Navy ; Russia had increased her Army ; in France M. Barthou, the Prime Minister, had brought in a Three Years' Service Bill. Yet the Left, which governed in France, though uneasy, took refuge in an ostrich-like blindness. The venerable Ribot was overthrown on the question of Three Years' Military Service on the day that he presented his new Government to the Chamber. There was still enthusiastic talk of the " International spirit." While the clouds grew darker, the French people were regaled with a *cause célèbre* : Madame Caillaux, exasperated by the threatened publication of the compromising private correspondence of her husband (one letter signed " Ton Jo," in which political secrets were revealed, was actually printed), shot Gaston Calmette, the Editor of the *Figaro* in his office ; she was tried and acquitted by a Paris jury.

The Socialists, led by Jaurés, and other internationally minded men still tried to persuade themselves that the rival nations were advancing towards each other; as indeed they were—in the tragic manner of express trains advancing on the same rails from opposing directions. That France was as romantic as ever, that the collision was only vaguely apprehended, that it was not clearly foreseen, even by those whose business it was to watch events and ascertain their significance, was shown by the new journey of Poincaré, the President of the Republic, and of Viviani, the Prime Minister, to Russia, after the Sarajevo murder, leaving the conduct of affairs at Paris in the weak hands of the amiable Bienvenu-Martin. The assassination of Jaurés in a little café in the rue Montmartre, by a fanatic who was worked up to fever heat by the Socialist pacifism, was a crime which proved to be the precursor of a greater crime.

WORKS TO BE CONSULTED

Of varying merit are—Tardieu's *La France et Les Alliances*; Morton Fullerton: *Problems of Power*; Sir Thomas Barclay's *Memoirs* (the Making of the Entente Cordiale); Maurras: *Kiel et Tanger*; Fabre-Luce: *La Victoire*; Victor-Margueritte: *Les Criminels*; Caillaux: *Agadir*; Poincaré's *Memoirs*; Diplomatic Documents. Sydney Herbert's *Modern Europe* is admirably concise.

BOOK III

THE WORLD WAR AND AFTER

CHAPTER I

FROM 1914 TO 1918

War Guilt—French Women—Character Displayed—Bordeaux and Paris—The Marne—War Aims—Industrial Losses and Gains—Verdun—Défaitisme—Clemenceau—Caillaux—Single Command—The Armistice

THE strength of the reaction from any extreme position is in exact relation to the earlier exaggeration. Precisely because France believed, or pretended to believe, in the undivided responsibility of Germany for the war, large numbers of intelligent Frenchmen are now pronouncing their *mea culpa*. Perhaps it was a mistake to compel Germany formally to admit in Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles that she alone bore the blame for everything that happened in Europe. One has only to consider in the most cursory fashion the international system existing in 1914 to be convinced of the folly of trying to find proofs of culpability or innocence in the "dozen days" that preceded the war. The war arose out of a state of feeling, a clash of interests; it came because everybody had been preparing for it diplomatically and militarily. That Germany should have signed Article 231 under compulsion could mean nothing except that Germany was beaten.

A concession to *force majeure* has no validity. It is not thus that the question can be disposed of. This confession is of course now openly, officially, and formally repudiated by Germany. The whole of the Versailles Treaty hangs upon this peg of presumed German guilt. But it does not follow that France was foolish to insist on the insertion of the clause. In the long run it was to be discredited, but in the meantime the fiction enabled France to obtain arrangements which she desired. The process of breaking down the stipulations of the Treaty was to begin at an early date, but the process was to last a long time, and France might hope permanently to acquire something which she could not otherwise have acquired. M. Clemenceau may be cynical but he is not stupid ; he knew what he was about in affirming the unilateral guilt of Germany.

It would hardly be worth while to reopen the subject in this place were it not that the subsequent reactions are highly characteristic of the French mentality. The French are easily misled by their sentiments. They have an exceptional faculty of self-deception and mistake emotions for realities. They are perfectly sincere and are as a people not artful or perfidious in using their natural impulses to practical purposes. If they were sustained during the war and after the war by a deep sense of indignation against Germany, that indignation was genuine. It was not the indignation of men with tongues in their cheeks. The French as a whole were thoroughly persuaded that there was one culprit. They were not conscious of diplomatic guile. They do not make deliberate use of their collective passions ; whatever they are, they are not hypocritical. Readily inflamed, they do not coldly reason how they can direct their flame. But afterwards, when the flame has burnt itself out, they are capable of the most rigorous examination of conscience. Their native intelligence begins to operate and in keen analytical manner they endeavour to ascertain the truth about themselves and their neighbours. They are in their logical mood far more severe critics of themselves than any other people in the world.

I am not aware that any considerable body of opinion in England or America is inclined to reverse the war judgments to the extent of putting the chief blame on England, of laying stress on the Anglo-German rivalry, of condemning the rôle of

British statesmen, who, nevertheless, on many occasions were frank enough in their appreciations of the consequences which were bound to follow the diplomatic understandings in Europe. I am not aware of any widespread public belief in Germany that Germany was the aggressor; certain special verdicts in Germany are rather to be regarded as the expression of political hostility towards a *régime* which led Germany to disaster, and there are vigorous attempts at self-justification. In Russia too it required a revolution, a complete obliteration of Czardom, to expose the sinister Russian designs. So one could continue: exculpation is the principal object of the peoples. France is altogether different. M. Poincaré, who was obsessed by 1870 and who was an easy prey of the Isvolskys and the Sazonoffs, properly defends himself: he defends himself ably and sincerely. The official diplomatists, the active politicians, and the professional patriots, either remain silent or energetically fulminate against Germany. But the intellectuals and many of the rank-and-file politicians have undertaken the task of inquiring into the origins of the war, and far from absolving the Allies they go to the extreme length of inculpating France and Russia. This does not mean that they ignore the established facts of Germany's boastfulness, brutality, and belligerency. It does not mean that they entirely acquit England. But with what is undoubtedly an excessive and inverted intellectual honesty they distribute the blame, as they suppose, impartially, but in reality with a partiality which turns against themselves. Their attitude will give us the key to much that is puzzling in the French character. The French character is a curious blend of passions which may be essentially unreasonable and of logicality which pushed too far is almost equally unreasonable. It is the alternation of these two phases of the French mentality which partly accounts for the so-called instability of the French. Trace the course of French affairs and you will always find this alternation of hot and cold.

An extraordinary amount of talent has, then, been expended in lightening the moral load on Germany and in ruthlessly increasing the moral load on France. To the work of Fabre-Luce, *La Victoire*, I am indebted for a number of suggestions, but this work errs, because in spite of its air of detachment it degenerates into a piece of special pleading against France. The same observation might be made of Victor Margueritte's *Les Criminels*, which is a powerful indictment of Delcassé, Paléologue, Poincaré, and of the Ministers of the Czar. Those who have not had long and close experience of the French may find it almost incredible that there is relatively little protest against the revelations, the arguments, and the conclusions of these and similar works ; and that, on the contrary, both in influential and popular quarters, they are hailed with relief as illustrations of France's intellectual integrity. Groups, and indeed parties, inspire themselves with the writings of Gouttenoire de Toury, of Demartial, of Henri Barbusse ; with the publications of Clarté, La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, and similar associations.

It would be possible for me to draw up a long list of men on the Socialist and Radical side who seem to take a positive delight in searching out the damaging statements to be found in the national archives. They have a perverted pleasure in self-accusation. There is always plenty of evidence to make plausible any case which one sets out to prove. Poincaré was sometimes cautious and sometimes imprudent. The French were in the bulk pacifist ; they dreaded a war which they felt unable to avert. The Kaiser was truly a militarist, but German Ministers to the end were sometimes moderating and sometimes provoking in their conduct. The Czar can be shown to be pacifically inclined, but his Ministers were perpetually intriguing. Austria was constantly blundering. There were war parties in nearly all the countries concerned and there were peace parties. Unquestionably the pacifists were everywhere far more numerous than the militarists, but in an imperfect Democracy they either could not or would not at the critical moment make their voices heard loudly enough. The German Democracy was too docile. The Russian Democracy was altogether crushed. In Austria the war-mongers were firmly entrenched in power. In France there had always been a sense of grievance and many noisy Revanchards had determined never to forget the grievance; but, on the other hand, they would have been negligible had not the circumstances favoured them. The majority of the people was certainly not prepared to go to war; the majority of the people was peaceful. They could only have been induced to spring to arms by the fear and the persuasion of an attack. Their patriotism could be quickly touched and only when they were convinced that their country was in danger were they shocked into accepting the combat.

Two totally different witnesses may be called in to testify to the mentality of the French people in the days preceding the war. There is first Margueritte, who writes: "Was war the policy of France, or the policy of Boisdeffre, Castelnau, Foch, Joffre, who had dreamt like the Lorrainer only of the Revanche, since the days when they sat on the benches of the school? The heart of Poincaré and alas! of superficial Paris—Nationalist and therefore war-like—beat with the clique of Déroulède at the review in springtime. There were amassed at Vincennes around the regiments in field uniform, a million howling idlers with patriotic refrains, with enthusiastic cries of '*Vive l'Armée*': was the rest of France then animated by the same desire of Revanche as these excited crowds?

"Let us interrogate ourselves with sincerity. Our *raison de vivre* at that date was no longer to reconquer at any price the lost provinces. Only those who practised the religion or profession of Chauvinism were bent on restoration by force. The generation which in 1914 was to fight under the banner of the Union Sacrée had almost forgotten Sedan as it had forgotten Waterloo. It had almost forgotten, but it had not altogether pardoned. It sufficed that it believed itself provoked for the slumbering rancour to be stirred in many minds. In others the dominant sentiment was that of finishing once and for all with the menacing neighbour and with the nightmare of killing—a legitimate sentiment because they would be the Soldiers of Right. They hoped they were fighting the last war. In others there was the idea of a fatality from which they could not escape without danger for themselves, a sombre resignation to ancestral prejudices. But scarcely anywhere was there a real will to revenge."

Jacques Bainville testifies: "To avert the war it no longer sufficed that France accepted as a *fait accompli* the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and confined her military efforts to her defence. . . . The illusion of the French Democracy was that it could preserve peace because it was itself pacific. Nevertheless at last it became impossible to misunderstand the danger." After showing how the victorious Left parties split, how Socialism became audacious, continually provoking agitation in the country, adhered to the Internationale, and by its doctrines favoured an *entente* with Germany, an *entente* which was impossible because every new concession was followed by new demands; after showing that Caillaux incarnated the idea of a *rapprochement,* while Clemenceau fought against this tendency with the Jacobin school—he notes the advent of Poincaré, who did not accept Thiers' policy of forgetting. He adds: "In literature, in the Press, in the intellectual world, almost always in the margin of political life, there was a continuous movement to which the name of Maurice Barrès must remain attached against the abandonment of the national idea. . . . The French Democracy, indifferent to far-off events, lived in such quietude that it hardly noticed the ultimatum of Austria to Serbia. At bottom it believed the war impossible, a phenomenon of another age abolished by Progress. It willingly thought that if the Kaiser and the Prussian officers desired the war the German people would not follow them. . . . If in the years which preceded 1914 anything seemed to guarantee peace, it was that the vanquished of 1871 no longer thought of taking their revenge. Germany was so strong that nobody dreamed of attacking her. Ordinarily the victor has no interest in putting the victory into question. But Germany willed the war."

These quotations, though somewhat contradictory, not only with each other but with themselves, help to an understanding of the French mentality on the eve of the war. That mentality was itself contradictory: the mass of the people was convinced that war could not come; the politicians were concerned chiefly with domestic affairs; there was a spirit of Nationalism confined to a narrow circle, and a spirit of Internationalism vaguely exercising itself in a rather larger circle, but of a deliberate will to war no trace. Whether Russia mobilized first, whether the Alliances were prepared in view of the contingency which arose, whether

Poincaré was haunted by the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the possibility of their recovery, are interesting historical questions, but they are totally different from the question of whether the French as a people actively desired the war. They were not even expecting it, and on this point the verdict must be absolute.

It is not easy to believe after a most careful study of the evidence that any country as a whole consistently adopted a war policy and persistently sought hostilities. Austria is unquestionably more to blame than Germany, and no amount of subtle argument will overcome the fact that Russia was the first to mobilize in the West. If one accepts the French cry in 1914, "*La mobilisation, ce n'est pas la guerre,*" at least Germany was entitled to suppose that Russia had made up her mind to fight, and that Germany's safety lay in her striking quickly since she would be attacked on both sides. But when everything is said in mitigation of German guilt, and when the French Ministers are subjected to the sternest examination, it seems to me that the French writers who insist at all costs in putting the burden of blame on their own country are misguided in their zeal.

The visit of M. Poincaré, the President of the Republic, and his Prime Minister, M. Viviani, to Russia after the assassination of the Archduke does not suggest that they believed in the imminence of war. They supposed that this particular incident, though pointing to an ultimate conflict, would be settled. That they should absent themselves from their post at a moment when delicate diplomatic negotiations on which hung the fate of Europe were beginning is incredible except on the supposition that less importance was attached to the event than is now pretended. Certain authors not only assume the complicity of the Serbian Government and the complicity of the Russian Government but also the complicity of the French Government in a conspiracy of which Sarajevo was not only the pretext but the fore-ordained signal. They show a grotesque disregard for the facts. They imagine that with the full knowledge of a plot against the peace Poincaré left Paris. It was in January of 1914 that M. Doumergue, then Prime Minister, arranged the date of the visit. M. Delcassé was then at St. Petersburg, M. Louis having been replaced. (M. Delcassé was a little later succeeded by M. Paléologue.) A telegram from Tschirschky, the German Ambassador at Vienna, intimates that the Austrian note was held back until Poincaré was on the sea on his way home to France. The President admits that on the Russian voyage occasional misgivings assailed him, but he dismissed them as foolish fugitive fancies. Meeting the Czar he discussed the maintenance of peace. It was thought that the best way of avoiding a crisis was a public demonstration of fidelity to the Triple Entente. The steadying influence of England was counted upon. " More than twenty-five years," said M. Poincaré in a toast, " have passed since our two countries united the efforts of their diplomacy, and the happy results of that permanent association are felt more and more every day in the equilibrium of the world. Founded upon a unity of interests, consecrated by the pacific will of the two Governments, supported by the Territorial and Naval forces which know each other, esteem each other, and are accustomed to fraternize, confirmed by a long experience and completed by precious friendships, the Alliance of which the illustrious Emperor Alexander II and the late President Carnot took the first initiative has constantly given proof of its beneficent action and its unshakable solidity. Your Majesty may be assured that to-morrow as yesterday

France will pursue in an intimate and daily collaboration with her Ally the work of peace and of civilization which the two Governments and the two nations have never ceased to forward."

There were a number of fêtes in honour of the French visitors but few diplomatic conversations. The resolution of Austria was not known when they began their return journey. Von Jagow had telegraphed the movements of the French rulers to Vienna. The news of the ultimatum reached St. Petersburg after the departure of the *France*, on which Poincaré sailed for home. Surely the object was to prevent conversations between France and Russia on the specific subject of the ultimatum and its tragic consequences? It was while Poincaré was in the Gulf of Finland that a *résumé* of the Note was delivered by wireless telegraphy. M. Viviani telegraphed to London and St. Petersburg urging that Serbia should offer such satisfaction as was compatible with her honour, and also urging further delay. It was further suggested that the Triple Entente should ascertain whether an international inquiry was still not possible.

The French travellers arrived at Stockholm. The news there was ominous. Von Schoen, the German Ambassador at Paris, had, it was announced, advised no intervention in the dispute between Austria and Serbia. It was stated that the Austro-Hungarian Government had mobilized several army corps. Nevertheless, as no warning came from the French Government—M. Bienvenu-Martin was temporarily at the Quai d'Orsay—M. Poincaré participated in the Stockholm festivities, afraid of frightening public opinion by a precipitate entry. On July 26th it was announced that the Kaiser was hastening towards Kiel. Then the voyagers decided that not an hour was to be lost. Europe was in a state of excitement. *Démarche* after *démarche* was being made. Not until the 29th did the *France* come into harbour. On the jetties were dense crowds touched with patriotic emotion. France was ready for any eventuality.

Preparations for a mobilization were proceeding. M. Messimy, the War Minister, and other members of the Government met Poincaré and Viviani at the Gare du Nord. "Paris is splendid!" cried M. Messimy, and M. Poincaré recalls his own impressions: "Never have I seen such a profoundly moving manifestation. I regarded with heavily-weighted breast that innumerable population that had come from all quarters of the town. It had one cry—'*Vive la France!*' It had one soul; it expressed only one thought and one purpose. 'Do everything possible still,' said Paris to us, 'to spare us the horrors of war, but if you do not succeed have confidence in us. We know how to fulfil our duty.'"

That is a fair description of the sentiments of France. Poincaré wrote on July 31 a solemn letter to the King of England. He pointed out that in the neighbourhood of the French frontier Germany was mustering her military forces. He protested the prudence and the moderation of France, but he feared the most redoubtable events. He considered that if Germany had the certitude that the Entente Cordiale would be asserted in case of need on the fields of battle, the peace would still be saved. "It is on the language and on the conduct of the British Government that depend the last possibilities of a pacific solution." The reply from England assured the French that every means was being tried by which military operations could be adjourned and time gained for calm discussion. Unhappily when the reply arrived hope had gone. On August 1st Germany declared war on Russia. M. Viviani withdrew the French troops from the frontier for a distance of ten kilometres to render impossible any incident which would justify a declaration of war on France. Belgrade had already been shelled by the Austrians. There was nothing for it but a French mobilization. The violation of Luxemburg followed. Belgium refused to allow Germany a right of passage, and when Belgium, whose neutrality had been guaranteed by the Powers, was invaded England was compelled to come in.

Whatever view one may take of the blunders, the hesitations, the weakness of the diplomatists, whatever verdict may hereafter be given on the sequence of events and the responsibilities of statesmen, it is certain that the people of France were taken by surprise. It is certain too that they did not rush in eagerly with cries of "*A Berlin*" as in 1870. They showed a quiet determination not unmingled with anxiety. The French had been regarded as a posturing and frivolous people. They had been racked by political struggles. But they now came together, forgetting their differences, facing the invader bravely.

I write with personal knowledge, for my own duties took me to France and kept me there in an exceptional post of observation during the greater part of the war. Except for the dark days of 1917, when there was a momentary sense of dismay, the French people, soldiers and civilians, were splendid. They cared nothing for the diplomatic subtleties about which there have since been endless debates; they only knew that their country had been invaded and they showed a unity, a steadfastness, a cheerfulness and a patience which surprised those who had only a superficial knowledge of the French character. It may be true that the Parliamentary institutions and the politicians are not worthy of the people; it may be true that the people themselves are in normal times changeable, gay, and light-hearted (though such a description ignores their fundamental industry, prudence, economy, and intellectual keenness) ; but when the test came they were of one mind. They were prepared for any hardships ; they would endure to the very end. There were profiteers and *embusqués* as in all countries, but for the most part there was displayed true equality. The soldiers were not drawn from this or that class. They were peasants and priests. They were artisans and intellectuals. They were rich and poor. The *poilu*, as the soldier was nicknamed, was courageous and tenacious ; he was better than anybody had supposed him to be. All the miserable differences were forgotten. The Socialist and even the Anarchist was deeply moved by the call of the *Patrie*. The Royalist and the Republican joined hands.

When Jaurès, the idol of the working-men, fell it was feared that the workers might refuse to march. But pacifism does not exclude patriotism. They immediately rallied at the call of their country. They forgot their own griefs and grievances. From the beginning it was seen that the French, who are peculiarly attached to their soil, would hold together in adversity with a fortitude that perhaps could have been equalled by no other nation. One does not minimize the efforts of the soldiers of any land in pointing out that it is less meritorious to be brave when the flowing tide is carrying one to success than it is to stand firm in defeat.

The French were overwhelmed. They were ill prepared. The military organization was poor. Armaments were lacking. The fortifications were comparatively useless and the reserves could not be properly employed. For a long time M. Millerand, who was called to the post of War Minister, obstinately stuck to artillery conceptions which proved to be inadequate, and with misplaced loyalty defended the fossilized officers. Far too much importance had been attached to the Three Years' Military Service; it was not the number of men scattered in far-off garrison towns which mattered most. But in spite of reverses, in spite of terrible handicaps, the France which had been described as decadent was transformed: there was no moral confusion. When the mobilization orders were posted there was instantaneous acceptance of the situation. The nation sprang to arms.

The women, wives and mothers, restrained their tears, offered flowers to the troops as they marched or as they entered the trains, and afterwards returned to take up the work of the men in field, office, and factory. Everybody who has lived long in France must have been impressed with the efficiency of the French woman. Devoted as she is to the home, regarding the family as the basis of national life, practising the most careful management, unsparing in her labour, she is yet not narrowly confined to the household. In normal times she transacts business that in most countries the man transacts. She often works outside the home. She may keep a shop; she may direct some enterprise. Never does she allow herself to be regarded as a creature of leisure and luxury. She has not demanded the vote, because she is aware that by her activity and intelligence she has obtained for herself a much more important position than the vote or any formal recognition of an improved legal status would confer upon her.

Now she was to demonstrate to the full her capacity. She inspired the soldiers and she performed all the civilian tasks of the men. No praise can be too high for the French woman's behaviour during the dreadful years. France could not have carried on had not the women performed manual labour usually held to be far too heavy for them.

They ploughed the earth. They drove the public vehicles. They made munitions. They conducted the bureaux. They were the auxiliaries of the soldiers in the hospitals and in other institutions at the front. There was some breaking down of the barriers which had been erected by convention. While the French married woman was fairly free, the unmarried woman had been screened and scarcely allowed to venture abroad unaccompanied. Now necessity sent the unmarried woman from the home into various branches of activity. She acquired a liberty which had been denied to her, and conservative as the French are in their customs, it is difficult after the war to bring back the unmarried woman into the old order of things. The war has had a permanent effect on French manners. There was quickly instituted an extraordinary tolerance in the relations of men and women.

The *marraine* made her appearance. Literally translated the term *marraine* means godmother. Nearly every soldier had his godmother, young or old, whose business it was to look after his material and moral needs. Apart altogether from family connections, the soldier and the *marraine* kept up a constant correspondence between the front and the base; and soldier and *marraine* vied in expressing themselves cheerfully. It was a point of honour to hide discouragement, to be uncomplaining, to stimulate each other to the greatest exertions. How much France owes to this spontaneous resolve of the sexes to present themselves in the most favourable light and to assist one another in trials and tribulations can hardly be estimated. France kept up her spirits largely because of the pleasant fictions which were told in their innumerable letters.

The Government was forced to recognize social conditions to which it had tried to close its eyes. With the decline of religious feelings marriage in the formal sense had long fallen among certain classes into desuetude. It has been stated that in Paris alone there are 300,000 *ménages* which are illegitimate. But whether the union was legal or not the State could not take away the man without undertaking some responsibility for his companion. The allowances that were made to wives were also made to the authentic partner of the unwedded conscript.

There was of course no real change in the character of the French; the war merely served to reveal their true character. The foolish legends which had been accepted were dissipated. The heroism of the French is different in quality from the heroism of the German and the Anglo-Saxon peoples. It may be well to examine again the prevailing cast of mind of the French, and although generalities are always dangerous and although the French are composed of many types which do not resemble each other, yet they have common distinguishing traits.

On the whole, far from being frivolous they are profoundly serious; in their schools the curriculum is overcharged, and since diplomas are a necessary passport it is rare that the French student does not apply himself assiduously to the acquisition of knowledge; in the workshops and offices he is conscientious; on the land he is unremitting in his toil; everywhere he puts in long hours of labour and the Eight Hour Day is more honoured in the breach than in the observance. He accepts the marriages which are arranged for him with a single eye to the upbuilding of a family, and his chief concern is to establish that family on a solid foundation. It is true that with an exceptional sense of duty he has a smiling philosophy of life: he does not take his pleasures sadly; he makes the most of all good things which are within his reach; he possesses the art of *savoir vivre.* He is witty and polite because wit and politeness add to the amenities of existence; but there is an undercurrent of gravity in his sprightly conversation. This seriousness, allied with *savoir vivre,* he carried into the trenches: he had a stern purpose but he had also a faculty of amusing himself in the most arduous and unaccustomed conditions. He felt himself to be a free citizen, for the principles of the Revolution are deeply engraved in his heart, and it was as a free citizen that he played the part of soldier. The French respect authority but they do not surrender initiative. They were apt to despise the Germans as over-drilled, without individuality, machine-like, and obsequious. Themselves, they were ready to obey orders, for obedience is indispensable, but they preserved their personal judgments, and if circumstances warranted could always act intelligently without instructions.

There has been an exposure of the grotesque propaganda which was practised. Wild stories were set afloat—chiefly, it is fair to say, for the benefit of the civilian population and not for the soldiers who laughed at the absurdly overdone descriptions of their own exploits and of the German atrocities. The French, as I can testify, were refractory to the *bourrage de crâne* (literally, stuffing of the skull) that was attempted. That there was such *bourrage de crâne* cannot be denied, but the very expression which was applied in all circles to the efforts of the propagandists is a sufficient proof that they were not altogether accepted. The French are intelligent and scoffed at their own exaggerations. At the same time if detailed inventions made no appeal to them, if they kept up their cheerful courage, they were, as always, inclined to indulge in metaphysical conceptions. They are great lovers of language and words often take the place of facts for them. Throughout they looked upon Victory (wonderful word !) as an end in itself. Only after the strife was over did they, reverting to realism, accept Clemenceau's reminder that Victories may be Pyrrhic. With all their intellectuality they believe, as we have already remarked, in such ideals as that of Justice ; they love abstractions such as that of *La Patrie* ; Glory is for them an impelling force. The French are vain while the British are proud. The British are moved by the idea of domination, not for its own sake but because domination is held to be the natural function of the British race. The vanity of the French is different. There is no dour thought of taking up a burden. The French are not, and never will be, true Imperialists. They followed Napoléon because they were thrilled by flags and drums and a fine *panache*. They have always identified themselves with the cause of Liberty : they are against the Tyrant.

The Second Empire was inflamed by the oppression of Poland and strove for the independence of Italy, just as France after 1918 felt herself to be the protector of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia and the little nations of Central Europe. The men of France went forth with the high resolve that this should be *la dernière guerre*—the last war, the war to end war.

Often the French appear unreliable and temperamental. Outwardly they are more expansive than the Anglo-Saxons, but their true emotions are more restrained. If they are excitable they are not maudlin. As for the patience of the French people, which was a source of wonder to their Allies in the war, the French can sometimes be the most patient and long-suffering people in the world. A little lesson in national psychology could be learnt by observing a French crowd standing in queues at public offices. They are tolerant of red-tape, far too tolerant. Indeed it is their patience which explains the occasional explosions which result in violent changes. They do not protest sufficiently and frequently, but there comes a moment when the pent-up discontent bursts forth. Many of the antiquated French practices are due to this excessive patience; one might cite in this connexion the inexcusable abuses of legal administration which permit the detention of accused persons in prison for months and sometimes for years while the abominable secret building-up of the case against them proceeds; one might cite the absence of long overdue social reforms—inoperative and inadequate factory laws, sanitary laws, fiscal laws. It was obvious, therefore, that the French, intelligent, cheerful, physically brave, patriotic in the extreme, devoted to the cause of liberty, possessing a thirst for glory, moved by high ideals, and remarkably patient, would display great endurance. To suppose that they would flare up and then be extinguished was to misunderstand them completely.

The example of 1870, dimly remembered, was misleading. In 1870 the French were overrun and beaten beyond hope in a few months, but this material breakdown was offset by the moral courage that was conspicuously shown: when a great part of France was in the hands of the enemy and Paris itself was invested the rest of the country wanted to continue the struggle, and it was with difficulty that the more prudent statesmen obtained an acknowledgment of defeat. So far from 1870 demonstrating that the French quickly subside, it demonstrated the contrary: it demonstrated, as 1914 demonstrated, that the French are, if their feelings are touched, ready to endure to the end.

History almost repeated itself in 1914: Paris was on the point of falling; but the French then rallied and, inch by inch, year after year, debated every parcel of ground with an obstinacy that has rarely been equalled. It is not to their political leaders that the praise should go. Doubtless with good reason, but with little faith, the Government, when Paris was menaced, fled to Bordeaux, and there indulged in the usual intrigues and suspicions. M. Klotz in his book of reminiscences has revealed the differences which arose between the Bordeaux Government and the Paris authorities. There was apprehension lest a *coup d'état* might be prepared at Paris. With the President, the Government, and the Parliament at Bordeaux, it was feared that those who were in Paris might dispose as they pleased of the army.

M. Briand and M. Marcel Sembat were hastily sent to Paris to inquire into what was happening. When they reported favourably it was suggested that they too were in the plot and they were asked by telephone to return to Bordeaux. Galliéni, the Military Governor of Paris, received orders not to make any communications to the Press that had not been sent via Bordeaux ; and the Eiffel Tower, used as a wireless station, was attached to Bordeaux. Moreover, when the victory of the Marne was won, Bordeaux was grudging in its congratulations: the felicitations of Joffre to the army were published three days late. The taking of Maubeuge was never officially announced because Bordeaux omitted to give permission. The follies of the censorship were common to all countries.

The rapidity of the invasion, though startling the French, did not dishearten them. They maintained their composure while the Germans swept irresistibly through Belgium and through Northern France. Though the French delivered battle the tide was not to be stemmed. It was about the middle of August that the operations really began, and less than a week later the French and the British, fighting against odds, were retreating from Charleroi and Mons. The whole of the North was in enemy hands and the road to Paris lay open. After the Somme, the Marne; and after the Marne the Germans hoped the French capital would be at their mercy. The French saw that the German preparations had been incomparably better than their own. They saw that the enemy had definite plans which were being executed with clock-like precision. It was apparent that Germany had counted on a repetition of 1870. She anticipated that in six weeks or so France would be *hors de combat.* Of what use then would be British assistance, arriving too late? The French, though not ungrateful, have always been inclined to utter reproaches against the British for their inadequate military efforts at the beginning, though England provided more men than France asked for, and the original miscalculation was that of the French General Staff, which failed to foresee the break through Belgium. They have never fully appreciated the importance of the naval pressure which eventually nullified Germany's military strength—a steady blockade which deprived Germany in the end of the necessaries of life and of warfare.

Defeat seemed inevitable. Joffre preserved a sang-froid which was nothing short of marvellous, and subsequent criticisms of him are largely to be discounted because of his calm in circumstances which might easily have produced dismay and consequent disaster. This calm was infectious. Although the Government departed there was no panic. Moreover, the French were not unaware of the extraordinary behaviour of the "contemptible little army" of the British, which held on like grim death. If the British Army lacked numbers it was superb in quality, and small as it was furnished precisely the extra weight that sufficiently checked the advance, for Joffre at the critical moment to take a counter-offensive that was conclusive. In Paris the American Ambassador, Mr. Myron Herrick, though his Government was neutral, decided to place in case of need the French buildings and citizens under his protection. At the same time the Banque de France, in accordance with arrangements made some years before, began to remove to places of security its gold deposits and its title-deeds. When the Germans were within a day's march of the capital trains were carrying away French treasures. Had the Germans entered Paris they would have found little portable loot.

Then happened what has been called the miracle of the Marne. It was General Galliéni who first realized that Von Kluck had marched too quickly and was leaving his flank exposed. All available men were mobilized and conveyed from Paris in every possible kind of vehicle. In particular the taxi-cabs of Paris were loaded with men and munitions. At the Ourcq the Germans were checked. Joffre with inimitable coolness suddenly stopped the retreat. At exactly the right moment he flung his forces against the enemy. The battle raged from the environs of Paris to the Moselle. In the second week of September the enemy fell back. The war was already lost for Germany though it required many months of bitter vicissitudes for the Allied victory to be confirmed.

Time had been given to Russia to begin operations, and in spite of the Tannenberg defeat it was generally believed that the French could hold the Germans while the Russian " steam-roller " crushed Germany on the Eastern side. Germany herself had calculated on a speedy victory in France before launching her full might against Russia. In France, as in England, one heard much of the inexhaustible

Russian reservoir. One heard little of Russian military incompetence, of Russian corruption, of Russian lack of armaments.

There was much disappointment when the war became a tremendous siege. The Germans, on their new lines stretching to the Argonne, dug themselves in and the French also constructed trenches. Joffre began the hideous process of "nibbling." No military genius appeared to indicate any way out of the deadlock. Napoléon, it was said, "would have thought of something," but there was no Napoléon. Yet there were still flanks to be turned and Germany raced to the sea. This was a special menace to England, and accordingly upon the British fell the task of containing the Germans on the long left side. Had the Channel ports fallen into German hands further British aid might have proved impossible. At all costs England had to keep her communications with France open. Thus began the battle of Ypres, and by desperate exertions the Allies managed to reinforce and consolidate their line from the sea to Arras. By the end of the year there were no positions to be turned. The armies had settled down to trench warfare.

There were plenty of diversions outside France which it is not our business to follow, but if there were offensives and counter-offensives, if there were slight advances and slight retreats, on the whole something like a stalemate had been reached. Italy, which had belonged to the Triple Alliance and in 1902 had made known that she would move with Germany only defensively, came in with the Allies. The Turks entered the war against the Allies, who landed in Gallipoli. The French took up a position at Salonica. The smaller countries more or less cancelled each other out on the Allied and German side. Poison gas was used by Germany. Rheims was shelled. Aeroplanes and Zeppelins were active and submarines pursued their deadly work. The Pact of London was signed by which the Allies solemnly pledged themselves not to make a separate peace.

War purposes were secretly formulated. Russia knew what she wanted in the Near East and did not hesitate to state her claims. Italy saw her opportunity of completing her territory. England had mapped out her demands, which, had Russia not collapsed in 1917, would have caused much friction. It is noteworthy that the metallurgical basin of Briey was not shelled either by the French or the Germans: the ironmasters of both countries coveted it and desired to preserve it intact. France already foresaw the return of Alsace-Lorraine. We have observed how the loss of Alsace-Lorraine had obsessed the French, and the recovery of the provinces immediately became their chief war aim. They had also designs on Rhineland; the opportunity of obtaining a frontier which would have natural advantages and protect them against invasion was too good to be lost; an agreement on this point was reached with Russia.

But a terrible road had to be trodden before there could be any real question of war aims. The diplomatists might indulge in secret bargaining to their heart's content. The military men could cherish whatever ambitions they pleased. The industrialists could move occultly. These things were unreal for the fighting was continuous and there was no assurance of success. France was in exceedingly bad case. It has been estimated that the German occupation of the North put out of action 83 per cent of the French foundries. Eighty per cent of the looms for the manufacture of woollen goods were in the invaded regions. Fifty-nine per cent of the cotton spindles were lost to France. Seventy per cent of the sugar industry was in German hands. Ninety per cent of the iron ore was out of reach. Fifty per cent of the coal resources were temporarily abstracted. These figures sufficiently show how French industrial activities had been concentrated in the North and East. Thus it was easy, as it seemed, for Germany to cripple France. Yet France rose to the occasion. She reorganized her industries in the most astonishing manner. Factories were planted in all the unoccupied regions. They were of course devoted to the production of ammunitions and of such articles as were required by the army but they could subsequently be devoted to industrial purposes of peace. This reorganization of industrial life has had profound and permanent effects. The North remains the principal centre of industry because it is best adapted to manufacturing, but nevertheless there has been a dispersal of manufacturing energy, and France may be destined to be a manufacturing as well as an agricultural country. To-day in the Central Plateau and in the South a great impetus has been given to every branch of industrial activity. The war years saw a decentralization of industry and an exceptional development of equipment which naturally will not be allowed to fall into disuse; and if the North has been reconstructed, the North is no longer as far ahead of the rest of the country as before. Notably the war was responsible for the growth of ports.

In this connection it is to be noted that the old dispute between the men of the towns and the men of the country-side was intensified. The peasant has always been opposed to the townsman and the townsman has aired his grievances against the peasant. It was impossible for the authorities to exempt the peasants, who claim—I believe erroneously—that they were called upon to bear the brunt of the fighting. The losses of the town-dwellers were probably at least proportionately as heavy as the losses of the country-dwellers, but the country-dwellers saw that the artisans were drafted into the munition works and felt aggrieved. The land was left to look after itself, or rather was looked after by the old men, the boys, and the women. Thus another consequence of the war is that land has fallen out of cultivation; many of the country-dwellers who survived were drawn to the towns.

The financing of the war was a serious matter for the French. With the whole of their man-power engaged in one way or another it was obviously impossible to pay for the war by taxation. Besides, the payment of the current expenses of the war was the last thing in the minds of the statesmen. The winning of the war was for them an affair of life or death and they could not concern themselves about the financial consequences. There was a vast quantity of savings to be drawn upon. The best draftsmen of the country produced posters appealing for loan after loan. There was much short-term borrowing. Ribot was one of the chief authors of the Bons de la Défense Nationale. Out of the long woollen stockings came the hoards of the patriotic peasants and the patriotic citizens. There was no unemployment and in the factories relatively high wages were paid. So there began to be piled up an enormous debt which was afterwards to create almost insuperable difficulties. The policy of fighting to the last man and the last sou—*jusqu'au boutisme*—was dangerous, but peace without victory was unthinkable. Sufficient for the day was the evil thereof, and financial perils were ignored. The rich contributed little in the shape of taxation. The highest income-tax in 1919 was ten per cent. An excess profits tax was imposed but inefficiently collected. The rate of exchange was kept up artificially. France was obliged to borrow large sums from abroad, and, sure of her friendships, convinced of the financial solidarity of the Allies, did not regard these borrowings as ordinary commercial transactions. She considered the money thus contributed as the Powers' offering to the common cause. There are indeed to be found references to this conception in the archives, and both England and America appeared at one moment to admit the justice of the claim. Not until war sentiments had vanished was there to come a rude awakening and a disillusionment that produced much bitterness.

It was not long before the confidence placed in Russia was destroyed, and it was with surprise that the French saw Poland overrun by Germany. The Allies feared that the great sprawling nation would surrender and were ready to promise Constantinople or any other territory which Russia might demand in order to keep her in the fight. Germany having put Russia practically out of action—though Austria too was in no good case—threw the whole of her forces against France. The battle for Verdun lasted for nearly the whole of 1916. The assault was the most formidable of all the assaults of Germany. Furious, desperate, and mighty blows were delivered against the citadel that had a symbolic significance. If Verdun had fallen, then indeed Germany might have triumphed. Like a battering ram the German troops were hurled against Verdun. It seemed that no power on earth could withstand the shock. But the French resolved that the Germans "should not pass" and with unexampled heroism they held the fort. It may be doubted whether there has ever been in all time such fierce fighting. The Germans poured thousands of tons of shells on the French and showed the greatest bravery in hand-to-hand encounters. But the French were like wolves at bay. They disputed every foot of ground. They proved once more that they are capable of being the best soldiers in the world when they feel that they are fighting for a cause. They must first be persuaded they have right on their side and then, however peaceful they may ordinarily be, they will die rather than give way.

Russian influences had been evil, but they had been confined to a small circle and had not touched the people, and whatever aggressive purpose Delcassé may have had in his pro-English policy had been carefully concealed. Thus the nation was convinced that it was fighting for its existence against an unprovoked aggression. It was this consciousness of complete innocence of any militarist designs which paradoxically enough explains the spirit of self-sacrifice displayed in its highest form at Verdun.

It is also to be noted that there existed in the French Army a comradeship that is rare in armies. There may be brutal officers in the French Army but their number is relatively small. They were on the most friendly terms with their men, and, setting the example themselves, they were certain of willing obedience. It was not blind obedience but a reasoned discipline. The French soldiers asked, as we are told soldiers should not, the reason why. They used their native intelligence. The equality that reigned was due also to the mingling of classes. A former Minister was proud to be a sergeant and a distinguished diplomatist might be a private led by the son of his servant, or for that matter by his servant himself. Moreover, besides the national patriotism—for France since the Revolution has been represented as a "moral person," to use Viviani's expression—there is perhaps a deeper patriotism—the patriotism of the provinces. Napoléon, with his excessive system of centralization, had created *départements* dependent upon the Paris authorities, but these purely formal divisions have not, and never will, extinguish the provinces, which have now no legal existence. A Frenchman before he is a Frenchman is a Provençal, an Auvergnat, a Burgundian, a Norman, a Breton, a Tourangeau, and so forth. They were all mingled, the men of these provinces, in the army, and they were defending not only France, a "moral person," but their province, the soil which gave them birth, the soil on which they lived, the soil for which they would die. To omit this regional patriotism, which is not an artificial cult but a living love, would be to omit the most important factor in the mentality of the men who fought at Verdun. But there is another reason which operated. The French, idealists as they are, held firm at Verdun because they believed in the universal triumph of Democracy. They felt themselves to be free men fighting for freedom.

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Since the outbreak of the war there had been a number of Ministerial changes, but the dominating figure hitherto had been that of M. Aristide Briand. The Union Sacrée had given him an opportunity for the display of his remarkable Parliamentary ability. He had taken for himself the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. That post had during the whole history of the Third Republic been disdained by the politicians and had been left to specialists, some of them bad, some of them good. In the circumstances of the war it acquired a special importance. The anonymous author of *Ceux qui nous Mènent* writes: "M. Briand did not doubt that he would be another Talleyrand, that his instinct would serve him admirably in putting upon paper the results and the benefits of victory by accords with the Allies—accords that the democratic development of the war and the intervention of Wilson were soon to render inapplicable. That idea, and the support that he gave to the military chiefs who took the decision to defend Verdun at all costs, must be put to the credit of M. Briand. Nevertheless his Ministry was worn out. He found himself obliged in 1917 to resign. It was with chagrin, for the great rôle that he had planned for himself when peace should be discussed escaped him. This chagrin was converted into vexation, and vexation led to faults which are surprising in a man so adroit. Was he doubtful of victory or did he try to force his fortune when he received the propositions of Lancken ?"

At any rate, there came a moment when France was suspicious. The Union Sacrée was breaking up. In Parliament there were personal rivalries. Ministries were losing their stability. Pacifism, which was called *défaitisme*, was manifesting itself. This pacifism had passed unnoticed among a few extreme Syndicalists, and, given a literary form by Romain Rolland in Switzerland with his *Au-dessus de la Mêlée* and by Henri Barbusse in his magnificent picture of military misery, *Le Feu*, had not been taken seriously. Now doubtful overtures were being made by more or less authorized Austrian emissaries and Germany was putting out peace "feelers." Rumania had been crushed. The Russian Revolution, presently to take a still graver form, had begun. Greek hostility towards France was shown in the massacre of French soldiers. There was lassitude, demoralization, revolt. Even the Generals were quarrelling among themselves. The plans of General Nivelle were alleged to have fallen into enemy hands, and Nivelle was not on good terms with the British commander. Foch was under a cloud. The losses on the Allied fronts were heavy. There were whispers that the army had been betrayed and there was incipient mutiny.

The bitter winter had disheartened the Parisians ; well do I remember the incessant grumblings of this perilous period. President Wilson, following the German peace offensive, had asked the Allies to state their aims, and the facts insufficiently known at the time were badly interpreted. Viscount Grey has recently revealed that Mr. Wilson offered to bring America into the war on the side of the Allies early in 1916 if Germany refused to enter the Peace Conference he proposed to call. But the circumstances were unknown to the general public and what leaked out produced only a depressing effect. Viscount Grey hesitated to press the proposals on France lest that country, which already had suffered immense casualties, should think England was trying to back out of the conflict. The terms of the offer were conveyed to M. Briand informally, with the intimation that England would not raise the question until France wished to discuss it. France thought it prudent not to reply. The terms of the proposed peace included the restoration of Belgium, the transfer of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and the acquisition by Russia of an outlet seaward. Germany, on the other hand, should have compensation outside Europe. Mr. Wilson's object was to secure a peace which would make a just end to the war. His policy was founded on the assumption that a stalemate had been reached.

Unquestionably Germany was not prepared to grant such a peace. Nor were the Allies, who had resolved on a " knock out." Without a clear knowledge of the diplomatic moves, the French people instinctively realized that forces were at work which might rob them of their victory. Those who saw that a prolongation of the strife would be calamitous came out into the open, and throughout France there was an increasing uneasiness which was not allayed by the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany in February, 1917, and the formal declaration of war two months later. Germany had begun ruthless submarine warfare, which made it impossible for America to preserve neutrality, but there was general scepticism as to the effective participation of the United States until it was too late.

Things were at their worst when M. Ribot in March, 1917, formed his Cabinet. M. Painlevé was placed in the War Ministry, while M. Malvy, who was accused of furnishing secret funds to an infamous sheet called *Le Bonnet Rouge*, which was conducting a *défaitiste* propaganda, was maintained at the Ministry of the Interior. M. Painlevé has considerable qualities. His intentions were excellent, and he is to be particularly commended for nominating Foch and Pétain to high posts. The foresight and courage, the wisdom and energy which he showed in dealing with an ugly situation, were not at the time appreciated. Into the controversies which followed the failure of Nivelle, whose offensive was expensive and ill-conceived, I do not propose to enter. In September, Painlevé became Président du Conseil. Nevertheless there was a further decline of *moral*. In this lamentable year scandals and alleged treasons were multiplied. M. Léon Daudet and the adherents of the Action Française had denounced in violent terms the supposed traitors. It may reasonably be argued that Daudet, who saw in the most innocent actions a proof of treachery, helped to stir up the panic, but his excuse would be that his denunciations were inspired by patriotism and that it was necessary to cut out the cancer. For cancer there was, eating into the vital organs of the French. There were men who were without doubt rogues and adventurers, spies and traitors, and they were not dealt with with any firmness. The French did not know where treachery would next be revealed. They are always ready to believe that their reverses are occasioned by the corruption of the authorities. A little longer and the war would have been irremediably lost. Once more Parliament was discrediting itself and internal decomposition was setting in. It was high time that a sort of Dictator, fearless, strong, resolute, were called to office. Had Clemenceau not been available at this critical moment Germany, after all, would have won the war.

For three years Clemenceau by his *L'Homme Libre* (afterwards called, in permanent reference to the Censorship, *L'Homme Enchaîné*) had wielded an enormous influence. With his Jacobin opinions (though he has himself denied them) he had striven for a Committee of Public Safety. He had struck out phrase after phrase which had swept through the country. "*Maintenant, haussons nos cœurs!*" was repeated everywhere. Again, "*Mourir n'est rien; il faut vaincre.*" "*Une nation,*" he wrote, "*c'est une âme,*" and after Charleroi and the Marne he cried daily, "We want a Government of Steel." Some of his criticisms were found shocking, and the President of the Republic was afraid of the harm that was often caused by the sharp-tongued old statesman. It was not easy for the friends of Poincaré and Clemenceau to bring them together. Their characters were in opposition; their methods of expression and of action were very different. In normal times Clemenceau, aged and irresponsible, an *enfant terrible*, despotic, cruel, downright, would have been impossible; but with France falling to pieces a Dictator was not only possible but necessary. His arbitrary decisions, his tyrannical manner, his injustice, his illegality, can hardly be justified, but they had to be tolerated for the sake of the new spirit which he brought into the war. There was confidence in him. The soldiers, whom he had visited frequently at the front as

President of the Army Commission, loved him. The civilians, a prey to the spy mania, trusted him. The *défaitistes*, many of them sincere pacifists, many of them worthless adventurers, men who were fishing in troubled waters, feared him. . . . Clemenceau is a strange mixture of irascibility, of wisdom, and of vigour. If he instituted a sort of reign of terror he stimulated the sound elements of France afresh. He dreaded an inconclusive peace. His popularity reached its height when at the end of July, 1917, he mounted the tribune of the Senate and on that historic occasion denounced the demoralizing campaigns in favour of a peace of defeat. He examined the anti-militarist propaganda openly carried on by the *Bonnet Rouge*, edited by a despicable but clever person whose assumed name, Almereyda, is an indecent anagram. He accused the Minister of the Interior, Malvy, of "having betrayed the interests of France."

There is no doubt that passports were issued with extraordinary laxity. There is no doubt that subsidies were given from the secret funds, which are often deplorably mismanaged, to those who were working against France. The excuse was that it had been the practice of the Ministry of the Interior and of other Ministries to keep some kind of check upon anti-Nationalist newspapers by subventions. The system which has been allowed to grow up of the most curious relations between the police and the Syndicalist and Anarchist organizations must be deprecated. One always feels that there is too close an understanding, and it is not unusual for a notorious Anarchist to turn out to be an agent of the police. The methods of the secret police have been exposed time after time, and the working classes are rightly suspicious of the noisiest militants. The theory apparently is that if undesirable movements are permitted a certain freedom, and are even encouraged the police may the more easily keep themselves acquainted with conspiracies.

M. Malvy did not originate the method, and it was difficult for him in the circumstances to effect reforms. He did not, he pleaded, wish to antagonize any section of the community. As a result of the clamour raised by Clemenceau there was a series of arrests. Leymarie, the Chef de Cabinet of Malvy, was inculpated. Duval was apprehended on his return from Switzerland with a cheque of 100,000 francs and was subsequently shot. Almereyda was thrown into a cell, where he was found strangled; and his death remains a mystery. Lenoir, the son of a publicity agent, who distributed largesse to the Press and had played an active part in the raising of the Russian loans, was executed. Senator Humbert, who had shouted in a leading journal for more cannon and more munitions, was held to be involved in doubtful transactions, which had for their object the acquisition by Germany of the newspaper; he was afterwards to be acquitted and to make serious charges in his turn. Bolo Pacha seems to have been a fraudulent intermediary who was not a traitor, but an adventurer who obtained German money without "delivering the goods." Mata-Hari, a dancer, was a spy and she was shot at Vincennes. Judet, the former editor of a Paris paper which had driven Clemenceau out of public life by accusing him of being in the pay of England, took refuge in Switzerland, and when some years later he presented himself for trial was acquitted.

These cases are typical but they might be multiplied. Whether the persons against whom was pointed an accusing finger were innocent or guilty did not matter overmuch. The Military Courts condemned almost automatically. Malvy, when he resigned, voluntarily presented himself for trial before the High Court of the Senate. There was no criminal charge against him, but had he been indicted for stealing the towers of Notre-Dame he would not have escaped punishment. He was sentenced to banishment for five years.

The most sensational victim of Clemenceau was, of course, Caillaux. Caillaux was imprisoned for two years while investigations were made into his conduct in various parts of the world. False documents were manufactured and the most flimsy charges were trumped up and supported by doubtful evidence. Perhaps it will be sufficient if I state that after a careful study of the facts and a daily attendance at the long trial one must remain unconvinced that Caillaux was guilty of more than imprudence. But imprudence there was. Whether M. Caillaux was in South America or in Italy or in France he attracted to himself the *défaitistes*, the spies, the adventurers, the intriguers, and although he persistently repelled them his name was mentioned in connection with almost every unpleasant incident which was the subject of prosecution. Germany appears to have founded hopes on him. The campaign of calumny was nourished every day. Foreign countries, including England, were moved. He was regarded as the centre of *défaitisme*, and the charges against him accumulated like a snowball rolling downhill. In Italy in particular he was said to have had a number of conversations destined to prepare a *rapprochement* with Germany. French diplomatists—notably M. Barrère—sent reports and documents which determined the formal accusation and arrest of the man who had assured France three years of peace from 1911 to 1914. There were amazing machinations against him and pretext after pretext served to fortify the *requisitoire*.

The Lipscher-Marx incidents can be resumed in a few words. Lipscher, an Austrian, tried to convey to Caillaux German conditions of peace. He pretended to be speaking in the name of the German Government and acting particularly as agent of the Baron Oscar Von Lancken, the former Counsellor of the German Embassy at Paris and personal friend of the Kaiser. Caillaux did not reply to his letters, and Lipscher sent to him his French mistress, Thérèse Duverger. Caillaux then sent to Lipscher a few lines which were an absolute refusal to listen to him and closed his door to Mme. Duverger. A few weeks later an unknown person gave Caillaux two pieces of paper. On one it was intimated that Lipscher did not appear to be a desirable intermediary but the writer was authorized to establish " the relations you desire." The other paper contained the name of Marx and his address at Berne. Caillaux declined to follow up the affair. His defenders are not content with showing the hollowness of the accusation, which reposed upon such slight foundations, but in their turn declare that this trivial anecdote is a proof of the manœuvres against Caillaux, the setting of traps, the fabrication of " proofs," which recalled those of the Dreyfus Affaire.

The Italian incidents are a mere mass of idle gossip. The French authorities at Rome seem to have behaved with unpardonable rudeness and to have accepted the most flimsy evidence of equivocal interviews. It must be remembered that when Caillaux was at Rome at the end of 1916 the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, announced to the Reichstag and to the world the peace propositions of the Central Empires. Italy was divided and somewhat shaken. The Vatican seconded the efforts of Austria and Germany. The Neutralists in Italy, the friends of Giolitti, were in favour of peace. The Socialists also proclaimed their pacifism. It was questionable whether Italy would endure. Obviously the secret presence of Caillaux, an alleged Germanophile, in Italy at this time was inopportune and gave ground for rumour. His acceptance of the services of Cavallini, himself suspected, was compromising. Cavillini was linked up with Bolo and had been associated with the former Khedive Abbas Hilmi. Other relations of Caillaux in Italy—for example those with Martini—added fuel to the fire. His courtesy towards Scarfoglio, a famous journalist, who was Germanophile but who was on good terms with the Italian statesmen, did Caillaux much harm. There was a suggestion that Caillaux should be expelled from Italy, but although M. Briand gave a free hand to the Italian Government he was permitted to remain. Another charge was that Caillaux had visited the Vatican and put himself in touch with pacifist prelates—a charge which was pure invention. If the visit of Caillaux to Italy created a certain scandal, that scandal was made possible by the indiscretions of French officials who launched Italian journalists against him. It was the duty of these officials to warn Caillaux against discredited persons with whom he might be brought into contact.

In the same way Caillaux' casual acquaintance with Bolo, Lenoir, and Almereyda are easily explained: they were well known in French social and political circles, and if everybody who knew them were to be tried most of the leading Ministers would have to be brought before the High Court. To drag in the Agadir negotiations of 1911 was clearly for the purpose of importing prejudice, and there is no need to discuss them again. The South American charges are that when Caillaux was on a mission he made the acquaintance of a young man, who called himself Count Minotto, who was of German education and is said to have been in the service of Germany. Minotto reported his conversations to the German Chargé d'Affaires at Buenos

Aires, Von Luxburg, who conveyed recommendations to Berlin. That Caillaux had any knowledge of the character of his interlocutor, or that he uttered any word which was disloyal, is altogether incredible, and an examination of the reports quickly demonstrates their fragility.

In addition, there were found in a safe at Florence documents written by Caillaux which are described as a project of a *coup d'état.* Caillaux' answer is simple: he had the right to put upon paper any ideas which occurred to him, and unless there were publication or a commencement of execution these projects could not properly be brought up against him. Now, although there is in the documents much that is to be deprecated, Caillaux throughout presumes the continuance of the war to a final victory, and in the tentative Cabinets which he set down on paper there were men such as Franklin-Bouillon, Dupuy, de Monzie, Pichon, René Renoult, Noulens, Renaudel, Albert Thomas, and others against whom the suspicion of conspiracy cannot be entertained. As for the responsibility of the war, the thesis of Caillaux as revealed in these private documents is interesting but not criminal. It is that Germany deliberately sought to provoke war in 1914 as in 1911. Germany bears the initial and the capital responsibility. But France is not exonerated. He writes: " Was the Great War sought by M. Poincaré and his friends? Was it, on the contrary, as affirm the defenders of the President of the Republic, provoked and willed by the Emperor of Germany? However contradictory it may seem, both of these assertions are correct. It would be putting the case more exactly to state that the Élysée did not acccomplish what was necessary to avert a war, which was envisaged without disfavour, while William II on his side willed the war with a desire at once passionate and vacillating and would have faltered if he had come up against a clear and firm resolution to maintain a proud and dignified peace. He encountered bellicose propensities. . . ."

One may have whatever opinion one pleases about the character and the capacity of Caillaux, but his condemnation by the Senate to a nominal term of imprisonment, deprivation of political rights, and interdiction of residence in the large towns was a political verdict and nothing but a political verdict. It only remains to add that with Clemenceau firmly in power the Radicals, of whom Caillaux had been the leader, left him to his fate.

For the convenience of the narrative we have compressed these *défaitiste* affairs into a few paragraphs, but they covered a long period, and there were echoes of the trials until 1925. Efforts were made by the aged Ribot and by Painlevé; but political bankruptcy, military collapse, social confusion, appeared imminent when Clemenceau brought a strong hand, an invincible patriotism, an irreducible energy, a clear intelligence, and a fine faith, to Parliament, to the country, and to the army. Henceforth, it was to be the *guerre intégrale*: no more pacific campaigns, no more German intrigues, neither treason nor demi-treason, would be tolerated. The country should know that it was defended. The country did know: it recognized the Chief.

The Chamber was difficult to manage. The extreme Left Socialists opposed measures designed to give sufficient forces to resist the new German divisions released by the Russian defection. Clemenceau answered them impressively; he obtained a hold on Parliament that has rarely been seen and in those critical months was a veritable master. The gravity of the situation may perhaps be shown by the fact that between January 30 and February 2, 1918, the Superior War Council held no fewer than seven sittings at Versailles. Its reply to the declarations of the Central Empires' Ministers at this time was a proclamation that the military efforts would be pursued with the utmost energy. The Germans with their long-range guns were battering Paris. Their aeroplanes were constantly flying over the capital. Had Paris been subjected to this ordeal a few months before it is possible there would have been dismay, but so remarkable was the moral effect of the knowledge that nothing was being neglected, that treachery was being stamped out, that a real leader was in charge, that Parisians went calmly about their work with shells exploding formidably every quarter of an hour. The Socialists wanted to send delegates to Stockholm to an International Peace Conference and to enter into *pourparlers* with the Bolsheviks who had signed with Germany the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Clemenceau replied: "My foreign policy and my domestic policy are the same. Domestic policy: I am conducting the war. Foreign policy: I am conducting the war. Always do I conduct the war. Russia betrays us: I continue to conduct the war. Unhappy Rumania is obliged to capitulate: I continue to conduct the war, and I will continue to the last quarter of an hour."

Four hundred deputies rallied to this affirmation. The Germans might make their supreme attack in the field, they might adopt any diplomatic devices, but France had thrown off her fatigue and her doubt. These words had an electrifying effect on the country; the will to win had never been so strong. Count Czernin stated that Clemenceau had asked whether he was ready to negotiate. Clemenceau with a brutal vigour cried across Europe: "Count Czernin lies." But the Austrian Emperor himself made overtures and Clemenceau, discarding the diplomatic usages, revealed the Austrian propositions. The wedge was driven in between Austria and Germany.

Towards the end of March (1918) a last desperate attempt was made by Germany. A million men came from the Eastern front, beating on the British lines, overwhelming the French, driving their way to Paris. The weakness of a dual command was exposed. Gothas and Big Berthas unceasingly bombarded Paris. Clemenceau, resolved to resist to the end, nevertheless told Poincaré that it might be better for the Government to leave the capital. Pétain at Compiègne recommended this course. Poincaré, who does not lack personal courage and who remembered how the Government had been blamed for its earlier flight to Bordeaux, flatly refused. Pétain made a second request but Poincaré was adamant. Clemenceau, who had been disposed to agree with Pétain, was convinced by Poincaré that the public might misunderstand. Two days later there was a memorable meeting at Doullens. Poincaré and Clemenceau, Sir Douglas Haig, Lord Milner, Foch and Pétain and Loucheur sat at a little table in the town-hall and decided that there should be no further retreat.

Stéphanne Lauzanne has described the scene: Poincaré was calm, Clemenceau caustic, Milner phlegmatic, Foch nervous, Pétain impenetrable, Haig harassed. The French and British commanders and statesmen agreed that Foch should have charge of the whole of the Allied Armies. This nomination, signed in pencil on a sheet of paper supplied by the Maire of Doullens, is one of the most important documents of the war.

The Americans poured in in vast numbers. The German blow, though terrible, was being spent, and while Germany had no more reserves the Allied

Forces, thanks to the United States, were steadily growing. It was a race against time. On the Socialist benches of the Chamber there were faint hearts, and when Germany reconquered the Chemin des Dames and pushed once more to the Marne there was a painful scene in the Chamber. The agitation was such that Clemenceau had to descend from the tribune. At last the uproar ceased and he addressed the House, refusing to judge the military men who were apparently losing. He recalled that he had announced cruel hours which it was their duty to support. "You have before you a Government which will never accept a peace of humiliation. While we are in power the country will be defended *à outrance* (to the end)." Indefatigably he visited every part of the front, exchanging jokes with the soldiers, inspiring them by his contempt for danger and his cheerfulness. In July the German rush was stemmed. Foch began his counter-offensive. The Germans were in retreat. They recrossed the Marne, abandoning Soissons, Noyon, Péronne. The Americans entered Saint-Mihiel. The Chemin des Dames was captured. Saint-Quentin, Cambrai, Laon, Lille, Ostend, were entered by the Allies. The North of France and Belgium were being delivered. Austria was cracking up; her request for a preliminary Peace Conference was repulsed. The inflammatory speeches of Clemenceau called for a continuance of the strife. More despairing appeals of Austria were unheeded. Germany turned to America as an arbitrator, asking for peace based on the famous Fourteen Points. (Clemenceau was always sceptical about the American terms. He was alive to the danger of America's becoming an all-powerful mediator because she had entered the war at the eleventh hour and was the only belligerent that was not exhausted. He expressed his scepticism and his distrust in the *boutade*: "God had need of only Ten Commandments, but Wilson promulgates Fourteen.")

The communications between Berlin and Washington, looked upon somewhat askance by the Allies, multiplied. Wilson suggested that the Allies should draft their conditions. During the *pourparlers* of October the Allies continued to advance, but the German retreat never turned into a rout. Austria succumbed. Turkey was finished. On November 6th Clemenceau read in the Chamber the conditions of the armistice imposed on Austria, and made known that the terms of the armistice for Germany had been fixed, sent to Wilson, and could be learned by Germany if she addressed herself to Marshal Foch.

On the evening of November 7 Erzberger, Von Oberndorf, General Von Winterfeldt and others, coming from Spa, presented themselves at the advanced posts of the French army to learn after 1,556 days of combat the conditions which Marshal Foch should dictate. The next day the German delegation was received in the Forest of Compiègne, where General Debeney had established his headquarters, in the special train of Marshal Foch, who was assisted by General Weygand, the ablest of the younger soldiers, Admiral Wemyss and others. There could be no question of refusing the terms, which were severe enough. They included the total evacuation of Allied territory, the withdrawal of the Germans beyond the Rhine, the surrender of prisoners, guns, aeroplanes, and fleet, and the cancellation of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest.

There were many French people who felt and who still feel that the conditions enunciated in the Forest of Compiègne were insufficient, that the Germans ought to have been pursued into the heart of their country and not allowed to return with drums beating and flags flying. Poincaré argued that the armistice was premature. Clemenceau was inclined to take the same view. But the opinion of Foch was conclusive. He was not prepared to take risks. He would have gone forward with all prudence had he been called upon to do so, and he considered that possibly 100,000 more lives would have been the price of a complete and spectacular victory. The controversy has never subsided. But what purpose would further fighting have served? Germany was surely humiliated and was fully conscious of her humiliation at the time. Since, it is true, she has tried to sustain the untenable thesis that she was not defeated in the military sense.

The whole Chamber saluted Clemenceau with enthusiasm when he announced on the morning of November 11th: "The firing ceased to-day on all fronts at eleven o'clock." He added: "In the name of the French people, in the name of the Government of the French Republic, I send the greetings of France, one and indivisible, to Alsace and to Lorraine, which are restored to us." That restoration in the moment of triumph was the predominant thought of the French. Foch's message to the troops was as follows: "After having resolutely arrested the enemy, you have for months with a faith and energy which were inexhaustible attacked without respite. You have gained the greatest battle of history and saved the most sacred cause—the liberty of the world. Be proud. With immortal glory you have decorated your banners. Posterity will be grateful to you." In this message is contained the authentic spirit of the French with their love of fine words and noble ideals. Faith, energy, the sacred cause of liberty, pride, immortal glory, the flag, posterity—all that makes the *panache* of the French is there. The weakness and the strength of the French are displayed. Here is a characteristic and self-revealing document if ever there was one. These are not meaningless conventional flourishes. Clemenceau in the Chamber struck the same note. Frenchmen should in that solemn hour promise always to work with their whole heart for the public good. The victory of Right, the consecration of Justice, the triumph of Democracy, proclaiming the end of Empires, the abasement of Dynasties, whose rapacity had terrorized Europe, the promise of Freedom to Oppressed Nations, Poland, Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, Armenia, and Alsace-Lorraine—these were the gratifying rewards of French sacrifices ; and the sincerity of French sentiment cannot be brought into doubt. The jubilations were unprecedented. A " new era " had begun.

WORKS TO BE CONSULTED

Headlam's *History of Twelve Days* ; Poincaré's *Origines de la Guerre* ; *Memoirs* of Klotz, Ribot, Viscount Grey, etc. ; Col. House's Papers ; Huddleston's *Poincaré* ; Buchan's and Belloc's *Histories of the War* ; Marcellin's *Politiciens Pendant la Guerre* ; Studies of Clemenceau by Leconte and by Geffroy ; Caillaux' *Mes Prisons* ; Painlevé's *Comment J'ai Nommé Foch et Pétain* ; Documents published by the Ligue des Droits de L'Homme ; collections of newspaper articles, etc.

CHAPTER II

FROM VERSAILLES TO LOCARNO

Reparations or Security ?—Russian Terms—The Conference—Protests—French Plans—Millerand—Briand—Poincaré—The Ruined North—Payments in Kind—The Ruhr—Inter-Allied Debts—Dawes Plan—Herriot—Locarno and the Will to Peace

AFTER the battle of Sadowa some of the French, who had certainly no cause to rejoice, celebrated the victory as though it were their own. In the Mémoires of the Duc de Broglie these amazing manifestations are recorded. "Paris," he wrote, "began to applaud as though French Imperial policy had scored a triumph. From every window hung a flag. I asked myself whether I was mad or whether those whom I encountered had suddenly gone mad." Nor must it be supposed that it was merely the masses who were victims of this delusion. "At the Académie everybody vied in expressing satisfaction and admiration," and the Duc records the exclamations of Prévost-Paradol and Cousin. I refer to this passage because it throws a light upon the character of the French which has been put particularly in evidence since the armistice. They have a curious capacity for rejoicing. Optimistic by nature, they contrive in spite of their keen intelligence constantly to deceive themselves. They deceived themselves as to the fruits of the Great War. They deceived themselves as to the consequences of the Treaty. They deceived themselves after every successive conference which was held in Europe from Versailles to Locarno. Always did they suppose that at last everything had been settled in their favour, and the *peau de chagrin* shrunk to nothing amid the jubilations of the French people. Voltaire knew his compatriots well when he wrote: "*Candide ou l'Optimisme.*"

They are not to be abused for their credulity. Their credulity was for the most part made up of respectable sentiments. They believed that civilization had been consolidated. They believed that results acquired were definite results. They believed in the loyalty of their Allies, and if they did not altogether believe in the good faith of Germany, at any rate they believed that the position could be stereotyped. If I may venture a personal reference in a chapter which is the record of an observer's impression, I assisted in the most impartial spirit at the whole series of conferences, which were crowded into a few years,* and never once at the conclusion of these conferences did I find in France any other sentiment than that of absolute satisfaction. Bit by bit the French expectations, which were placed amazingly high, were reduced. But with each diminution there was an outburst of applause. It is true that the applause was followed on reflection by a natural reaction. The plaudits changed into reproaches. But France was ready to begin again; and after Spa, Boulogne, San Remo, London, Paris, and the rest, including the League Assemblies of Geneva, there were the same foolish festivities. There is in the temperament of the French people, incorrigibly romantic, a fount of cheerfulness, and against this temperament their intellect exercises itself in vain.

Here is the paradox of the French: with the nimblest brains in the world goes an irrepressible need of enthusiastic manifestations. Against reason the French must celebrate. They celebrated with a vengeance from 1918 onwards, and although they experienced a corresponding disillusionment from time to time they always managed to discover a fresh source of self-congratulation. If they felt themselves deserted by England they revelled in the consciousness of American friendship, and if America reminded them too sharply of the debt they turned with alacrity towards England. If everybody failed them they fell back upon Germany, whom they conceived as their predestined collaborator. Sometimes they tried to build up alliances in Central Europe to the detriment of the League of Nations, and sometimes they hailed the League of Nations as a mystical defender of peace. They suddenly discovered the Vatican, against which they had fought, and dreamt of a great European Catholic Confederation—a sort of religious League of Nations, as the League of Nations is a sort of secular Vatican. They had drawn a *cordon sanitaire* around Bolshevized Russia, but they were later to see in Russia immense possibilities of the future. In short, misled by their facile and incurable emotion, they had no fixed policy which could reasonably be fulfilled. At one moment Poincaré would endeavour to extract from Germany incalculable milliards by the coercive occupation of the Ruhr. At the next moment M. Herriot would beam upon Germany and M. Briand would lightly pass over Germany's breaches of the disarmament promises.

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* As Special Correspondent of the old *Westminster Gazette*, the *Observer*, *The Times*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, the *New Statesman* and other American and English journals.

For some years France poured out money like water, caring not for the morrow because she was convinced that Germany would pay. Then she tried in a panic to retrieve her shattered finances by ill-regulated demands on her own people. Perpetually was there exaggeration ; perpetually was there an oscillation between one extreme and the other. France was unable to take steadily a clear course. She had indeed two general ideas—one that she should obtain reparations and the other that she should reach security. She is excellent in formulating principles, but in the application of those principles she is vacillating. She could not make up her mind and was attracted by this glittering prize and then by that. Whether she wanted speedy payments from Germany or whether she wanted to keep her reparation claims as a Damocles weapon suspended above Germany's head she hardly knew. As Mr. Lloyd George quaintly put it, the conundrum was whether France should cut up Germany into beefsteaks or milk her. France wanted to do both. France was not sure whether her Allies were to be kept by her side or dismissed, whether they were a hindrance or a help. She was not sure whether the European feud should be pursued implacably or whether it should be finished. More contradictions in diplomatic thinking, in diplomatic action, have never been crowded into so short a space of time. And yet, with each new move pæans of praise ascended. In this atmosphere of illusion, in which instability of purpose was the dominant French trait, Germany had an easy game. It was, I remember, the fashion to decry German diplomacy as clumsy; but German diplomacy has without faltering taken a straight path, while French diplomacy, lost in a maze, has darted with repeated exclamations of pleasure into every blind alley of the labyrinth. Germany has unceasingly striven to disembarrass herself of the burden of reparations, and is succeeding. Germany has unceasingly striven to make of none avail the disarmament clauses of the Treaty, and is succeeding. Her tactics have been simple enough: they consist in dissolving the war alliances.

France has helped Germany by her irruptions against the Allies. It is a pitiful story from the point of view of France and is one more proof of the lack of real leadership. The French people should not be blamed overmuch because the exceptional times have not thrown up any steadfast guide. No matter what policy had been adopted after the war, it would have had its advantages and its disadvantages; but a blend of all policies could have only disadvantages. The Treaties themselves betray opposite policies. In them are to be found a verbal respect for nationalities coupled with an attempt to reconstruct Europe on the old foundations of an equilibrium of power. The idea of nationality led to the formation of new countries, but those new countries are actually formed of conglomerate elements. Always do they contain considerable hostile minorities. Some ideal justice was unquestionably contemplated, but where it clashed with convenience the arrangements fell short of the ideal. The result was illogical, a hotchpotch of rival systems, a hopeless compromise between expediency and principle. Much might have been said for the sledge-hammer breaking of Germany; as much was said for the Balkanization of Austria-Hungary. But less can be said for the nominal preservation of German unity, with such irritating encroachments on that unity as the Polish corridor to Danzig, the subsequent award of German portions of Upper Silesia to Poland, the detachment of the Saar subject to a plebiscite after fifteen years, and the diversion of the Saar coal to France, the occupation by the Allies (which principally means the French) of Rhineland, and a dozen other anomalies of the same character.

During the war there had been agreements between the Allies, but with the defection of Russia and the incoming of the United States, these agreements were cancelled. The Allies can count themselves fortunate in that the Russian Revolution made an end of Russian pretensions. Without Lenin, the peacemakers, who had made contradictory promises against each other's interests, would indeed have been embarrassed. The French territorial claims would perhaps have been granted had Russia played a part in the Conference, but they would have placed America and England in a false position. In the Near East, Russia and England would inevitably have come into collision. It may be that the anger of the French statesmen against Russia was particularly violent because Russia rendered French diplomatic designs impossible of fulfilment. The peoples were never told the principles of the peace propositions of Lenin of December 22, 1917. Naturally they were rejected as earlier Austrian propositions were rejected. I believe that the Russian text has never been published in the orthodox Press or in book form. I therefore reproduce it here in order to show how far it differs from the Allied peace and particularly from the peace that Clemenceau contemplated :

> "1. No territories conquered during the present war shall be forcibly annexed. The troops occupying these territories shall be immediately withdrawn.
>
> "2. The independence of peoples, lost during the war, shall be completely re-established.
>
> "3. National groups which did not enjoy independence shall themselves decide by way of referendum the question of their political independence or indicate the State to which they would belong. This referendum should be based upon the complete liberty of the vote for the entire population including refugees and *emigrés*.
>
> "4. On territories inhabited by various nationalities the rights of minorities shall be protected by special laws assuring their national autonomy, and if political conditions permit, their administrative autonomy.
>
> "5. No belligerent shall pay a contribution to

another, and those already paid in the shape of War Costs shall be reimbursed. As for the indemnification of war victims it shall be made by means of a special fund created by the proportional payments of all the belligerents.

"6. Colonial questions shall be resolved in the conditions indicated in Articles 1, 2, 3, and 4. But the Russian delegation proposes to complete them by declaring inadmissible any restriction, even though it be indirect, of the liberty of feeble nations by stronger nations, such as, for example, economic boycotting, or a submission of one country to another by an imposed commercial treaty or separate customs accords."

Months were allowed to elapse before the Allies met in the Salle de l'Horloge at the Quai d'Orsay to prepare the peace terms. President Wilson made the mistake of appearing in person and of surrounding himself by partisans—whose advice was, incidentally, ignored. I remember well the exaltation of the French people when Mr. Wilson landed. Imperialism, cynicism, domination, was far from their thoughts. They worked themselves up to the highest pitch of idealism.

Clemenceau did not share that exaltation. Foch was chiefly desirous of fixing the frontiers of Germany at the Rhine, obsessed as he was by the idle dream of security which was afterwards to become the fixed idea of the politicians. The politicians and the military men in France were not content to go back to Sedan—they wanted to go back to Waterloo. Alsace-Lorraine was not enough. Mr. Lloyd George, to his credit, stood firmly against such an abuse of victory. He was not moved by the long, carefully argued Note of Poincaré. He was unconvinced by Foch's Memorandum, in which the Generalissimo declared emphatically that the Rhine should be the Western military frontier of the German people; in which he asked that Germany should be deprived of her right to manœuvre, to build garrisons or *dépots*, or otherwise enjoy territorial sovereignty on the Left Bank of the Rhine. It was set out that Germany would thus be deprived of facilities for rapidly invading Belgium and Luxemburg. Did not the material and moral situation of Germany, and above all her numerical superiority, call for the erection of a strong barrier?

France disclaimed annexionist ambitions. The Rhine provinces were to be autonomous but were nevertheless to be put under the guardianship of the Allies. In the end Mr. Wilson agreed with Clemenceau to a temporary occupation and to a Triple Pact, which was not ratified. According to M. Tardieu, the fifteen years' occupation of Rhineland laid down in the Versailles Treaty may in certain circumstances on which the French counted be prolonged in perpetuity. Mr. Lloyd George has complained that these arrangements were made in his absence and that he had no alternative but to acquiesce.

The second demand of France was that enormous sums—as much as 400 milliard gold marks was mentioned—should be paid by Germany. It was useless to talk economics. Nearly everybody appeared to be ignorant of the practical possibilities. No indemnity was actually fixed. The League of Nations was set on foot and it represented a real hope; but, as it was conceived in many quarters, it was a new Holy Alliance of a secular kind designed to govern Europe on the basis of the *status quo*. The unilateral guilt of Germany in the provocation of the war was laid down and was held to constitute the justification for many of the impositions on Germany. A common criticism in France was that England took whatever she could lay her hands on, such as the Colonies and the German Fleet, and fobbed off France with less tangible rewards. The criticism does not of course bear examination. France obtained Alsace-Lorraine, which was a most valuable possession, since the lost provinces had been immensely improved by Germany. She obtained the Saar coal mines. She was allowed to install herself in Rhineland. These things are more than equal to the German Colonies which went to England. As for the surrender of the German Fleet which might be regarded as a particular menace to England, it is completely offset from the French point of view by the disarming of Germany on land. Conscription was abolished, and the German Army reduced to 100,000 men. A drastic control of armaments, which were strictly limited, was instituted. It must be confessed that such control in the long run must be inoperative and futile. No nation can be kept down for ever, and in the changing conditions of dissolving alliances and re-grouping of Powers the attempt of the French to keep a strangle-hold on Germany was doomed to failure. But such was the French choice. Germany was also to cede Eupen and Malmedy to Belgium. Luxemburg was to retire from the Zollverein. Northern Schleswig was left free to determine its adhesion to Denmark. It is generally admitted that Poland was given far too much territory, partly at the expense of Germany but chiefly at the expense of Russia; and the separation of East Prussia from the rest of Germany by a strip of Polish land leading to the free city of Danzig is a provision which must be revised by mutual consent or by force. Although England obtained South-West Africa and most of East Africa besides New Guinea and other islands, while Japan received Kiao Chau, and even New Zealand and Australia profited by the distribution of Germany's Pacific Colonies, France too was not left out, and was given the greater part of Togoland and the Cameroons. In addition, under the mandatory system she was to hold Syria on behalf of the League of Nations. Though the Syrians were tired of the Turkish yoke they have not taken kindly to French control.

There were a number of economic clauses; notably were Franco-German commercial relations provisionally regulated in order that Alsace-Lorraine should not suffer during the period of transition. Other treaties were afterwards elaborated. There was the Austrian Treaty signed at Saint-Germain, whose principal interest for the French is that it forbids a junction of Austria with Germany. The Hungarian Treaty was framed at Trianon, the Bulgarian Treaty at Neuilly, and the Turkish Treaty at Sèvres. The latter Treaty was quickly to be annulled; for Turkey, signing under duress, rebelled, and as the Allies were not united and not prepared to make war, they underwent the humiliation of submitting to Turkish terms at Lausanne. Czecho-Slovakia was constructed out of pieces of the ramshackle Dual Monarchy, and Serbia, doubled in size, was given the name of Yugo-Slavia.

While these negotiations were being conducted in Paris the French authorities were fiercely anti-Bolshevik and Clemenceau opposed any new attempt to open *pourparlers* with Russia. The Russian Revolutionaries were immensely aided by the various military campaigns encouraged or launched by the Allies against them. There was of course a chance that the Soviet Government would succumb to the assaults, but as they did not the effect of outside interference was to consolidate the Revolution.

At first Germany, against whom an Allied blockade was inexcusably maintained after the armistice, refused to sign the Versailles Treaty. There were moments of misgiving. Would the document which had been painfully hammered out be thrown into the melting-pot again? On the Allied side there were criticisms. One of the American attachés resigned, addressing a letter to Mr. Wilson in which he said: "I was one of the millions who trusted confidently and implicitly your leadership and believed you would take nothing less than a permanent peace based upon unselfish and unbiased justice. But our Government has consented to deliver the suffering peoples of the world to new oppressions, subjections, and dismemberments. Russia, the acid test of goodwill, has not been understood. The unjust decisions of the Conference in regard to Shantung, the Tyrol, Thrace, Hungary, East Prussia, Danzig, and the Saar Valley, and the abandonment of the principle of the freedom of the seas, make new international conflicts certain. It is my conviction that the present League of Nations will be powerless to prevent these wars. The duty of the Government of the United States to its own people and to mankind is to refuse to sign or ratify this unjust Treaty, to refuse to guarantee its settlements by entering the League of Nations, to refuse to entangle the United States further by an understanding with France."

This opinion was to be adopted—or at least the conclusion was to be adopted—by the United States. General Smuts issued a grave manifesto explaining his reasons for signing under protest. "There are territorial settlements," he wrote, "which will need revision. There are guarantees laid down which we all hope will soon be found to be out of harmony with the new peaceful temper and the unarmed state of our former enemy. There are punishments foreshadowed (including the hanging of the Kaiser and the trial of war criminals) over most of which a calmer mood may yet prefer to pass the sponge of oblivion. There are indemnities stipulated which cannot be exacted without grave injury to industrial revival in Europe and which it will be to the interest of all to render more tolerable and moderate." He concluded that he was confident the League of Nations would prove to be the path of escape for Europe out of the ruin wrought by the war. "The abolition of militarism, confined to the enemy, might soon appeal to the Allied peoples as well as a blessing and a relief."

When on June 28th, the fifth anniversary of the crime of Sarajevo, representatives of twenty-seven nations signed the Versailles Treaty in the Galerie des Glaces, nobody was content. Germany had made her protest against the imposition of a Pact in whose elaboration she had not participated and which was forced upon her at the point of a pistol. England was already uneasy, foreseeing diplomatic complications. America promptly withdrew from her entangling associations with Europe. France's mood had changed by this time, and although there were the usual jubilations, she was beginning to see that the victory meant little. She was to become more and more conscious of the hollowness of the Treaty, but she was inclined to blame the framers of it for their leniency. "The bad workman always complains of his tools," said Clemenceau. "The Treaty is not something fixed and final which settles the affairs of Europe for ever. It is an instrument to be used; and on the manner in which it is used depends its value." M. Poincaré, as President, though compelled to refrain from public expression of his views, denounced the Treaty privately. A little later M. Briand was to speak of it as the "mare of Roland." The *rapporteurs* in the Chamber and in the Senate were exceedingly reserved and critical.

The Conference had set out to do two things. It had set out to make a new map of the world and it had set out to give a shape to the new spirit of mankind. It made its map for better or worse. What has it done with those immense forces, chaotic and elemental, which only needed turning into right channels ? Certainly as a platform from which a splendid appeal would be made to humanity the Conference had been a failure. It had damped down the universal demand for a new order of things. There had been a revolt against war ; against the imperialisms ; the national exclusivisms ; the gospel of hatred and division ; and this yearning for new international relationships, this reaching out for world solidarity, this disgust with militarism and with the ways of the old diplomacy which bartered away peoples as chattels, which worked in the dark and without reference to the masses chiefly concerned, might well have marked a turning point in the painful progress of humanity. Perhaps the Covenant of the League may yet be shown to be the best part of the Treaty.

After the 1919 elections Clemenceau, who had won the war but who was accused of losing the peace (his nickname of Père La Victoire had been changed to Perd La Victoire), was thrown down from his pedestal. He had hoped to become President of the Republic when M. Poincaré retired in 1920, but M. Deschanel, with his promise of resumed relations with the Vatican, was elected in his stead. The French politicians decided that however much they deprecated the Treaty they must apply it strictly as the Charter of Europe, and they held that in no circumstances could there be revision. M. Millerand who became Prime Minister—with M. Paléologue at the Quai d'Orsay—was obsessed by the problem of security even more than by the problem of reparations. At Spa and at San Remo it was apparent that his chief concern was the maintenance of France in a position of supremacy on the Continent. He was not afraid of breaking the common front of the war Allies. " With or without the Allies," was the famous phrase he used, and his march to Frankfort against British warnings was a token of his desire to break up Germany and if necessary to cast off British hegemony. There was adumbrated a great scheme of alliances which would put permanent pressure on Germany and serve as a buttress for France. Among the wilder notions was that of a great Danubian Confederation in which Bavaria was to take its place, detached from Prussia, linked up with Austria and with the new and the new-old States of Catholic leanings founded in Central Europe. It was, of course, impossible to realize such a plan, but, nevertheless, from the Baltic to the Black Sea the process of constructing a chain of States, controlled by France, with anti-German sentiments, was pursued. M. Millerand based his policy upon Poland, which was to take the place of Russia ; he was actively opposed to the new Russian Government and stimulated the illegal fighting against Russia. He did not pause to think that had the anti-Bolshevik push succeeded there would have been a revival of Russian Imperialism which would have diminished Poland and the rest of the Central and Eastern European countries. He saved Warsaw from being captured by the Bolsheviks and was rewarded by elevation to the supreme post of President when M. Deschanel was ill.

Belgium was drawn into the French orbit and Czecho-Slovakia, bound by a special treaty to France, took the leadership of the Little Entente. French influence was extended in Rumania and Yugo-Slavia. Everything was done to rearrange Europe on a French pattern. For a few months after M. Millerand went to the Élysée, M. Leygues carried on, and then came the more supple administration of M. Briand at the beginning of 1921. He was more conciliatory towards England. The British had soon abandoned their interest in reparations—or, rather, had relegated reparations to a secondary place, demonstrating their scepticism as to the possibility of collecting considerable amounts by balancing their Budget without German aid. The French, keeping their confidence, pledged themselves to compensate directly, irrespective of German payments, those citizens who had suffered damage. The result was a scandalous scramble for the payment of inflated claims, and an unregulated expenditure on the part of the Government, which had not one Budget but two, the second being described as the Budget of Recoverable Expenditure and showing no receipts except those which were fatuously anticipated from Germany. This was the fatal beginning of France's financial difficulties. It was an easy course against which nobody ventured to protest. But M. Loucheur, who was the right-hand man of M. Briand, sought to develop the system of payments in kind, coming to an accord with Herr Rathenau at Weisbaden. Not until May, 1921, was the German liability fixed by agreement among the Governments by the Reparation Commission, which drew up a Schedule of Payments providing for the payment of 132 milliard gold marks to be distributed in accordance with the following percentages: 52 per cent for France, 22 per cent for England, 8 per cent for Belgium, and the balance for a number of other countries. Eighty milliards of this amount, however, were expressed as C Bonds, which were to bear interest only when the payment of the A and B Bonds was assured. In other words, the C Bonds were scrap paper. It was under M. Briand's Government that the League of Nations made its award in the dispute about the rich mining district of Upper Silesia, unduly favouring Poland and unduly penalizing Germany. It was also M. Briand's

Government which took the first step towards the occupation of the Ruhr, in seizing Dusseldorf, Ruhrort, and Duisburg. Further, M. Briand resumed relations with the Vatican in continuance of the policy of establishing a firm diplomatic foothold in the Catholic centres of Europe. Moreover, France made friends with Turkey.

Doubtless M. Briand was doing his best in face of the resuscitation of a blatant patriotism in France which compelled him to appear to aim at the simultaneous solution of the two pressing problems of reparations and security. He was hampered in his task, which, in any case, was an impossible one, by M. Poincaré, who in a remarkable series of journalistic articles was clamouring for the most rigorous fulfilment of the Treaty terms. When in the first month of the following year M. Briand was on the point of reaching a compromise at Cannes by which Germany was to be accorded a partial moratorium and France was in return to obtain a limited pact of security with England, Paris called for his immediate return and he was obliged to resign. M. Poincaré succeeded him and for nearly two and a half years put into operation a policy of coercion, which included the occupation of the Ruhr. The former President, whatever may be thought of his proceedings, was unquestionably backed up by French public opinion as it was manipulated by the Press. Nor must it be supposed that the Radicals in Parliament made any effective protest; the moment the patriotic chord was touched they acquiesced, even though they knew in their hearts that coercion could not succeed. Parliament was subservient, as it is always subservient, no matter what its political complexion, when a Strong Man holds the reins. Doubtless there is more than one France, just as every other nation has more than one face, and it is somewhat foolish to talk about her "true visage."

But democracies, however intelligent may be the individual members of the community, will always follow the men who take up a positive attitude, who know their own minds, who are downright in their methods. The subject of economics cannot be understood by the majority of the people, but the majority of the people can well understand the simple thesis that they have an enemy in a neighbouring country.

Thus French idealism was submerged, or, rather, a new meaningless word beginning with a capital letter—Security—was set up as the national idol. The war atmosphere which had been dissipated as if by magic momentarily in 1919 was thicker than ever in 1922. The anti-German propaganda had spread like a poison gas over the whole of France. Precisely as Germany after 1871 professed to fear the French, so France was induced to fear Germany, and although the bad faith of Germany in failing to live up to her reparation promises was made the pretext, the growing motive of the French politicians was to dismember Germany. General Mangin immediately after the war had encouraged a Separatist movement in Rhineland, and his behaviour was so flagrant that Clemenceau was forced to recall him. Throughout the succeeding years we find the *motifs* intertwined—Reparations and Security—but always uppermost in the French mind was the demand for Security, though the demand for Reparations was uppermost in French utterances.

From the earliest days enlightened British opinion had been aware that the maximum payment of Germany could be only 50 milliard gold marks. The Americans, too, while putting Germany's capacity higher, suggested a *forfait* of 25 milliard dollars. Germany herself was prepared to give 100 milliard gold marks without interest, and making allowances for the variations in actual value of payments spread over different periods, it may be that these apparent variations are not considerable. The French, in speaking vaguely of such amounts as 400 milliard gold marks, did not admit that by swelling their claims they were making a mobilization of German resources impossible. To make Germany responsible for the cost of the war was something new in diplomacy, and even the simple reconstruction of the devastated regions would have had elements of novelty. Either the statesmen were afraid to tell the truth—the plain truth that Germany could not pay without expanding her foreign trade to the ruin of other countries; the plain truth that Germany is not populated by a race of supermen who could bear not only their own burdens but the burdens of the whole world—or they deliberately intended to make of reparations an instrument for the crushing of Germany. It should be stated that M. Klotz tried to introduce the subject of Inter-Allied Debts but was promptly met by a blank refusal from the American Treasury to discuss the subject. England also was reluctant to put the debate on the broader foundation of international indebtedness, and at no time did the belligerents listen seriously to arguments in favour of a "clean slate." Yet it is obvious in retrospect—and indeed it was apparent at the time—that a general settlement would have averted the dire consequences which flow from the existence of a mountain of debts.

Economic questions were, in fact, not tackled at all; the peace-makers were animated by political considerations. Nothing was done to stabilize the international exchanges, and it was therefore inevitable that there should be economic upheavals which seriously interfered with trade and threw country after country into the most dangerous convulsions. It is now acknowledged that not only must Germany provide for payments in her Budget—that is to say, must obtain from taxation a surplus over internal State expenditure—but must also, if she is to transfer large payments abroad, have a corresponding excess of exports over imports. Now the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the automatic deliveries of coal from Germany which were provided for, meant that the potential metallurgical output of France was increased by 50 per cent. France, if she was to enjoy her new wealth, had to export on a much higher scale. How were these exports to be reconciled with an increase of German importations into France ? It is at least arguable that from the economic point of view it would have been better for France to have renounced reparations altogether. But France, as already stated, had pledged herself to recompense her *sinistrés*, that is to say, her war victims. Since the compensation for the *sinistrés* had in practice to be obtained from the French taxpayer, it is obvious that France was sacrificing herself for the ruined North. This was a foolish generosity whatever may be said about justice to the victims, for it was at any rate possible that the whole of France would sink under the dead weight she had placed upon herself. France was hypnotized by the ravaged regions. Had, then, the rest of France sustained no damage ? That damage was not so stark but it was none the less real. The depreciation of the currency has since made the most ignorant citizen aware that his lot is as hard as that of the people of the North. There is no straining after epigram in saying that France went near to ruin herself in the restoration of the invaded provinces.

Policy which is sentimental must be disastrous. While there were these exaggerated demands for the rebuilding of the North at all costs, France was elevating her traditional protectionism into a grotesque doctrine. German co-operation in the repair of the ruined regions was held to be undesirable. Rich *consortiums* meant to take the work into their own hands and to reap the entire profits. They were unable to see that if Germany were engaged directly on the restoration of the North, German efforts would be diverted from the capture of more permanent markets and the French manufacturers, whose great lack was in man power, would be free to conquer less fugitive markets.

When I was in Spa in July, 1920, the Germans put forward offers, which to all appearances were perfectly sincere, to take upon themselves the necessary task and to provide labour and material. The French would not examine these proposals, which were repeated in Brussels and in London in the following year. Yet France was obliged to introduce foreign workers and to pay for material at high prices. The Rathenau-Loucheur accords of October, 1921, respecting reparations in kind were an advance, but they were never put into real operation. The figures for 1919 to 1921 show that the opposition to reparations in kind was such that while material to the value of 9 million francs was received under the Treaty from Germany, the free commands of France in Germany reached 2½ milliards. In 1922 France could have had, under the mutual arrangements, goods to the value of 950 million francs, but took only 273 million francs' worth, of which 163 million francs' worth were automatic deliveries of coal. Therefore, when there was the protest of M. Poincaré against German defaults in delivery, which were comparatively trivial, it should be remembered that France had committed huge defaults in her commands. There should have been advantages given to both sides. The French should have been able to buy in Germany at a price inferior to world prices, and the

Germans should have been able to sell at a price superior to internal prices.

The whole machinery of exchange was falsified and the Commission of Reparations was constantly at variance with the German authorities in their estimates, by reason of the fall of the currency. The French were intent on payments in hard cash. They were fond of repeating that France in 1871 had paid the indemnity of five milliards without demur. They overlooked the different circumstances. There was no relation between the amount of the French indemnity and the German indemnity ; and, further, only a small proportion of the French indemnity was paid in cash, the rest being obtained from external loans. Germany was without credits abroad and her commercial balance was in deficit. She was exhausted ; there was economic disequilibrium ; the Budget was unbalanced and could not be balanced without the most strenuous exertions, and for these exertions a respite was needed. Moreover, her liabilities were for a long time unlimited, and when they were at last defined they were fixed at a figure in which nobody but the French professed to believe. When M. Poincaré had been in power for a few months a committee of bankers met and suggested an international loan in favourable conditions. But such a loan involved a reduction of the debt to manageable proportions. The bankers wanted guarantees. M. Poincaré was implacable. Nothing was done. Industrial participations were proposed as a solution but were rejected. The best way out of the difficulty might have been an arrangement between the German coal magnates and the French industrialists who had an excess of iron ore and an insufficiency of fuel. Negotiations on these lines began as early as 1920, but they were held to be altogether outside the problem of reparations.

There was nowhere in France a true appreciation of the economic factors, and when Germany was offered no inducements, could entertain no hopes, when concessions were refused and every compromise turned down, Germany fell into despair. The indignation which was aroused in France at Germany's fiduciary inflation was genuine. The rapid depreciation of the mark, the flight of capital, the plunge into bankruptcy, were regarded as a gigantic and deliberate swindle. The French policy must, however, be held responsible in that it gave Germany no motive for delivering herself. At the best, deliverance would have been doubtful, but had there been a reasonable prospect of deliverance it is to be presumed that the German people would have worked indefatigably to rid themselves of the iron hand that was fastening upon them. M. Poincaré seems to have been afraid that Germany would pay too quickly: it was a foolish fear, for there was never any such danger; and it was also an unworthy fear, for it implied that the ostensible search for reparations was in reality directed against German unity and against German prosperity.

Even M. Poincaré, determined to prevent the development of German industries by putting the French demands at their highest, was obliged, by the increasing consciousness of the possibilities, to reduce the French demands to 26 milliard gold marks. The man who had fulminated against the repeated truncation of French claims, himself, in spite of his stubborn policy, cut them down much more than any of his predecessors, who had trailed their bloated claims from capital to capital and from casino to casino in interminable conferences. He recognized, in effect, that the C Bonds were worthless and proposed to use them for the nominal payment of French debts. It is now, I think, clear that the original intention of disannexing the Rhineland provinces from Germany was the underlying intention of post-war French diplomacy. France had been worked up into a patriotic panic. She dimly discerned the unavowable purpose of the Ruhr occupation, and although Poincaré publicly insisted that the control of Rhineland and the Ruhr was not the French objective, was not an end in itself but only the means to an end, yet more or less consciously, more or less clearly defined, security was chosen as the more desirable alternative of the incompatible aims. When a moratorium was proposed in August, 1922, M. Poincaré formulated his policy of Rhineland " pledges " in exchange for the moratorium.

At first he had proceeded cautiously. Chiefly did he denounce the long series of conferences in which French Ministers had, it was said, succumbed to the blandishments of Mr. Lloyd George. This was a fine thrust, for the *amour propre* of the French people was hurt by the suggestion that they had been outwitted. Poincaré was to make an end of French subserviency. He stood up a rigid, lonely figure, impenetrable even to his friends, and came near to being a new Dictator. He was obeyed not out of love but out of respect. As President he had acquired exceptional prestige, and that he should step from the Presidency into the dusty arena of politics was regarded as a proof that he was a man with a mission. The very attacks upon him by the Communists, who rendered him responsible for the war and nicknamed him "*Poincaré—La Guerre*," helped him in the eyes of the more orthodox parties. Deputies on all the benches were afraid of the Poincaré experiment in advance, and their misgivings were expressed. The aged Ribot shook his head doubtfully. Tardieu, one of the framers of the Versailles Treaty, though advocating what is vaguely called a strong policy, was not convinced that the occupation of the Ruhr was the right solution of France's problem. Doumergue, who was afterwards to become President of the Republic, made his sentiments known. The Nationalists—for example, Maurice Barrés and Jacques Bainville—would have pursued an entirely different course. Herriot, the leader of the Radicals, uttered nebulous warnings. The Socialists were distressed at the impending breakdown of every prospect of reconciliation. The Communists fulminated against the Prime Minister. It would have been difficult to find in the whole of France any solid body of opinion for the Ruhr expedition. And yet when events marched swiftly and ruthlessly in this direction effective protests were not raised, and when the Ruhr was in fact invaded everybody except the Communists acquiesced and permitted the prolongation of the occupation for over two years. The majority of Frenchmen, when once the die was cast, actively supported the occupation. They persuaded themselves that it was the only way to overcome Germany's recalcitrancy and that it was yielding admirable results. The credits for the Ruhr were voted without resistance and French Radicals certainly cannot be acquitted of participation in an enterprise which they were later to abandon.

One thing which was partly instrumental in determing the French attitude was the Balfour Note on Inter-Allied Debts, which put cancellation out of the question. This gave an additional argument to M. Poincaré. In no circumstances, wrote Lord Balfour, did England propose to ask more from her debtors than was necessary for the payment of England's creditors. But while England did not ask for more she could not be content with less. M. Poincaré insisted that German payments were not only required for the satisfaction of French needs but for the settlement of Inter-Allied Debts. If England—and America—were to press France, who was receiving no payments from Germany, France it was pretended was compelled to put pressure upon Germany. The 80 milliards of C Bonds could, so far as France was concerned, be cancelled precisely to the degree that the Inter-Allied Debts were cancelled. But no creditor country was prepared either to accept these fictitious bonds or to tear them up. Therefore, M. Poincaré stuck to his demand for productive pledges: a euphemistic phrase which covered the economic and military control of Germany by France.

After the London Conference of 1922 M. Poincaré, on his return to Paris, recalled the disappointments of France. He declared that France had been denied the right to have a French policy. An alliance could only be lasting if there were equality and mutual respect for national sovereignty, but France had constantly subordinated her wishes to those of the agile British statesman. " When Germany formulated her fresh demands for a moratorium the British Government, without consulting France, publicly declared that the German wish should be granted," said M. Poincaré, " and at the same time England in a Note reminded France that she was a debtor country. We were greatly surprised that a kind of eventual demand should thus be addressed to us at the very moment when Germany was announcing that she would not pay and when England was supporting Germany. The coincidence was, to say the least, regrettable. If England required to be paid immediately for what France had purchased from her during the war, and if at the same time she deferred the payment of reparations, she was endeavouring to reduce France to the necessity of turning to those of her Allies who were her debtors, and thus France would be invited to recover from

Italy, Rumania, and Serbia the sums which she was not allowed to recover from Germany. I need not say that we shall not allow ourselves to be placed in such a strange position. We are not dreaming of calling upon our Allies to pay at this moment. We want to present our bill against Germany first. Until it is paid it is morally and materially impossible for us to discharge our debt to our British friends, and they must understand that we on our side do not wish to dun our common friends."

This presentation of the case was calculated to make a great impression in France. The ground was cleverly chosen by M. Poincaré. The Reparation Commission made various proposals, but to no purpose. Mr. Lloyd George fell and was succeeded by Mr. Bonar Law in November. There was a flash of hope, but the policy of the Ruhr was hardening in France. The French Prime Minister disclaimed the intention of conducting a military expedition or of taking sanctions of a punitive character. He represented his purpose to be the installation of Allied engineers and Customs officers in Germany. If England would not co-operate, then France would in the last resort act alone. To prepare the way the Reparation Commission in December was, after a stiff resistance on the part of Sir John (now Lord) Bradbury, induced to declare Germany in default in her timber deliveries. This declaration was strengthened by another declaration of Germany's default in respect of coal. The legal case for " sanctions " was established. The January Conference in 1923 could but be abortive. Mr. Bonar Law came to Paris with a British scheme, but it was too late. His offer was not unreasonable, but it was put forward in an unfortunate manner. England did not at the time assert her implacable and active opposition to the occupation of the Ruhr; she simply washed her hands of it. I have reason to know that

M. Poincaré put his threats into execution, *la mort dans l'âme.* But he had left himself no alternative: he had gone too far to retreat. If at first the French occupied only the outskirts of the Ruhr with a few engineers and a few soldiers they were, once in, bound to extend their occupation until the life of the Ruhr, political, economic, financial, and administrative, was utterly dislocated.

It was useless to point out to the German Government that it was in its interest to facilitate the work of the French Mission, for the German Government realized that the British sympathies were with Germany. The German industrial head-quarters were removed from Essen; the French were thwarted in every possible way. So-called passive resistance was adopted. The technical mission thereupon changed into an undisguised military occupation. German officials were expelled; the Ruhr was cut off from the rest of Germany by a Customs cordon; there was a general cessation of work; transport was rendered impossible for some time. The French and the Belgians (for Belgium stood by France) took over the administration of the whole of the Rhineland and the Ruhr railways, forming a *régie* which they proposed to convert into an international *régie*. There was a protracted struggle. The French had to reorganize everything. They discovered that it was impossible to dig coal with bayonets. They found that soldiers and engineers could not carry off coal on their backs. The most severe measures were taken. On the whole, the Germans remained calm and there was little bloodshed. Encouraged by the British attitude, the Germans declined to surrender and the French, feeling that they had now committed themselves and that national honour was at stake, were resolved to pursue the adventure to the end. Poincaré is a timorous man who, like all timorous men, is capable of showing an iron will. Month after month he held out against the increasing British condemnation of his policy as illegal. The British condemnation was decisive. Sooner or later this veto was to make itself felt irresistibly. It became a more and more insistent veto with the nomination of Mr. Baldwin as British Prime Minister and of Lord Curzon as Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

There were misgivings in France. The officials at the Quai d'Orsay informed me that they would be content with a political victory. If only Germany would acknowledge that she was in the wrong, France would be glad to escape with credit from an impossible situation. Elsewhere I have noted my impressions of the French evolution of thought. There was at first a good deal of bluff in the cry for the occupation of the Ruhr. Even in January, M. Poincaré was hesitating to take a step in the dark. When the French bluff was called the whole country stood behind M. Poincaré. Still it was expected that a speedy and easy political triumph would be obtained. But as Germany was adamant, there was on the French side exasperation, pride, and a great hardening of heart. What was meant to be a brief demonstration leading to a *dénouement*, grew into an angry call for unconditional surrender and so into an attempt to smash up Germany for ever. At Brussels it was decided not to evacuate the Ruhr until the last penny was paid. General Degoutte, who was in charge of the troops, publicly declared that the French would stay a thousand years if necessary. The American General Allen, who was in Rhineland, observed that the French Government would not be satisfied with an economic settlement. Something like a virtual annexation of the Ruhr and the Rhineland was, as M. Tirard the High Commissioner openly acknowledged, envisaged. We had gone from a conscious search for reparations, with a subconscious search for security, to a conscious search for security with reparations converted into a secondary issue.

The British *questionnaire* to France was based on the assumption that France wanted to stay in the Ruhr. There was a voluminous correspondence between Lord Curzon and M. Poincaré, in which both the British and the French statesmen seemed more anxious to score points than to arrive at results. Against the adamant Poincaré the Curzon menaces were vain. Not a week went by without a fiery speech from M. Poincaré, which was reported *in extenso*. In Parliament and out of Parliament he expounded his theme clearly: it was that there would be no final evacuation until payments were completely effected. "Pay or we stay," he cried. And he repeated his phrase with variations tirelessly. Whatever opposition there might be was bludgeoned into silence. A typical opponent who ceased to oppose was M. Loucheur, who said, "I went to discuss the methods of reparations in kind with Herr Rathenau at Wiesbaden and we established a system which might easily have given the best results had it been properly tried, but, unfortunately, there were political complications. I still hold, however, that we could make good use of materials and goods supplied by Germany and that by developing this method of payment we should recover an important proportion of our credits on Germany. Even at Cannes, where I participated in the Conference with Mr. Lloyd George, we seemed to be well on the way to a definite solution of our difficulties. I was against the occupation of the Ruhr before the event and did not conceal my opposition, but when the step was taken, in consequence of the undoubted bad faith of Germany, it was the unquestionable duty of all Frenchmen to support the Prime Minister. The Flag of France is engaged and we cannot allow our prestige to be diminished."

The more advanced Radicals, faced with a *fait accompli*, also announced that they could not take less than the 26 milliard gold marks which M. Poincaré regarded as a minimum payment, and if they did not adopt the formula that the Ruhr should not be evacuated before Germany paid, they adopted the not fundamentally different formula that the French should not leave the Ruhr until they were positively assured that there was no risk of Germany's not paying. Still, they talked of "international solutions" without defining them.

It is a mistake to suppose that M. Poincaré fell in the May elections of 1924 because of his Ruhr policy. The Radicals and the Socialists avoided the discussion of the Ruhr. They dreaded the accusation of being anti-patriotic. There was a complete change with the disappearance of the Bloc National and the incoming of the Bloc des Gauches (the Radicals and Socialists), but that change was brought about by the alarming slump of the franc. In concentrating his attention on foreign affairs M. Poincaré had neglected the Budget. The Budget of 1923, which was quite inadequate, was not passed until the middle of the year, and for 1924 there was, strictly speaking, no Budget at all. It was simply decided to apply the 1923 Budget to the following year. When the franc ran frantically downhill, M. Poincaré was forced to bring forward hasty proposals for increased taxation on the very eve of the elections. He demanded *décrets-lois* for the purpose of dictatorially reducing the swollen army of State officials; and he asked for a *double décime*—that is to say, for a two-tenths increase all round of the existing taxes. This last-minute demand on the taxpayer furnished the Radicals and Socialists with irresistible arguments. What! they exclaimed, we were told that Germany would pay and we now are told that we must pay. Do you then despair of receiving anything worth while from the Ruhr? Is this an acknowledgment of failure? Have we been taught to rely on German payments only to discover that unless we help ourselves we shall plunge headlong to bankruptcy? It was on the financial issue that the elections were fought and that M. Poincaré's idea of a permanent control of Rhineland and the Ruhr was defeated.

Nevertheless, M. Poincaré himself was aware that the depreciation of currency, whether caused by international pressure or by Frenchmen's loss of confidence in themselves, might compel a modification of his policy; and in the latter part of 1923 he agreed to refer the "eternal question" to an international group of experts. It was on January 14th that the Commission met, and it worked uninterruptedly in Paris—with the exception of flying visits to Germany—until April 9th. Its main report is signed by representatives of various countries as follows: America, General Charles G. Dawes and Mr. Owen D. Young; England, Sir Robert M. Kindersley and Sir Josiah C. Stamp; France, M. J. Parmentier and M. Edgar Allix; Italy, Signor Alberto Pirelli and Signor Frederico Flora; Belgium, M. Francqui and M. Maurice Houtart. The main committee was known as the Dawes Committee, though if any one man should have given his name to the report it is Sir Josiah Stamp. A second committee of experts met at the same time to consider the means of estimating the amount of Germany's exported capital and of bringing it back to Germany. This committee was composed as follows: Mr. Reginald McKenna (English); Mr. Henry N. Robinson (American); M. André Laurent-Atthalin (French); Signor Mario Alberti (Italian); and M. Albert E. Janssen (Belgian). The Dawes plan, as it was called, may thus be summarized: Its purpose was to balance the German Budget and stabilize German currency while providing for reparation payments. Its method was co-operation between the Allies and Germany based on mutual interest. It provided for an international loan of 800 million gold marks, to establish a new Bank of Issue in Germany, to stabilize the German currency, and to enable Germany to meet the first year's reparation payments. The Bank was to be the fiscal agent and depository of the German Government but to be free of Government control. Its administration was to be undertaken by a German President and managing board, but it was to be supervised in matters affecting the creditor nations by a general board of seven Germans and seven foreigners. A gold reserve of 33⅓ per cent was to be maintained. Reparation payments under the Dawes plan were to be made through the Bank of Issue. The sources of revenue were (1) in part the international loan; (2) a mortgage on German railways; (3) a mortgage on German industries; (4) a transport tax and an item in the general Budget guaranteed by certain "controlled revenues." The experts estimated that the plan should produce for reparation demands one milliard marks the first year and 220,000,000 marks more the second year. In the fourth year there should be 1,750,000,000 marks. In the fifth year a maximum annual payment of 2,500,000,000 should be reached. Thereafter, payments were to be on a sliding scale and subject to a reduction in certain contingencies. The plan differentiated between the amount that could be raised in Germany and the amount that could be transferred abroad. It provided that Germany's payments abroad should not exceed her earnings abroad. Payments for the account of reparations were to be deposited to the credit of the Agent-General for Reparation Payments and five experts in foreign exchange and finance were to control the use and withdrawal of these deposits. Deliveries in kind were to be regulated by the experts. The principal purpose was to control the transference in such manner as to keep the currencies steady. If it should subsequently be discovered that reparation payments by Germany exceed the sums which can be transferred without creating difficulties, the excess payments are to be allowed to accumulate in the Bank of Issue, but these accumulations in the Bank should not exceed two milliard gold marks. When they pass that figure they are to be used in bonds and left in Germany. The total accumulation in Germany was not, said the experts, to exceed five milliard gold marks. If this figure were reached further reparation payments by Germany should cease until the transfer of the accumulated funds became possible.

It is obvious that this problem of transference remains unsolved. The Dawes plan may break down, not because Germany cannot raise the surplus receipts from the " controlled revenues "—customs, alcohol, tobacco, beer, and sugar—but because when the surplus is placed into a pool in Germany the onus for its transference does not lie upon Germany but upon the foreign experts, and because those experts may find themselves unable to devise suitable methods of taking the credits from the German pool. The full weight of foreign intervention was felt in the drafting of this report which may hereafter make an end of reparations, and in the necessity in which M. Poincaré stood of appealing to American financial aid to prevent a panic in France. The Morgan Bank of New York came to the rescue of the franc, putting at the disposal of the French a *masse de manœuvre*, credits to the extent of 100 million dollars. In doing so it clearly intimated its desire to see the Dawes plan adopted.

M. Poincaré was therefore obliged to accept the conclusions of the experts, though he made a number of reservations and would have sold his final consent as dearly as possible. It was not, however, left to him to put the plan into operation. His defeat on the financial terrain was followed by his defeat on the political terrain.

In May, 1924, the Left obtained a majority and immediately proceeded to differentiate itself as far as possible from the preceding Parliamentary majority. It inaugurated a *politique de combat.* It drove M. Millerand from the Élysée and elected in his place M. Gaston Doumergue. It made the blunder of not confining its activities to the solution of the two pressing problems: first, the problem of international relations; second, the problem of French finances. It entered into a fight, which was inopportune and foolish, with the Clericals. It stirred up strife when unity was needed more than it had ever been needed before. But although in the flush of triumph it behaved foolishly, it is to be credited with a vast improvement in international relations, and the trio, Herriot, Painlevé, and Briand, led the way to Locarno. The Ruhr experiment was regarded as a failure, and Herriot, who became Prime Minister, found himself in general agreement with Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the British Prime Minister, as to the course to be followed for the pacification of Europe.

The Dawes report was formally accepted at the London Conference held on July 16, 1924. Germany agreed to the arrangements and in October promulgated the laws voted by the Reichstag for the fulfilment of the plan. The Ruhr occupation was immediately rendered "invisible" and a pledge that the evacuation should be completed by September, 1925, was given. There was a total destruction of the system of Rhineland pledges and the exploitation by a Franco-Belgian *régie* of the Westphalian railways. The Entente Cordiale between France and England was re-established.

Then came the British elections, which brought back Mr. Baldwin as Prime Minister and brought in Mr. Austen Chamberlain as Foreign Secretary. Russia received French recognition; M. Jean Herbette, the leader-writer of the *Temps*, went as Ambassador to Moscow and Mr. Krassin came as Ambassador to Paris. Just as M. Clemenceau had said, "*Je fais la Guerre*," M. Herriot said "*Je fais la Paix*." France took a new interest in the League of Nations and M. Herriot himself went to Geneva for the opening of the Annual Assembly in September. A Protocol, designed to bring about the automatic coalition of peace-loving nations against a bellicose nation which should become aggressive, was adopted. It was supported by the three pillars of Arbitration, Security, and Disarmament. Although it was not ratified, another version of it was the following year embodied in the Locarno Pact.

If the French people had not deserted M. Poincaré while he was in power they rallied without hesitation to the call of M. Herriot when he was in power. They had been persuaded by the high-sounding phrases of M. Poincaré: they were equally persuaded by the high-sounding phrases of M. Herriot. There was in his doctrine precisely that note of idealism which invariably meets with a response when it falls upon French ears. Nor did they forget that Security was their chief aim. The method changed but the objective remained the same. If peace could not be had by coercion; if the forces against France were too powerful for her to carry to success her design of cutting up Germany piecemeal; then she would try the policy of confidence, the policy of the olive branch. The policy of the olive branch implied great French sacrifices: it implied the renunciation of the right to put pressure upon Germany for the collection of reparations; it implied the abandonment of Separatist movements; it even implied the wilful closing of French eyes to the non-fulfilment of German promises of disarmament. France became trustful and, against evidence that the German Government had not disarmed, and would not disarm, proclaimed the victorious virtue of universal amity.

Later, M. Briand, as Foreign Minister, skilfully worked with Mr. Chamberlain and with Herr Stresemann to elaborate a series of documents. The main document is known as the Locarno Pact. It was drawn up in the little Swiss town in a conference to which Germany was admitted on an equal footing. Germany accepts her frontiers with France and Belgium as permanently settled by the Treaty of Versailles. Germany accepts the permanent demilitarization of Rhineland. Both these provisions are in the Versailles Treaty, but it was thought advisable to have them renewed voluntarily. England pledges herself to assist in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the West.

There was a general belief that there had been brought about a relaxation of the tension between European nations. It was resolved that quarrels should be referred to arbitration and that Germany in pursuance of this end should take her place in the League of Nations.* Yet there were a number of perplexing issues which were raised by previous French policy. The French had special engagements with Poland, with Czecho-Slovakia and with other nations, which amounted to promises to uphold by force of arms the existing territorial arrangements. Everybody felt that the existing territorial arrangements on the Polish side would some day or other have to undergo drastic revision. Germany was willing to enter into arbitration treaties with her Eastern neighbours, but in the last resort England was not prepared to fight for the preservation of the Eastern frontiers; and the French support of Poland, instead of averting war, might hereafter produce war on a large scale. Nevertheless, there was an entirely new orientation of policy and a genuine hope that the Pact and the accompanying arbitration treaties would result in international appeasement. How immense was the achievement of Locarno can best be appreciated by casting one's mind back to the end of 1923. Two years before Locarno the Ruhr experiment was in full course; the French were apparently resolved on the disintegration of Germany; the Germans were apparently resolved on the violent expulsion of the French; and a great war seemed sooner or later to be inevitable.

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* Germany made her public appearance at the League Assembly on September 10, 1926; and the Pact became operative with her admission.

Criticism of the Locarno agreements there may well be, but the paper guarantees of the future security of Europe may prove to be real guarantees not because they contain legally binding obligations but because their signing is a moral gesture which impresses itself upon the imaginations of the peoples and politicians of Europe. There was a spectacular reconciliation. It has been well pointed out that there are legal treaties and moral treaties, and that in practice the latter alone are effective. Lawyers like M. Poincaré, who insist on the letter of the Treaty of Versailles, for example, miss the essential consideration that nations only respect engagements which they freely take, which they believe it is their interest to respect, and that they tear up imposed treaties at the first opportunity if they are strong enough. To regard the Versailles Treaty as Holy Writ, as eternally valid, was absurd: the sense of insecurity was increased by the foolish maintenance of a fiction. The Locarno documents are loosely drafted; they are full of flaws, loopholes, and ambiguities. Yet they have validity as part of the effective public law of Europe. They were not signed under duress but in a spirit of friendship, and while that spirit exists it is permissible to suppose that no general conflagration will arise out of disputes on matters such as the possession of Bessarabia or Transylvania or the Danzig Corridor. Even with Russia there was a renewal of bonds. It was felt that the Great War was at last, in the final months of 1925, finished.

While it would not be becoming to indulge in exaggerated jubilation, for the first time for a generation the Powers were on decent terms. In France there was a good deal of prudence, for the country which had shown an amazing capacity for self-deception was being taught by disappointments. A big price had been paid for the Pact; the evacuation of the zone of Cologne which had been postponed for a year because Germany had failed to carry out the disarmament clauses, and the modification of the occupation of Rhineland, meant that France had relinquished her reliance on coercion and had placed her faith in a pacific Germany. If that faith was misplaced, then France was at the mercy of her more powerful neighbour. If the Pact meant anything, it meant that there was trustfulness and amity in Europe, and it was not easy for large sections of Frenchmen to readjust their minds. In some quarters there were gloomy questionings as to whether France had been duped and whether the net result of the Locarno Pact was not merely the virtual abandonment of the attempt to disarm Germany, the virtual abandonment of the Watch on the Rhine, the virtual abandonment of any strenuous and persistent demand for reparations, and the virtual establishment of an understanding between Germany and England, rather than between Germany and France.

The Pact also implied the breakdown of the special diplomatic relations between France and her smaller Allies in Europe; it implied a fresh diplomatic alignment. The French noted that the British authorities made it clear that whatever engagements had been taken by the Guaranteeing Powers towards France had equally been taken towards Germany. In the event of German aggression it was doubted whether England would really be on the side of France. It was conceivable that England would in certain circumstances be on the side of Germany. Moreover, the Pact was to be operated through the League of Nations. This conception, this procedure, promised France arbiters rather than Allies. Were there a sudden attack, England would in theory be obliged to intervene if there were urgency, and if it were impossible to await the decision of the Executive Council of the League. But England was to be the sole and sovereign judge of such urgency. Minor violations of international law would probably find the Allies of the war divided. A serious breach of international law might be held by England to be reparable by arbitral or judicial proceedings. Further, the text of the Versailles Treaty, in which it is written that if Germany does not observe Articles 42, 43, 44, and 45 (respecting the demilitarization of Rhineland) she commits a hostile act against the Powers, was certainly limited. Sceptics declared that Germany was fully enlightened; provided she did not act too brutally and did not employ direct violence, every licence was accorded her to alter to her advantage the 1919 treaties. Should she pass without transition to brutal and direct violence, she would be faced by Allies who had renounced in advance all preparation for prompt action, and who perhaps would be unable to agree. The French treaties of alliance with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia would only come into force in application of Article 16 of the Covenant; that is to say, after deliberation and unanimous decision of the League Council. Was such a system sufficient to hold in check those elements which were working for the forcible overthrow of the arrangements of Versailles? At no time in modern history has it been possible to disarm in perpetuity a determined adversary, but France had striven for the control of the German Army and armaments and there was some dismay at the prospect of Germany's reorganization of her army, Germany's reconstitution of her armaments, without Allied opposition. Germany's presence in the League of Nations, though desirable for many reasons, might eventually lead to her manipulation of the machinery of the League for her own purposes. England was reproached with pursuing her traditional policy of enfeebling any nation which might become predominant on the Continent. She had fought against German hegemony and she had now snatched the hegemony of the Continent from the French. In doing so had she not assured Continental hegemony to Germany?

These are fair objections to the Locarno Pact, and if one assumes the absence of sincerity, amity, and a desire for collaboration in the preservation of peace on the part of Germany—and for that matter on the part of France—the contentions are sound. In other words, the worth of the Pact is in rigorous relation with the spirit that prevails or will prevail on either side or on both sides of the Rhine. In so far as the Pact is the embodiment of a will to peace, it is valuable; in so far as it is not the written expression of an existing will to peace, it is a scrap of paper. In order, therefore, to judge the Pact, it is necessary to know the German mind and the French mind, and both the German mind and the French mind are perpetually changing. It is not the text which is of importance: it is, after the signing of the Pact as before the signing of the Pact, the trend of thought in the two countries which must be studied if one is to arrive at a just appreciation of the immediate and the remote prospects. There are signs which are favourable, but there are signs which are unfavourable. So far as France is concerned the favourable signs are plentiful. Left to themselves, not excited by the politicians, the French are a peaceful people who do not seek to dominate others, but who are aroused by any suspicion of attack on their sovereign rights, and who are readily inflamed by an appeal to their patriotic sentiments or to their pride as champions of universal liberty. More than ever is it necessary to encourage whatever makes for peace and thus to multiply the favourable signs.

The essential thing to be said about the Locarno Pact is that we must not sleep upon it as upon a pillow. If it is soporific in its effects, if it induces us to close our eyes to unpleasant developments, if it lulls us into a false sense of security, it will be baneful and not beneficial. It may be made into an instrument of peace, but it is not in itself an assurance of peace. The price of peace, as of liberty, is eternal vigilance; unceasing cultivation of better international relations. Sentimental reliance on the Locarno Pact may be dangerous. There is bound to be a disastrous disillusionment if we prematurely celebrate the extinction of European feuds. While judiciously approving the work that has been done, we must not forget that much remains to be done if the inevitable revision of the Treaties is to be carried out pacifically and without shocks. The Pact is a beginning and not the end. It is a portent to be placed among other promising symptoms of Europe's convalescence.

WORKS TO BE CONSULTED

In my opinion the best account of the peacemaking from the French point of view is André Tardieu's *La Paix*. There is interesting material in Bourgeois' Report on the Treaty ; Keyne's *Economic Consequences of the Peace* is indispensable ; there is an official account of the Conference by Temperley ; Tumulty, Dillon, and others have told the story of 1919 well. In addition it is necessary to refer to the Treaties themselves, to the Reports of the Reparation Commission, to the Dawes Report, to *The Times* reports (especially from 1922 to 1924), to the Locarno Pact, and to a number of documents most of which are published in the French Revue *L'Europe Nouvelle* ; Bardoux' series of books *Paris à Spa, Lloyd George et la France*, etc., and Auguste Gauvain's *L'Europe au Jour le Jour*, are useful.

CHAPTER III

PARTIES AND PERSONS

The Group System—Extra-Parliamentary Forces—Freemasonry—Catholicism—Against the Régime—Nationalism—Radicalism—Socialism—Communism—Some Politicians

At the beginning of the Third Republic the battle of parties was comparatively simple. Broadly, there were Republicans and Monarchists. But the Monarchists, as we have seen, could not agree upon the Monarch, and the Republicans were soon divided about the Republic. After Republicanism triumphed, the Republican party split up into the Opportunists of Gambetta and Jules Ferry, and the Radicals of Flocquet and Clemenceau. The former advocated "a Parliamentary method which consisted in not attempting to tackle all questions at the same time, in limiting the field of reforms, in setting aside irritating subjects." The latter demanded immediately great reforms, such as the separation of Church and State, and cared nothing for the circumstances of the moment.

From 1879 Opportunists and Radicals were alternately in power until about 1893. Then a number of Catholic Conservatives, following the counsel of Leo XIII, rallied to the Republic and constituted a Republican Right ready to collaborate with the Moderate Republicans. About the same epoch the Socialist party took a new lease of life under the leadership of Jules Guesde, and in 1905 the rival Socialist factions were united. A *bloc* system was necessary. Broadly, a Centre Right Bloc was formed by the Catholics and the former Opportunists who took the name of Progressists and made themselves the champions of property and order; and a Left Bloc, which was Radical-Socialist, called for social reconstruction. At the Extreme Right were

Nationalists who did not properly belong to either group. The Radicals deliberately sought the support of professed Socialist Revolutionaries. But there was, as the Socialist party grew, a dissolution of the Radical-Socialist Bloc. On the one side the Radicals lost their fire and were joined by Moderate men. On the other side the Socialists were more independent and more intransigent. On the eve of the 1914 elections the Advanced Radicals and the Socialists reconstituted a *bloc* against the Three Years' Military Service Law and in favour of the Income Tax. The Radicals and Socialists thus won the 1914 elections.

During the war the Union Sacrée was, as we have seen, proclaimed, and Conservatives and Socialists were to be found in the various governments. In 1919 the Bloc National came into power: an alliance of Moderate Republicans and Conservatives. In 1924 the Bloc des Gauches came into power, with the Radicals taking office, supported by the Socialists, who declined actually to enter the Government. This Left Bloc had a narrow majority and was always in danger of falling to pieces, because the Socialists tried to carry the Radicals further than the Radicals cared to go, and it was only by raising false issues which were particularly ill-timed in hours of grave financial peril, that the Radicals were permitted to rule (the Socialists rejecting all responsibility).

Speaking generally, the parties are not strongly organized; they are, rather, electoral committees which elaborate programmes and are manipulated by comparatively few persons in their own interests, while the great public looks on apathetically and somewhat contemptuously. The politicians for the most part obey no party discipline and serve as Ministers under the most diverse Governments. To explain to readers in countries which have solid political parties and usually stable majorities on one side of the House or other, the perpetual Parliamentary changes in France, with the confused group system, is not easy. But when in the space of one year there have been seen no fewer than five different Cabinets some attempt must be made to account for these frequent upheavals. It will be agreed that continuity is impossible when Prime Ministers may be thrown down every few months. The essential thing to remember is that the Chamber is divided into many sections. They are often not very different from each other either in doctrine or in programme. Even their names are hardly distinctive enough. There are, for example, the members of the Union Républicaine, the Gauche Républicaine, and the members who call themselves Républicains de Gauche. There is the Gauche Radicale and there are the Radicals and there are the Radical-Socialists and there are the Republican-Socialists besides the Socialists proper, and the Communists. Now, these groups may combine in many ways and the majority in favour of a particular Government is subject to fluctuations. No one party can govern alone. No one party is numerous enough. Therefore alliances of some kind are inevitable. But the alliance of Radicals and Socialists has always been somewhat artificial, for their ultimate aims are divergent. Sometimes the tendency is for the Radicals to separate themselves from the Socialists and to link up with the Union Républicaine and other groups of the Centre and of the Right. The Socialists in their turn are tempted to negotiate with the Communists and to form a powerful Opposition of the Left. Thus in the lifetime of a single Parliament, which is normally four years in length, there may be Prime Ministers belonging to any one of the many groups, and the centre of gravity may shift from the Left to the Right.

The Socialists in the 1924 Parliament numbered 104 and the Communists 26. The Radicals mustered 140 and the Republican-Socialists 36. The Gauche Radicale is an organization of 40 members. The Union Républicaine has 104 members, while the party of the Républicains de Gauche has about 40. There are about 80 other members. In these conditions it is not surprising that from time to time one group secedes and upsets the whole balance of power.

It should not be concluded that because a Prime Minister obtains a vote of confidence by a large majority he is therefore safe. A large majority may be given him at a moment when he is on the point of falling for tactical motives. I have seen a Ministry which everybody knew was collapsing obtain a majority of 400 in the Chamber. Abroad such a triumph might appear conclusive, but no opinion should be formed unless one has a full knowledge of the circumstances, for on the following day the huge majority may turn bodily over on the Ministry. It is unfortunate for France that in a time of crisis no Government can really count upon a sufficiently long existence to carry through needed measures.

In these conditions it is natural that Governments should pay more attention to political exigencies than to the genuine requirements of the country. They are aware that the moment they attempt to do anything which may displease this or that group they put themselves in jeopardy. An excellent example is furnished by Colonial developments. A friend of mine who had spent several months in Morocco and was well informed was shown requests by Marshal Lyautey for reinforcements towards the end of 1924. The attack of the Riffans was foreseen. It is probable if some additional troops had been paraded about the country the attack would have been averted. But the politicians at home, who at that moment were obliged to play up to the Socialists, who are opposed to all Colonial enterprise, dared not take action. The result was that when the attack, which had been foreseen, took place in 1925 Marshal Lyautey was unable to stem the tide and Tarza and Fez were almost taken and the whole of Morocco lost. In the long run there was much fighting that might have been avoided.

A similar story has to be recorded with regard to Syria. General Sarrail was appointed for political reasons against the better judgment of the authorities and when things began to go wrong the authorities were warned again and again that his withdrawal was imperatively called for. But his withdrawal would have displeased certain groups of politicians and therefore he was maintained until a disaster which could not be disguised overtook the French. Finances were muddled in 1924 and 1925, chiefly because there was a political tug-of-war and the right solutions did not commend themselves to parties which the Government did not feel strong enough to offend. The real weakness of France in every domain arises from the exaggerated importance that politics play in Parliament owing to the existence of the group system.

The political forces in France which are extra-Parliamentary are numerous. Freemasonry, which in most countries is a non-political movement, has undoubtedly a political bias in France and is freely accused of being the stronghold of Radicalism. Freemasonry was introduced into France from England in 1725, but it rapidly assumed a purely French form. It is anti-Clerical and during the French Revolution played a considerable part. Even Duruy says: "The Freemasons worked in obscurity and silence. They belonged to an old and vast association of men of every rank and country, who in spite of rites that were both ridiculous and useless, nurtured and propagated liberal ideas." Later when the struggle against Clericalism began under President MacMahon it is recorded that " another force which militated against the churches was Freemasonry—Devil-Worship, as the Clerical party called it—which began to take a powerful grip on the country about this time." But there has been much exaggeration about the part which Freemasonry has played in modern French history. It is easy to imagine the wildest nonsense about any society which is more or less occult. Hilaire Belloc puts the matter in its right perspective in his study of *Danton*. " He was indeed," says Belloc, " a member of a Masonic Lodge, as were, for that matter, all the men conspicuous or obscure, Democratic or utterly Reactionary, who appeared upon the Revolutionary stage : probably the King, certainly old aristocrats, like the father of Madame de Lamballe, and whole hosts of the Middle Class, from men like Bailly to men like Condorcet. But it is reading history backwards and imagining the features of our own time to have been present a century ago, to make Masonry the determining element in his career." Of the Huguenots he says : " They stood upon the flank of the attack which intellectual scepticism was making upon the Catholic Church, they were prepared to take advantage of that scepticism to secure political victory, and since the Revolution they have been the most powerful and, after the Freemasons, with whom they are largely identified, the most strongly organized of the anti-Clerical forces in the country."

The Grande Loge was founded in 1736. In 1773 the Grand Orient emerged from the Grande Loge. The Grand Orient differs from Anglo-Saxon Lodges in that not only does it occupy itself with politics but has struck out from its ritual the Great Architect of the Universe. Some idea of its tendencies may be given by summarizing the resolutions passed by the last annual Convent, as the General Assembly is called. On the question of Franco-Russian relations the Grand Orient declares that it is more and more necessary to complete a *rapprochement* and to propagate in Russia principles of Democracy, of human solidarity, and of liberty of conscience, which form the basis of its constitution.

In the League of Nations the Convent affirms its entire confidence, believing it will help to establish peace between the peoples by moral, intellectual, and economic co-operation. The League of Nations should become the League of Peoples. Its delegates should be elected by Parliaments and by economic groups and not designated by the Governments. The League should have armed forces; at any rate it should be able to call upon the armed forces of its members to execute its decisions. These decisions should be regarded as law without being submitted to the deliberations of the Legislative bodies of the various nations. All countries should be admitted and an international constitution comprising executive, legislative, and judicial powers should be elaborated.

The Grand Orient pronounced in favour of the Ecole Unique—a single educational ladder on which the sons and daughters of rich and poor should have equal chances of mounting in accordance with their merit—and among the resources which should be affected to the establishment of the Ecole Unique are the proceeds from economies in the army and navy budgets. The State should exploit the natural riches of the country. It is to be observed that a prominent politician was conspicuous in the proceedings of the Convent and was elected to a high post.

The Grande Loge de France on its side passed similar political resolutions. It approved the work of the League of Nations and expressed itself in favour of controlling the manufacture of munitions. The following motion was passed unanimously: "The Convent of the Grande Loge de France, confirming once more its desire of contributing with all its strength to the establishment of peaceful and fraternal relations between the peoples, convinced that the fullest agreement between France and Germany is one of the indispensable conditions of pacification, faithful to its pre-war policy, renews the unanimous decision of the Convent of 1924 concerning a Franco-German *rapprochement*."

Further discussions led to the acceptance of a resolution on the subject of free trade and protection. The lodge approved the "establishment of free trade after a period of transition characterized by the application of liberal commercial treaties and by the gradual lowering of protective tariffs. In the first place, the present financial situation would thus be purified. The interdependence which would result from the recognition of the special qualifications of each nation and by the adoption of free trade would be a new guarantee of peace. The international economic unity would lead eventually to political unity or at least to a form of federation which would comprise the European States." Other resolutions insisted on the need of educational facilities and the teaching of morality based upon a secular as distinct from a religious system.

The International Lodge of Human Rights, which is the only one to admit the initiation of women, also held its session at Paris and discussed questions which particularly concerned women and children. The conclusions which it reached proclaimed that women should have the same privileges as men. The hope was expressed that there should be undertaken an administrative reform of Northern Africa. Military protectorates, such as exist in Morocco and in Syria, were condemned, and it was asked that they should be transformed into purely civil *régimes*. Finally, a fraternal salute was addressed to Italian Freemasonry persecuted by the Fascist dictature.

It is certainly not my business to defend or to attack French Freemasonry, but it is impossible to ignore it as a political force. Its opponents render it responsible for all the recent happenings in France. A little work published a year ago puts together some of the most curious demands of Freemasonry. "*On doit sentir la maçonnerie partout, on ne doit la découvrir nulle part.*" That Freemasonry is strong in France cannot be doubted and it has on many occasions controlled Governments.

The Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen is an association whose influence is thrown on the side of Radicalism. Its special mission is to redress injustices that have been committed. It inquires carefully into cases of alleged judicial errors and constitutes dossiers. It puts pressure on the Government in every possible way. It calls public meetings and avails itself of the columns of the newspapers. There seems no good reason why such a League should have a party complexion since Radicals, like Nationalists, when they are in power are capable of the most arbitrary acts. The fact is, however, that most of its adherents are Radicals and that it is especially active against those whom it is the custom to call Reactionaries. The Ligue was constituted in 1898 at the beginning of the Dreyfus Affaire. It defined its rôle as follows: "La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme proposes to defend the principles of liberty, equality, and justice, enunciated in the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 and 1793. It appeals to all Republicans to combat inequality, illegality, and intolerance. It will intervene whenever an injustice, an arbitrary act, an abuse of power, or an illegality is reported. Its means of action are representations to the public authorities, petitions to the Chambers, publications and meetings."

Roman Catholicism theoretically has no politics, but it is inevitable that, in a country in which Radicalism has definitely placed itself in opposition to the Church, the Church should throw its weight against Radicalism. After various vicissitudes, the Statute of the Church of France was defined in 1516 by a Concordat, that is to say, a Treaty concluded between a Spiritual Power—the Pope, Leo X—and a Temporal Power—the King, François I. This Concordat remained until the Revolution. The civil constitution of the Clergy, which was insisted on by the Constituent Assembly of July, 1790, broke the Concordat. General Bonaparte, who became First Consul, resumed negotiations with Rome, and a new Concordat was drawn up in July, 1801. It was this arrangement which remained in force until 1904, when, as we have seen, there was a rupture of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and the Government of the Republic. The Separation of Church and State, which in other circumstances could well be accepted by good Catholics, was the last of a series of restrictive measures directed against the privileges of Catholicism. There was the expulsion of unauthorized Congregations in 1880, there were secular laws relating to schools in 1881 and 1882, the imposition of military obligations on the Seminarists in 1889, and the tightening of the control over Religious Orders, compelling some of them to choose between dissolution or exile, in 1901. The law of December 5, 1905, finally abolished the Concordat of 1801, and made it possible to create

Associations Cultuelles which might hold ecclesiastical property. By two consecutive Encyclical Letters Pope Pius X condemned these associations as contrary to the apostolic hierarchy, and presenting a schismatic tendency. The question has often been discussed since 1906, and an agreement regarding diocesan associations was almost reached after the war. The laws of 1907 placed the exercise of the Roman Catholic religion in France within the limits of the Common Law, and gave the Church the full enjoyment of its edifices and its objects of cult. During the war the priests and the sisterhoods displayed the utmost patriotism, and a revulsion of feeling led to the restoration of Ambassadorial representation at the Vatican and a relaxation of the application of the laws relating to Congregations. The religious war seemed to have come to an end, but with the advent of the Radical Government in 1924 an attempt was made to revive the anti-Clerical agitation.

There has been much discussion of the significance of French Neo-Catholicism. After considering most carefully the religious situation in France I have come to the conclusion that no man can pronounce with real authority on the spiritual phenomena. Is there or is there not a true religious renaissance? Those who would answer in the affirmative would have with them only a section of the Catholics. The other day I was placed at dinner between two Catholic Editors of equal competence. On my right was the Editor of the most vigorous weekly Catholic organ. On my left was the Editor of the leading Catholic newspaper. The conversation was on this theme. The Editor of the Catholic daily, whose business it is to stir up optimism, insisted, as he insists in his paper, that there is an enormous growth of religious ideas. The Editor of the weekly organ, whose business it is to be critical, took exactly the opposite view. They base their convictions on precisely the same statistics—statistics which they interpret in accordance with their temperament. These statistics are altogether inadequate and serve one as well as the other. The Chiefs of the Church are in similar contradiction.

That there is a revival of the political influence of the Vatican in Europe generally, and, as I think, in France, is another matter. France at one moment frankly based her foreign policy on friendship with the Vatican; she had need of Catholic support in the Central European countries which were essentially Catholic. Her allies and her prospective allies on the Continent among the new and the new-old nations which emerged from the peace-making were largely Catholic and might have been welded together by their common Catholicism. One need only point to Poland and to Czecho-Slovakia which France regarded as pivotal countries. There was even a design—far too diagrammatic to be practicable—to construct a confederation in which Catholic Bavaria and other Southern Catholic Germanic lands might have joined hands with Danubian Catholic lands against Protestant Prussia. The "policy of presence"—the sending of a French Ambassador to the Vatican after a rupture of relations which had lasted for a generation—was inaugurated because France felt that she might assume the leadership of Central Europe at the Vatican and become the recognized head of a hierarchy of Catholic peoples. Men like Millerand and Briand, who, in the days of religious strife, had been instrumental in bringing about the severance, were now foremost in bringing about the reconciliation. Herriot tried to reverse the decision but after a prolonged fight was definitely beaten. Then, after all the hubbub, the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister were at the end of 1925 the principal witnesses of a ceremony at the Élysée in which the Barrette of the Cardinalate was presented to Mgr. Cerretti, the Papal Nuncio at Paris. This ceremony in the palace of a Protestant President is, in my opinion, one of the most significant spectacles which have been seen since the war.

Certainly something is happening in France, but how far that something is political and how far it is religious it would be hard to ascertain. The Catholics whether practising or not, have rallied against the menace not only of Radicalism but of Socialism. Rightly or wrongly—and I think wrongly—Catholicism has been inclined to identify itself with Conservatism. There may be no necessary connection, and some of the French Catholics believe it would be better to avoid any appearance of taking up sides in the social struggle. Yet it remains true, as Dean Inge has suggested, that large numbers of Frenchmen consider society to be disintegrated by the ideas of 1798. The forces against Catholicism are chiefly Agnostic. To Agnosticism is attributed the declining birth-rate, the relaxation of morals, the Communist tendencies, and it is natural therefore that the Catholics should group themselves in political organizations of which they form the backbone and become a formidable political power.

M. Joseph Aynard has emphasized the primordial difference between France and England (and to a lesser extent America)—the difference of religion. When the Frenchman is no longer Catholic he is still in the Catholic tradition. Even his anti-Clericalism is subjected to the influence of his country, and in so far as he is not merely negative, in so far as he is positive, he turns towards Catholicism. The very words Clericalism and anti-Clericalism are difficult to understand in Anglo-Saxon countries. Clericalism in those countries denotes narrowly the special mentality of those who live in a Clerical milieu. In France anti-Clericalism is a political arm directed sometimes against men who are not religious and have no relations with the Clergy but who are supposed to have "reactionary" ideas surviving from a past of which they have not conserved the noble heritage. The words are, in short, convenient political rallying-cries and often little more; and there is nothing to prevent an anti-Clericalist from being a good Catholic. In morals there is a fundamental difference between the French and the Anglo-Saxon view-points. Catholicism has the notion of human frailty and is indulgent, while Protestantism is apt to consider vice as monstrous, incredible, altogether unnatural. This explains in part the leniency of French tribunals for human weaknesses, and the severity of British and American justice. In education the Anglo-Saxons seem to suppose that intelligence is a natural gift which develops itself, while the French consider that it requires careful fostering in order that it shall assist a will naturally turned towards evil. One could multiply these observations, but the upshot of it all is that France is, as always, a Catholic country. Whether it is a more fervently practising Catholic country since the war is a question which we must leave in abeyance.

It is convenient to glance at the organization of Protestantism in France in this connection, although the present-day Protestants as such have kept out of politics. If one were to generalize one would be tempted to say that the million Protestants in France are chiefly to be found among the reformers. They are not negligible as is sometimes supposed, and the present President of the Republic, M. Doumergue, is an adherent of the Protestant faith. The principal sects are the Eglise Réformée Evangélique, and the Eglise Evangélique Lutherienne.

There are smaller groups of Wesleyans, Baptists, and so forth. They unite under the name of Fédération Protestante with head-quarters at Paris.

Judaism, which is not very strong in France, has also the good sense to keep outside political quarrels, but from time to time a violent anti-Jewish campaign springs up. Edouard Drumont, in the *Libre Parole*, devoted his life to a crusade against the Jews, who under the Republic have in large measure increased their influence in finance and in politics. What added such bitterness to the Dreyfus Affaire was the anti-Semitic campaign into which men of great ability flung themselves. But Jew-baiting now appears to have entirely ceased, and no longer is the Israelite Cult blamed for all the misfortunes of the Third Republic. It remains true, however, that the vast majority of French Jews are to be found on the Left, and many of them on the Extreme Left.

An organization which although basically Catholic has broken away from orthodox political Catholic thought is " La Jeune République " of Marc Sangnier. Numerically it is not very strong, but it has done a good deal to spread ideas of internationalism and of universal friendship. It looks to the young to realize the amity of peoples. The originality of this movement lies in the fact that hitherto the majority of Catholics have belonged to the Right. La Jeune République proves that there is no necessary opposition between Catholicism and Democracy. Its members protest against the old classification of Catholics and Reactionaries on one side, and on the other side Republicans and anti-Clericals. It points out that in Germany Catholics have opposed Prussian Nationalism, in England and America Catholics are often " advanced," in Italy Catholics have marched with the Socialists. While the State should be laic it should have a benevolent attitude towards religion, for the suppression of religion may be fatal to a community. La Jeune République is somewhat socialistic in general tendency.

It is largely the young men who have thrown themselves into the work of the Union which is designed to promote the idea of the League of Nations. This is an active body, and its branches in the universities are particularly vigorous. There is a large number of associations which have for object the spread of the international idea, especially among intellectuals, and the leaven works surely. Naturally they do not ally themselves to any party, but there is no doubt on which side they are generally to be found. The strength of the Radical and Socialist Parties is drawn from the teaching classes and from the minor officials and other lesser intellectuals who impregnate the country with somewhat vague enthusiasms and ideals.

The Ligue des Patriotes, on the contrary, believes that the salvation of France is only to be found in a vigilant Nationalism which is undisguisedly anti-German, which holds the Rhine to be the frontier of Germany, which insists upon the political aspect of religion, which is intransigent and somewhat bellicose. Maurice Barrès succeeded Déroulède as the President of this League. Now General de Castelnau is the effective president.

When M. Millerand left the Élysée he formed the National Republican League. It stands for all that the Bloc National stood for. The connection between the policy of the Bloc National and the associations which exist to favour its propaganda on the one hand, and economic organizations on the other, has been amply demonstrated. In 1924 an inquiry was ordered by Parliament into the activities of the Union des Intérêts Economiques, of which M. Billiet, a Senator, was the head. It was shown that both in the 1919 and the 1924 elections funds had been distributed to candidates and to local newspapers, while tracts and posters had been printed by the Union in favour of certain candidates. The Union collected its funds from manufacturers and traders, large and small, for the purpose of protecting capitalism, which, it was alleged, was endangered by the growth of Socialism and of Communism. The Union was definitely against the Bloc des Gauches which during the elections advocated capital levies and declared that the profiteers of the war should be made to disgorge. Doubtless such a society is perfectly legitimate, but unpleasant charges were made that bribes were received by some of the deputies. There was a great outcry against corruption. But the Union des Intérêts Economiques is by no means the only organization of its kind. How far, and by what machinery the Comité des Forges, the great association of French ironmasters, controls French politics cannot be ascertained, but it is certain that it does not neglect to look after its interests in Parliament. The bankers, mineowners, manufacturers, agriculturists, group themselves for their common defence.

The object of the Millerand organization—La Ligue Républicaine Nationale—was to organize the Opposition forces against the Radicals. Because it is all-embracing it cannot have as militant a character as various smaller organizations which frankly admire the methods of Fascism. Thus there is the nucleus of a Fascist army in Les Jeunesses Patriotes led by M. Taittinger. Their numbers would undoubtedly increase rapidly if there were social disorder, and they might constitute themselves into armed forces. A rival organization has been founded by M. Georges Valois and M. Philippe Barrès. Its organ is the Nouveau Siècle and it has given itself the French name of Faisceau. Its adherents wear Blue Shirts. They would not be afraid of a *coup d'état*. M. Georges

Valois, originally belonged to the Action Française, but he felt that something bolder was required. He appeals to the youth of the nation. There is, he says, an opposition between the post-war and the pre-war generations. The post-war generation cannot admit that the country can be properly governed by the "old gang." From Poincaré to Caillaux the politicians are, in the eyes of Valois, only the ghosts of an epoch that was without vitality —tired men, incapable of making use of the victory, because they had been nourished in thoughts of defeat. The great drama of the post-war period is that a people which triumphed has been governed by successive teams of the vanquished, who march around like a stage army and never give place to the younger men. There is a call for chiefs, with one supreme chief. This chief will be thrown up by circumstances. He must not be afraid of responsibility as are the fatigued politicians. He will find well-drilled troops ready to support him in every possible way. That chief need not be a Monarch. Rather should he be a Dictator who has given proof of energy.

The Action Française was founded in 1898, but it became Royalist only in 1901. It has a newspaper which bears its name. It believes that justice must be subordinated to the *raison d'état*. It is the only Royalist party which is really alive, and although it has little Parliamentary representation it is extraordinarily influential. As it is to undo the work of the Revolution its chief cannot be other than the "heriditary chief, the heir of forty Kings who have created France"—that is to say, Jean, Duc de Guise, who succeeded Philippe, Duc d'Orléans. Its adherents have formed themselves into a band known as the "Camelots du Roi." They molest Radicals and Socialists in the streets and in public meetings; they loudly profess to be arming against the Communists.

For practical purposes opposition to the Republic had until lately entirely disappeared in France. When the Republic was proclaimed for the third time after the Franco-Prussian War the majority of the supporters of the Republic were somewhat lukewarm. France was called "a Republic without Republicans," just as Germany is to-day. The Republic was regarded as a temporary expedient to cover up the defeat. But with the passage of time, in spite of the storms which threatened to wreck the new Republic, the number of those who sincerely hoped for a change diminished. The Bourbon partisans can hardly be found to-day, while the Bonapartists are practically extinct. Those who urge the claims of the Pretender, who lives in exile (the laws of exile which apply to the Pretenders were passed in 1886 and are still enforced), use the Duke as a banner, but they do not trouble overmuch about him. They are, above all, Nationalist, even Imperialist, carrying patriotism to excess. They hang on to the skirts of Roman Catholicism, but some of the principal adherents of the movement are admittedly philosophical atheists. They are essentially apostles of force. Léon Daudet and Charles Maurras are undoubtedly the foremost figures in the movement. Daudet is the son of the distinguished novelist Alphonse Daudet. He possesses great literary talent. His intemperance of language does not cause very serious injury to French statesmen because it is discounted. He appears to be a great overgrown schoolboy with an inordinate love of farce. He is like a character out of Rabelais—a big, lusty, roaring man who enjoys life immensely. He is full of a boisterous humour; he is impelled by a sense of fun. He is not as malicious as he would appear in spite of his amazing fulminations, his astounding charges against France's prominent citizens. He constructs the wildest romances, but he never forgets the comic side. There are many pages in his Memoirs which will live when most literature of to-day is long dead. His portraits are unforgettable. What vivid traits, what zest, what gusto! They are caricatures, but they are brushed in with a fine sweep and rich colour. Maurras is an entirely different type of man. One quickly finds in conversation with him that he has an exceptionally well-stored mind, a surprising power of dialectic, a clearly constructed philosophy. He is a classicist and an admirable writer, but his casuistry is detestable and his arguments for the employment of violence in political life are deplorable.

In spite of loud manifestations, the Royalist movement, as such, has dwindled. Fifteen years ago the Royalist party was directed by a few quiet, aristocratic persons who did not make any progress but who held together, a little band which was not to be despised. They were swept aside by the more turbulent spirits. Circumstances for a time favoured Daudet and Maurras. The war gave them an opportunity of declaring themselves to be more patriotic than the Republicans, whom they accused of displaying weakness, if not worse, in face of Germany. They led the easy game of spy-hunting. They revealed some fresh treachery every morning. They proved conclusively that to be a Republican was to be a traitor. They were responsible for the terrorism which prevailed after the Armistice, they wielded an influence altogether disproportionate to their numbers, and when the Ruhr was occupied their apparent power reached its apogée. Everybody was afraid of them.

With the elections of May 11, 1924, they were for a time routed. An analysis of the electoral results reveals the insignificance of their active forces. In

Paris they polled few votes. In 1902 they managed to obtain 6,280 votes in the 19th Arrondissement; in 1924 they obtained 550 votes. In the 8th Arrondissement the figures of 1902 were 7,063; in 1924 they were 1,448. In the 5th Arrondissement Léon Daudet himself obtained 850 votes as against 5,567 cast for the Royalist candidate twenty-two years ago. These figures are typical of the rest, and yet, in spite of this retrogression, the Royalist campaigns attract the greatest attention. The policy of insults and defamation, of provocation and of assault, meets with a certain success. The group has enjoyed a strange licence which indicates that it has sympathizers in high places.

The former Bonapartist party no longer demands the return of a hereditary sovereign, but nevertheless does not forget "the principles which in two troubled epochs have permitted France to re-establish order and prosperity." The "Appel au Peuple" as the party calls itself, regrets that it is impossible to impose another Napoléon. Both Napoléon I and Napoléon III are represented as having wrought well for France. It is suggested that there should be a revision of the Constitution of 1875, "which gives no authority to the Chief of State." Without a candidate to put forward, the little group would like to give whoever is in power a sort of dictatorship.

The Fédération Républicaine, founded in 1903, is anti-Radical. It was one of the most important elements in the constitution of the Bloc National. It asks for a careful revision of the Republican institutions in order to assure cohesion and stability. In fiscal policy it has always been against direct taxation, which it regards as vexatious and inquisitorial. It deprecates the division of the nation into classes. Naturally it demands a vigorous policy and it supported M. Poincaré. More to the Left are the

Républicains Démocrates, who profess themselves to be in favour of social reforms. The Parti Républicain Démocratique, though constituted in 1920 continues the traditions of the Alliance with a similar name set up by Adolphe Carnot in 1901. Above all it is anti-Socialist ; it stands for the defence of industrial and commercial interests. In Parliament some of its members inscribe themselves on the roll of the Gauche Républicaine and others are Républicains de Gauche (it should be noted that the Parliamentary groups do not necessarily correspond with the electoral political parties).

There is also a group, which is anything but "advanced," calling itself the "National Radical Party." It expressed itself as in favour of a policy which would procure guarantees on the Rhine and guarantees in the Ruhr. Internally it adopted one startingly reactionary principle: it declared that experience had proved that economy was not possible if the Government was obliged to follow legislative paths. It needed the weapon of decree-laws—that is to say, the Government should be armed with power to decree a law, without reference to Parliament, at its good pleasure.

It is not necessary to consider all the groups which form themselves. They do not put forward any remarkable ideas. The Fédération des Républicains Rénovateurs may be mentioned because it believes that an economic revival in France would be determined by a decentralization and an encouragement of regionalism. Other groups which were more or less attached to the Bloc National demand liberty for industry, commerce, and agriculture. They are against the existing State monopolies and oppose the creation of new monopolies. They deplore the action taken by the Radicals in letting go of the Ruhr. They call for a policy of energy, and although they proclaim their desire for international peace, that peace must be preserved by the might of France. They do not believe in the sincerity of Germany; they are persuaded that within a comparatively short space of time Germany, who is preparing for war, will again attack France and may win.

La Ligue de la République is one of the unifying organizations on the Left. It was established in 1921 by M. Paul Painlevé. Republicans are those who accept without restriction the definition of Gambetta; the Republic implies obligatory secular education, the complete separation of Church and State, the reduction of armaments to the lowest point compatible with the security of the country, a progressive tax on income, and protective laws for workers. The principal object of the Ligue is to prepare and preserve the union of the Left parties against attempts at a Restoration or a Dictatorship, and against Reactionary policies. The Ligue neither supersedes nor suppresses any existing group: it considers diversity of conceptions as beneficial, but it asks that divergencies shall be effaced in the hour of electoral battle in order that the action of the Left can be co-ordinated.

So far as electoral promises are concerned, the Radical and Radical-Socialist party, at the head of which is M. Herriot, and to which belong both M. Caillaux and M. Malvy, has usually been extremely cautious. Although it has in power recognized the Soviet Government, it has always protested against the dictatorship of Moscow. It has equally protested against putting France under the protection of the Vatican. In practice it has indeed carried on warfare against the Vatican, realizing that the party is best held together by the anti-Clerical prejudices of its members. The party was animated by the desire for justice in respect of war offenders and extended to them a generous measure of pardon. Peace abroad it proclaimed as one of its objects. In fiscal matters it saw the need of the most drastic revision of the haphazard methods that threatened to lead France to bankruptcy, but its first steps in this direction were certainly not promising.

This party occupies an intermediate position between the Moderate Republicans and the Socialists. The bases of its policy were laid down in 1907 at the Nancy Congress. The programme then adopted has been modified year after year and it is now much more Internationalist than formerly. At the head of its programme at one time was the revision of the Constitution. There was a demand for the abolition of the Senate, which is composed of older men, elected indirectly by electoral colleges, and is naturally inclined to be less audacious than the Chamber. For some years the agitation against the Senate was allowed to slumber but occasionally it breaks out. Generally the demand of the party is that the Chamber should have the last word, especially in financial matters. On the electoral law the members have always been divided, but the majority is against the *scrutin de liste*, with its false proportionalism, and in favour of simple single-member constituencies.

It has dropped its call for the election of judges, but it asks for the more rapid administration of justice and the protection of personal liberty against the abusive employment of prolonged preventive detention. Certainly the independence of the magistrature is not in France sufficiently guaranteed. In the economic domain it stands for a fairer system of direct taxation, with a diminution of taxes on foodstuffs and of taxes which weigh upon agriculture, commerce, and the *petite industrie*. It has pronounced for the eight-hour day, the development of syndicalism, and the participation of the worker in the direction and profits of production. It has always promised to improve housing conditions. It advocates the gradual extension of women's rights. The Ecole Unique is one of its pet projects.

The Republican-Socialist party of which Paul Painlevé is the chief, and which, although greatly inferior in numbers to the main Radical party, yet fulfils an important rôle, is essentially a Reformist party. It is not the enemy of individual property, but it is the adversary of abuses, and it asks for the intervention of the State in all social, commercial, and industrial phenomena. It is against "the empire of monopolies, against financial coalitions and economic trusts." It is opposed to excessive profits and to anything which makes for dear living. It is sympathetic towards those officials who wish to associate in Trade Unions. Liberty of conscience, religious and political, it regards as essential. It calls for the collaboration of classes. Taxation should be distributed in such manner that there is equality of sacrifice. The Republican-Socialists have always expressed themselves in favour of adequate reparations, but they also profess their peaceful intentions towards Germany and all other nations. The League of Nations would, they think, become an organ of security if its power were augmented.

The Socialists when they found themselves separated from the Communists were for some years in the doldrums. They had apparently few followers in the country; they had no machinery. Attempts to run newspapers failed. But at the 1924 elections they came back in a compact group to the Chamber. Not only were they a hundred strong, but they could decide the fate of the Radical Government by giving or withholding their support. They are charged by the Communists with betraying the people by deciding, under the leadership of Léon Blum, a skilful dialectician, and Paul Boncour, an eloquent lawyer, and Pierre Renaudel, a former editor of *L'Humanité*, to throw in their lot with the Radicals, who are represented as men who abandon their principles on grounds of opportunism. For better or for worse the Socialists tried to be the tail which wagged the Radical dog. Doubtless they saw many of the purposes which they pursued almost attained only to escape them at the last moment. In internal politics they demanded a generous amnesty which would blot out offences committed during the war. They asked for the reintegration of participants in the Railway Strike of 1920; liberty for Trade Unions and other working-class organizations. They opposed attempts to dispossess the State of public services in favour of private capitalists, and they pressed for the reform of these services in accordance with the demand of the Confédération Générale du Travail—that is to say, the direction of public services by a triple representation of the public, the workers, and the State. They stood for the settlement of a number of questions by technical bodies, of which the Confédération Générale du Travail established the type in its proposal for a great Economic Council; a Capital Levy which would relieve the overburdened Budget; and the reorganization of the Army by the substantial reduction of military service. From the external point of view the Socialists required the establishment of peace based upon equitable international arrangements. Reparations, they said, should be obtained by an international loan guaranteed by German capital; security should be obtained by the disarmament of Germany and the neutralization of the Left Bank of the Rhine with the League of Nations acting as the guardian of European peace.

In a broader definition the Socialists seek to substitute collective possession and control of property for individual possession and control of property. Their doctrines are drawn from two sources—the teachings of the French reformers of the early part of the nineteenth century and the teachings of Karl Marx. Three tendencies manifested themselves in the early part of the last century in France. Proudhon sought to give class consciousness to the workers, to show them that they should have different ideals from those of the bourgeoisie—ideals which were rather economic than political. He proclaimed distrust of an authoritative and centralized State, and believed in co-operative methods. Blanqui represented revolutionary Communism and found more promise in political changes than did Proudhon. He deliberately encouraged violence. Louis Blanc, on the other hand, thought that progress could be effected pacifically and that the State might intervene by edicting better labour laws. These tendencies have this in common—that they demand emancipation of the proletariat in conformity with an ideal justice. French Socialism is indeed essentially idealist. Marx, on the contrary, tried to construct a scientific Socialism founded upon material experience. He adumbrated the conflict of classes. After the old nobility the bourgeoisie conquered power; it is now for the workers in their turn to conquer power. This is more than ever necessary owing to the development of great industrial concerns which concentrate capital in the hands of a few persons. The future triumph of Socialism is for Marx certain by the operation of rigorous historic laws. Socialism must be revolutionary and must be international. The Marxian doctrines in France, though imposing themselves, have always been somewhat softened.

Though endeavouring to enforce discipline the Socialist party is constantly divided. It sits, as Marcel Sembat punningly said, in perpetual scission. Its unity was at least nominally effected by Jaurès in 1905, when it took the name of Parti Socialiste Section Française de L'Internationale Ouvrière. Its more current appellation is Parti Socialiste Unifié. The war came and the party adhered to the Union Sacrée. The Socialists voted the Budget and war credits contrary to their declaration of 1905. In spite of the resolution of Amsterdam, Socialists like Jules Guesde, Albert Thomas—now Head of the International Labour Bureau at Geneva—and Marcel Sembat, joined the Government. From 1915, however, a Socialist minority, of which the leaders were Alexandre Blanc, Brizon, and Raffin Dugens, protested against the war. The deputies named participated in the International Conferences of Zimmerwald and Kienthal, which decided that Socialists should oppose the war in every possible manner. Jean Longuet represented a middle tendency. The principle of national defence was admitted by him but he raised his voice against "*jusqu'au boutisme.*" After the war Bolshevism completed the destruction of Socialist unity. Marx in 1864 had organized the First Internationale. In 1900 the Second Internationale was constructed by most of the Socialist parties. The Third Internationale was established by the Communists. At Tours in 1920 the majority of Socialists gave their adhesion to the Third Internationale. They constituted the Communist Party. The dissidents kept the old title and are to-day the Socialist party proper. In their ranks are Paul Boncour, Renaudel, Blum, Bracque, Longuet. The Communists, though numerically small in Parliament, are particularly active in the country.

Two other dissenting parties with little influence and few supporters were formed by Georges Pioch, an indefatigable writer, and Frossard, the former secretary of the Socialist party, on the one hand; and by Aubriot and Levasseur on the other. To-day there is some indication that the groups may come together again. At present the Socialists differ from the Communists in that they believe in national defence in spite of capitalism, and are hostile to the subordination of Trade Syndicates to the discipline of a political party, especially when that political party receives its instructions from Moscow. They do not consider violence an indispensable condition of social transformation. They advocate realizable reforms.

The Communists, on their side, though by no means as dangerous as was at certain moments pretended, organized themselves at the behest of Moscow in cellules, rayons, and federations. Their method was to plant representatives in every workshop, in every regiment of the army, and this cellule was to collect about it as many adherents as possible. Communism although indulging in the noisiest propaganda yet became by a strange paradox a secret society. Some of the Communists were conspicuous enough, but it was the business of others to wear masks and to spread Bolshevik doctrine with the utmost discretion. It never appeared to be likely that Communism would succeed in France in its ultimate purpose of overturning society, but Bolshevik ideas nevertheless penetrated everywhere, particularly among the working classes. The Communists were strengthened by the seizure of the Socialist newspaper founded by Jaurès, *L'Humanite.* When the split with Socialism came they, as the majority, simply excluded the Socialists and took possession of the whole machinery, becoming an autonomous party. Their programme, in so far as it can be stated, is as follows: the extinction of the public debt by the seizure of large fortunes; the suppression of the tax on wages, and of indirect taxes; the socialization of banks, mines, railways, and all large industries; the generalization of social insurance without any demand for subscription from the working classes; the institution of what is called a Democracy of Workers and Peasants, the workers and peasants, through their syndicates, to run directly the public services; the abolition of the permanent army and the creation of a people's militia; the declaration of the right of the Colonies to determine their own destiny; the extinction of the magistrature and the substitution of the jury system; the expropriation of great landed proprietors; the creation of agricultural co-operative societies; the constitution of a popular High Court to judge those responsible for the war and the prolongation of the war, the military chiefs, and the profiteers; the annulation of the Treaty of Versailles and the conclusion of a veritable peace without indemnity or annexation; the substitution of the United States of Europe for the League of Nations.

The Communist party, which belongs to the Third Internationale, is governed by Moscow. Among its most prominent leaders in France are Marcel Cachin, who has managed to change with each evolution of Socialist thought; Vaillant-Couturier, a fiery young man; André Berthon, a successful lawyer. The real directors are, however, in the background; they prefer to be obscure, and in spite of tremendous agitation the Communist party remains an occult body. It is constantly excluding those who differ from the majority on points of doctrine or of tactics; and therefore it is in less danger of seeing a minority develop in its midst into a majority, and of treating it as it treated the Socialists.

Among the articles of the Third Internationale of Moscow of which the French Communist party is a section are the following:

> ‘In almost all the countries of Europe and of America the conflict of classes enters into the stage

> of civil war. The Communists cannot in these conditions trust the legality of the bourgeoisie. It is their duty to create everywhere in addition to the legal organization a clandestine organization capable of fulfilling at the decisive moment its duties towards the Revolution. The duty of propagating Communist ideas implies the absolute necessity of conducting a systematic propaganda and a persistent agitation and where open propaganda is difficult it must be conducted illegally. At the present epoch of merciless civil war the Communist party cannot play its part unless it is organized in the most centralized fashion and a discipline of iron similar to military discipline is admitted."

The strength of the Communists lies in the fact that they come into direct contact with the industrial and agriculturist workers, endeavouring to educate them in their principles, while all the other parties are merely electoral committees without real authority over the masses. In a country where there is general disgust with the politicians who form a clique apart, where there is an absence of genuine public opinion, the vitality of an energetic Communist party is not a negligable symptom.

The Union Socialiste Communiste, of which Ernest Lafont is the leader, is to all intents and purposes allied with the Communist party.

The Confédération Générale du Travail is not, strictly speaking, political in character. Theoretically it does not occupy itself with parties but is purely a Trade Union movement. In practice, however, it is closely allied with the Socialists. During the war, M. Jouhaux, its chief for many years threw his weight on the side of the successive Governments, and became a patriot of the patriots. That is why he is held in small esteem by the Communistically inclined Trade Unionists, who formed a rival association. After the abortive strike in 1920 and the proceedings which were taken against it to secure its dissolution as an illegal body, it lost a large part of its adherents and became exceedingly feeble. The Confederation is, however, a necessary organization, and it will probably regain its former strength and become a powerful influence in the life of the nation. It is of comparatively recent origin. Until 1884 the French Trade Unions lived outside the law. Syndicalism was in its various forms proscribed and prohibited under the First Empire, under the Restoration, and under the Second Empire. It was not until the Third Republic had been in existence for fourteen years that some sort of legality was given to the organization of the workers. The Confederation grouped together the various Trade Unions with difficulty, not only because legal obstacles continued to exist, but because the French worker is extremely individualistic and independent and is refractory to the Syndicalist discipline. It was at the Congress of Nantes in 1894 that the principle of the General Strike was affirmed in spite of the opposition of the political Parti Ouvrier, at one time the strongest of the French Socialist parties. In its present form the Confederation may be said to have sprung from the Congress of Nantes, but a number of later Congresses were needed to give it a definite constitution. After the war, the number of Syndicates or Trade Unions which composed the Confederation rose to 4,000. In 1914 there were only 600,000 members, but in 1920 there were more than 2,500,000. Afterwards the numbers fell much below the million. The Communists set up a new organization known as the Confédération Générale du Travail Unitaire.

Some thumbnail sketches of a few of the politicians who have figured, or may figure, prominently in post-war history may here be given. There was elected as President of the Republic in 1924 M. Gaston Doumergue. He has not in his political career stood out very conspicuously. Perhaps that is an advantage for him. The man of strong character and of tenacious opinions may easily come to grief at the Élysée. The best French Presidents have been men who may fairly be described as colourless. They amble along, making no enemies, while the more prominent politician, if he attracts more attention also accumulates adversaries in his path.

M. Doumergue has shown considerable ability and an exceptionally shrewd political sense. As is fairly common in France, he rose from the most humble beginnings. His father was a small farmer at Aigues-Vives in the South, and considerable sacrifices were necessary to send the boy to the Lycée of Nîmes. There he distinguished himself and an effort was made to enable him to continue his studies until he became a lawyer. He went as a Judge to Cochin China and then, after a short colonial experience, entered politics. His cordiality, industry, and attention to affairs, secured for him a number of ministerial posts, which he filled without involving himself overmuch in the party struggles. Doubtless a good deal of luck has aided him ; nevertheless he is precisely the type of politician who in France, where personal jealousies and intrigues are intense, is destined to succeed. If not a great President in a country where great Presidents are not wanted, he is at least a charming one.

At the Élysée, warned by the fate of his predecessor, he practises strict impartiality. When he is called upon to form Ministries he tries to set aside prejudices ; he is likely to accept any Prime Minister who is designated by the sentiment of the two

Houses. He would be equally at home with M. Poincaré, whose friend he is, as with M. Caillaux, for whose acquittal he voted when M. Caillaux was tried by the Senate.

M. Alexandre Millerand, his predecessor, who, after his resignation, became naturally the combative chief of the opposition to Radicalism, is altogether unlike M. Doumergue. He is a somewhat headstrong, obstinate man, who tried effectively to direct affairs. He has become an ardent Nationalist. He it was who founded the Bloc National, and he was chiefly responsible for the implacable front which France presented towards Germany.

In social affairs he has become intensely conservative, but he would have the Constitution seriously amended in order to strengthen the power of the President and of the Senate, which should be bulwarks against Socialism.

It is strange that a considerable number of prominent publicists and politicians in France who are now regarded as reactionary should have passed through a stage of ardent and even unruly enthusiasm for social reforms. M. Millerand in 1896, in his famous discourse at Saint-Mandé, proclaimed the right to strike. In 1920, following the Railway Strike, he instituted proceedings against the Confédération Générale du Travail and temporarily reduced this association of Trade Unions to impotence. He was foremost in the anti-Clerical movement, and to him as a lawyer was entrusted the liquidation of the Congregations. But it was M. Millerand who commenced the negotiations for reestablishing relations with Rome. When he entered the Cabinet of Waldeck-Rousseau he was the first Socialist Minister in France, and he initiated a number of reforms. To him are due pensions, a weekly rest day for workers, and the shortening of hours for women employed in industry. Most of his Ministerial work until the war was in connection with internal affairs. He is an able organizer, a hard worker of the dogged rather than the brilliant kind. The war found him in the post of War Minister, where he undoubtedly made blunders, but his loyal support of his subordinates is held to excuse him.

M. Joseph Caillaux, in spite of his misfortunes, was looked upon by many Frenchmen as a financial genius. He is at once the most hated and feared of French politicians. He was bitterly reproached for his negotiations with Germany in 1911 over the head of his Foreign Minister, which resulted in the cession of a portion of the French Congo to the country that even then was threatening war. He was associated with the adoption of the Income-tax in France and the Income-tax though it has been imposed for ten years, has never been thoroughly accepted. During the war the arrest of M. Caillaux was ordered by M. Clemenceau for his alleged pacific intrigues. The sentence which was passed upon him depriving him of political rights was raised by the amnesty which was voted at the end of 1924. Thus he was permitted to re-enter political life. In spite of the cumulative weight of evidence that he had permitted himself to be mixed up in a number of unpleasant affairs, there has never been proof of disloyalty. He was, strangely enough, accepted by the Right as Finance Minister in 1925 because he was anti-Socialist. He has advocated a real reconciliation with Germany and a definite economic and political union of France and Germany. Since the days when he was acknowledged chief of the Radical party other chiefs have arisen, and it is not easy, therefore, for him to overcome personal opposition in his own party. Personally M. Caillaux is not altogether likeable ; he is proud and irascible, he cannot lightly support contradiction.

M. Paul Painlevé, who narrowly escaped becoming President of the Republic, was War Minister and afterwards Prime Minister in the most difficult year of all, 1917, when the beginnings of a mutiny occurred in the army and the civilians had grown weary of the war. It was touch-and-go whether France would crack up. Nothing would be more foolish than to attempt to put the responsibility of this crisis on M. Painlevé. He has been accused of hindering the disastrous offensive of General Nivelle, who had begun his push without proper preparation. That he should have inquired into the causes of the useless slaughter, that the offensive should have been stopped, and that General Nivelle should have fallen into disgrace was inevitable.

When the Radicals triumphed at the polls he was made President of the Chamber. The selection was not altogether good, for M. Painlevé cannot pretend to impartiality. He feels strongly, thinks quickly, and expresses himself with emphasis. As he is one of the most brilliant mathematicians in France, it is the fashion to be surprised at his strong feeling. Great mathematicians are not, of course, necessarily cold and cautious. In M. Painlevé is a strange mixture of the emotional and the critical faculties. He has an extraordinary facility for instructing himself in any subject through conversation ; he has, too, a remarkable faculty of improvisation. The temperament of the savant, it is to be feared, is not the most suitable temperament for the politician. In 1925 he was as Prime Minister and Finance Minister completely baffled by financial problems.

M. Aristide Briand, though a Radical in sympathies, cannot be regarded as a strictly party man.

He is too versatile, too supple, too tactful to occupy any other position than that of the Centre. If he leans to the Left, he is still capable of obtaining the support of the Right. This was exemplified in the 1919 Chamber when he was Prime Minister for a year governing with the Bloc National, and in the 1924 Chamber when he was again Prime Minister this time with a Radical-Socialist majority. He is regarded as the man for an emergency. Ten times has he been Prime Minister of France. As a persuasive orator he is perhaps unmatched. His voice has been described as a violoncello on which he can play all tunes. It is a delight to listen to him, striking the deepest notes and then changing the tone of his voice to a light banter, and then thrilling with indignation. He is the supreme virtuoso of politics. With his stooping shoulders, his inveterate smoking of cigarettes, he gives an impression of indolence. He is not to be numbered among the tremendous workers. He depends upon his alert intelligence, his ability to appreciate instantly what should be done. When he is not in office he spends much of his time on his farm in Normandy.

No statesman has ever had a more remarkable career than has M. Aristide Briand. It is about twenty years since he became Minister for the first time, and he has actually occupied Ministerial positions for about ten years in all. On the average, therefore, one year out of two he is in office. At least fifteen times has he been in some Governmental post. There is no case which can compare with that of M. Briand. He easily holds the record. At the same time it is a record that has its undesirable connotations. It reveals the lack of continuity which is the principal defect of French politics. If M. Briand had been in power for ten consecutive years he might have accomplished something. But in fact he comes and goes and never stays long enough to do anything that matters. An exception should perhaps be made in respect of the Locarno Pact, which crowned his career. Apart from this outstanding event, all one can say is that M. Briand is particularly able and knows his Parliament. Before the war, during the war, and since the war, in the most diverse conditions he has come forward at the right moment, and he has (a rare gift) withdrawn quietly at the right moment. Each time he has resigned power he has done so voluntarily—that is to say, he has anticipated the storm that threatened and has not waited for an adverse vote. Everybody predicted as he went that he would return. Never did he give the impression that he was extinguished but only that he was in momentary eclipse. His great art is to accept the inevitable—or what he considers to be the inevitable—with a good grace, and to avoid doing anything irreparable. He certainly does not attempt to set back the limits of the possible : he is content to exploit the domain of the possible. He loves " arrangements " : he is an expert in " combinations." His strength—and his weakness—lies in his unique position. He carefully places himself in the Centre so that he can lean to the Left or to the Right as may be necessary. Often he does not inscribe himself as a member of any Parliamentary group. Thus he cannot be regarded as a party man and can when difficulties arise be accepted by every group and every party. This gives him an enormous advantage, but it also is a handicap, for his Ministries are composite and usually not very strong. They are composed of second-rate politicians. Certainly in the history of the Third Republic, with its Parliamentary inconstancy, with its swift Ministerial changes, there is no other phenomenon which corresponds to the perpetual recurrence of M. Briand.

Louis Loucheur is afflicted as few men are afflicted: he has an excessive wealth of ideas. He is never at a loss for a solution of any problem submitted to him. Unfortunately he is not content with one solution—he produces half a dozen, and often they are contradictory. It is, I believe, an accepted axiom in the law courts that one defence is far better than two, while the man who tried to present three or four alibis would be certain of condemnation. M. Loucheur in short gives the impression of being too clever. It is, as one critic says, not only the franc that requires stabilization—M. Loucheur also should be stabilized. He has done excellent work under many Ministers—under Millerand, Briand, Ribot, Painlevé, and Clemenceau during the war, when he attended to the munitions. At the Armistice he was made Minister of Reconstruction, and everybody will remember that he signed the Weisbaden accords which anticipated to some extent the Dawes plan. He was one of the French delegates to the League of Nations and at the 1925 Assembly proposed an International Economic Conference which should pave the way for the settling of International Debts by a wise distribution of raw materials and manufactured goods instead of by cash payments. A few years ago he was understood to declare that France could not pay its foreign debts. But his explanation is that while there should be no repudiation of the debts it is necessary to set up some machinery for the exchange of merchandise. This view has indeed been generally approved by leading American economists as well as European financiers.

M. Paul Boncour is an excellent orator of the florid kind, indulging in long, rolling, picturesque phrases and statuesque attitudes. At Geneva, where he was the delegate of France to the League of

Nations, his eloquence has been greatly admired. His pink, clean-shaven face, surmounted by a shock of white hair, is the face of an actor. He is a successful advocate and one of the chiefs of the Socialist party. He is to be seen at all first nights in the Paris theatres and is a lover of letters. On education he is an authority. His knowledge of the law is profound and he reasons on any legal point with pertinency and persuasiveness. Altogether he must be put among the "intellectuals" with which the Socialist party in France abounds. Whatever may be true of other countries, it is true of France that Socialism produces the greatest scholars and the best thinkers. His Socialism is not doctrinaire but is rather an ideal—a deep desire for human justice, human culture, and human uplifting.

M. Léon Blum is the true leader of the Socialists; he is the man who "pulls the strings." His knowledge is encyclopædic; he has written on a variety of subjects, literary, dramatic, and social. Politically he has devoted special attention to financial questions, and some of his speeches on this subject have been masterpieces of exposition. He was responsible for the support which the Socialist party gave to the Radicals—a policy which is open to criticism and may hereafter be resented by those followers who consider it the business of the Socialist party to remain aloof from the bourgeois parties.

When M. Raymond Poincaré, ex-President of the Republic, ex-Prime Minister of France, sank into temporary obscurity after the reverse of 1924, it was thought that his day was done, but M. Poincaré, though he did not endeavour to put obstacles in the way of his successor, could be counted upon to bide his time and to reappear as strong as ever if the opportunity served. In my opinion, no man has dominated recent French affairs to anything like the same extent as M. Poincaré.

Without going back to his earlier days he may be considered to have remained in almost continuous office from the time he succeeded M. Caillaux as Prime Minister before the war to his fall after the long Ruhr struggle. Whether he has had a good or evil influence on France furnishes a subject for controversy, but there can be no controversy about his honesty of intention, his disinterestedness, his patriotism, and the extraordinarily skilful manner in which he carried out his policy in the face of the most formidable international opposition any statesman has ever had to face. He has been peculiarly consistent in his attitude towards Germany. As a *bon Lorrain*, he was raised to the Presidency eighteen months before the war, and there were those who saw in this elevation an announcement of the war. His seven years of office at the Élysée are among the most critical years of modern French history. He was overruled by M. Clemenceau in the peace-making and reduced to silence. When he escaped from the prison-house of the Élysée he did not retire from public life but entered the arena undaunted and determined to make the best of a Treaty which he regarded as disastrous. He wrote himself into power again. At each successive abandonment of French rights he fulminated against the Prime Minister who was in office, and when he became Prime Minister he refused all concessions to Germany.

He has been abused more than any other statesman, but he has cared nothing for popularity. Nicknames were fastened upon him—*Poincaré-la-Guerre, Poincaré-la-Ruhr*—but without any parade he kept on his logical course. Slender as a steel blade is slender, he is finely tempered. There is nothing he resents so much as to be called a man of the Right.

Indeed, in his social policy he has shown himself to be far more liberal-minded than many of those who vaunt their Radicalism.

Although M. Georges Clemenceau has now bidden farewell to politics, the Grand Old Man of France has been such a power that even in his retirement he cannot be overlooked. In my view, he is by far the most striking character of modern French history. He has touched life at every point. He has been an indefatigable fighter—the defender of Manet and of Monet, the champion of Zola in the great Dreyfus days, the friend of Rodin, the playwright, the novelist, the newspaper editor, the traveller, the duellist, the terrible Tumbler of Ministries, the statesman and the arbiter. He has lived life to the full and is a force of nature. His mordant wit has spared neither friend nor foe ; he is sceptical and cynical and at the same time capable of the greatest enthusiasm and devotion to a cause.

When everything was going wrong for France, the whole nation clamoured for Clemenceau. He rallied France to impossible efforts ; he inspired the army and the people with his own indomitable courage. If there is one man without whom the war would not have been won, it is Clemenceau. If there is one man who shaped the peace, it is Clemenceau. And then, when he left the political arena and refused to be drawn into controversy, the eyes of everybody turned uneasily or expectantly on the tiny cottage in La Vendée, or on the dingy apartment of Passy. His enemies—for he has many—allowed themselves to snarl when Clemenceau had disappeared, but they had always some fear that " The Tiger " would once more bound out of his den and pounce upon them.

He has never concealed his contempt for honours, and when he was elected a member of the Académie

Française he ignored the election and never took his seat under the cupola.

The lieutenant of M. Clemenceau also suffered a temporary eclipse in the reaction against the Versailles Treaty, but M. André Tardieu, renouncing politics for the moment, was bound to return. The actual elaboration of the Treaty was in large part due to M. Tardieu. The Treaty is full of obscurities, but this could hardly be avoided owing to the confusion in which it was drawn up and the tug-of-war between two vastly different peace conceptions. But M. Tardieu is one of the clearest political writers of our time. When he was the foreign editor of the *Temps* his daily bulletins were masterpieces of rapid exposition. He showed the same gift in his editorials in the short-lived *Echo National.* One cannot have every quality, and M. Tardieu lacks subtlety. He might have been one of the principal Ministers in the Poincaré Cabinet but he preferred to be uncompromisingly Nationalist and to denounce M. Poincaré as feeble. It was an impossible attitude fcr a man of his ambition to take, for M. Poincaré represented the most extreme tendencies acceptable to the country and to Parliament, and the current was already turning Leftwards. But M. Tardieu has unbounded confidence in himself, and he holds the important cards of knowledge and industry.*

An eminently successful politician has been M. Louis Barthou. He has always been happy and has passed from one post to another, in spite of the fluctuations of party fortunes, almost without interruption. Eleven times has he been Minister and once Président du Conseil. Every important portfolio has been held by him: Minister of Public Works, of

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* He accepted the post of Minister of Public Works in the 1926 Poincaré Cabinet whose mission was to save the franc.

Justice, of the Interior, of Foreign Affairs, of War, and of Education. He passed without difficulty into the illustrious ranks of the "Immortals." He became the President of the Commission of Reparations. Doubtless he is just as dangerous for a Ministry when he is a member of that Ministry as when he is outside it. He is regarded as too supple, too sceptical, too unreliable.

But M. Barthou if he has had one of the most successful political careers, regards himself rather as Homme de Lettres. He is a bibliophile, and contrives to find the most curious unpublished letters of great writers. He has indeed been reproached for revealing, in books and articles where malice twinkles in every line, the most intimate secrets of men like Victor Hugo, of Sainte-Beuve, and of frail women. Rarely have I heard anyone make better complimentary speeches than M. Barthou. Every sentence is polished and graceful and is spiced with wit. But out of his soft, velvety paw there emerges from time to time an agate claw. The Béarnais are celebrated for their finesse; M. Barthou does not belie his reputation, and if he has not been accepted more than once as Prime Minister it is because he is too adroit and is wanting in frankness. Never does he commit himself altogether. Although personally he has probably obtained all that he wanted, he has to some extent deceived the Nationalist hope in him. He might have been a greater leader had he chosen to take greater risks.

M. Herriot is not, and never will be, the rigid, austere, haughty statesman. He is affable and unconventional. He is incapable of concealing his frank delight in persons and things. He is good-humoured and good-hearted. He is, however, easily influenced by his entourage and is spoilt by power. He thus places himself in the most unpleasant situations. When he first became Prime Minister with hardly any previous experience of statesmanship he shocked the officials by smoking the plebeian pipe over his papers, and taking off his coat to work in the magnificent *cabinet de travail* at the Quai d'Orsay, with its gilt ornamentation and Gobelins tapestries. His homeliness is honest; he comes from the people, and only by the most strenuous exertions did he manage to obtain the excellent education that is his. He was one of the most promising pupils of the École Normale Supérieure and became a professor at Lyons. His book on *Madame Récamier* shows a capacity for research and literary talent. He is erudite and industrious, though his judgment is often at fault. For a score of years he has been Mayor of Lyons.

At Lyons he was worshipped, and when he entered politics his time was divided between that flourishing provincial city and Paris. Two nights a week he spent in the train. Whatever be his future he has, for better or worse, been one of the pivotal men of the Third Republic. His opportunity came in 1924 when Radicalism was triumphant, and he seized the opportunity to come to an agreement on the application of the Dawes plan. He reversed the policies of his predecessor, gave an impetus to the movement for better relations with England, with Germany, and with Russia, and rescued France from her isolation. He made many mistakes, was often weak and uncertain in his actions, moved with his head among the clouds and his feet not always on the solid earth, but he gave a new turn to events and historically represents supremely significant dates and incidents.

M. André Maginot, the tallest man in the House, is chiefly distinguished for his pugnacity. He expresses himself briefly but forcibly, and always gives the impression of being prepared to undertake the responsibility of the most adventurous policy. He was the War Minister of M. Poincaré, and is regarded as a lieutenant of M. Millerand.

M. Anatole de Monzie has perhaps not yet found the place to which his talent entitles him. This is perhaps due to his independence, his intelligence, and his originality. It is difficult to fit him into any mould, he is always somewhat disconcerting. He knows how to pack into a few words a wealth of meaning, and often he surprises his best friends. In politics it is dangerous to think for oneself ; it is necessary to think with the crowd. M. de Monzie is in perpetual revolt ; he is not amenable to discipline. It was the commission presided over by M. de Monzie which conducted the negotiations which led to the Government's recognition of Soviet Russia. He is the most promising of the younger politicians ; and has already held a number of offices.

M. Franklin-Bouillon is also not amenable to discipline. His course has been erratic. He is a man of impetuous temperament. He has always protested that he is friendly towards England. Some years of his life he spent at Cambridge. But, on the other hand, in the Near East he initiated policies which often appeared to be anti-British. His friendship for Mustapha Kemal is notorious. He it was who under the Briand Ministry came to an agreement with the Turks with respect to the Syrian frontier, and he has been blamed for the events which led up to the diplomatic revenge of Turkey at the Conference of Lausanne. He is a severe critic of the Versailles Treaty, which he looks upon as the instrument of British hegemony on the Continent. Certainly M. Franklin-Bouillon is a man seriously to be reckoned with. In the 1924 Parliament he became the President of the Commission of Foreign Affairs, and, though a Radical, is often in disagreement with his own party.

WORKS TO BE CONSULTED

La Vie Publique dans la France Contemporaine; Ceux qui nous Mènent; Louis Barthou: *Le Politique*; Huddleston: *Those Europeans*; Jean Piot: *Comme je les Vois.*

CHAPTER IV

LES JEUNES—AND OTHERS

Incertitude—The Renaissance of the Drama—The Literary Fair—Painting—Music—The Schools and Recent History—Girls in the Professions—Knowledge, Pure and Applied

All epochs it may truthfully be said are epochs of transition. Only in retrospect do they become definite stages on the road of humanity. The period in which we live appears to us to be particularly troubled and we too easily imagine that other periods possessed a stability that is lacking in ours. It is necessary therefore to discount very freely the impression that the post-war years are without meaning of their own, without character of their own, without real existence of their own—are merely an unpleasant passage over an abyss between two fixed points—the past and the future. Every age must seem like that, and one has only to cast one's mind back to the *fin de siècle* and to the disturbed pre-war days to realize that we are always waiting for something to end, always waiting for something to begin. Yet there is a dominant sensation, not altogether unjustified, produced by the spectacle of the social, the intellectual, and the artistic life of France to-day.

The younger generation is at once gloomy and gay. It seeks pleasure as never before, and it is the victim of ennui. It is not sufficient to look at the young man and the young woman in the dancing-halls, in the swift-moving automobiles, on the sporting fields: one must look also at the pictures which the writers paint of themselves and of their milieux. There is disenchantment; there is chagrin. There is apparently nothing to which *la jeunesse* can attach itself. Money has an uncertain value; work seems to be to no purpose; the nation has perhaps no destiny. The future has been spirited away up some gigantic sleeve. Let us hope the moral and material needs of the French will presently be satisfied and that they will recapture the sense of continuity, of duration, of solidity. In all domains there is incoherence, there is trepidation, there is rapidity of motion without consciousness of a goal. If it be true that man aspires to the eternal, to-day he is apparently condemned to the instantaneous. In all artistic work which has been touched by the war there is something cinematographic. The French are not alone in losing their compass, and it is easily possible to exaggerate the disarray of France if one confines one's attention to the large towns and to the intellectual circles. In the provinces, and for that matter in great strata of Paris itself, a sober peasantry and bourgeoisie is left untouched and unchanged, while a new industrial class with a wider outlook stretching beyond the national boundaries is born. France is deep-rooted ; in the very centre of the whirl is the traditional France, tranquil and unperturbed. But in the margin there is a violent commotion, and it is difficult to augur of the morrow.

Youth is rudderless. There are violent fluctuations of moral values as well as of currency values. There is discontent and a frantic search for something new, a rejection of the old, and a disillusionment. In literature the Dadaistes, purely bent upon destruction, were a portent ; so were the Sur-Réalistes. In painting there was for a time the same despairing revolt, a plunge into senseless eccentricity. In music Erik Satie and the Six (though there were admirable composers among them) went to the wildest extremes. Socially there was a frenetic seeking after artificial amusements. " Lisbon burns but Paris dances," cried Voltaire. After every *grande crise* in the world's history there has been such an outbreak of folly and the perversities of the moment need not concern us overmuch.

Before the war there were many schools, each of them with its own discipline. There were, for example, Naturalist writers and writers who were still influenced by the Romantic movement. There were others who studied psychology. There were Academicians. There were writers for the multitude and writers for the *élite*. In painting there were the same oppositions, but in spite of the diversity there were obvious crystallizations. To-day, as Marcel Prévost, one of the most acute observers, has remarked, there is a sort of unanimity—a turbulent stream in which individual influences are impotent. There are no leaders and no followers, yet everybody is rushing in the same direction. Precisely because there is lacking such æsthetic struggles as those heroic combats between the Romantics and the Naturalists, the prospect is not pleasing. Helter-skelter the young men fly from the past, but fly towards no ideal. The most amazing phenomenon is that the public as a whole is on the side of the innovators. The Philistine is—and one is obliged to say, unfortunately—almost defunct. The artist need not struggle for many years to obtain recognition. Provided he is under thirty years of age, provided he denounces his predecessors loudly enough, he is accepted. It is not necessary to display talent; it is only necessary to produce a birth certificate. There is unquestionably a wealth of talent, but it is ill-directed. There are too many short-cuts to notoriety and to commercial success. One has always sought to encourage, for example, the Théâtre d'Avant-Garde, and one looks back with some pride and emotion to the stormy scenes at the Théâtre de L'Œuvre when Ibsen's works were introduced into France and such extraordinary farces as the *Ubu-Roi* of Alfred Jarry were played; and to the uproarious nights of Antoine's Théâtre Libre when such plays as Saint-Georges de Bouhélier's *Carnaval des Enfants*, poetic in spite of its grim realism, surprised Paris. Paris is now blasé, and the seekers after novelty cannot move it. They may take the most daring themes which would have been unthought of by Dumas *fils*, audacious as he was in his day, and there is scarcely a lifting of the eyebrows. The most special manners have been treated openly by the younger men (witness *La Prisonnière* by Edouard Bourdet) and nobody protests. Even at the Comédie-Française *Le Tombeau Sous l'Arc de Triomphe* by Paul Raynal, with its vigorous denunciation of the egoism of the stay-at-homes during the war, stirred only a few ripples of feeling. There is positively nothing that the younger men dare not do; but they cannot arouse indignation, they cannot create scandal; and a riot in a Paris theatre is now almost unthinkable. They cannot escape success. There is a cult of the Young, and if one turns to the theatre as representative of the times one learns two things: the first is that the curiosity of the public knows no bounds, demands perfect frankness, cannot be shocked; and the second is that only the post-war generation can really satisfy this restless curiosity of the public. Let us enumerate without comment the dramatists who were played before the war.

There was Edmond Rostand, romantic, flamboyant. There was Eugène Brieux with his *piecès à thèse*, a social reformer of the theatre. There was Alfred Capus with his cheerful heedlessness. There was Maurice Donnay, witty and caustic. There was Henri Lavedan, excellent in the construction of his plays, graceful and pleasant. There was Jean Richepin, ardent and picturesque. There was François de Curel, who selected great subjects for dramatic demonstration. There was Robert de

Flers, expert in his appeal to the boulevard taste. There was Henry Bataille who buried a true poetic talent under sheer commercialism. There was Tristan Bernard, humorous and clever. There was Henry Bernstein, aiming at vivid effects. There was Georges Courteline who gave us little masterpieces of observation. There was Georges Feydeau, the most skilful manipulator of farcical scenes. There was Sacha Guitry amazingly facile, a dexterous amuser. There was Paul Hervieu, now somewhat old-fashioned, with his allegories and his moralizing. There was Georges de Porto-Riche, a passionate exponent of the *théâtre d'amour*. There were Romain Coolus, Francis de Croisset, Emile Fabre, René Fauchois, Pierre Frondaie, Félix Gandéra, Paul Gavault, Henry Kistemaeckers, Charles Méré, Fernand Nozière, André Rivoire, Alfred Savoir, Pierre Veber, Pierre Wolff, Miguel Zamacoïs, and many others who were more or less conventional in their art, who held the great public, and who for the most part are still admirable practitioners.

Since the Armistice there has been a renaissance of the drama which may well be compared in its proliferation, if not in its quality, with that which was seen in England at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Some of the names we shall mention were known before the war though they have grown much brighter since the war, and to them must be added a galaxy of other names. There is an extraordinary confusion. When sixty-six of the newer men recently united to found a Théâtre des Jeunes Auteurs they specifically stated that they were not founding a school. Each of them was a law unto himself. There was an absence of unifying principle. Some of them had already been applauded at the Comédie-Française, at the Odéon, or in the boulevard theatres. Others had attained some renown on special stages, such as those of the Théâtre des Arts, L'Œuvre of Lugné-Poë, the Vieux-Colombier of Jacques Copeau, L'Atelier of Charles Dullin, and La Grimace of Fernand Bastide. Others were totally unknown. Thus their origins, their formation, and their careers, were as different as may well be. The " little chapels " which were in vogue a dozen years ago had disappeared. There was no conflict of tendencies, no excommunications, no conspiracies ; the most diverse elements were somehow blended. Co-operation does not necessarily mean conformity to carefully elaborated rules. Quarrels of doctrines are demoded. The younger men have undoubtedly affinities with the older men ; one may trace the influence of Paul Claudel with his medieval mysteries ; one may trace the influence of Henri Becque with his bitter appreciations of real life ; one may trace the influence of those who believed that the mission of the drama is to pose problems of conscience and problems of environment ; one may trace the influence of Marivaux with his delicious comedies ; one may trace the influence of the Romantics. But all these influences are not separated but combined.

H. R. Lenormand, though he must be regarded as one of the older of the younger men, loves images, and there is in his work a rather unhealthy flavour of psycho-analysis. Georges Duhamel tries to be exceedingly simple and sympathetic in his attitude towards daily existence. He is pathetic while dispensing with eloquence. He is poetic in prosaic circumstances. Charles Vildrac seeks similar effects. There is, for example, in *Le Paquebot Tenacity* a truth of sentiment in an atmosphere of disappointment. Jean Sarment, in some respects the most characteristic of them all, writes in symbols of a touching sadness : crowns of cardboard, fishers of strange shadows, beautiful eyes which see more clearly because they are blinded. Paul Géraldy is pleasantly sentimental, intimate, setting up a sort of confessional box for his stage lovers. Jacques Natanson, still under thirty years of age, has produced a series of brisk dialogues in which there is always a point of irony and has become one of the spoilt darlings of the Parisian playgoer. Jean-Jacques Bernard takes a situation and pulls it to pieces suggestively. Stève-Passeur gives one the impression of a livelier Strindberg. Claude Roger-Marx, Vialar, Léopold Marchand, are inclined to over-development, extracting the utmost meaning from their anecdote. Henri Clerc shows in a few vigorous traits the difficulties of mutual understanding, the tragedy of family association. Boussac de Saint-Marc is possessed of a mystic anguish. Henri-Ghéon strikes a pious note. Gallantly defending the poetic tradition of his father, Maurice Rostand chooses exalted themes such as Glory, Aspiration, Mystery, Resurrection, for his rather too prolific versification. In a lower key François Porché, who was " discovered " during the war, sings of Christopher Columbus and Joan of Arc. Jules Romains has written at least one scintillating comedy—*Knock*—which is a satire on the doctors. Louis Verneuil, though conventional, has shown an exceptional talent. Denys Amiel has in a few years won a foremost place. Marcel Berger has considerable significance for the student of the French stage. Claude Anet has depicted the provinces, and Francis Carco the *bas-fonds* of Paris. The peasant has inspired Martin du Gard in the *Testament du Père Leleu*. Exaggerated, grandiloquent, pushing his conceptions to the verge of the unreal, Crommelynck has rightly triumphed with his *Cocu Magnifique*.

The fantastic realm of the unconscious personality which has been explored in other countries by

Pirandello, by Schnitzler, and by Georg Kaiser, has also been explored—as though there were some *mot d'ordre*—by many of the younger Frenchmen. What has been called the "*théâtre de l'inconscient*" especially attracts them. Marcel Achard in his light, laughing manner tears the mask from the visage of his personages. Bernard Zimmer with a bitter gaiety exposes his contemporaries. The *vie intérieure* is on the whole the principal concern of the post-war generation in the theatre, and as Henri Bidou has written, "the reign of positive facts is terminated." It is possible to imagine, if introspection on the stage is carried to its limits, a single character sufficing for the dramatist—a single character without action whatsoever. Obviously a long monologue would be intolerable—though it has been almost achieved in certain plays which come to mind—and therefore it is likely that we shall see the same person multiplied on the boards, holding conversation with himself in his various aspects. The young men are haunted by the *dédoublement de la personalité*, the struggle of the conscious with the unconscious.

Let me give very briefly two examples which take us in this direction and are fairly typical. The story, such as it is, of *Le Tentateur* is of a poor tax-collector whose wife takes money from his safe and falsifies his books. That is all; but the author causes the tax-collector to proceed to an examination of conscience. Had he in his railings against social inequalities, the contrast between poverty and riches, ostentatious extravagance and humble misery, instigated his wife to a crime which he would not himself have committed? Is he the real culprit? The other story which occurs to me is that of a girl painter whose father, an illustrious artist, loses his reason. To preserve his reputation she hides him and paints his pictures. That again is all; but we are given a *monologue intérieur* filled with questionings. Was she right to renounce the ambitions she cherished for herself? Was she right to sacrifice her own individuality as an artist? Was she right to forgo youth and love and life? With such slender material, with scarcely any external drama, do many of the younger men work, and that they can maintain our interest for three of four acts of introspection is a proof of great technical ability.

Certainly it is not technical ability which is wanting in the theatre. There is a precocious cleverness. A band of young authors have formed themselves into a club with the title of "*moins de trente ans*," and most of them, unlike their elders, who had to struggle for many years before they could get a hearing, have their share of fame. We live in a time when the rhythm of things is accelerated, when men like Pagnol and Nivoix, authors of the satirical *Marchands de Gloire*, may have their works produced not in out-of-the-way little theatres but in the full blaze of the boulevards; when Paul Haurigot and Marcel Espiau in spite of their youth are given their chance by one of the magnates of the commercial theatre, M. Gustave Quinson. Only recently have the barriers which separated *la jeunesse* from the reputed practitioners been broken down, but now *la jeunesse* need not take refuge in its *petites chapelles*. The public is fatigued with *choses connues*, and demands in these days of reawakening life, with all their incertitudes and dissonances, some better image of itself. The young men are still seeking their way but there is much promise for the future.

A word is due to the youngest of the older workers for the theatre: Firmin Gémier, director and actor, who is now devoting himself unreservedly to his immense project of international co-operation in the theatre, by which there shall be an exchange of ideas and of productions, and by which, as he hopes, a new popular art not unlike the great dramatic art of ancient Greece shall be evolved.

In literature there is a similar activity of *les jeunes.* They are not quiet workers like their elders and modesty is not their most conspicuous virtue. The conditions have altogether changed. In this turmoil one must shout to be heard. For the most part the young writers endeavour to secure one of the literary prizes which will consecrate them and distinguish them from their fellows. There is much intrigue: commercial as well as personal factors come into play. To my mind, after an intimate knowledge of its working, the prize system is unreservedly to be condemned. A few men benefit, and perhaps deservedly—though this is by no means sure. The majority of writers are injured in various ways. In the first place, the booming of the prize-winners thrusts better men into the background. In the second place, too many young men write with their eye fixed on the jury instead of writing precisely what they feel. In the third place, an author should be spared the humiliation of having to seek patronage, of having to ingratiate himself, of having to waste his time in meeting the arbiters of literary modes, who have generally little qualification, though French critics would hesitate to tell the truth about them. I am unable to agree that the atmosphere created is a healthy atmosphere. That there is over-production can hardly be denied, but against this it would be foolish to protest. Nobody can estimate the demand for books, and therefore nobody is entitled in advance to declare that the supply is excessive. The consumption of wheat in a country can be calculated; but who shall say what quantity and quality of mental nourishment is needed?

I take last year's figures for publications of all kinds. Contrary to the popular belief the novel occupies a low place in the literary output. Over 2,000 works on social and economic subjects were issued. A thousand more may be described as pedagogic. Seven hundred religious works are on the list. History is represented by 1,200 volumes. Geography and travel books number over 300 and science 400. In round figures, 700 medical treatises were published and 200 books about art. In the vague and comprehensive category of letters 2,400 volumes are included. Letters are subdivided into philosophical works, 182; literary criticism, 352; poetry, 358; drama, 291; and finally novels and short stories of which 1,148 titles are given. Thus out of nearly 9,000 works, fiction contributes something more than 1,000. It is surely a much smaller proportion than is generally imagined. Serious books have a large sale, but of course the greatest circulations are attained (apart from exceptional books, such as those of Rostand) by the *roman*. Anatole France always reached 100,000, but popular writers who are probably unknown outside France, such as Clément Vautel and Maurice Dekobra, are much more successful. Since the war the art of advertising literary productions has been practised blatantly and without stint. A young man barely twenty years of age was for a time placed upon a pedestal among the world's great writers. Every year there are half a dozen "masterpieces" on which everybody is in agreement; happily they are forgotten the following year.

The public reads much more; and moreover, buys and not borrows. As in the drama, the "schools" have disappeared. Naturalism, Realism, Symbolism, and the rest, never meant as much as their champions imagined; to-day the 'isms overlap and every style flourishes. Those who endeavour to form a little clan apart are not taken as seriously as in the 'nineties; preciosity, though it still exists, seems to have had its day. There are published in the same month works by Romain Rolland, by Louis Bertrand, by Jean Giraudoux, by François Mauriac, by Pierre Benoît, by Roger Martin du Gard, by Georges Duhamel, by Marcel Arnac—a more higgledy-piggledy collection of names standing for such diverse work it would be difficult to unite. Henri Béraud, robust, pugnacious, is ubiquitous; but the delicate, thoughtful Paul Valéry, with a handful of essays and a few poems, is equally conspicuous and is actually elected to the Académie Française at the first time of asking. The most dissimilar talents are in these days given their chance; he would be a bold critic who would attempt to bar out those who do not conform to a particular set of canons. In the nineteenth century there was an enduring incomprehension of audacity. Anybody who struck a new note had to fight bitter adversaries, and in his turn he declared that whatever was not modelled on the pattern he preferred was negligible. To-day liberty (some would say anarchy) reigns, and we are shaking off the yoke of those who had special conceptions of literature and who did their best to kill literature by imprisoning it in rigid corsets. The writers, like the women, have discarded torturing instruments of whalebone and steel. If "juries" were abolished freedom would be complete. This does not mean that writers and readers may not have their preferences, but those preferences must be regarded as idiosyncratic and not to be imposed on others. This variety naturally makes the task of the chronicler, who thinks it his business to form theories, and to practise that form of generalization which consists in indicating tendencies, practically hopeless. It would be convenient to be able to say that French literature since the war has shown such-and-such tendencies ; but it would be misleading. Doubtless there are critics with limited knowledge or with narrow prejudices who can still satisfy themselves with sweeping assertions ; but the chief thing to say about *les jeunes* is that they cannot be classified. There is no relation between a Jean Cocteau and a Roland Dorgelès. The men who clustered around André Gide only a few years ago arouse the wrath of the remaining Gidists by continually breaking away. Most of the foreign commentators on French literature whom I read make the mistake of thinking that there are one or two centres of real significance and outside them nothing. This supposition never had full justification. To-day it has none. The characteristic of our time is its catholicism. It may be deplorable from the point of view of those who possess ready-made literary formulæ that they no longer can trace the plan of the labyrinth of letters ; but without wasting much sympathy upon them I find modern eclecticism not only a reality but in some respects a desirable reality.

It is impossible to stick a label on the post-war output. Nevertheless if, in some superficial contradiction with oneself, one is tempted to pick out what is new, one would say that there is a reaction against Romanticism, in so far as Romanticism was an escape from reality, together with a reaction against Realism, in so far as Realism dealt with the merely tangible. There is a regard for truth, but it must be spiritual truth rather than material truth. There is an appreciation of poetry, but it must be a poetry which has a scientific basis. Fundamental falsity is abhorred, but so is photographic exactitude. Neither sheer documentation nor sheer imaginative flights are approved. There is an insistence on the human soul. There is sympathetic interpretation. But it would be wrong to harden these observations into a doctrine, for I repeat that the absence of dogma is the most noteworthy fact in modern French writing. It is, for example, a far cry from the staccato brilliance of Paul Morand to the ponderous involutions of Marcel Proust ; and whoever regards the lively epigram, the flashing cosmopolitan observations of Morand, or the minute analysis, the detailed description of characters seen through the glass of memory of Proust, as representative of the age, has failed to grasp the essential variety of the French spirit. Henry de Montherlant, with his love of sport, of enterprise, and action may be up to date. But so is Henri Barbusse, with his profound humanity, his sense of the writer's social mission.

The Academie Française has among its members politicians, philosophers, soldiers, historians, and others who have little claim to literary fame. Among the writers who are given official honours we may particularly note Jean Richepin, a true poet with an eye for the picturesque, whose *Chansons des Gueux* reveal the life of tramps and vagabonds ; Louis Bertrand, who has devoted himself to historical periods and particularly to the epoch of Louis XIV ; Henri Bergson, whose philosophic writing has high literary qualities ; Marcel Prévost, an interesting psychological novelist ; Camille Jullian, a distinguished historian ; Georges Goyau, a Catholic writer ; Henry Bordeaux, a popular novelist ; René Boylesve, of great charm ; Edouard Estaunié, whose novels show distinction ; René Bazin, who has told the story of the soil ; Joseph Bédier, an authority on early French literature who is perhaps best known for his adaptation of *Tristan et Yseult* ; Pierre de Nolhac, who has written much about Versailles ; Paul Bourget, the doyen of the Académie, whose problem stories have had a long vogue ; Henri Brémond, whose varied production includes the literary history of religious sentiment and some admirable though controversial observations on pure poetry; Henri de Régnier, a careful craftsman in prose and verse.

René Benjamin has written with extraordinary verve the life of Balzac. Philippe Soupault is to be carefully watched. The Brothers Jérome and Jean Tharaud have gone far afield for their inspiration; Claude Farrère is also exotic; Myriam Harry has felt the glamour of the Near East. Valery-Larbaud, with a wide knowledge of European literature, has sought his subjects under other skies, like so many of his contemporaries. Other men who are interesting are Joseph Delteil, whose *Joan of Arc*, though creating a scandal, has many vivid pages; Pierre MacOrlan, fantastic and ingenious; Pierre Hamp, who tells the story of toil. Older men and women who are still working are Abel Hermant, Pierre Mille, Henri Duvernois, the two Rosnys, Victor Margueritte, Lucie Delarue-Mardrus, Colette, and among the critics Jean Carrère and Paul Souday.

In poetry Francis Jammes, Paul Fort, the Comtesse de Noailles, stand out. There is a large output of *vers libres*. It would be absurd in this place to try to draw up a list which can pretend to be reasonably complete. There should be noted, however, in conclusion, the regionalist movement in literature. Francis Carco, who is perhaps the most satisfactory younger French writer, has chosen Paris for his field; Alphonse de Chateaubriant, Ernest Pérochon, Henri Pourrat, Auguste Bailly, Maurice Génevoix, René Maran, and others have laid their scenes in Alsace, in Auvergne, in Burgundy, in Brittany, in Gascony, in Languedoc, in Normandy, in Poitou, in Savoie, in Provence, and in the Colonies; and the regionalist literature of which Frédéric Mistral may be considered the precursor is developing.

In painting the terms of the problem change for each generation. In the Paris exhibitions, whether at the Grand Palais, at the picture-dealers, or in the cafés of Montparnasse, it is impossible to close one's eyes to the attempt to find a technique. The past fifteen years in art were marked by a certain slipshod execution. Knowledge of one's craft was neglected. The *à-peu-près* was held to be sufficient. Artists looked for short-cuts and did not impose upon themselves strict rules. To-day, while there is much research, *les jeunes* are striving for more precision. If one recollects the general aspect of the galleries before the war it will be admitted that the *tableaux* were for the most part light, fugitive, superficial. There was a deformation of line and juxtaposition of tone merely to produce an impression of freshness. The pictures were suggestive rather than expressive.

There are plenty of such pictures to-day, but on the whole, after a period of more or less hasty notations, there is a revolt against negligence, whether that negligence be deliberate or unconscious. The history of art is the history of a series of reactions. Probably before long it will be considered that the firmness with which figures are now being sculptured in paint is excessive. But after a misguided imitation of Henri Matisse—who possesses an immense skill and subtlety which his imitators lacked—the well-modelled figure is again in fashion. There is a probity of draughtsmanship, a desire to show the profundity of forms. The younger men are at least working. They are not content with productions which would have pleased them in the first post-war years. There is and always will be a good deal of newspaper and magazine "boosting," which is bad for art, though it may be excellent for the commercial success of the individual artists who are "launched" because they have hit upon a novel mode of expression. But in spite of the appallingly organized *réclame* and the false æsthetics, mere mannerisms are being discarded. The young men who matter are trying first to learn their business and second to cast aside theories and to be natural. In a most interesting volume entitled *Propos d'Artistes* by M. Florent Fels, most of the younger painters repudiate the "fakes and pretences" with which the art world has been afflicted. "There never was a more artificial period of mannerisms than that through which we have just passed," declares Dunoyer de Segonzac, one of the most talented artists of this generation. "One tried to annex everything: negro art, the ethnographical museum, modernized Hellenic art, æstheticized aeroplane motors. . . . All these deformations are dead. It is absurd to say that it is no longer possible to paint from nature in this age of automobiles and aeroplanes—as if Delacroix and Corot ever allowed the railway locomotive, the great invention of their day, to influence their art! The theories of the past few years have no affinity with the art of Greece and of twelfth-century France and of Cézanne, whom the aesthetes have the effrontery to claim as their predecessor. America is about to give the world a magnificent architecture, without any artistic intention at all! As for me, I try to express as best I can the things I love best: a French landscape, a beautiful girl. We shall see later on whether it is art. I believe in working in solitude: contact with nature provokes a state of grace. A French peasant said to me one day: 'It is a curious thing how stupid the world becomes when there is too much instruction!'" The best of the younger men are "working in solitude" like de Segonzac; they have broken away from the "schools."

After Impressionism there were a number of experiments. Pointillisme was tried by Georges Seurat, Paul Signac, H. E. Cross, and others. Odilon

Redon strove for a more synthetic art. Vuillard and Bonnard painted delicious intimate scenes. Maurice Denis devoted himself to great decorative compositions. Eugène Carrière, whose stock is unjustifiably falling, stood apart. The most important influences were perhaps those of Cézanne and Gauguin. The admirers of Cézanne to-day are beginning seriously to criticize him for attempting things that he could not fulfil. Unfortunately he was copied in his less successful manifestations as well as in his supreme triumphs. His glory is that he freed art from imprisoning conventions and was splendidly direct. Gauguin with his science of composition, his massive though flattened forms, his simple tones, was a fine painter but he worked in two dimensions only. The Douanier Rousseau, who has been grotesquely overpraised, was conscientious and saw with his own eyes and made men look again at the Primitives. Von Gogh was a remarkable neo-Impressionist. Then came Picasso who may be said to have invented Cubism—though he did much more. Cubism as practised by Braque and Lhôte gave its attention to volumes; much was learned from it, but that painting should escape into the realm of geometrical abstraction is ultimately unthinkable, and Cubism, except as it is expressing itself in architecture, has now chiefly an historical importance. So too has Futurism and a dozen Theories which the younger men were perpetually and passionately evolving, forgetting that the appeal of painting cannot be intellectual. Derain became a recognized chief and had for a time many followers. Among other French painters are Othon Friesz, studied and patient but yet subtle; Vlaminck, sparkling but rather facile; Laprade, Marquet, Flandrin, Rouault, interesting in different manners. Jean Marchand paints extremely well. Modigliani, a Paris Italian who died after the war, produced beautiful work which was purely personal. Utrillo has depicted inimitably corners of Paris. Kisling is to be taken seriously. I find Alix powerful. Dufy is too stylistic but is pleasing. Marie Laurencin, Luc-Albert Moreau, Favory, Gromaire, cannot be omitted from this summary list. Jules Zingg will, I think, go far. Van Dongen remains the most fashionable painter with Jean-Gabriel Domergue as a rival. A number of men of other nations work in Paris: at present perhaps the most notable is the Japanese Foujita. In sculpture Aristide Maillol and Bourdelle are deservedly the best known. Paul Dardé is, I think, one of the greatest living masters. Sicard is gracious, Bouchard grave, Landowski vigorous. In architecture, as we have already observed, there are new ideas working. The conditions of town life have changed; new materials have been found; and hitherto insufficient attention has been paid to the need of a renovation, of an adaptation, of architecture, in which France in every age has excelled. This renovation, this adaptation, is occupying the thoughts of the younger men. The vitality of the French in decorative arts was amply demonstrated in the 1925 International Exhibition.

Paris after the war greatly strengthened its position as one of the world's capitals of music, and though it cannot be said that any greatly significant original work has been done an excellent tradition is being carried on in interpretation and in teaching. More than ever students come to France, and the consecration of Paris is regarded as indispensable to those who have chosen a musical career. An authoritative opinion on certain aspects of French virtuosity may be quoted: "France has developed a technique with regard to the use of the voice which no other country in the world can hope to rival successfully. The use of the tones—there is a priceless standard set up by French diction-masters and a French tradition that has never abated its rigour. It is the same in the theatre. Diction is of the highest moment there too. It may be objected that other capitals, like Berlin and Vienna, also possess a musical tradition, priceless, individual, and rare. This is undoubtedly true. The musical atmosphere in Vienna is perhaps the best in the world; the aliveness and experimental tendency of Berlin, backed by a fine technique and an academic heritage, is quite beyond dispute. But for voice diction and training, for purity of language, pronunciation and enunciation, Paris, I believe, leads the world. There is a classical standard that is hundreds of years old."

The productions of the Opéra and of the Opéra-Comique have lately been somewhat disappointing. But there are a number of concerts of the highest quality with modern programmes in which the newest compositions may be studied. Moreover, the halls in which individual recitals are given are many. Further, in the cafés one will find orchestras of good-class musicians, and the humblest lover of music may hear in his own quarter of Paris well-executed works of modern men for a franc or two. Since Debussy, with his incisive and delicate language, his wonderful technique, died, we have had Paul Dukas, his most distinguished disciple, and the delightful Maurice Ravel, who is unequalled in a sphere of fantasy that is often humorous. Albert Roussel has written colourful symphonies. Henri Rabaud, the Director of the Conservatoire; Witkowsky of the Schola Cantorum; Charles Widor, Secretary of the Académie des Beaux-Arts; Gabriel Pierné—are among the masters of *les jeunes*: they are foremost composers for the concert and the operatic stage. Louis Aubert has been influenced by Chabrier; and Guy Ropartz by Franck; but they have struck new notes. Samuel Rousseau constructs rich medleys of exotic charm. Reynaldo Hahn has given us delicious partitions. Claude Terrasse, who recently died, had a rare musical wit. Messager is still producing pleasant operettas. Gabriel Dupont chooses ambitious themes. Déodat de Séverac, Georges Hue, Paul Vidal, display exceptional talent. Florent Schmitt is a chief who has shown great originality and profound science. It is unnecessary to discuss Erik Satie, but some of the men and women who surrounded him afterwards abandoned their atonal doctrines. Arthur Honnegger is a modern of the moderns, but, unorthodox as he is, he is accepted by the French public; while Darius Milhaud, with his violent dissonances, is frankly entertaining. Georges Auric, Germaine Taillefer, Poulenc, and others who were regarded as "Futurist" in music, aiming at the destruction of tonality, are developing on more conventional lines. Georges Migot must be given a high place. There are among the professors and conductors men of great technical attainments who preserve the most open minds and are ready to give a trial to the younger musicians who violate the classical forms and who protest against the "mummification of music." Out of the incoherence something new is emerging.

In what spirit are the children in the schools being taught? This is an important question: on it may depend the future relations of peoples on the Continent. The Carnegie Foundation has published an illuminating inquiry on the scholastic works used since the war in France, Belgium, Germany, England, Italy, and so forth. Some of these textbooks are deplorable. In general it may be stated that the record of recent years is told with an insistence on the bad character of one's neighbour and the good character of one's own nation. A river, a chain of mountains, or a narrow arm of the sea, is, if we are to believe many of the manuals, the dividing line between vice and virtue.

In France this sentiment is to be found. But the mischief that may be done by a perpetuation of the passions of the war years is appreciated by the teachers themselves, who are trying to eliminate passages unsuitable for the use of the schools. In a positive sense an impulse was given by M. Yvon Delbos when he was Minister of Public Instruction which should be fruitful. He addressed a circular to the school authorities requesting that once a year the "lessons" of the war should be impressed upon the children. Naturally he recommended an exaltation of heroic deeds which would stimulate in the minds of the children the desire of being worthy of their fathers. But it is not only love of their own country which should be inculcated: he asked that sentiments of humanity and devotion to great causes should be the principal objects of admiration. He went further: he demanded that pacific ideas should be taught. The progress realized at London and Geneva and the conclusion of the Locarno accords and the happy and rapid success of certain initiatives taken by the League of Nations, should, he said, show that France is essentially the centre of peaceful efforts and not of imperialist designs. Militarism was not to be praised; on the contrary, it was the interdependence of the peoples which should be stressed as the French ideal. "Thanks to these efforts," says the circular, "Europe is organizing itself effectively and the world will be organized little by little around juridical and moral principles of which the most noble representatives of humanity have in all times affirmed the value: international solidarity, respect of treaties, the obligatory arbitration of conflicts. The League of Nations symbolizes these aspirations, guarantees acquired results, and it is impossible to emphasize too greatly the importance of its rôle." These suggestions, said the Minister, are not put forward as imperative commands. The liberty of thought of the members of the teaching profession must be respected, and those who do not feel in their conscience the truth and the utility of such declarations should not be compelled to render this homage to Peace. Whatever is said should be dictated by sincere conviction. But though M. Delbos thus leaves the matter to the individual responsibility of the teachers, there is no doubt that the vast majority of the teachers are in accord with these sentiments and that they respond with alacrity to the invitation of the Minister. But what of the textbooks? The answer is not altogether satisfactory.

After the disaster of Sedan the Third Republic developed popular education and schools were opened in the smallest villages. In the Écoles Normales the masters were persuaded that the German victory was the work of the German teacher, and they in their turn had the "high mission of repairing the wrong that had been done." The war of 1870 gave birth to a patriotic scholastic literature which exalted military qualities and held out the hope of a reversal of the defeat. After 1885 the diffusion of such books was considerable and a large part of the mature generation of to-day learnt to read in these volumes. Their "lessons" were corrected in part by the growing predominance of economic problems, of colonial problems, of industrial problems, together with the Dreyfus Affaire and the religious struggle, which transformed the French mentality and discredited militarism.

Pacifism and Internationalism gradually took the place of Chauvinism. There were, however, two Frances. In the Primary Schools humanitarianism was taught, but in the Secondary Schools and in the

Enseignement Supérieur anything which weakened Nationalism was in disfavour. French insularity has been noted; but when the Allies came to fight on the soil of France the children were taught more thoroughly the geography, the history, the literature, the industry, and the essential traits of the various nations of Europe, of America, of Africa, of Asia. A typical work which was used was *Le Tour de l'Europe Pendant la Guerre* by G. Bruno. After the victory, the theme of "France's immortal glory" found its way into the textbooks. The war was given its place in books of history, of moral instruction, of political economy, and in scholastic anthologies. The teaching of history is always dangerous, for history is the most complex, the most obscure, and the most formidable of all subjects. Historical facts must necessarily be chosen from a mass of details each of which may have its significance. In the inquiry to which we have referred it is laid down that the child has the right to be told the truth and that the school should not be a forcing-ground of hatred. But how is this ideal to be attained? Certainly the authors of most of the newer schoolbooks formally protest against hatred of countries or persons, but they ask the child to "remember" the crimes committed against France. Lessons of "prudence" are enforced, and Germany is represented in the worst light. The bombardment of hospitals, the killing of non-combatants, are recalled. Miss Cavell, the *Lusitania*, the Eglise Saint-Gervais, the big Berthas, the Gothas, Louvain, Rheims, Douaumont, the Chemin des Dames, asphyxiating gases, pillages, atrocities of all kinds are, in gravure and in letterpress, placed before the eyes of the infants, who are thus conducted into a Museum of Horrors. *Souvenez-vous!* is a perilous cry. Yet it is just to remark that the authors evoke the hypothesis of a regenerated Germany who need not be excommunicated and may be given a sort of conditional pardon. In a few cases complete forgiveness and forgetfulness are recommended. But this is rare. On the whole, the school-books are pitiless with regard to the culpability of Germany. Whatever may be properly said for or against Germany in books destined for adult readers, it is clear that there should be no passion in educational works. The relation of the events which led up to the catastrophe must necessarily be far too *simpliste* in textbooks intended for a juvenile audience. We read that France, England, and Russia did everything to avert the war, but that Germany in her determination to dominate the world insisted on strife. Nuances are naturally omitted; a frightful *requisitoire* is directed against the former enemy. It seems to me that in these conceptions of an entirely virtuous and pacific France, great, just, generous, noble, and loyal; and of a Germany utterly barbarian, cruel, tyrannical, bellicose, there is an immense danger.

How is it possible in a few pages to present a sufficiently complete account of the tremendous drama? Massive affirmations, simplified narrative, an absence of philosophical commentary, make such productions not only useless but misleading and mischievous. An excessive place is reserved for interesting anecdotes and legends which doubtless served their purpose in the hot days of fever. An impartial story of the war for scholastic use is at present impossible. Since the prodigious events must be told, if told at all, to the children, in an inexact, unilateral, and tendencious manner, should the teacher drop history from the curriculum? At a recent congress of French teachers it was indeed proposed to suppress the teaching of history. Another proposal is that schoolbooks of this character should be written by foreigners—impartial and competent writers in neutral countries chosen almost as one chooses the judges of the Hague Court. M. G. de Reynold made the suggestion of an International Committee which should draw up an agreed uniform textbook for all countries. But this too appears impossible in actual circumstances. It may be that the Commission of Intellectual Co-operation which has been founded will discover some way of dealing with the vexed question of instruction in recent history without fostering sentiments which must be inimical to international relations.

In the Universities the French youth is showing the keenest interest in international movements, and the impulse to learn more of other countries, to obtain a sympathetic understanding of their characteristics and their problems, comes chiefly from the post-war generation. It would be too much to expect that youth should be of one mind, and what are called reactionary causes are also taken up by a section of the students. Yet, on the whole, not only is there an intellectual ferment which in itself must be regarded with satisfaction but the young men are inflamed with generous ideas. The material difficulties which have had to be overcome are great. Like all countries which have passed through a financial crisis it has been hard to procure the necessary instruments which are made abroad and foreign literature which is sold at exorbitant prices. The school equipment is obsolete. Scientific workers like Madame Curie and Branly are handicapped. The professors are paid incredibly low salaries. The students in so far as they belong to the middle classes—and it is from the bourgeoisie that French intellectuals are recruited—have in large numbers to maintain themselves by working at menial tasks in the evenings. The ruin of the *rentier* means the ruin of the middle-class families, and it is not surprising that many of the young men who would in other days have chosen an intellectual career shrank from the hardships which were implied and selected more lucrative commercial professions. What is rather surprising is that so many of them preferred to prepare themselves for unremunerative pursuits. A Loan of Honour has been instituted to assist French students, and a Cité Universitaire has been built.

The Government itself was inclined to encourage technical trades and increased the facilities for technical instruction. The industrial development of Germany and Belgium was held up as an example. Is France mistaken in thus turning towards commerce on a large scale? Certain it is that the industrialization of France means the decay of classical culture. When a Humanist like M. Léon Bérard insists on a greater place for Latin and Greek and Letters in the curriculum he is denounced as Reactionary, and Radical Ministers reverse his decisions. Modernism, as it is called, laying stress upon utilitarian scientific teaching, has made much progress. Somehow the Humanities have been foolishly associated with Clericalism.

It has become a commonplace to state that the war has brought about a greater emancipation of the French girl. There has, above all, been a marked feminine intellectual movement, which is becoming more and more accentuated, but the precise figures have not always been readily available. I propose to give a few of them in order that one may judge of the undoubted evolution that has taken place.

It is necessary to compare the statistics of 1913–14 with those of 1923–24. They will be found more eloquent than anything that could be written on this subject. Before the war, taking the various faculties of the Paris University, there were 88 women students as against 15,198 men students in law; in physical science 508 as against 4,990; in letters there were 1,288 as against 3,563. Altogether, if other faculties were included, there was a total of 2,328 women as against 31,791 men. There were, in other words, thirteen or fourteen men students to one woman student.

But during the scholastic year of 1923–24 there were 1,023 women as against 14,302 men in law; 1,248 women as against 9,283 men in physical science; 2,870 women as against 4,295 men in letters; and if one totals the figures of all the faculties there were 7,786 women as against 36,576 men. This means that there were only four or five men students as against one woman student in the University.

It will be immediately acknowledged that such progress in a period of ten years is remarkable. But this is not all. At the École des Chartes the work of the girl students has been brilliant. They have penetrated the portals and carried off the first prizes. In 1923–24 two girls led the way. This year ten candidates received the diploma and three of them were girls. In the same way, in the examination for librarians, nine candidates were received, three of whom were women, in 1920. In 1921 eight out of the nine candidates received were women. In 1922 the girls were successful in the proportion of ten to sixteen.

At the École Centrale des Arts et Manufactures no women were received before 1918, but in 1921 seven obtained the diploma and in 1922 nine. At the École des Beaux-Arts, there were 115 girls in 1914 against 1,500 young men. In 1924 there were 165 girls as against 1,600 young men. Generally speaking, an analysis shows that letters—history, philology, and literature—are chiefly favoured by women. Physical sciences follow. Then comes the study of the law, hundreds of women advocates now practising at the Bar; and afterward the *beaux arts*. These studies open the door to many professions which were practically closed to women only a few years ago, and there can be no doubt that they have shown their aptitude and their efficiency in branches of work for which it was long thought they were not especially qualified.

The figures are in themselves interesting, but it should also be borne in mind that there is constant progress, and if so much has been done in ten years, which can hardly be regarded as favourable years, one may expect that much more will be done, now that the impetus has been given, in the coming generation.

It is almost superfluous to state that France has been foremost in the development of recent inventions. The young Frenchmen have a passion for engineering of all kinds. They have not ceased to effect improvements in automobiles. Some of the best builders of both the cheaper and the expensive cars are French, and in all the international tests French firms come out well. The French are constantly adding something to our knowledge of aeronautics, and there is an enthusiasm for the aeroplane that is not surpassed in any country. France holds as I write the majority of the air records—for non-stop flights, for weight-lifting, for duration, for height. A network of air services is being established throughout Europe and Africa.

For purposes of national defence the aeroplane is ranked very high, and France possesses the most powerful air fleet in the world. In wireless transmission remarkable things are being done: particularly is there the apparatus of Belin, by which photographs and written messages can be conveyed over long distances, adopted by the State for use between Paris and Strasbourg and other towns, and operating like the ordinary telegraph. A system of "television" is being perfected by the same inventor.

Though the importance of telegraphic communications with the French colonies has long been recognized, the high cost of submarine cables prevented their extensive development in the period before the war, recently wrote Commercial Attaché C. L. Jones, Paris, in a report to the American Department of Commerce. The use of wireless telegraphy had not become general in that period, and it is only in the past few years that a comprehensive plan for wireless telegraphy service has been developed. At the time of the Armistice the stations operating from the Eiffel Tower in Paris and from Lyons and Nantes had been set up, permitting communication with distant points. The great Lafayette station at Bordeaux was approaching completion. By this time, also, detailed plans had been made and material ordered for important stations in a number of Colonies, including those at Saigon in Indo-China, Bamako in French West Africa, Brazzaville in the Congo, and Tananarive in Madagascar.

In 1920 the Lafayette station at Bordeaux was finished and put into service at once. It was at that time the most powerful in the world. The War Department, under whose direction it had been built, turned over this station and that at Lyons to the Post and Telegraph Administration. They were immediately used to establish unilateral communications with the Colonies. Radio telegrams were sent out at set hours to the colonial centres, but the replies had to come by cable until local sending stations could be established in the Colonies. In 1922 the powerful station of Sainte-Assise, near Fontainebleau, was completed by the Compagnie Générale de T.S.F., and two years later the station at Saigon, built by the same company, was finished and put into communication with that at Bordeaux. In November, 1924, bilateral communications were established with Bamako and Tananarive after completion of local stations in these cities. Further extension of the services at Bamako is planned by which the station would handle trans-Saharan messages and act as a relay station for other posts in West Africa.

The only other large station now projected is that at Brazzaville, which will complete radio telegraph communications between all the great Colonies and the mother country. Connection of the small Colonies with the home country is not now contemplated because of the large expense which would be involved for communications of restricted importance. Short wave-lengths are being tried for sending messages to these less important areas. Tests are now in process for the establishment of wireless telegraph communication between Paris and Djibouti, by means of waves of from fifty to one hundred kilometres, with a power of five kilowatts. Similar wave-lengths have not been heretofore tried for the other stations because at the time they were built the technical advance in radio telegraphy had not indicated their adaptability for such service.

There is a search for synthetic oil and a number of methods have been discovered. France has a shortage of fuel and is dependent upon other countries for coal and petrol. Her efforts are therefore directed towards her enfranchisement from the foreign oil trusts and coal magnates. Electricity is increasingly being produced by water-power and gigantic schemes which will reduce the French need of importing fuel have been drawn up and will be put into operation as economic circumstances permit. Owing to the financial stringency France has practically abandoned the building of large battleships and is concentrating upon the less expensive submarine for coastal defence and for the keeping of communications with her Colonies. In photography France has always led the way, and in the cinema is not content with the reproduction of the kind of film which comes from America and to a smaller degree from England. She is evolving a distinctive French pictural art. Archæological research in France, in Egypt, in North Africa generally, in the Near East and in the Far East, is pursued without respite. Travel and exploration, especially in Central Africa, is found more attractive than ever and a number of important expeditions, some of them with motor-cars with caterpillar wheels by which the desert may be crossed, have been organized since the war.

In every branch of science to which we gave particular attention in an earlier chapter there are young men who are working with distinction. In short, in spite of the peculiar difficulties, the French are alive to the great movements of modern thought and are contributing their share to the advancement of knowledge. The torch is being borne aloft unfalteringly by *les jeunes*.

At the beginning of November, 1925, was opened in Paris an institution of an international character which is doubtless destined to play a most useful and important part in the direction of the world's affairs. This institution is essentially French in origin; it was first proposed by M. Henri Bergson, and was founded, with the agreement of other countries, by the French Government. Moreover, it is directed by a young Frenchman, M. Julien Luchaire, an inspector of education who fittingly represents the aspirations of *les jeunes*. It is increasingly evident that while the peoples can be brought together in many ways, there is no method of establishing good relations which may have such far-reaching results as cultural contacts. One cannot estimate in advance the consequences of the attempt to promote and, as it were, to organize these cultural contacts.

The International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, which is housed in a wing of the Palais-Royal, has, regarded in its broader aspect, a twofold purpose: first, the fostering of intellectual activities; second, the correlation of the intellectual activities of the various countries connected with it. There already existed, and still exists, an International Commission of Intellectual Co-operation. That commission, which is a branch of the League of Nations, is the directing authority. The Institute is the bureau of studies and the executive organ of the commission. Naturally there have been criticisms of the founding of the Institute. It has been objected by other nations that, established at Paris, it will become too French. It has been, on the contrary, objected in France, by those who are insular in their views, that French culture is likely to be "internationalized," losing its special qualities. Julien Luchaire declares that the Institute will take a middle path between the two sets of criticisms which have been formulated.

CHAPTER V

PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY

Parliamentary Incompetence—French Finances—Administration—The Colonies—Population—Alsace-Lorraine—Economic Prospects—Foreign Policy—Security and Disarmament

Diogenes found his search for a man long and disappointing. It is curious that democracies to-day should be absorbed in the search for some miraculous man who by a stroke of magic will right all wrongs and bring order out of disorder. In France in the middle of 1926 there was a general sentiment not unlike that which was experienced in 1917 before the advent of Clemenceau. People were waiting for something, or, rather, for somebody.

The truth is that there is a growing distrust of Parliament and of the Parliamentary system. The great manufacturers of France—and a more imposing list of names has rarely been printed—in a letter to the President of the Republic recently expressed their apprehension of Parliamentary incompetence. The financial difficulties could not, they said, be overcome if they were dealt with as a matter of party controversy. It was proposed that Parliament should voluntarily renounce by a solemn act its initiative in finance, and a body which had shown itself to be impotent hand over its powers to a carefully selected organization of business men and of experts.

Parliament, with its incessant strife, its changing majorities, its battle of parties, its personal intrigues, should not be allowed—so it was contended—to control a sinking fund, which should be in the hands of a department enjoying complete autonomy. Thus there emerged the idea of an extra-Parliamentary dictatorship.

Even the most prominent Radical organs indulged in the most downright criticisms of "the afflicting spectacle that is offered by the politicians, with their disorderliness, their talkativeness, their manœuvres and their impuissance." Lack of doctrine and of purpose was deplored. There were plenty of orators without power and leaders without courage. The *régime* itself was threatened if somebody did not come forward to impose his views upon Parliament and upon the country precisely as Clemenceau did when France was cracking up in 1917. What made these comments the more remarkable is the fact that France in the past has suffered greatly from dictators—from some of the men of the Revolution, from the Napoléons, from the MacMahons, from the Boulangers—and in her fear of dictatorship had dismissed Millerand from the Élysée. She saw around her the Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia and the Fascist dictatorship in Italy. And yet in despair she began to call for a Man.

There is, perhaps, nothing in the Parliamentary system as such that is to be decried, but undoubtedly the reaction against Parliament in France, the decline of faith in the politicians, is a natural result of many years of inefficient Government, intensified by exceptionally bitter personal and party struggles at a time of crisis. During the war France held together because she resolved on national unity, and Socialists and Radicals and Nationalists joined hands. The financial crisis called for the same abandonment of party and personal conflicts. It may be absurd to pretend that the Parliamentary institution generally is effete, that Democracy is outworn. But useless quarrels, fruitless disputes, national divisions, should be done away with in grave circumstances. It is not Parliament which should necessarily be discredited; it is party. It is not a Man that is needed; it is national unity.

How excellent, says one French writer, were the parties of the Left when they were in opposition! How eagerly we awaited the day when they should triumph! But the months have passed and we have seen the lobbying, the machinations, the conspiracies, the conflicts of ambition. In the shadows the plotters, sometimes avid of power and sometimes shrinking from seizing it, move about agitatedly, stabbing each other. One hears resounding phrases. The Government follows this or that current, obedient to every wind that blows; smashes on mysterious rocks, changes its pilot or its crew on the high seas, dashes in one direction and then brusquely reverses its course. In all this there is not a directing idea and not a powerful arm. The muddle creates in every class the desperate sentiment of incertitude, the poignant sensation that everything is falsified, upset by occult powers, by unworthy comradeships, by Banks installed in the Ministries and in the newspaper offices; while the politicians show self-complacency, a desire to gain time, to set aside the problems and to safeguard their future. There is a bankruptcy of men and of vision.*

There is in the whole country an aspiration towards something which is neither the present nor the past. A *crise de régime*? It could not be doubted by any competent observer. There was still a chance of salvation, but one was sceptical whether that salvation could come from Parliament. Ministerial crisis succeeded Ministerial crisis; the franc fell steadily and economic and social upheavals threatened. Never was there such a multiplicity of scandals; never was the inefficiency of the elected person, obliged to pander to mob passions, ignorant, without foresight, self-seeking, prejudiced, verbose, revealed so clearly. Chateaubriand wrote that the invasion of ideas had succeeded to the invasion of the Barbarians, and he prophesied the decomposition of civilization. By ideas he meant those fixed and false ideas which are known as doctrines. Doctrinaires believe themselves to be a superior race. German Imperialism based upon bad philosophy led triumph of a theory was destructive. French to disaster. Russian Communism seeking the Democracy, which made idols of words with capital letters, ran into excesses and proved its inability to re-establish peace and order. Parliamentarians in France persuaded themselves that it was only necessary to pronounce speeches to cure all human ills. The parties of the Left in particular were convinced that they were the incarnation of political truth, and therefore in the approved Jacobin spirit became tyrannical towards their opponents, who were regarded as the incarnation of error. Radicalism confirmed itself in its view that it was synonymous with Republicanism. It was intoxicated with a mysticism of its own. Its chiefs declared battle on the men and institutions who were considered capable of embarrassing them. Everything was sacrificed to the *régime*, and the *régime* was a party with no positive programme but only an ardour for destruction, inflamed against the "enemy" who did not share its mysticism.

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* At the end of July, 1926, there was a political truce, and M. Poincaré formed a Cabinet containing no fewer than six former Prime Ministers.

Socialism as conceived in France is essentially revolutionary, however much the exponents of Socialism, for immediate purposes, temporize and compromise. Radicalism is essentially bourgeois; but it will fight ferociously to defend its acquired positions and nourishes special hatreds. In normal times this would be of relatively small importance, but when conceit and rancour and incapacity are enthroned with a system tumbling to pieces the danger is apparent to all men. One liked to suppose that the mischief was caused by a war-exalted Bloc National, but that theory will no longer hold water. The so-called Bloc or Cartel des Gauches, whose foreign policy aroused for it and for France considerable sympathy, was terribly disappointing in its dealings with the vital internal problems of the country. The Radicals, after the famous Onze Mai (May 11, 1924), failed far more completely than the Nationalists because the Nationalists were in power during a transition period and their mistakes could be corrected. The Radicals came to office at a time when it was urgently necessary to face realities. They floundered lamentably. Nothing that they condemned timidly when in opposition did they discard after two years of office. On the contrary, they introduced many new evils. They were understood to be antagonistic to loans, but they raised more loans in a given space of time than their predecessors ; and what is worse, their loans, some of them at an excessively high rate of interest, were futile. They fulminated against inflation, but while they were fulminating they were for the first time without authority and in an occult manner printing bank notes and permitting the returns of the Banque de France to be falsified. Nor did they succeed in balancing the Budget or in promulgating it punctually, in spite of many assertions that this was their primary purpose. The Bloc National was blamed because of the Budgetary deficits, but it is to be observed that those deficits were reduced year after year until they were as small as the deficits since shown by the Radical Governments.

The real charge against the Bloc National is that it proceeded too slowly. It was always moving in the right direction, but it told the truth bit by bit instead of calling immediately for a supreme fiscal effort. It had, with the complicity of the other parties, and for that matter with the complicity of other countries, cherished the illusion that Germany would pay, and therefore was reluctant to saddle the French people with crushing obligations. Poincaré, however, it should not be forgotten, was overturned chiefly because he proposed heavier taxation—thus giving his opponents an opportunity of making great play against him at the polls. It is the irony of politics that a Prime Minister may be upset not for his blunders but for his most admirable initiatives. Not because he was the man of the Ruhr but because he was the man of the *décrets-lois* and the *double décime*, was Poincaré, with the Bloc National, defeated. The situation was then by no means desperate. Solutions might still have been postponed for a number of years—on one condition. That condition, which was essential, was that confidence should not be shaken. The Bloc des Gauches not only neglected to find a solution but proceeded to divide the country by untimely political disputes and by vague threats against capital, which had the effect of drying up the sources of Treasury revenue and of sending much available French capital abroad.

The reasons for this deplorable revival of long-forgotten quarrels are not difficult to discover. The Cartel was a legitimate electoral creation. With the electoral law which implied the formation of lists, it was obviously to the advantage both of the Socialists and the Radicals to stand together in most of the multiple-member constituencies in order to rout the Nationalist candidates. They had a common purpose—that of smashing the Bloc National. But when their task was accomplished it was not easy to see how the two parties could maintain their association in Parliament. They could only join hands in a fresh attack upon the Clericals and on wealth.

The French, a thrifty people, had a right when they invested in Government stock to expect that the

State would keep its promises; and repudiation, whether it takes the form of inflation to the point of virtual extinction of State liabilities, whether it takes the form of the conversion of bonds paying high interest into bonds paying lower interest, or whether it takes the form of writing off, perhaps as part of a capital levy, means the ruin of the middle classes, of the peasantry, and perhaps of certain banks which have large bond holdings. But deflation by the substitution of new money for the relatively worthless old money would have consequences just as severe. The sale of monopolies, such as the match monopoly and the tobacco monopoly, for the purpose of raising ready money has been mooted, but this would be a dreadful blow to Etatisme, which is an article of the Radical creed, and, moreover, would hasten the process of bringing France under the control of foreign capitalists. The whole problem in 1926 was an agonizing one. Most of the remedies which were proposed would unquestionably increase the need of bank-notes and so make matters worse.

There was the usual outcry against the peasant, who is described as inadequately taxed: and the charge is partly true. There was the usual reproach directed against the immense army of deserters from their fiscal duties. In the existing state of parties whatever was acceptable to one side was unacceptable to the other, and in the absence of a stable majority, in the absence of a stern resolution to put aside theories, no comprehensive plan seemed possible. French writers have themselves been more vigorous in their denunciation of the so-called élite than an alien observer has any right to be. They have lamented the timidity, the intrigue, the apathy of the Parliamentarians, and their inability to act.

France was handicapped again because of her bad administration. It was actually believed before the war in France that Europe envied the organization of France; but there were severe critics of the *rond de cuiriste* spirit which was responsible for many evils. (A *rond de cuir* is the round leather cushion commonly employed in Government offices.) In some respects France is incurably conservative and the French people desire nothing so much as to sink into a safe job, always ill-paid, but generally comfortable. In the public services—State, Departmental, Communal, Colonial—there are no fewer than 1,400,000 agents. Thus the functionaries are an excessively large class. They are not easily to be shaken out of their habits. They hamper national development in all directions—the development of the merchant marine, the development of popular instruction, the development of the railways, of the postal, the telegraph, and the telephone services.

The administration sterilizes French efforts, paralyses French action. Those who enter the ranks of officialdom are usually without courage or personal initiative, contenting themselves with a modest and regular existence. Their aspirations are limited; they accomplish their work without haste day by day, following set rules and avoiding, above all, responsibility. The Ministers, as we have seen, come and go, knowing nothing—what can they know in a few months?—of their departments. Without responsible Ministers, without efficient and enterprising permanent officials, how can progress be expected? Undoubtedly it is true that in this unimaginative and often incompetent bureaucracy there are two and sometimes three persons who are performing tasks that one person might easily perform. Even in the banks, with their antiquated methods, there is a whole host of men who are shockingly underpaid but who can hardly hope to be better paid because there are far too many of them.

When the bank clerks go on strike the banks carry on their business with only a third of the normal staff.

Everywhere there is misemployment. In the post offices you will see long files of waiting patient members of the public before one *guichet* while the clerks behind six other *guichets* have apparently nothing to do except to fill up forms. To have a parcel weighed or a letter registered is an endless operation. On the State railways the repeated *controle* is amazing. One may not go out of Paris in a taxicab without passing the *octroi*, which carefully registers how much petrol is in the tank and issues a certificate. The *douane* is vastly overstaffed. With a surplus of personnel there is a multiplication of formalities which become perfectly meaningless and only serve to complicate and delay things. Anyone who has had experience in obtaining a *carte d'identité* or any other kind of identification paper, of which the French are so fond, must be annoyed at the frightful waste of time and the pettifogging demands. Bureaucracy is not confined to government offices: a visit to the theatre may necessitate a stand before three or four different *guichets*. The big emporiums also indulge in an excess of unproductive labour. The concierge is in his way a functionary. The tobacconist is a functionary. The functionary is the curse of France, but who will be bold enough to apply the guillotine; who will be bold enough to force the functionaries into more useful labours? Attempts at retrenchment are resented and the unhappy Minister who ventures to make proposals in this sense finds his career cut short.

The French so misuse their man-power that they are obliged to import workers from other countries, such as Poland, Italy, Spain, and Czecho-Slovakia, to fulfil the necessary work of the community.

Moreover, precisely where energetic functionaries are needed they are not supplied. The income-tax, for example, was introduced into France during the war, but no proper machinery for its collection was provided. It would be unthinkable to take officials from the most obsolete offices in order to give them new tasks. The result is that the tax collectors cannot keep pace with the caprices of Parliament. They read the *Journal Officiel*, and they discover that there is a change of method or of measure, but they are obliged to await the formal instructions of the central department, which moves slowly. They are overwhelmed with official papers, and even the most worthy public servants become discouraged. At the end of 1925 they were for the most part receiving as salary about a thousand francs a month, which was at that time much less than ten pounds or fifty dollars a month. The entire machinery requires the most drastic overhauling, and with all her brilliant qualities France will be left behind in the race if she does not consent to a complete renovation of her old-fashioned habits.

One reason why France has not been more successful in her Colonies is that the same bureaucratic ways are carried overseas. The French do not care overmuch to quit their own land, and when they do they desire to reproduce the home conditions. The most grandiose schemes too often are allowed to slumber in Ministerial cartons. There is, of course, also the lack of money, for a good deal of money must be sunk in the Colonies before profits can be expected.

Still, in Northern Africa—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia—and in West Africa, in Central Africa and in Madagascar, in Syria and in Indo-China, and in the islands, such as Guadeloupe and Martinique, which come into the American orbit, there have been special endeavours since the war, and it may be that the impetus that has been given to colonization will not be wasted. The younger Frenchmen are becoming aware of their insularity and there is a real awakening of enterprise. To Africa, France looks for troops as well as raw materials. Perhaps it is a pity that there should be an excessive use of coloured contingents, but it must be remembered that the French are politically "colour-blind" and have no prejudices against the black and the yellow peoples. In so far as the Colonial idea is merely an extension of the idea that the French themselves should be *rentiers* and bureaucrats, leaving productive labour to be done by foreigners and recruiting mercenary troops abroad, it is to be deprecated, but I believe that there is a genuine policy of assimilation. France has indeed improved transports and the economic equipment of the Colonies; she has developed the colonial production and she has increased the colonial exports. Yet it is difficult to see how with her under-population she can make the best use of Colonies, which demand at least French direction. It is on this account that other countries that are over-populated and have inadequate colonial outlets look with envy upon the French possession of an enormous overseas Empire.

The demographic figures of contemporary France have momentous importance. The French for several decades have widely practised birth control and the birth-rate is accordingly low. Other countries are beginning to imitate the example of France, but it remains true, as we indicated a moment ago, that France is an under-populated country surrounded by over-populated countries. It is to be remarked that birth control is not practised by particular classes in France as it is elsewhere; rich and poor alike are less and less inclined to bring up children. The figures would be still more striking were there not patches of France which are piously Catholic. It is Agnostic France which has the lowest birth-rate and Catholic France which has the highest. Naturally the Church is opposed to birth control, and it is possible to conceive of Roman Catholicism obtaining greatly increased power in France and perhaps in the world in general in consequence of the resolution of the Agnostics to refrain from reproduction.

This is a phenomenon that deserves the closest study by sociologists. Nobody can pretend that the spread of neo-Malthusian doctrines have resulted in a betterment of social conditions. In theory something may be said for the conscious control of the birth-rate if it were accompanied by a conscious control of the death-rate. One might suppose that the single child, receiving better because undivided attention, would grow up healthier; but the statistics are against such a supposition. Not only is the birth-rate low but the death-rate in France, especially among children of tender years, is high. It is so high that practically alone among the countries of Europe France is obliged to encourage immigration and to enter into contracts with her neighbours for the replenishment of her man-power, while relying on African negroes for military purposes.

Unfortunately, the methods of sanitation which have been adopted by the Western countries are inefficiently applied in France, and in the villages the standard of hygiene is lower than it should be, while infant mortality in the towns is shamefully excessive. That able writer "Lens" justly says: "Thus the French death-rate remains about as high as the birth-rate. The neo-Malthusian gospel is destructive. The French race perishes in France, and the hour approaches when history now being made will be visible, and growing Germany illustrate once more the law of the pressure of population and the truth that those who multiply shall inherit the earth."

If one takes the comparative figures for 1924 one finds that in France there were 19 more births than deaths for each 10,000 inhabitants, while in Germany there were 70—the German figures being exceptionally low, for in other years there were over 100. In England there were 66 in 1924 as against 81 in the preceding year. The excess in Belgium is well over 70, and in Spain over 90, and in Italy over 126. The total is about 72,000 in France against nearly 500,000 in Germany, and 250,000 in England.

The French are aware of the disadvantageous position in which they are placing themselves, and are indeed inclined to overstate the case. Popular writers alarmingly declare that in a few years Germany will have a population of eighty millions as against forty millions in France. There is relatively little difference between the productive territory of the two countries. For my part, I see no escape from the obvious conclusion, for the encouragement given to French families is futile, and propaganda in this matter can have little influence. One factor may to some extent counterbalance the decline of France: that is, the extraordinary power of assimilation that France possesses. Foreigners are quickly transformed into Frenchmen. There are at least three million aliens in the country to-day and the number of foreigners swells every year. Even against this observation, however, it is necessary to place another observation: the French are beginning to chafe at the invasion of the foreigner, and there are deputies who perpetually indulge in xenophobia and endeavour to pass laws which discriminate between the foreigner and the Frenchman. The dilemma for the French is unpleasant enough: they cannot look with favour either upon their own relative diminution as a nation or upon their dispossession by the foreigner. Yet it is useless to kick against the pricks; the foreigner cannot be kept out in present conditions, and it is not desirable that he should be kept out. He brings his labour and he brings his money. If the French try to discriminate against the foreigner then they simply emphasize the difference and reduce their magnificent faculty of absorption.

At the 1921 census the French population was 39,209,600 and this included 1,709,749 Alsace-Lorrainers. As compared with 1911 there was a diminution of 400,000. Thus if Alsace-Lorraine had not been restored the population would have been over two million lower than in 1911. Yet France has not dealt with complete wisdom towards Alsace-Lorraine and a serious problem already presents itself. The difference of language is a vital difficulty, and the representatives of Alsace-Lorraine have protested against any attempt to banish the mother-tongue from the schools. If French were introduced as the official language it would be long before it could drive out the teaching of German. The following dialogue in Parliament is illuminating:

M. Daladier (Minister): I declare that I am hostile to any measure which would militate against the unity of the country.

Abbé Muller: Upon this point we shall never surrender.

M. Daladier: Nor will I give way.

A little later at the same session the Government felt that it should speak less emphatically. M. Frey threatened to interpellate the Government on the need for teaching German in Alsace-Lorraine and on what was called the premature "francisation" of the recovered provinces.

M. Frey: We have heard various declarations upon the teaching of the French language, and all our colleagues from the three recovered *départements*, without distinction of party, have decided that the problem must be liquidated.

M. Pierre Laval (speaking for the Government): There is a misunderstanding. Nobody in the Government thinks of prohibiting German to the populations of Alsace and Lorraine, but we simply hold that the interests of the country command the generalization of the teaching of French. Permit me to recall a word of Napoléon I. Napoléon said: Let them speak their own language; they will fight in French. We paraphrase the saying: Let them speak their dialect; they will always think in French.

Unhappily it is not by epigrams that serious problems of nationality and of language are solved. When the French took possession of the provinces promises were made by Marshal Joffre, by M. Millerand, by M. Poincaré, who were then the responsible authorities, that there would be no drastic change. The moment there was an inclination on the part of the French Government to rule Alsace-Lorraine from Paris and to withdraw the privileges which the provinces enjoyed under German control, there was a loud outcry. Paris considered it anomalous that French laws and customs should not prevail in Alsace-Lorraine, and Alsace-Lorraine insisted on the retention of the old laws and customs. The appointment of a Commissioner-General and the institution of separate administrative machinery was intended to be a temporary measure, and when the process of unification began the Alsace-Lorrainers were incensed. They were particularly incensed at anti-Catholic policy. They did not in the least approve of M. Herriot when in his ministerial pronouncement he spoke of the desirability of "hastening the day on which the last differences in the legislation of the recovered *départements* and the rest of the territory would be effaced."

The schools of Alsace-Lorraine were not secular as in France. There were Catholic schools and Protestant schools and Jewish schools, but there were no lay schools. Nor was it only language and religion which separated the people of Alsace-Lorraine from the French people proper. Other laws, chiefly of a commercial character, were regarded as sacrosanct by the Alsace-Lorrainers. The economic interests of Alsace-Lorraine drew the provinces towards Germany. The French Press was on the whole strangely silent about the important movements which manifested themselves. There were advocates of autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine, especially in the Catholic groups, but also among pro-German Radical groups.

Alsace-Lorraine would be glad to be regarded as a member of the French family if tactful methods were employed. Alsace-Lorraine might easily prove to be a hyphen between France and Germany. The natural sympathies of the people are with France, and only the most unpardonable errors could possibly give any real strength to those who favour autonomy. It should not be forgotten that it was under the German rule that the resources of the district were exploited and an efficient railway system laid down. As lately as 1907 the great potash deposits were discovered. The textile trades became prosperous. The coal and iron mines were developed to an undreamt-of extent. The natural trade outlet for the provinces is Germany. Thus there must be a sound working agreement between Germany and France. Until the beginning of 1925 the commercial arrangements of the two countries were regulated by the Versailles Treaty, but these arrangements then lapsed and it was necessary to come voluntarily to Customs accords. The negotiations did not proceed satisfactorily, but it is happily to be recorded that in August, 1926, a provisional understanding was reached.

There must also be understandings between the industrialists of the two countries. With regard to potash there were quickly reached private agreements by which the German and the French potash owners should divide world markets and not enter into ruinous competition. It was not so easy to arrive at a compromise between French textile manufacturers and German textile manufacturers. But chiefly was an arrangement between the mining and manufacturing magnates of Westphalia and the French metallurgists imperatively called for if German coal and French iron ore were to be properly utilized. M. Humbert de Wendel has pointed out that even while the Economic Articles of the Treaty of Versailles which apply to the *départements* were in operation, economic relations with Germany were complicated. All kinds of obstacles, prohibitions, boycottings, refusals to deliver combustibles and raw materials, interruptions of transport, injured the industry of Alsace-Lorraine.

The political circumstances of the first few years of peace created many perturbations in the various branches of the economic activity of the provinces, and Germany too suffered. Westphalia and Lorraine are regions which are complementary by their mineral resources. If either side declined to co-operate with the other it would prejudice the industries on both sides of the frontier. To-day nobody contests the need of exchanges between lands which have respectively a superabundance of coke and of ore. The French metallurgists were not disposed to link the question of reparations too closely with the question of obtaining fuel for their furnaces. They preferred liberty of transaction.

Nor is it only the exchange of ore and of coke which is required. Before the war Lorraine factories furnished to Westphalia semi-finished materials which were then worked in Germany. There was the closest connexion between Lorraine, Luxemburg, the Saar, and Southern Germany. That connexion in some form or other must be maintained. France has always had a considerable coal shortage, and a greater shortage of coke suitable for the metallurgical industry; and with the recovery of the Lorraine ore-fields the French requirements, so far from diminishing, have become greater than in 1913. If there were not an understanding, the Lorraine ore might easily become a burden to France. Although metallurgical production has increased it has not increased in proportion with the enlarged resources.

It is sometimes objected that France runs grave danger of coming under German subjection if she co-operates with Germany. There is indeed some ground for such fear, but it may, I think, be dispelled for two reasons: the first is that even at the worst it is perhaps the lesser of two evils, for without an agreement France will be hopelessly handicapped; the second is that French industries are showing that they are well able to take care of themselves and have developed much larger conceptions of business than they previously possessed. Whether we like it or not, our age is an age of internationalization, and all countries are interlocked. There can be no longer water-tight compartments. The French leaders of industry have shown that they appreciate the changed conditions, and great French firms (Schneiders, for example) have spread out their tentacles in all the Danubian countries and have outside France already allied themselves with the Germans. A few years ago they were relatively modest; now they are reconstituting their industries and are consolidating them. They do not confine their attention to a region or even to a nation. They are not content with specialization ; but, on the contrary, endeavour to bring under the same control the sources of their raw material, their factories, their markets : they link up banks and factories and ships ; and their economic equipment has been entirely modernized.*

The possibilities of the future are tremendous. It may be that in the post-war years, which were marked by a great increase of exports, France was favoured by her low currency. How far her economic prosperity is fictitious cannot yet be ascertained, but in my own view when the financial troubles are overcome France will remain an industrial nation, enterprising, rich, and flourishing. This does not mean that France will cease to be an agricultural country : there is no reason why she should not be at once an agricultural and an industrial country. Certainly land has gone out of cultivation and the number of workers on the land have been reduced, but more up-to-date methods are being practised—notably the electrification of the country-side has begun—and the production of wheat and other cereals is as high as before the war.

In spite of administrative blunders and administrative procrastination improvements are to be registered in every domain, and there are evidences of a great renaissance which, even in the midst of the gravest preoccupations, has been prepared. That there is an economic revolution competent observers cannot doubt. They may question its precise importance, and they may ask whether the French will show sufficient perseverance, but they cannot question the wider vision, the daring, and the efficiency of the commercial leaders, who are shedding the insularity, the cautious traditions, of other days. That there are many reforms to be effected in Governmental financial methods and in State administration, I have already shown, but private persons and companies are rapidly learning lessons and are already putting them into operation.

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* As I revise these pages a Franco-German metallurgical agreement in respect of output, prices, and markets, is on the point of being reached ; and Belgium and Luxemburg are coming into the arrangement.

In an earlier chapter we glanced at some of the problems of foreign policy. The Locarno Pact has undoubtedly brought a *détente*, and it may be that European relations have been permanently improved. It is, however, too early for the judicious observer to pronounce dogmatically as to the effect of *rapprochements* effected under the ægis of the League of Nations. A new "spirit" has been evoked, but whether it will have the happy results that are contemplated remains to be seen. One does not wish to be sceptical, and indeed one is convinced that French diplomatic thought, always romantic, is oriented in friendly directions; but for some time to come there will be superimposed on the formal friendships which have shaped themselves particular diplomatic arrangements. This and that country will have, in addition to the general understanding, special understandings with other countries. Counter-insurances will be taken. France is always somewhat suspicious of British designs and would like to find another ally on whom she may rely. It does not follow that there will be anything more than a tacit partnership, but who is to be the tacit partner? Before the war it was Russia, which balanced England. It is not outside the bounds of possibility that Russia will again balance England. Certainly there are indications that France and Russia will sooner or later sink their differences. As to the degree of genuine good feeling that is possible between France and Germany it would be presumptuous to hazard an opinion. From time to time there has been much talk of a Continental Bloc, which chiefly implied a Franco-German alliance. There are many reasons why the French and the Germans cannot have any truly warm associations, and although they may end their feud and seek to work together there is no conviction that security has yet been attained.

On Poland and the Little Entente France tried to base her foreign policy, but now Poland and the Little Entente are less inclined to regard themselves as French " colonies " and assert a greater freedom, finding it desirable not to remain antagonistic to Germany or to Russia.

On the whole, the outlook is promising. Europe appears to be settling down. Yet France cannot substantially reduce her army unless she has an absolute assurance that if there were hostilities she would find many of the European nations automatically and effectively at her side. She has pinned her faith on the development of an aeroplane service : she is especially strong in this arm. There has been proposed—and it is a proposal which is worthy of the most serious consideration—an Entente in the Air. In the same way France, in the absence of a great fleet of battleships, which the State is too poor to build, has come to look upon the submarine as her principal sea-weapon, and she is not prepared to scrap the submarine unless there is all-round reduction of navies. It would be too *simpliste*, at the bidding of nations which preserve many Dreadnoughts, to surrender a submersible fleet which is looked upon as purely defensive, and so increase the disparity between the naval forces of France and other nations. France is prepared to reduce the period of military service, which is a drain upon her man-power and an economic disability, but she wishes to do so only when the guarantees that are given are beyond dispute. Briefly, her conception is that the forces which the League of Nations should be able to control in the event of war being declared upon her should be at least equal to the forces, naval, aerial and military, of any country which by any stretch of imagination might attack her. Disarmament is not, according to the French thesis, a simple matter.

The preparation of a future conference for the reduction of armaments has been regulated by a lengthy document which has received the approval of the most prominent civil and military persons. A disarmament conference it is declared will be called when the League of Nations believes that the general conditions of security are such as to enable the European nations to relieve themselves of the military burden. The Locarno Pacts undoubtedly hasten the moment when practical steps in this direction can be taken. It is felt, however, that similar accords should be drawn up in other regions of Europe—notably in the Balkans. Paul Boncour, who is the greatest authority on this question on the French side, is anxious that whatever is done should be real and sincere. In the document that has been elaborated it is argued that the armaments of a country cannot be judged simply by the number of men under the colours and by the quantity of war material in depots. There is what is called the "*potentiel de guerre.*" This *potentiel de guerre* is composed of multiple elements which contribute to give a determined force to a nation for the conduct of a war—army, stocks of arms, population, possibilities of revictualling, capacity of industrial production, state of finances, geographical situation, facilities of mobilization, and so forth.

The *questionnaire* on which the disarmament discussions were based—a *questionnaire* largely inspired by France—contains the following points:

> I. What should be understood by armaments? How should the divers military, economic, and geographical elements on which depends the puissance of a country in time of war be defined? How may there be determined the particular properties of the divers elements constituting the armaments of a country in time of peace: military, naval, aerial, methods of recruitment, of instruction, of organization capable of an immediate military utilization?
>
> II. Is it possible to limit the war armaments of a country, or should measures of disarmament apply only to armaments of peace?
>
> III. What rules can one follow in order to compare the armaments of one country with those of another—for example, should not the standard be fixed by the number of effectives, the periods of military service, the *matériel*, the expenditure on armaments, and so forth?
>
> IV. Are there offensive and defensive armaments? Is there any method by which it may be decided whether a certain force is organized in a purely defensive spirit, whatever may be the employment to which it may be turned in time of war? Can it be decided, on the contrary, whether it is constituted in a spirit of aggression?
>
> V. According to what principles is it possible to establish coefficients of the armaments which may be allowed to each country in taking into account the number of its inhabitants, its resources, its situation, the length and nature of its maritime communications, its railways and their character; the vulnerable frontiers, the great vital centres near to the frontiers; the necessary and variable time required by the various States for the trans-

formation of the armaments of peace into armaments of war; the degree of security that a country may possess in case of aggression and the assistance that it may receive in virtue of the Covenant or of particular engagements? May disarmament be helped by an examination of the possibility of facilitating the rapid fulfilment of promises of economic and military aid?

VI. Can one distinguish between civil and military aeroplanes? If it is possible to make such a distinction, how can one estimate the military value of civil aeroplanes in calculating the aerial forces of a country? May one attribute a military value to the mercantile marine in estimating the naval forces of a country?

VII. If one admits that disarmament depends on security, how far can one realize regional disarmament after regional security? Must one conclude that any project of disarmament is unrealizable unless it is universal?

After a careful reading of these suggestive questions one becomes aware that there are many misgivings and that the twin problems of security and disarmament cannot easily be solved.

All the problems of France—some of which we have glanced at in the present chapter and in other parts of this book—are of interest to the wider world. The interest is not merely academic. We cannot be onlookers. The rôle of disinterested or even interested observer is inadequate. Neither America nor England may pass by on the other side.

There are many matters in which we may not interfere, even though we were Allies and Associates of France in the Great War. We can only note and extract such lessons as are useful to us from the mistakes of Parliament, with its interminable discussions; we have nothing directly to do with the defects of the French Administration; but some of the problems of France are our problems too, and none of them can in these days of intellectual and economic interdependence leave us apathetic. In particular we cannot be indifferent to France's colonial difficulties and her colonial hopes; we cannot be indifferent to her declining population and the resultant immigration which may change the relations of France with other Powers; we cannot be indifferent to the problem of Alsace-Lorraine on which turn the most redoubtable issues to-day as in 1870; we cannot be indifferent to the possibilities of a Franco-German *rapprochement* on the industrial as well as on the political plane; we cannot be indifferent to the new economic conceptions and practical enterprise in France; we cannot be indifferent to France's foreign policy and to the question of disarmament.

These problems affect us directly or indirectly. They transcend national boundaries. They become world problems. But perhaps above all should we, not only out of sympathy with France but in our own interest, direct our attention to French finances. The whole course of events will be changed if France does not find her feet again. It is likely that the Foreign Debts problem will again be raised. It is not necessary to adopt, without the gravest reservations, the French thesis of the common cause, which, in spite of the promise to pay, is still maintained in influential quarters and, above all, by popular opinion. The lower ground of expediency cannot, however, be disregarded. Rigorous justice, according to the French, would have required "the general addition of all expenses of war and their repartition among the belligerents proportionally to the riches and circumstances of each country."

During the Peace Conference such a proposal was categorically rejected. But since the Peace Conference we have learned a great deal about the inter-relations of peoples. Since the Peace Conference economic verities have become clearer. Since the Peace Conference there has been a general default, moral and material, on the part of Germany, and on the part of the Allies; and it is unfair to remember the sole default of France.

The theory of the common cause is now dismissed; but although the French have overstated the theory it has more validity than is acknowledged in England and America. There should have been a friendly conference to discuss in a spirit of realism—and from realism sincere sentiments ought not to be excluded—the entire situation with a view to satisfactory adjustments as between creditors and debtors. There should be borne in mind the respective sacrifices not only on the battle-field but in the relinquishment of what were once held to be legitimate expectations. It will be found that the percentage of relinquished expectations is higher in France than in any other country. While one cannot ask other countries voluntarily to bring their percentage of abandonment of credits to the level of the French percentage, something in the nature of a levelling down should be attempted, should indeed be accomplished. The liquidation of the war is a painful process. It has been painful for the Balkanic countries. It has been painful for Austria-Hungary. It has been painful for Germany. It has been painful for Russia. In Africa it has been painful. In the Near East it has been painful. In the Far East it has been painful. England went through much suffering. It may be doubted whether the United States escaped, as is commonly believed, the pangs which accompanied the liquidation of the war.

Yet for France the process has been particularly painful. Recriminations are always foolish and it is not our business to allocate faults. The Third Republic was born in defeat and was cradled in storm. It grew up with the stigmata of its origins upon it and was perpetually shaken by dissensions and intestinal disabilities. For nearly fifty years it struggled to maturity; its constitution was never over-strong; its institutions were constantly assailed and were never perfected. Throughout a long and devastating war it gallantly supported the brunt of fierce onslaught, and afterwards, disappointed and disillusioned, it committed, not surprisingly, many mistakes. In the eighth year after the Armistice, in spite of numerous concessions, in spite of real efforts to recover its equilibrium, it was more seriously menaced than at any moment of its existence. Nevertheless France will emerge, I am convinced, from her trials and tribulations stronger than before. It may be reproached against me that in this book, in which I have paid tribute to the finer qualities of France, I have not spared the sombre colours. It was my duty to criticize, but I have not been blind to the hopeful signs which spring to the eye. There has been a breaking up of Empires, a shifting of power, a volcanic social upheaval, and values have been changed and the old watchwords found wanting. The modern world has passed through a fiery furnace. Recovery and reconciliation are in sight. If antiquated machinery must be scrapped, France, like other countries, will ultimately be the better for the scrapping.

France has still to put her house in order, but she has learned that victory is a figment, that war is catastrophic, that the future depends upon internal renovation, and the cultivation of friendships with foreign peoples, and the substitution of co-operation for competition. Some of the older men are doubtless recalcitrant, but there is a revolt of youth. Nowhere is there, whatever may be thought of external appearances, a greater urge and surge of youth than in France. Reputations have been exploded, obsolete ideas have been pricked, and vigorous expression has been given to the claims of youth to recast society on a better pattern.

Fate has conspired with men to shatter the Universe to bits, and French intellect is endeavouring to remould it nearer to the heart's desire. The historian may hereafter find that those Frenchmen who, in the early days of the war, endeavoured to make the voice of Reason heard, and those Frenchmen who, after the war, sought to systematize the vague aspirations of Humanity towards better things, were the true prophets of a new era. The politicians and the diplomatists do not come out well from any conscientious study of the past half century because they worked in traditional grooves, but the thinkers and artists and the anonymous crowd of generous-minded Frenchmen help to restore to their country the rôle in which France likes to cast herself—that of the Intellectual Mother of Europe.

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